IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 
 
 

 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 

 
 
v. 
 

urtis Lee, A.K.A Steven Ackridge, 

: 
: 
Petitioner 
 
: 
 
 
:  No. 101 M.D. 2022 
 
 
: 
 
 
Christopher M. Thomas, Director of   : 
: 
Classification Movement and  
: 
Registration (Philadelphia Prison  
: 
System), and Jaime Sorber, 
: 
Superintendent at S.C.I. Phoenix, 
: 
and Kim Nixon, Records Room  
: 
 
Supervisor-Department of 
: 
Corrections at S.C.I. Phoenix, 
 
:  Submitted:  December 9, 2022 
Respondents  
 

 

 

 

 

EFORE:  HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge 
HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge 
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge 
 

OPINION NOT REPORTED 

EMORANDUM OPINION BY 

  C

 B

 M

JUDGE CEISLER  

 

 

 

 

FILED:  March 17, 2023 

 

Petitioner  Curtis  Lee,  A.K.A.  Steven  Ackridge  (Lee),  an  inmate  currently 

incarcerated within this Commonwealth’s prison system, has filed a pro se petition 

for review (PFR) in our original jurisdiction against Respondents  Christopher M. 

Thomas, Director of Classification Movement and Registration (Philadelphia Prison 

System), Jaime Sorber, Superintendent at S.C.I. Phoenix (Sorber),1 and Kim Nixon, 

Records  Room  Supervisor-Department  of  Corrections  at  S.C.I.  Phoenix  (Nixon) 

(Respondents, collectively). Through his PFR, Lee contends that he was not given 

the  proper  amount  of  judicially  ordered  credit  for  time  served  in  pre-trial 

1 “S.C.I.” stands for “state correctional institution.” 

 

 

confinement, and requests what amounts to mandamus relief against Respondents in 

order  to  correct  this  putative  error.  In  response,  Sorber  and  Nixon  (DOC 

Respondents, collectively) have jointly filed preliminary objections to the PFR, as 

has Thomas individually, through which they all assert that Lee is not entitled to the 

relief he seeks. Upon thorough review, we overrule Thomas’ preliminary objections 

in  part,  sustain  them  in  part,  and  dismiss  Lee’s  claims  against  him,  and  overrule 

Respondents’ preliminary objections in part and sustain them in part. 

I. Background 

 

The  relevant  facts,  as  articulated  by  Lee  in  his  PFR,  gleaned  from  the 

documents attached thereto, and taken from the record created in his prior, related 

appeal involving the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board),2 are as 

follows:3 On December 6, 1996, Lee pled guilty in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County (Sentencing Court) to multiple burglary and robbery charges. 

2 The Board has been renamed the Pennsylvania Parole Board. See Sections 15, 16, and 
16.1 of the Act of December 18, 2019, P.L. 776, No. 115 (effective February 18, 2020); see also 
Sections  6101  and  6111(a)  of  the  Prisons  and  Parole  Code,  as  amended,  61  Pa.  C.S.  §§  6101, 
6111(a). 

 “Generally, when considering preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, a court 
may not take judicial notice of the records in another case. This general rule is subject to limited 
exceptions. ‘It is appropriate for a court to take notice of a fact which the parties have admitted or 
which is incorporated into the complaint by reference to a prior court action.’” Guarrasi v. Scott, 
25 A.3d 394, 398 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (quoting Styers v. Bedford Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 900 
A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. Super. 2006)).  

Here, Lee discusses Lee v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 251 A.3d 842 
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (Lee I), the original jurisdiction action he brought against the Board, at length 
in his PFR, and has even attached thereto our opinion that disposed of that case, as well as a number 
of the briefs and other evidentiary items that were filed in that action against the Board. See PFR 
at 9-11, Exs. 4-11. Accordingly, we may take judicial notice of the record from that prior matter.  
We also note that Lee neglected to separate the vast majority of his PFR’s factual averments 
into individually numbered paragraphs, with nearly all of them contained in what amounts to a 
lengthy narrative statement, so we cite to the PFR by referencing the relevant page number, or, 
where necessary, the relevant attached exhibit.  

  3

 

2 

Lee I, 251 A.3d at 843-44. As a result, he was sentenced to 78 months to 180 months 

in state prison (Original Sentence), with a maximum date on that Original Sentence 

of August 1, 2016. Id. at 844. In 2008, the Board paroled Lee to a detainer sentence 

that had been lodged against him in North Carolina. Id. at 844 n.3.  

 

In 2011, Lee was arrested in North Carolina on drug and theft charges, as well 

as  technical  parole  violations,  and  was  jailed  in  Mecklenburg  County,  North 

Carolina. Id. Thereafter, in 2012, Lee was inadvertently released from jail in North 

Carolina, instead of being handed over to the Board. Id. He was arrested again the 

following year in Mecklenberg County and, on March 8, 2013, was transferred to 

the Board by the Mecklenberg County Sheriff’s Department. Id. 

 

Thereafter, on September 16, 2014, the Board paroled  Lee to a community 

corrections  center  (CCC)  in  Philadelphia  known  as  the  Gaudenzia  First  Program 

(Gaudenzia), at which point the maximum date on his Original Sentence was April 

30, 2021. Id. at 844. This recalculated maximum date factored in the time that had 

elapsed  between  his  transfer  to  North  Carolina  in  2008  and  his  return  to  Board 

custody in 2013. Id. at 844 n.3. 

The  Board  subsequently  took  administrative  action  to 
declare Lee delinquent, effective April 12, 2016, because 
he moved from his approved residence without permission 
and was unsuccessfully discharged from Gaudenzia ([for] 
technical violations). See [Certified Record (C.R.)] at 14-
15. On June 3, 2016, the Philadelphia Police Department 
arrested  Lee,  charged  him  with  multiple  drug-related 
offenses  (New  Charges),  and  confined  him  in  the 
Philadelphia County Prison. Id. at 16-21. The Board filed 
a detainer warrant against Lee that same day. Id. at 22. Lee 
subsequently  waived  his  right  to  counsel  and  to  a 
preliminary  detention  panel,  and  to  a  violation  hearing 
before  the  Board,  and  he  admitted  to  the  technical 
violations. See id. at 31-34. 

Id. at 844. 

3 

 

On July 13, 2016, the Board issued a decision, which memorialized its July 7, 

2016 determination that Lee was to be recommitted on the Original Sentence to serve 

six  months  of  backtime  as  a  technical  parole  violator  (TPV).  Id.  In  addition,  the 

Board directed that Lee was to be automatically paroled from the Original Sentence 

on December 3, 2016, pending resolution of the New Charges. Id. Finally, the Board 

recalculated the maximum date on the Original Sentence as June 21, 2021, in order 

to reflect the length of Lee’s most recent delinquency. Id.  

 

 

The  Sentencing  Court  then  repeatedly  delayed  Lee’s  sentencing,  due  to 

concerns about Lee’s mental health and competency, which also led the Board to 

hold off on taking additional action against Lee in response to that conviction. C.R. 

at 63, 67.4 During the course of this delay, Lee was detained in the forensic unit at 

the Philadelphia Department of Prisons’ Detention Center. Id. at 63. 

On April 5, 2018, the Board issued another decision, in which it referenced its 

July 2016 decision, noted Lee’s conviction on the New Charges, and stated that it 

would take no additional action against Lee in response to that conviction. Lee I, 251 

A.3d at 844. This decision also left the maximum date on Lee’s Original Sentence 

unchanged, as June 21, 2021. Id. 

On  April  18,  2018,  Lee  was  reparoled  to  a  CCC  in 
Philadelphia. See id. at 69-74.[5] 
On July 20, 2018, the [Sentencing Court] sentenced Lee 
on  his  New  Charges  to  2  to  5  years  of  incarceration, 
followed  by  a  maximum  of  5  years  of  probation  (New 
Sentence).  See  C.R.  at  75,  80.  The  sentencing  order 
specifically stated that “[t]his sentence shall commence on 
07/20/2018[,]”  [with  “[c]redit  for  time  served[,]”  and 

 

4  Lee  has  been  diagnosed  as  suffering  from  schizoaffective  disorder  and  post-traumatic 

 It is unclear why or from what the Board  paroled Lee at that point, given that he had 

finished serving the last of his Board-imposed backtime on December 3, 2016. 

stress disorder. C.R. at 61. 

  5

4 

directed  that  [said]  “[c]redit  [is]  to  be  calculated  by  the 
Phila[delphia]  Prison  System[.]”  Id.  As  such,  following 
Lee’s  commitment  to  an  [S.C.I.],  the  Department  of 
Corrections  (DOC)  issued  a  sentence  status  summary 
(DOC Summary), calculating Lee’s New Sentence to have 
a  controlling  minimum  date  of  April  18,  2020,  and  a 
controlling maximum date of April 18, 2023. C.R. at 82-
84. The DOC Summary also indicated that Lee was given 
credit  towards  his  New  Sentence  for  the  time  he  spent 
incarcerated  prior  to  sentencing  on  the  following  dates: 
June 2, 2016; and April 19, 2018, to July 20, 2018. Id. at 
82. 

Lee I, 251 A.3d at 845. 

 

On October 25, 2018, Lee’s then-counsel sent Thomas a letter, in which she 

asserted that Lee had not received the full amount of pre-sentence custody credit to 

which he was entitled, and requested that Thomas expeditiously correct this mistake. 

PFR,  Ex.  5.  Thomas  responded  to  Lee’s  then-counsel  via  a  letter  of  his  own  on 

November 16, 2018, writing, in relevant part: 

I have investigated what you claim as an error committed 
regarding . . . Lee’s credit . . . and [have] concluded the 
following: 
He  was  awarded  credit  from  6/2/16  to  6/2/16  (date  of 
arrest) and from 4/19/18 to 7/20/18 (date of sentencing). 
The  time from 6/3/16 to 7/19/18 was applied to dockets 
CP-51-CR 0805241, 0811261, and 0900491-1996 which 
were  [s]tate  [b]ack  [t]ime  [s]entences  [i]mposed  and  
calculated  by  the  .  .  .  Board  on  7/7/16  after  his  [s]tate 
[p]arole  was  revoked.  Your  client  should  have  been 
informed of this in writing by the . . . Board as with all 
[p]arole  [v]iolators.  Since  the  [s]tate  [p]arole  [d]etainer 
was lodged by [the Board] on 6/4/16, the sentences should 
have started then, not 6/3/16, as . . . DOC calculated. He 
was then re-paroled on these dockets by the . . . Board on 
4/18/18  and  we  subsequently  started  his  credit  again  on 
4/19/18. 
[S]ince  the  .  .  .  DOC  calculates  state  sentences  and  [is] 
from  where  [sentence  status  summaries  are]  generated, 
which I do not have, I cannot ascertain whether or not his 

5 

[New S]entence reflects the credit awarded. I recommend 
you obtain a copy either from your client or . . . DOC and 
confirm what credit was granted and follow up with me if 
needed. 

Id.,  Ex.  6.  On  December  6,  2018,  Lee’s  then-counsel  informed  Lee  about  her 

communications with Thomas, told Lee that “[i]t appears that the  majority of the 

time  that  you  were  sitting  in  Philadelphia  County  [prior  to  the  July  20,  2018 

sentencing hearing] was somehow applied to your older dockets[,]” and also asked 

Lee to “send [her] a copy of [his] green sheet so that [she could] see where all  of 

[his]  credit  was  applied.”  Id.,  Ex.  5.  There  is  nothing  in  the  record  for  Lee  I  or 

contained in Lee’s PFR from this matter indicating that there were any subsequent 

exchanges between Lee and his then-counsel. 

 

On April 9, 2019, Lee filed an administrative remedies form with the Board, 

in which he claimed that the Board had not applied the correct amount of presentence 

detention credit towards his Original Sentence and had thus erroneously calculated 

the  Original  Sentence’s  minimum  and  maximum  dates.  Lee  I,  251  A.3d  at  845. 

Additionally, he asserted therein that the Board had illegally changed the length of 

his judicially imposed New Sentence and had violated his due process rights. Id. 

By letter mailed October 2, 2019, . . . counsel for the Board 
responded  to  Lee’s  administrative  remedies  form  and 
subsequent correspondence, indicating that it would take 
no  further  action  in  the  matter.  C.R.  at  141.  The  Board 
explained that its April 5, 2018 decision did not recommit 
Lee as a convicted parole violator for his . . . conviction on 
the New Charges, but merely noted the conviction and that 
the  Board  would  take  no  action  on  the  conviction.  Id. 
Moreover, because the Board’s decision took no action as 
to Lee’s [then-]recent . . . criminal conviction, no further 
relief could be granted regarding that conviction. Id. The 
Board then clarified that, to the extent Lee challenged the 
April 18, 2020 minimum sentence release date for the new 
conviction, the sentencing court and DOC are responsible 
initial  sentence  credit 
for  calculating  an 

inmate’s 

6 

determination,  not  the  Board;  therefore,  the  Board 
dismissed  Lee’s  challenges  to  his  initial  sentence  credit 
allocation regarding his New Sentence as unauthorized. Id. 
Lee then filed with this Court a pro se petition for review 
(Petition)  seeking  to  appeal  from  the  Board’s  October 
2019 communication . . . . In response, the Board filed an 
application to quash Lee’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
(Application), and th[is] Court thereafter ordered that the 
Application be decided with the merits of the Petition. 

Lee  I,  251  A.3d  at  845-46.  On  February  3,  2021,  we  granted  the  Application, 

concluding that we lacked jurisdiction to consider Lee’s Petition because the Board’s 

October 2, 2019 letter to Lee did not constitute an adjudication and, in addition, that 

we could not construe the Petition as a mandamus action against DOC, which was 

not a party to that action. Id. at 847-48. 

 

Thereafter, Lee filed  this action against DOC Respondents and Thomas, in 

which, broadly speaking, he reiterates his assertion that he has not received proper 

credit  towards  his  New  Sentence  for  the  time  period  he  was  held  in  presentence 

detainment. See generally PFR at 8-20, 24-25. Lee also maintains that he is being 

illegally held by Sorber as a result of Nixon’s and Thomas’ alleged failure to award 

him  such  credit,  which  he  claims  has  contravened  the  July  20,  2018  sentencing 

order’s express terms, as well as Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. 

§ 9760,6 and has resulted in him serving time beyond the true maximum date on his 

New Sentence. PFR at 1-5, 8. Accordingly, Lee requests that we order Nixon and 

Thomas  to  recalculate  Lee’s  New  Sentence  to  reflect  that  the  Sentencing  Court 

awarded him credit for time served between June 2, 2016, and July 20, 2018; vacate 

 

6  Per  Section  9760(1)  of  the  Sentencing  Code,  sentencing  courts  are  required  to  award 
convicted individuals with “[c]redit against the maximum term and any minimum term . . . for all 
time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or 
as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit shall include credit for time spent 
in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.” 
42 Pa. C.S. § 9760(1). 

7 

the New Sentence’s probationary term in the interest of “justice”; and direct Sorber 

to release him from prison immediately. Id. at 8, 37-39. 

 

Thereafter, DOC Respondents and Thomas each demurred to the PFR via the 

aforementioned  preliminary  objections.  DOC  Respondents  challenge  the  PFR  on 

two bases.  First, Lee does not have a clear right to relief, because the language used 

in the sentencing order is vague and does not precisely identify the period for which 

Lee is entitled to receive credit towards his New Sentence. Second, because they do 

not  have  a  duty  to  give  him  the  credit  he  seeks,  as  that  same  credit  was  already 

applied  towards  his  Original  Sentence.  DOC  Respondents’  Br.  at  9-11.  As  for 

Thomas, he presents arguments that are substantially similar to those put forth by 

DOC Respondents, with an additional assertion that he has no duty to provide the 

sought-after relief because only DOC can do so. Thomas’ Br. at 11-19. 

II. Discussion 

In  considering  a  demurrer,  [such  as  those  articulated  by 
Respondents,]  we  accept  as  true  all  well-pled  material 
allegations  in  the  petition,  as  well  as  all  inferences 
reasonably deducible therefrom. Aviles v. Dep’t of Corr., 
875 A.2d 1209 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). However, conclusions 
of  law  and  unjustified  inferences  are  not  so  admitted. 
Griffin  v.  Dep’t  of  Corr.,  862  A.2d  152  (Pa.  Cmwlth. 
2004). 
In addition, courts reviewing preliminary objections may 
not only consider the facts pled in [a petition for review], 
but  also  any  documents  or  exhibits  attached  to  it. 
Lawrence  v.  Dep’t  of  Corr.,  941  A.2d  70  (Pa.  Cmwlth. 
2007). It is not necessary to accept as true any averments 
in  [a  petition  for  review]  that  conflict  with  exhibits 
attached to it. Id. A demurrer must be sustained where it is 
clear and free from doubt the law will not permit recovery 
under the alleged facts; any doubt must be resolved by a 
refusal to sustain the demurrer. Kretchmar v. Com[.], 831 
A.2d 793 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). 

8 

Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth.  2014).  Additionally, as 

already  discussed  supra,  a  court  may  take  judicial  notice  at  the  preliminary 

objections stage of materials from prior court proceedings that, like in this matter, 

are incorporated by reference into the petition for review. Guarrasi, 25 A.3d at 398 

n.3. As for mandamus, it 

is  an  extraordinary  remedy  at  common  law,  designed  to 
compel the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory 
duty. McCray v. Dep’t of Corr., . . . 872 A.2d 1127 ([Pa.] 
2005); Detar v. Beard, 898 A.2d 26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). 
“The purpose of mandamus is not to establish legal rights, 
but  to  enforce  those  rights  already  established  beyond 
peradventure.”  Detar,  898  A.2d  at  29.  This  Court  may 
only issue a writ of mandamus where: (1) the petitioner 
possesses a clear legal right to enforce the performance of 
a  ministerial  act  or  mandatory  duty;  (2)  the  defendant 
possesses a corresponding duty to perform the act; and, (3) 
the petitioner possesses no other adequate or appropriate 
remedy.  Id.  Mandamus  can  only  be  used  to  compel 
performance of a ministerial duty and will not be granted 
in doubtful cases. Id. 
Notwithstanding, mandamus is an appropriate remedy to 
correct an error in DOC’s computation of maximum and 
minimum dates of confinement where the sentencing order 
clearly  gives  the  inmate  credit  for  the  time  period  in 
question  and  DOC’s  computation  does  not  comply  with 
that  credit.  Black  v.  Dep’t  of  Corr.,  889  A.2d  672  (Pa. 
Cmwlth.  2005). However, mandamus is  not available  to 
challenge  DOC’s  failure  to  give  credit  where  the 
sentencing order is either ambiguous or does not specify 
the credit at issue. See McCray; Black; Aviles. In addition, 
mandamus is not an appropriate remedy to cure an illegal 
sentencing order. Aviles. 

Allen, 103 A.3d at 369-70. 

 

Respondents all premise their first argument upon the assertion that the July 

20, 2018 sentencing order’s language is too open-ended to establish that Lee has a 

clear  right  to  relief,  and  reference  a  litany  of  cases  that  they  claim  support  their 

9 

position on this point. See DOC Respondents’ Br. at 9-10; Thomas’ Br. at 12-15. 

However, they misapprehend the nature of those cases, in which there was complete 

silence  in  the  relevant  sentencing  order  as  to  credit  for  time  served;  ambiguity 

regarding  how  such  credit  should  be  applied,  due  to  the  interplay  between  the 

affected inmate’s various criminal convictions and/or probation violations; and/or 

evidence that clearly showed that the sought-after credit has already been granted. 

See  Perez  v. Pa. Dep’t  of  Corr.  (Pa. Cmwlth.,  No.  77 M.D.  2020,  filed Dec. 22, 

2020), slip op. at 1-5, 2020 WL 7587148, at *1-*3; Terrell v. Facility Manager at 

SCI-Mahanoy State Prison, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 95 M.D. 2020, filed Nov. 19, 2020), 

slip op. at 2-7, 2020 WL 6799150, at *1-*3; Harvey v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 541 M.D. 2019, filed May 12, 2020), slip op. at 2-7, 2020 WL 2394917, at *1-

*3; Canfield v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 585 M.D. 2016, filed Aug. 11, 

2017), slip op. at 2-4, 2017 WL 3443256, at *1-*2; Mullen v. Dep’t of Corr., (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 328 M.D. 2013, filed Jan. 30, 2014), slip op. at 2-6, 2014 WL 346711, 

at *1-*3; Wilkinson v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 567 M.D. 2010, filed Sept. 

21, 2012), slip op. at 2-5, 2012 WL 8678133, at *1-*2; McCray, 872 A.2d at 1129. 

 

Lee’s  situation  is  entirely distinguishable from  those  present in  these  other 

matters.  As  already  discussed,  the  July  20,  2018  sentencing  order  provides,  in 

relevant part, that Lee was to receive “[c]redit for time served[,]” and directs that the 

precise  amount  of  such  “[c]redit  .  .  .  be  calculated  by  the  Phila[delphia]  Prison 

System[.]”  PFR,  Ex.  6.  In  addition,  Lee  had  already  finished  serving  the  Board-

imposed TPV backtime on his Original Sentence prior to the date of sentencing on 

the  New  Charges  and,  other  than  his  New  Sentence,  Lee  had  no  other  carceral 

sentences  towards  which  the  remaining  pre-sentencing  credit  could  have  been 

applied. Thus, in context and unlike in the cases relied upon by Respondents, the 

10 

July 20, 2018 sentencing order unambiguously imbued Lee with a clear right to have 

all such remaining credit applied towards his New Sentence.7 

 

This  remaining  credit  potentially  encompasses  a  large  portion  of  the  time 

period identified by Lee in his PFR. Lee served six months of TPV backtime on his 

Original  Sentence  between  June  3,  2016,  and  December  3,  2016,  and  therefore 

cannot  receive  duplicate  credit  towards  his  New  Sentence  for  that  time  period. 

Jackson  v.  Vaughn,  777  A.2d  436,  438  (Pa.  2001).  In  addition,  he  has  already 

received credit towards his New Sentence for June 2, 2016, as well as for the time 

period between April 19, 2018, and July 20, 2018. Lee I, 251 A.3d at 846. However, 

there  is  nothing  at  this  point  that  shows  he  ever  received  the  remainder  of  the 

presentence detention time credit which he seeks, and to which he was entitled, for 

the time he served from December 3, 2016, through April 18, 2018. See 42 Pa. C.S. 

§ 9760(1). Though Respondents argue that the Board applied credit for that period 

to Lee’s Original Sentence, this assertion appears to be based upon a misreading of 

the Board’s July 13, 2016, and April 5, 2018 decisions, as well as its April 18, 2018 

 

7 Lee’s situation is similar to that which was present in Allen. In that matter, an inmate had 
repeatedly  violated  his  probation  and  had  consequently  been  resentenced  several  times  to  both 
additional stints in prison and extended periods of probation. 103 A.3d at 367-68. As a result of 
Allen’s third violation, the sentencing court revoked his probation and resentenced him to between 
59 months  and 119 months  in  state prison, with  “credit  for  any time previously  served on this 
matter as determined by prisons.” Id. In adjudicating Allen’s mandamus action against DOC, we 
held that the quoted language clearly evinced the sentencing court’s intent to award Allen credit 
for all time he had served as a result of his previous probation violations, and to have that credit 
applied towards the newly imposed violation of probation sentence. Id. at 370-71. We accordingly 
concluded that DOC had contravened the terms of the sentencing court’s order when it failed to 
apply that credit in such a fashion. Id. at 372. In other words, the sentencing order’s language may 
have appeared to be ambiguous, facially speaking, but was not when that language was placed in 
its proper context. The same is true here. 

11 

parole order.8 Indeed, contrary to Respondents’ position, there is nothing that shows 

the Board ever awarded Lee credit covering that window.9 See PFR, Ex. 10, Apps. 

A-B; Lee I, 251 A.3d at 844. Thus, we cannot conclude at this stage of litigation that 

he does not have a clear right to the relief he seeks regarding roughly 16½ months 

of credit for time he served in presentence detention. 

 

As  for  Respondents’  remaining  argument  that  they  have  no  corresponding 

duty to provide Lee with the time credit he seeks, this is partially correct and partially 

incorrect. To reiterate, though Lee has already received credit for some of the time 

he was held in presentence detention, it does not appear that this was the case for the 

period between December 3, 2016, and April 18, 2018, despite the fact that he has a 

clear right to receive credit for that span. Thomas correctly points out, though, that 

the responsibility to properly calculate Lee’s New Sentence falls upon DOC at this 

stage. See Comrie v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 142 A.3d 995, 1001 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016); 

Forbes v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 931 A.2d 88, 92-94 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Though Lee 

claims that Thomas is a proper party to this action, he also  avers in his PFR that 

Thomas  is  an  employee  of  the  Philadelphia  Prison  System,  an  assertion  that  is 

supported  by  the  attached  documentation.  See  PFR  at  2,  8,  10,  16,  42,  Ex.  6. 

Therefore, as Thomas is not DOC itself or a DOC employee responsible for sentence 

calculations, he owes no current duty to Lee in relation to the sought-after relief. 

8 As mentioned in note 5 supra, it is not clear at this stage why the Board paroled Lee in 

2018, given that he had not been serving Board-imposed backtime at that point. 

 

 Thomas’ November 16, 2018 letter to Lee’s then-counsel also appears to be predicated in 

part upon the same misreading. See PFR, Ex. 6. 

12 

  9

     

III. Conclusion 

 

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we sustain Respondents’ respective 

preliminary objections in part, regarding Lee’s clear right to receive credit towards 

his New Sentence for time served in presentence detention on June 2, 2016, as well 

as  from  April  19,  2018,  to  July  20,  2018;  Respondents’  corresponding  duty  to 

provide Lee with the relief he seeks for those time periods; and Thomas’  broader 

lack of duty to provide Lee with the sought-after relief. Furthermore, we overrule 

the remainder of Respondents’ preliminary objections, dismiss Lee’s claims against 

Thomas and, in addition, dismiss Thomas from this action. Finally, we direct DOC 

Respondents to answer Lee’s PFR within 30 days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 

 
 
 

 
 
 

 

 
  ____________________________ 
  ELLEN CEISLER, Judge 

13 

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 
 
 

 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 

 
 
v. 
 

urtis Lee, A.K.A Steven Ackridge, 

: 
: 
Petitioner 
 
: 
 
 
:  No. 101 M.D. 2022 
 
 
 
: 
 
Christopher M. Thomas, Director of   : 
: 
Classification Movement and  
: 
Registration (Philadelphia Prison  
: 
System), and Jaime Sorber, 
: 
Superintendent at S.C.I. Phoenix, 
: 
and Kim Nixon, Records Room  
: 
 
Supervisor-Department of 
: 
Corrections at S.C.I. Phoenix, 
 
: 
Respondents 
 

 

 

 

 

  C

  

 

O R D E R 
 

AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 2023, it is HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. 

Respondents  Christopher  M.  Thomas,  Director  of  Classification 

Movement  and  Registration  (Philadelphia  Prison  System)  (Thomas), 

Jaime  Sorber,  Superintendent  at  S.C.I.  Phoenix  (Sorber),  and  Kim 

Nixon, Records Room Supervisor-Department of Corrections at S.C.I. 

Phoenix’s  (Nixon)  (collectively  Respondents)  respective  preliminary 

objections are SUSTAINED IN PART, regarding: 

a.  Petitioner Curtis Lee, A.K.A Steven Ackridge’s (Lee) clear right to 

receive  credit  towards  his  New  Sentence  for  time  served  in 

presentence  detention  on  June  2,  2016,  as  well  as  from  April  19, 

2018, to July 20, 2018;  

 

b.  Respondents’ corresponding duty to provide Lee with the relief he 

seeks for those time periods; and  

c.  Thomas’ broader lack of duty to provide Lee with the sought-after 

relief; 

Respondents’ preliminary objections are otherwise OVERRULED; 

Lee’s claims against Thomas are DISMISSED;  

Thomas is DISMISSED as a respondent to this action; and 

Nixon and Sorber shall answer Lee’s petition for review within thirty 

(30) days. 
 
 
 

 
 
 

 
 
 

 

 
  ____________________________ 
  ELLEN CEISLER, Judge 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5.