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J-S05018-23  

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

IN RE: W.A.S., A MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: A.G., FATHER 

 No. 1172 WDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 6, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Orphans' Court at 
No(s):  23A-2022 O.C. 

IN RE: J.L.S., A MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: A.G. 

Appeal from the Decree Entered October 6, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Orphans' Court at 
No(s):  22A-2022 O.C. 

 No. 1173 WDA 2022 

EFORE:  BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: 

 

 

FILED:  March 17, 2023 

    A

    A

 

 

 

 

  B

  

A.G.  (Father)  appeals1  from  the  decrees,2  entered  in  the  Court  of 

Common  Pleas  of  Jefferson  County,  Orphans’  Court  Division,  involuntarily 

terminating  his  parental  rights  to  his  minor  twin  sons,  W.A.S.  and  J.L.S. 

(Children)  (born  Oct.  2020).    Counsel  has  filed  an  application  and  Anders3 

brief seeking to withdraw.  After careful review, we grant counsel’s application 

and  affirm  the  decrees  involuntarily  terminating  Father’s  parental  rights  to 

Children.    Father  is  still  incapable  of  parenting  Children  despite  receiving 

services over the past 18 months, during which time Children have been in 

placement. 

 

On  February  8,  2021,  Jefferson  County  Children  and  Youth  Services 

(CYS) caseworker, Rebecca Sallack, received a report that Children’s mother, 

A.S.,4 presented to the emergency room at the Punxsutawney Hospital with 

then-three-and-a-half-month-old J.L.S., who had bruises on his arm and leg.5  
____________________________________________ 

1 Father has complied with the dictates of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 
A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), by filing a separate notice of appeal for each Orphans’ 
Court  docket  number.    See  In  re:    M.P.,  204  A.3d  976  (Pa.  Super.  2019) 
(applying Walker holding in termination of parental rights context). 

 On November 1, 2022, our Court sua sponte consolidated these appeals, as 
they involve related parties and issues.  See Pa.R.A.P. 513. 

  Anders  v.  California,  386  U.S.  738  (1967);  Commonwealth  v. 
McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981). 

4 The trial court also involuntarily terminated A.S.’s parental rights to Children.  
A.S. has also filed an appeal that we address in a separate decision.  See In 
Re:  W.A.S.  & J.L.S., Nos. 1170 & 1171 WDA 2022.   

 Police found a wood clamp in maternal grandparents’ home that had a shape 
which was consistent with the shape and size of the bruise on J.L.S.’s arm.  
N.T. Termination Hearing, 8/30/22, at 60. 
 

  2

  3

  5

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J-S05018-23 

While Mother at first denied hurting J.L.S.,6 she ultimately admitted to having 

caused some of the bruising by squeezing J.L.S.’s arm and leg.7  Children were 

living  with  Mother  at  their  maternal  grandparents’  home  at  the  time  of  the 

incident.    Maternal  grandparents’  home  was  determined  to  not  be  a  safe 

environment  for  Children  and  an  emergency  protective  custody  order  was 

entered.  W.A.S. and  J.L.S. were immediately removed from the home and 

Children  were  adjudicated  dependent  on  February  23,  2021.    CYS 

initially  attempted  to  reunite  Children  with  Father.    However,  Father  first 

denied  paternity  and  then,  ultimately,  refused  to  take  custody  of  Children 

without Mother  present.   On  April 13,  2021, Children were placed  in a pre-

adoptive  foster  home,  where  they  remain  to  date.    CYS  established  the 

following family service plan for Father:  undergo drug and alcohol evaluation 

and follow all recommendations; obtain a psychological evaluation8 and follow 

6 Mother, in fact, first accused maternal grandfather of hurting J.L.S.  Id. at 
58. 

 Mother was immediately  arrested and  incarcerated.  On August 30, 2022, 
Mother  entered  the  ARD  program  on  third-degree  felony  charges  after 
entering a guilty plea for endangering the welfare of a child, simple assault, 
and harassment.  Mother was still on probation at the time of the termination 
hearing. 

 Father was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
and personality disorder (unspecified).  N.T. Termination Hearing, 8/30/22, at 
26.  The psychological evaluation noted that Father “has a significant mental 
health  history,  []  has  been  participating  in  both  therapy  and  medication 
management[,  and]  should  continue  to  participate  in  these  services  on  an 
ongoing basis.”  Id.  
  

  7

  8

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____________________________________________ 

placed in kinship care.   

J-S05018-23 

J-S05018-23 

all  recommendations;  participate  in  anger  management  classes;  notify  CYS 

within  7  days  of  any  address  or  telephone  changes;  participate  in  and 

complete nurturing parent classes; engage in supervised visits with Children 

and  confirm  attendance  at  visits  at  least  24-hours  in  advance;  and  provide 

diapers, wipes, formula, and baby food for visits.  Id. at 6.9  Child permanency 

plans, which were instituted in March 2012 and revised throughout October 

2021,  were  implemented  and  included:    participation  in  early  head  start 

programs;  weekly  one-hour  visits10  with  Father  at  CYS;  age-appropriate 

stimulation  and  activities  for  Children;  early  intervention  evaluations;  and 

participation in physical therapy.  Id. at 10-13. 

Permanency  review  hearings  were  held  in  May  and  August  2021  and 

February and May 2022.  At the 2021 review hearings,  Father’s compliance 

with  his  family  service  plan  was  considered  minimal/substantial  and  his 

progress  was  considered  none/moderate,  respectively.    N.T.  Termination 

Hearing, 8/30/22, at 4.  At the 2022 review hearings, Father’s compliance was 

noted as moderate/substantial and his progress minimal.  Id. at 5.  In May 

____________________________________________ 

9 The service plan was revised in September 2021, after Father had completed 
his  drug  and  alcohol  evaluation,  anger  management  class,  and  nurturing 
parent class.  Id. at 7.  The new plan recommended that Father obtain mental 
health  counseling  and  follow  recommendations  and  notify  CYS  within  seven 
days  of  any  employment  or  employment  schedule  changes.    Id.  at  7,  9.  
Father  was  also  told  to  obtain  stable  housing  free  of  any  safety  concerns, 
maintain a healthy living environment for Children, and keep CYS caseworker 
informed  of  any  new  addresses.    Id.  at  7-8.    The  service  plan  was  again 
revised in April 2022 to add the following:  a weekly ten-minute phone call 
with Children.  Id. at 9-10. 

10 In October 2021, Father’s visits were increased to two-hours once a week.  
Id. at 12.   

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2022,  visitation  ceased  and  the  permanency  goal  was  changed  from 

reunification to adoption.  On July 8, 2022, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily 

terminate Father’s rights to Children.   

On  August  30,  2022,  the  court  held  a  termination  hearing  that 

incorporated the record in the underlying dependency proceeding.  At the time 

of  the  termination  hearing,  Children  had  been  in  placement  for  18  months.  

CYS caseworker Sallack and Erin Landeni-Rogan, Father’s therapist through 

the  Erie  County  Probation  Department,11  testified  at  the  hearing.12    On 

September  6,  2022,  the  trial  court  granted  CYS’  petition  and  terminated 

Father’s  parental  rights  pursuant  to  subsections  2511(a)(2)  and  (b)  of  the 

Adoption  Act.13    Father  filed  a  timely  notice  of  appeal  and  court-ordered 

____________________________________________ 

11 Father was on probation after pleading guilty to simple assault and other 
offenses  unrelated  to  this  matter.    Ms.  Landeni-Rogan  began  working  as 
Father’s  therapist  in  December  2021,  having  had  approximately  7  sessions 
with him at the time at the termination hearing.  N.T. Termination Hearing, 
8/30/22,  at  68.    Ms.  Landeni-Rogan,  however,  testified  that  she  was  not 
comfortable  opining  with  regard  to  Father’s  ability  to  parent,  id.  at  70,  or 
Father’s “cognitive process [with regard to] his ability to care for [C]hildren.”  
Id. at 72. 

2 Children were represented by guardian ad litem, Greg Sobol, Esquire, and 
attorney,  Danielle  Melillo,  Esquire,  at  the  termination  hearing.    See  23 
Pa.C.S.A.  §  2313(a)  (children  have  statutory  right  to  counsel  in  contested 
involuntary termination proceedings); but see In re K.R., 200 A.3d 969 (Pa. 
Super. 2018) (en banc) (separate counsel for children’s legal interests need 
not be appointed, under section 2313(a), where children were able to express 
preferences  to  counsel,  counsel  expressed  children’s  preferences  and 
children's  best  interests  to  orphans’  court,  and  there  was  no  conflict  in 
positions). 

3 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. 

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  1

  1

 

J-S05018-23 

J-S05018-23 

stated: 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.  On 

December 9, 2022, counsel filed an application to withdraw.   

In In re Adoption of V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992), our Court 

Counsel  appointed  to  represent  an  indigent  parent  on  a  first 
appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating his or her parental 
rights,  may,  after  a  conscientious  and  thorough  review  of  the 
record,  petition  this  [C]ourt  for  leave  to  withdraw  [from] 
representation if he or she can find no issues of arguable merit on 
which  to  base  the  appeal.    Given  the  less  stringent  standard  of 
proof required and the quasi-adversarial nature of a termination 
proceeding[,]  in  which  a  parent  is  not  guaranteed  the  same 
procedural  and  evidentiary  rights  as  a  criminal  defendant,  the 
[C]ourt holds that appointed counsel seeking to withdraw [from] 
representation must submit an Anders brief. 

Id.  at  1275.    Moreover,  we  held  that  “any  motion  to  withdraw  [from] 

representation, submitted by appointed counsel, must be accompanied by an 

advocate’s  brief,  and  not 

the  amicus  curiae  brief  delineated 

in 

[Commonwealth  v.]  McClendon,  [434  A.2d  1185  (Pa.  1981)].    Id.    See 

also  In  re  Adoption  of  R.I.,  312  A.3d  601,  602  (Pa.  1973)  (“[T]he  logic 

behind . . . an individual in a criminal case being entitled to representation by 

counsel  at  any  proceeding  that  may  lead  to  ‘the  deprivation  of  substantial 

rights’ . . .  is equally applicable to a case involving an indigent parent faced 

with the loss of her child.”). 

- 6 - 

J-S05018-23 

 

 

In his Anders brief, counsel raises the following issue for our review:  

“Whether the [trial] court erred in terminating Father’s parental rights under 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §[§] 2511(a)(2) [and (b)].”14  Father’s Brief, at 4.   

Before  reaching  the  merits  of  Father’s  appeal,  we  must  first  address 

counsel’s petition to withdraw.  To withdraw under Anders, counsel must: 

1) petition the Court for leave to withdraw[,] stating that, after making 
a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined 
that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the [Anders] 
brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the [appellant] that he or she 
has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional arguments 
that the [appellant] deems worthy of the [C]ourt’s attention. 

Commonwealth  v.  Cartrette,  83  A.3d  1030,  1032  (Pa.  Super.  2013)  (en 

banc)  (citing  Commonwealth  v.  Lilley,  978  A.2d  995,  997  (Pa.  Super. 

2009)).  With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform 

the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court 

has held that counsel must “attach to [his or her] petition to withdraw a copy 

of  the  letter  sent  to  the[]  client  advising  him  or  her  of  their  rights.”  

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

An Anders brief must also comply with the following requirements: 

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 
citations to the record; 

____________________________________________ 

14 Although counsel’s “Statement of Questions Involved” only states that the 
court  erred  in  terminating  Father’s  parental  rights  under  subsection 
2511(a)(2),  Father’s  Rule  1925(b)  statement  and  the  summary  of  the 
argument  and  argument  sections  of  the  Anders  brief  also  discuss  that 
termination  was  improper  under  subsection  2511(b).    Thus,  we  will  also 
address that subsection in this decision. 

- 7 - 

J-S05018-23 

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 
supports the appeal; 

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and 

(4)  state  counsel’s  reasons  for  concluding  that  the  appeal  is 
frivolous.  Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 
controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).  Finally, this 

Court must “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there 

are  any  additional,  non-frivolous 

issues  overlooked  by  counsel.”  

Commonwealth  v.  Flowers,  1133  A.3d  1246,  1250  (Pa.  Super.  2015) 

(footnote omitted). 

 

Instantly,  Father’s  counsel  has  filed  an  application  to  withdraw, 

certifying that he has made a conscientious examination of the record and any 

applicable  law  and  determined  that  Father’s  appeal  is  wholly  frivolous.  

Counsel has also filed a brief, which includes a summary of the  history and 

facts of the case, potential issues that could be raised by Father, and counsel’s 

assessment of why those issues are wholly frivolous, with citations to relevant 

legal authority.  Counsel has also supplied Father with a copy of the Anders 

brief  and  application,  together  with  a  letter  advising  Father  of  his  right  to 

proceed  pro  se,  or  with  new  privately-retained  counsel,  to  raise  any  other 

issues  Father  believes  might  have  merit.    Accordingly,  we  find  that  counsel 

has substantially complied with the requirements of Anders, Santiago, and 

V.E., and, thus, may review the issues raised by counsel and also conduct our 

independent review of the record. 

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J-S05018-23 

 

In cases involving termination of parental rights, “our standard of review 

is limited to determining whether the order of the trial court is supported by 

competent evidence, and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration 

to the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.”   In re Z.P., 994 

A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting  In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 8 (Pa. 

Super. 2009)).  “Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.”  In 

re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (internal citations 

omitted).  On review, “we employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record 

in  order  to  determine  whether  the  trial  court’s  decision  is  supported  by 

competent evidence.”  Id.   

Parental  rights  may  be  involuntarily  terminated  where  any  one 
subsection  of  [s]ection  2511(a) 
is  satisfied,  along  with 
consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.  Initially, the 
focus  is  on  the  conduct  of  the  parent.    The  party  seeking 
termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
parent’s  conduct  satisfies  the  statutory  grounds  for  termination 
delineated in [s]ection 2511(a).  Only if the court determines that 
the  parent’s  conduct  warrants  termination  of  his  .  .  .  parental 
rights  does  the  court  engage  in  the  second  part  of  the  analysis 
pursuant  to  [s]ection  2511(b):    determination  of  the  needs  and 
welfare  of  the  child  under  the  standard  of  best  interests  of  the 
child.  

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).   

- 9 - 

Instantly,  the  trial  court  terminated  Father’s  parental  rights  under 

subsection 2511(a)(2)15 and (b).16  To satisfy the requirements of subsection 

2511(a)(2),  the  moving  party  must  produce  clear  and  convincing  evidence 

regarding the following elements:  (1) repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect, or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal 

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

(a)  General rule. — The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be 

terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: 

2)  The  repeated  and  continued  incapacity,  abuse, 
neglect[,] or refusal of the parent has caused the child 
to  be  without  essential  parental  care,  control  or 
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being  and  the  conditions  and  causes  of  the 
incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or refusal cannot or 
will not be remedied by the parent. 

  (

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) (emphasis added). 

16 Subsection 2511(b) states: 

(b)  Other considerations. — The court in terminating the rights 
of  a  parent  shall  give  primary  consideration  to  the 
developmental, physical[,] and emotional needs and welfare of 
the child.  The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely 
on  the  basis  of  environmental  factors  such  as  inadequate 
housing,  furnishings,  income,  clothing[,]  and  medical  care  if 
found to be beyond the control of the parent.  With respect to 
any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the 
court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 
conditions  described 
initiated 
subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

therein  which  are 

first 

____________________________________________ 

15 Subsection 2511(a)(2) states: 
 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 

 

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J-S05018-23 

J-S05018-23 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.  

See  In  re  Adoption  of  M.E.P.,  825  A.2d  1266,  1272  (Pa.  Super.  2003) 

(emphasis  added).    The  grounds  for  termination  of  parental  rights  under 

subsection 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, 

are not limited to affirmative misconduct; the grounds may also include acts 

of refusal, as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.  In the Interest 

of A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

The trial court noted the following in its Rule 1925(a) opinion: 

As Ms. Sallack detailed in her testimony, Mother and Father are 
profoundly deficient when it comes to recognizing, understanding, 
and responding to [C]hildren’s needs.  Between Justice Works and 
Ms.  Sallack,  they  received  ample  instruction  on  how  to  care  for 
[Children] both physically and emotionally.  Little to none of it has 
taken root, though, which has left Mother and Father in a position 
where they are unable to parent these twin boys.  Their inattention 
alone has put [C]hildren in physical danger that easily could have 
resulted  in  actual  injury  had  Ms.  Sallack  not  intervened.    More 
than  merely  inattentive,  they  struggle  to  recognize  such  basic 
things as when [Children] are hungry or have had enough to eat, 
and  they  require  continual  prompting  to  check  [Children’s] 
diapers, to actively monitor their movements, and even to interact 
with them instead of watching from the sidelines or directing their 
attention  to  other  matters.    In  short,  Mother  and  Father  have 
shown that they are incapable of meeting [Children’s] physical and 
emotional needs outside of a closely[-]supervised environment[.] 

*     *     * 

As well as being warranted under subsection (a), terminating both 
parents’  rights  is  the  outcome  best  able  to  ensure  [Children’s] 
developmental, physical, and emotional needs, see [23 Pa.C.S.A.] 
§  2511(b),  as  it  will  allow  them  to  be  adopted  and  become 
permanent members of the family they have known most of their 
lives.  It will allow them to remain in the same environment and 
with the same people who have consistently loved them and met 

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J-S05018-23 

their varying needs for the last 17 months and will not adversely 
destroy a bond, beneficial or otherwise, between them and their 
natural parents.  As indicated above, it is their foster parents, not 
Mother  and  Father,  with  whom  [C]hildren  have  established 
parent-child  bonds.    The  [c]ourt[,]  thus[,]  has    no  reservations 
about  severing  existing  and  beneficial  emotional  ties  by 
terminating Mother[’s] and Father’s parental rights. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 4.  The record substantiates the trial court’s 

conclusions  and, 

therefore,  supports 

termination  under  subsections 

2511(a)(2) and (b). 

 

Although  Father  completed  parenting  classes  as  part  of  his  family 

service  plan,  CYS  caseworker  Sallack  testified  that  parents  only  do  well  “if 

you’re sitting there telling them every step of the way . . . what to do.”  N.T. 

Termination Hearing, 8/30/22, at 22.  See id. at 16, 18 (caseworker testifying 

after she instructed Father to make sure Children were safe during visit, Father  

continued  to  pay  no  attention  to  Children,  left  W.A.S.  on  high  dining  table 

chair instead of taking him off of it, and seemed to be “worrying more about 

what  [the  caseworker]  was  doing  behind  [a  one-way]  mirror”);  id.  at  18 

(Father standing in corner of room during visit “not paying attention to what 

was going on with the boys”); id. (Father sitting in chair during visit “picking 

his nose and . . . flicking the boogers around the visit room”); id. at 19-20 

(Father  putting  J.L.S.  on  his  lap  and  being  “stiff  as  a  board,  like  he  was  in 

trouble,  staring  off”);  id.  at  20  (neither  parent  checking  diaper  45  minutes 

into  visit);  id.  at  17  (neither  parent  could  tell  if  Children  ready  to  eat);  id. 

(when Children were being fed, parents could not tell if Children had finished 

eating); id. at 21 (caseworker taking Father to kitchen to show him how to 

heat up Children’s food).   

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J-S05018-23 

Caseworker Sallack also testified that during visits, Father “struggle[d] 

to interact with the kids and play with them [and, instead,] would just sit and 

look at them [and e]very now and then would engage with them.”  Id.; see 

also  id.  at  56  (as  Children  got  more  mobile,  parents  really  “seemed  to 

struggle” employing parenting skill).  In fact, when W.A.S. tried to grab a toy 

that Father was playing with, Father “pulled back” and told W.A.S. “daddy’s 

playing with it.”  Id.; see also id. (parents “missed opportunities to sit and 

interact  with  [Children]  .  .  .  and  play  with  them”);  id.  at  22  (caseworker 

testifying parents had to be “redirect[ed during] visits frequently”). 

 

In the 18 months since Children have been removed from Father’s care, 

Father has been incapable of properly supervising, caring for, and tending to 

the  needs  of  Children  during  visits  without  the  constant  intervention  and 

instruction  of  CYS  caseworkers.    See  23  Pa.C.S.A.  §  2511(a)(2)  (“the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will  not  be  remedied”);  see  also  In  re  M.E.P.,  supra  at  1272.    Notably, 

Father’s  visits  have  never  progressed  beyond  supervised  due  to  safety 

concerns.  See N.T. Termination Hearing, 8/30/22, at 54-55, 66 (CYS never 

felt comfortable lessening visit restrictions based on safety concerns posed to 

Children);  id.  at  65  (caseworker  testifying  Children  could  never  be  left 

unsupervised  with  parents  where  conditions  that  led  to  their  removal  from 

parents  still  exist).    In  fact,  caseworker  Sallack  testified  that  Father’s 

parenting skills have “[been getting] progressively worse.”  Id.   

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J-S05018-23 

 

Even with consistent “hands-on” parenting instruction for over one year, 

Father has been unable to prove that he can put those lessons into practice 

and carry out parenting responsibilities.  Without more, Children are at risk 

physically and emotionally.  Accordingly, Father’s inability to utilize the skills 

he learned during the parenting classes and apply them to parenting Children 

justifies termination under subsection 2511(a)(2).   

 

With regard to subsection 2511(b), CYS caseworker Sallack noted that 

while  Children  were  “friendly”  and  “familiar”  with  Mother  and  Father  during 

visits, when Children would return to their foster home, the Children would be 

“so excited” to see their foster parents, “run[ning,] giggling[,] and laughing.”  

Id.    CYS  caseworker  Sallack  further  testified  that  Children  “appear  very 

bonded”  with  foster  parents  and  the  entire  foster  family,  that  Children  “are 

starting to say [and refer to foster parents as] dadda and mama,” and that 

foster parents are providing for Children’s needs.  Id. at 28-29.   

 

Here, the record supports the conclusion that Children do not have an 

established  bond  with  Father.    Instead,  the  evidence  demonstrates  that 

Children  have  a  parent-child  bond  with  their  foster  parents,  who  are  an 

adoptive  resource.    See  Trial  Court  Opinion,  9/6/22,  at  3  (“The  [foster 

parents] are the people they love, the people they greet with excitement, and 

the people with whom they have developed family-like bonds.”).   See also 

Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2015) (in determining 

whether  termination  proper  under  section  2511(b),  trial  court  “can  equally 

emphasize  the  safety  needs  of  the  child,  and  should  also  consider  the 

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intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent,” in addition to examination of any parent-child 

bond).    Accordingly,  we  conclude  that  the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its 

discretion  in  determining  that  termination  of  Father’s  parental  rights  would 

best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of 

Children.  See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 

Decrees affirmed.  Application to withdraw granted. 

udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate:  3/17/2023 

 

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