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J-A20039-22  

2023 PA SUPER 45 

DENIA EDWARDS, PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF 
DOUGLAS A. EDWARDS 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

 

 

COMPANY       

 

Appellant 

ORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY 

 No. 826 EDA 2021 

Appeal from the Order Entered November 2, 2020 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 
No(s):  181003685 

EFORE:  STABILE, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.* 

OPINION BY PELLEGRINI, J.:  

 

 

      FILED MARCH 21, 2023 

 

Under the relation back doctrine, our courts, in certain situations, have 

validated the acts of a personal representative of an estate that predate their 

official appointment.  In this interlocutory appeal by permission, we consider 

whether the doctrine applies when a plaintiff timely files an action on behalf 

of an estate but does not apply to be appointed the personal representative 

until after the statute of limitations has run. 

Finding  that  the  doctrine  applies  in  such  situations,  the  Court  of 

Common  Pleas  of  Philadelphia  County  (trial  court)  denied  the  motion  for 

summary  judgment  filed  by  Norfolk  Southern  Railway  Company  (Norfolk 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
 

 

 

 

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Southern) to dismiss the action filed by Denia Edwards (Edwards), personal 

representative of the estate of Douglas A. Edwards, her late husband’s estate.  

Norfolk Southern appeals from that order and argues that the relation back 

doctrine is inapplicable here because Edwards did not apply to be the personal 

representative  of  the  estate  until  two  months  after  the  expiration  of  the 

statute of limitations.  After review, we affirm and hold that her appointment 

as  personal  representative  of  her  late  husband’s  estate  relates  back  to  her 

filing the complaint. 

I. 

 

On October 27, 2015, Douglas A. Edwards died.  On October 26, 2018, 

with one day left  before the statute of limitations expired,  Edwards filed  an 

action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, 

alleging  that  her  late  husband’s  renal  cell  cancer  was  caused  by  his  two-

decade-plus employment with Norfolk Southern.1  The complaint named the 

plaintiff as “Denia Edwards, personal representative for the estate of Douglas 

A. Edwards.”  At the time, however, Edwards had neither applied for nor been 

appointed  the  personal  representative  of  her  late  husband’s  estate,  even 

though  she  was  named  the  executor  in  his  last  will  and  testament.    On 

December  27,  2018,  two  months  after  the  statute  of  limitations  for  a  FELA 

____________________________________________ 

1 The statute of limitations for bringing a FELA action is three years.  See 45 
U.S.C.  §  56  (“No  action  shall  be  maintained  under  this  chapter  unless 
commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued.”). 
 

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action had run, Edwards finally applied to be the personal representative of 

her late husband’s estate in Mercer County, West Virginia, which is where she 

and her late husband lived.2 

 

Norfolk  Southern  filed  preliminary  objections  for  lack  of  personal 

jurisdiction,  which  were  denied  after  Edwards  filed  an  amended  complaint.3  

Norfolk Southern then filed an answer and new matter raising the statute of 

limitations as a defense, following which it moved for summary judgment on 

that basis asserting that the action was time-barred because Edwards did not 

apply to be  the personal representative  until after the statute of  limitations 

had  expired.    Edwards  countered  that  her  appointment  as  personal 

representative related back to her filing the complaint.  The trial court agreed 

and  denied  summary  judgment.    After  the  trial  court  refused  to  certify  its 

order as an appealable interlocutory order, Norfolk Southern petitioned this 

Court for permission to  appeal  under  Pa.R.A.P. 1311(b),  which we  granted.  

2 Under West Virginia law, “[a] person appointed to be the executor of a will 
shall not have the powers of executor until he or she qualifies by taking an 
oath and  giving  bond, unless not required to post bond by § 44-1-8 of this 
code… .”  W. Va. Code § 44-1-1. 

 Norfolk Southern properly did not raise their statute of limitations defense 
in  their  preliminary  objections.    See  Sayers  v.  Heritage  Valley  Medical 
Group, Inc., 247 A.3d 1155, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“Generally, a statute 
of limitations defense is properly raised in new matter and not in preliminary 
objections.”);  Pa.R.Civ.P.  1030(a)  (“[A]ll  affirmative  defenses  including  but 
not limited to the defenses of ... statute of limitations ... shall be pleaded in a 
responsive pleading under the heading ‘New Matter’ ”). 
 

  3

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Norfolk  Southern  then  filed  this  appeal  to  argue  that  summary  judgment 

should have been granted because Edwards waited until after the statute of 

limitations  to  apply  to  be  appointed  the  personal  representative  of  her  late 

husband’s estate. 

II. 

 

We  begin  by  reviewing  the  relation  back  doctrine  and  the  key  cases 

addressing the doctrine.  Generally, “all actions that survive a decedent must 

be brought by or against the personal representative” and “a decedent's estate 

cannot  be  a  party  to  litigation  unless  a  personal  representative  exists.”  

Salvadia  v.  Askbrook,  923  A.2d  436,  440  (Pa.  Super.  2007)  (citation 

omitted).  The relation back doctrine, however, will sometimes be applied as 

an exception to the general rule.  As we have explained: 

Simply  stated,  the  doctrine  of  relation  back  as  applied  to  cases 
where  an  estate  is  a  party  means  that  the  courts  under  certain 
circumstances will validate the acts of the personal representative 
of the estate which preceded the date of his official appointment.  
Thus,  where  a  plaintiff,  acting  as  the  personal  representative  of 
an estate, initiates an action before the statute of limitations has 
run,  but  also  before  his  or  her  appointment  as  personal 
representative  has  been  finalized,  the  doctrine  of  relation  back 
may be applied in appropriate circumstances to validate the filing 
of  the  action,  even  though  the  plaintiff’s  appointment  is  not 
finalized until after the limitations period has expired. 
 

Prevish v. Northwest Med. Ctr. Oil City Campus, 692 A.2d 192, 201 (Pa. 

Super. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

In the late 1970s, the doctrine was applied in three cases in which the 

plaintiffs  applied  to  be  the  personal  representative  but  were  not  formally 

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appointed until after the statute had run.  The first case was McGuire v. Erie 

Lackawanna  Ry.  Co.,  385  A.2d  466  (Pa.  Super.  1978).    In  McGuire,  the 

plaintiff petitioned to be the administrator of his daughter’s estate after she 

was  hit  and  killed  by  a  train.    While  he  paid  the  filing  fee,  the  letters  of 

administration were not issued because he did not post the bond.  Before the 

statute of limitations ran, he filed a survival action alleging that he was the 

administrator of his daughter's estate.  Three weeks later, he finally posted 

the bond and was issued the letters of administration.  The defendant moved 

for summary judgment because the statute of limitations had run before the 

letters were issued.  The trial court denied summary judgment and certified 

its order as involving a controlling question of law. 

On  appeal,  we  held  that  the  father’s  appointment  as  administrator 

related back to when he filed the action.  We began by noting that the relation 

back doctrine had generally been limited to actions that benefit an estate.  We 

found  this  test  too  limited,  however,  because  it  did  not  answer  whether  a 

railroad should have to pay an asset to an estate that did not exist at the time 

the limitations period expired.  Id. at 467-68.  As a result, we suggested the 

better test was “whether in all circumstances ‘relation back’ will achieve a just 

result.”  Id. at 468. 

To answer what a just result would be in the case, we emphasized that 

the  purpose  of  statutes  of  limitations  is  to  “expedite  litigation  and  thus  to 

discourage delay and the presentation of stale claims” and “promote finality 

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and stability.”  Id. (citations omitted).  With this in mind, we found that the 

plaintiff had done enough within the statutory period to fulfill the purposes of 

the statute of limitations. 

When the complaint was filed, it represented a timely statement 
of every element of the claim, except in one respect:  the plaintiff 
appellee  had  not  been  formally  named  administrator.    That 
deficiency, however, was minimal.  At the time the complaint was 
filed, that is, within the statutory period, [the plaintiff] had applied 
for  letters  of  administration.    Under  the  provisions  of  the 
Decedents, Estates & Fiduciaries Code, Act of June 30, 1972, P.L. 
508,  No.  164,  [§]  2,  20  P.S.  [§]  3155(b)(3),  [the  plaintiff]  as 
decedent’s father had a prior right to be appointed; having applied 
to be appointed, he was unlikely not to pursue his application to 
completion.    Nor  had  anyone  else  applied.    The  only  thing  that 
held  up  the  issuance  of  letters  was  appellee’s  failure  to  post  a 
nominal bond of $1000.  While we grant that the bond represents 
something  of  a  contingency,  we  nonetheless  find  that  in  the 
circumstances,  appellee’s  appointment  as  administrator  was 
substantially assured at the time the complaint was filed, that is, 
within the statutory period of limitations. 
 

McGuire, 385 A.2d at 468 (footnote omitted). 

 

We then noted that this reasoning was similar to that used in Beckman 

v. Owens, 5 A.2d 626 (Pa. Super. 1939), a case in which we allowed a suit 

against an estate even though the executor named in the decedent’s will was 

not granted testamentary letters until after the statute ran.  In so noting, we 

quoted Beckman’s holding that 

(A)n  executor  “derives  his  authority  to  act  from  the  will.    The 
granting  of  letters  testamentary  by  the  register  of  wills  is  a  pro 
forma act, to give effect to the will of the testator.” . . .  “(P)arties, 
upon whom is a necessity of present action, may proceed on the 
presumption that (the executor appointed) will accept, and their 
action is valid until he actually renounces, or they have notice that 
he will not accept. (”) 
 

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McGuire, 385 A.2d at 468 (quoting  Beckman, 5 A.2d at 627) (omission in 

original) (internal citation omitted). 

 

We then contrasted its facts with those in an earlier case in which this 

Court declined to apply the relation back doctrine.  In Lovejoy v. Georgeff, 

303 A.2d 501 (Pa. Super. 1973), the plaintiff timely filed a writ of summons 

on  behalf  of  his  injured  son  against  the  father  of  the  deceased  driver  as 

“administrator” of the driver’s estate.  The plaintiff applied for the issuance of 

letters  of  administration  for  the  estate  but  the  letters  were  not  issued  until 

after the statute of limitations had run.  We distinguished these facts by noting 

that 

when  the  [writ  of  summons]  was  filed,  the  identity  of  the 
administrator  was  uncertain;  either  parent  [for  the  deceased 
driver]  could  have  renounced  the  right  to  letters  and  the  other 
accepted, or both could have renounced.  At the time the statute 
ran, therefore, there could have been no such presumption as in 
[Beckman] and as in the present case, that the father would be 
administrator.    Thus  it  was  quite  possible  that  the  [writ  of 
summons] had identified as a party someone who was not, and 
would not become, a party, so that the [writ of summons] might 
have been served on the wrong person entirely.  This possibility 
introduced the sort of instability not present in Beckman or the 
present case, and was fatal. 
 

McGuire, 385 A.2d at 469 (footnotes  omitted).   Thus, unlike  Lovejoy,  the 

McGuire court concluded that the defendant railroad could “proceed on the 

presumption  that”  the  plaintiff’s  appointment  as  administrator  would  be 

completed.    Id.  at  468-69.    For  that  reason,  the  relationship  between  the 

plaintiff and the defendant “was not affected with the sort of instability that 

statutes of limitations seek to preclude.”  Id. at 469. 

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J-A20039-22 

 

We  reached  a  similar  result  a  year  later  in  D'Orazio  v.  Locust  Lake 

Vill., Inc., 406 A.2d 550 (Pa. Super. 1979).  There, the decedent was a child 

who drowned in defendants’ lake.  Before the statute of limitations ran, the 

decedent’s mother filed (1) a petition for letters of administration and (2) a 

complaint  against  the  defendant,  naming  herself  administrator  of  her  son’s 

estate.  The mother assumed that letters had been issued because she had 

obtained the bond and paid its premiums for several years.  After the statute 

of  limitations  had  run,  however,  she  learned  that  the  letters  had  not  been 

issued because she did not execute the bond.  Upon learning this, she signed 

the bond and was issued the letters.  The trial court, however, dismissed the 

complaint because the letter had not been acquired until after the statute of 

limitations had run. 

 

On  appeal,  we  reversed  and  held  that  our  decision  in  McGuire 

compelled finding the relation back doctrine applied, explaining: 

Although  [the  plaintiff]  here  was  finally  granted  letters  much 
longer  after  the  statute’s  running  than  was  [the  plaintiff  in 
McGuire],  this  fact  does  not  alter  our  disposition.    The  crucial 
factors  are  that  letters  had  been  requested  and  the  action 
commenced  within  the  statutory  period,  and  [the  plaintiff’s] 
appointment  as  administratrix,  under  the  circumstances  of  this 
case,  “was  substantially  assured  at  the  time  the  complaint  was 
filed, ... within the statutory period of limitations.” 
 

D’Orazio, 406 A.2d at 552 (quoting McGuire, 385 A.2d at 468). 

 

Not  long  after  D’Orazio,  our  Supreme  Court  addressed  a  similar 

scenario in Estate of Gasbarini v. Medical Ctr. of Beaver Cnty., 409 A.2d 

343  (Pa.  1979).    In  Gasbarini,  the  decedent  died  while  a  patient  in  the 

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defendant  hospital  and  under  the  care  of  the  defendant  physicians.    The 

decedent’s  widow  promptly  applied  for  letters  of  administration  but  her 

counsel failed to post bond.  Counsel later filed a writ of summons against the 

defendants, naming the decedent’s estate as plaintiff.  Counsel again named 

the estate as plaintiff when he later filed a complaint asserting wrongful death 

and survival actions.  Defendants responded by filing preliminary objections 

alleging  that  the  estate  was  not  a  proper  party.    When  counsel  failed  to 

respond, the complaint was dismissed. 

Unbeknownst to the widow, counsel was suspended and later disbarred.  

As  a  result,  she  hired  new  counsel  and  was  named  administrator  of  her 

husband’s estate after posting the bond.  Counsel then petitioned to reinstate 

the complaint and amend its caption to add the widow as the estate’s personal 

representative,  which  the  trial  court  granted.  On  appeal,  we  reversed  and 

ordered that the complaint be dismissed.  On allowance of appeal, however, 

our Supreme Court adopted our reasoning in McGuire in applying the relation 

back doctrine in the widow’s favor. 

The  original  complaint,  filed  by  [prior  counsel],  made  clear  that 
the  action  was  based  upon  our  wrongful  death  and  survival 
statutes.  Further, as previously mentioned, the complaint made 
clear  that  [decedent’s  widow]  was  bringing  this  action  in  her 
capacity as administratrix of the decedent’s estate. 
 

e believe the instant case is on all fours with McGuire and we 
believe its reasoning is persuasive.  Instantly, the only deficiency 
in [plaintiff’s] complaint was the fact she had not yet been named 
administratrix  of  decedent’s  estate.    All  other  requirements, 

  W

* * * 

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however,  had  been  completed  within  a  short  time  period  after 
decedent’s death and within the applicable statute of limitations 
for either a wrongful death or survivor action.  As we believe the 
appointment of appellant as administratrix should relate back to 
the … date on which the complaint was filed, we find that neither 
action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
 

Id. at 346-347. 

 

In Wilkes-Barre Gen. Hospital v. Lesho, 435 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1981),  our  Commonwealth  Court  considered  a  scenario  where—unlike 

McGuire,  D'Orazio  and  Gasbarini—the  decedent’s  plaintiffs  waited  until 

after  the  statute  of  limitations  had  run  to  apply  to  be  the  personal 

representatives of the estate.  There, the plaintiffs’ daughter allegedly died of 

medical malpractice.  Two months later, the plaintiffs petitioned to settle her 

estate but did not apply for letters of administration.  The plaintiffs then filed 

a complaint in the Arbitration Panels for Health Care against the defendants, 

identifying  themselves  in  the  caption  and  body  as  individuals  and 

administrators of their daughter’s estate.  While letters of administration were 

eventually  granted,  the  plaintiffs  neither  applied  for  nor  were  granted  the 

letters until after the statute of limitations had run.  The defendants moved 

for summary judgment but the arbitrator found that the relation back doctrine 

applied. 

 

On  appeal,  the  defendants  argued  that  McGuire,  D’Orazio  and 

Gasbarini supported reversal because the plaintiffs in those cases applied for 

letters of administration before the statute of limitations had run, thus giving 

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“substantial assurance that the letters would be granted to the person alleging 

his or her fiduciary capacity in the pleading.”  Lesho, 435 A.2d at 1342. 

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth Court held that the reasoning used in 

McGuire and reiterated in Gasbarini applied with equal force to the plaintiff 

Absolutely  nothing  was  changed  in  the  [plaintiffs’]  complaint  by 
virtue  of  letters  of  administration  having  been  granted  to  them 
after the statute of limitations had run.  From the time the original 
complaint was filed, the [defendants] were aware that they were 
being sued for their alleged negligence resulting in the death of a 
named decedent.  Every element necessary to establish the two 
causes  of  action  against  the  [defendants]  was  set  forth  in  the 
complaint,  including  the  erroneous  fact  that  the  [plaintiffs]  had 
been appointed administrators of their daughter’s estate. 
 

* * * 

n any event, it is our opinion that by permitting the doctrine to 
apply  to  the  circumstances  of  this  case,  the  acts  of  the 
administrators  will  have  been  validated,  a  just  result  will  have 
been achieved, the estate will have been benefited and a remedy 
will not have been lost.  Neither will the objectives of the statute 
of limitations have been disturbed. 
 
Id. at 1343. 

  I

parents in Lesho, explaining: 

 

Finally, this Court revisited the relation back doctrine in the context of 

a survival action in Prevish v. Northwest Med. Ctr. Oil City Campus, 692 

A.2d  192,  201  (Pa.  Super.  1997)  (en  banc).    There,  the  plaintiff’s  wife 

allegedly  suffered  a  stroke  and  paralysis  because  of  defendants’  medical 

malpractice.  After she died, the plaintiff filed a writ of summons against the 

defendants,  with  a  caption  naming  the  plaintiff  as  his  wife’s  estate.    In  his 

subsequent complaint filed after the statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff 

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listed  himself  as  the  plaintiff  and  alleged  that  he  had  been  appointed  the 

executor of the estate.  The defendants filed preliminary objections to strike 

the  complaint  because  the  plaintiff  had  not  obtained  consent  or  leave  to 

amend the  complaint’s  caption to correct of the name of  a party.  The  trial 

court agreed and declined to apply the relation back doctrine because (1) the 

writ  of  summons  named  the  estate  as  plaintiff,  and  (2)  no  personal 

representative had been designated until after the statute had run. 

 

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court should have allowed 

him to correct the caption to reflect his appointment as executor of his wife’s 

estate.  To address this contention, the Prevish court reviewed all the above 

cases and found them distinguishable. 

 
In  McGuire,  D'Orazio,  and  Lesho,  a  survival  action  was 
commenced by the timely filing of a complaint the caption of which 
identified  the  plaintiff  by  name  as  the  administrator  of  the 
decedent’s  estate.    In  Gasbarini,  a  survival  action  was 
commenced by the timely filing of a complaint the caption of which 
named the decedent’s estate as the plaintiff, but the body of which 
explained  that  the  plaintiff  was  in  fact  the  administratrix  of  the 
estate.    In  each  case  the  designation  of  the  plaintiff  as 
administrator/administratrix  was  premature,  as  certain  steps 
remained to be taken which were not accomplished until after the 
statute  of  limitations  had  run.    In  all  four  cases,  however,  the 
defendants were notified, before the statute of limitations had 
run, of the fact that an action had been filed against them by a 
named  individual  who  was,  at  least  putatively,  the  personal 
representative  of  the  decedent’s  estate.    Insofar  as  the 
commencement of the action was concerned, nothing remained to 
be done after the limitations period had expired but to formalize 
the  plaintiff’s  previously  asserted  appointment  as  personal 
representative. 
 

Prevish, 692 A.2d at 204 (emphasis in original). 

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With this in mind, the Prevish court went on to find that the relation 

back doctrine did not apply to the plaintiff’s actions because 

…[t]he writ of summons was the only document filed before the 
limitations period expired, and its caption identifies the estate of 
the decedent as the plaintiff.  Such a writ is, of course, a nullity.  
Moreover,  the  writ  does  not  identify  the  executor  of  the  estate, 
nor does it inform the defendants that there is, even potentially, 
an executor (that is, that the decedent died testate).  Concerning 
the  parties’  relationship,  these  facts  evidence  “the  sort  of 
instability that statutes of limitation seek to preclude.”  McGuire, 
supra. 

Plaintiff] has cited no case, and we are aware of none, in which 
the relation back doctrine was applied to ratify, post-appointment, 
the  attempted  commencement  of  an  action  by  a  personal 
representative whose existence was in no way suggested by the 
pleading  that  he  filed.    We  decline  to  extend  the  doctrine  to 
encompass  such  a  situation.    Accordingly,  we  affirm  the  trial 
court’s order dismissing the complaint. 
 

  [

Id. at 204-05. 

III. 

 

On appeal, Norfolk Southern argues that Edwards lacked the capacity to 

bring her action on behalf of her late husband’s estate since a FELA action can 

be maintained only by either the injured person or, if the person is deceased, 

their  personal  representative.    See  45  U.S.C.  §  59.4    It  emphasizes  that 

____________________________________________ 

4 “Any right of action given by this chapter to a person suffering injury shall 
survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving 
widow or husband and children of such employee, and, if none, then of such 
employee’s parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such 
employee,  but  in  such  cases  there  shall  be  only  one  recovery  for  the  same 
injury.”  45 U.S.C. § 59. 
 

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Edwards did not apply to be the personal representative of her late husband’s 

estate until after the statute of limitations had run.  Because she failed to do 

so, Norfolk Southern argues that the complaint was a nullity because Edwards 

lacked standing to pursue claims on behalf of the estate at the time when she 

filed the complaint. 

 

As for the relation back doctrine, Norfolk Southern asserts that it does 

not  apply  here.    It  argues  that  McGuire,  D’Orazio  and  Gasbarini  support 

reversal  because  the  plaintiffs  in  those  cases  applied  to  be  the  estates’ 

personal representatives before the statute of limitations ran.  On this point, 

Norfolk Southern highlights the D’Orazio court’s statement that the “crucial 

factors” in allowing the relation back doctrine in that case were “that letters 

[of administration] had been requested and the action commenced within the 

statutory  period,”  thus  substantially  assuring  the  plaintiff’s  appointment  as 

the  estate’s  executor.    See  D’Orazio,  406  A.2d  at  552.    Further,  Norfolk 

Southern  contends  the  presumption  that  one  will  be  appointed  an  estate’s 

executor  attaches  only at  the time the application  is  made.   See McGuire, 

385 A.2d at 468-69. 

 

Turning to Edwards, while conceding that a decedent’s estate cannot be 

a party to litigation unless a personal representative exists, she contends that 

the relation back doctrine applies here.  First, she notes that the plaintiffs in 

McGuire,  D’Orazio  and  Gasbarini  all  died  intestate.    Here,  in  contrast, 

Edwards was named the executor in her late husband’s last will and testament.  

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Next, she notes that in the most “on point” case on this matter—Lesho—the 

Commonwealth Court rejected the very same argument that Norfolk Southern 

raises here:  that McGuire, D’Orazio and Gasbarini stand for the proposition 

that the relation back doctrine applies only when the plaintiff applies to be the 

personal representative before the statute of limitations has run.  Rejecting 

this argument, the Lesho court concluded that the reasoning used in McGuire 

and  Gasbarini  supported  finding  that  the  relation  back  doctrine  could  be 

applied even the plaintiff waits until after the statute of limitations had run to 

be appointed the personal representative.  Edwards further emphasizes that 

like the plaintiffs in McGuire, D’Orazio and Gasbarini, she identified herself 

in the complaint’s caption as the personal representative of her late husband’s 

estate, thus notifying Norfolk Southern  before the statute of limitations had 

run  that  an  action  had  been  filed  against  it  by  a  person  who  was,  at  least 

putatively, the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. 

 

After review, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment 

and concluding that the relation back doctrine applied here.5 

____________________________________________ 

5 Our standard of review of an order granting or denying summary judgment 
is well-settled: 
 

We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party,  and  all  doubts  as  to  the  existence  of  a  genuine  issue  of 
material  fact  must  be  resolved  against  the  moving  party.    Only 
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is 

 

IV. 

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J-A20039-22 

 

First, just as we did in McGuire, we begin with the purpose of statutes 

of limitations to determine whether the relation back doctrine can be applied 

under these circumstances.  “Generally speaking, statutes of limitations are 

rules of law that set time limits for bringing legal claims.”  Nicole B. v. Sch. 

Dist.  Of  Phila.,  237  A.3d  986,  993-94  (Pa.  2020).    “They  serve  several 

purposes:    imposing  finality  on  the  litigation  system;  providing  defendants 

with  an  end  to  their  potential  liability;  and  avoiding  litigation  of  disputes 

involving stale evidence.”  Id. at 994.  As this Court has long recognized, the 

“purpose  of  any  statute  of  limitations  is  to  expedite  litigation  and  thus 

discourage  delay  and  the  presentation  of  stale  claims  which  may  greatly 

prejudice the defense of such claims.”  McCreesh v. City of Philadelphia, 

888 A.2d 211, 222 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted). 

 

In  McGuire,  D’Orazio,  Gasbarini  and  Lesho,  our  courts  noted  two 

main reasons why application of the relation back doctrine did not contravene 

the  purpose  of  statutes  of  limitations.    First,  in  each  of  those  cases,  the 

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clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law will summary judgment be entered.  Our scope of review of 
a  trial  court’s  order  granting  or  denying  summary  judgment  is 
plenary, and our standard of review is clear:  the trial court’s order 
will  be  reversed  only  where  it  is  established  that  the  court 
committed an error of law or abused its discretion. 
 

Siciliano v. Mueller, 149 A.3d 863, 864 (Pa. Super. 2016).  Moreover, the 
standard  or  review  for  issues  involving  the  interpretation  of  a  statute  of 
limitations  is  de  novo  and  the  scope  of  review  is  plenary.    See  Erie  Ins. 
Exchange v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578, 585 n.13 (2017). 
 

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complaint was timely filed within the statute of limitations and set out every 

element  of  the  plaintiffs’  claims.    Thus,  except  for  the  plaintiffs’  formal 

appointment as personal representative, the defendants in those cases were 

put on notice before the statute of limitations had run that “an action had been 

filed  against  them  by  a  named  individual  who  was,  at  least  putatively,  the 

personal representative of the decedent's estate.”  Prevish, 692 A.2d at 204.  

Thus, at that stage in those cases, the only thing that remained for the plaintiff 

to  do  was  to  formalize  their  previously  asserted  appointment  as  personal 

representative.  Id. 

 

The same applies here.  Edwards timely filed her FELA action and set 

out all the elements of her claims before the statute of limitations had run, 

thus putting Norfolk Southern on notice that they were being sued.  Critically, 

just as the Lesho court recognized, nothing changed concerning those claims 

by  virtue  of  Edwards 

later  being 

formally  appointed  the  personal 

representative.    See  Lesho,  435  A.2d  at  1343  (“Absolutely  nothing  was 

changed  in  the  [plaintiffs’]  complaint  by  virtue  of  letters  of  administration 

having been granted to them after the statute of limitations had run.”). 

 

Second, in each of the four cases, the complaint listed the plaintiff as 

the  personal  representative  of  the  estate  in  the  caption  or  alleged  that  the 

plaintiff was the administrator of the estate.  See McGuire, 385 A.2d at 467; 

D’Orazio, 406 A.2d at 551; Gasbarini, 409 A.2d at 345; Lesho, 435 A.2d at 

1341.  Likewise, in both her original and amended complaints, Edwards listed 

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the plaintiff in the caption as “DENIA EDWARDS, Personal Representative for 

the Estate of Douglas A. Edwards.”  Further, she averred in both complaints 

that  she  was  the  personal  representative  of  the  estate.    See  Complaint, 

10/26/18,  ¶ 2;  Amended  Complaint,  12/17/18,  ¶ 2.    As  a  result,  while  she 

had  not  yet  applied  to  be  the  personal  representative  of  the  estate,  the 

complaint put Norfolk Southern on notice that Edwards was bringing the action 

in her capacity as personal representative of the estate. 

 

On this point, we do not find it fatal to her claims that Edwards waited 

until  after  the  statute  of  limitations  had  run  to  apply  to  be  the  personal 

representative  of  her  late  husband’s  estate.    In  McGuire,  D’Orazio  and 

Gasbarini, despite each of the decedents dying intestate, it was “substantially 

assured”  that  each  of  the  plaintiffs  would  be  appointed  the  personal 

representative of the estate.  In McGuire, the appointment was held  up by 

the plaintiff failing to post the bond; in D’Orazio, it was the plaintiff’s failure 

to execute the bond; and in Gasbarini, it was plaintiff’s counsel failing to post 

bond.  In each case, there was no dispute that the plaintiff would be appointed 

the  estate’s  personal  representative,  as  the  only  thing  delaying  the 

appointment was the oversight of paying or executing the bond for the letters 

of administration. 

 

While  this  case  differs  from  those  cases  in  that  the  decedent  died 

testate, there was still no real dispute that Edwards would be appointed the 

personal  representative  of  her  late  husband’s  estate  since  she  was  named 

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executor in her late husband’s last will and testament.  Under West Virginia 

law,  the  only  thing  she  needed  to  do  to  be  appointed  the  personal 

representative was file the application of fiduciaries and take an oath in the 

county in which her late husband’s last will and testament had been recorded.  

See W. Va. Code § 44-1-1.6  Given that Edwards was (1) named the executor 

in her husband’s will, and (2) listed herself as the plaintiff in the timely filed 

complaint,  Norfolk  Southern  could  “proceed  on  the  presumption”  that  she 

would  seek  appointment  as  personal  representative  of  her  late  husband’s 

estate.    Thus,  just  as  the  McGuire  court  concluded,  we  find  that  “the 

relationship between the parties was not affected with the sort of instability 

that statutes of limitations seek to preclude.”  McGuire, 385 A.2d at 469. 

 

As  noted,  citing  McGuire,  Norfolk  Southern  asserts  that  the 

presumption that Edwards would seek appointment as personal representative 

could  attach  only  if  she  made  a  timely  application.    Based  on  our  reading, 

however, McGuire states no such thing. 

To  recap,  in  McGuire,  we  held  that  the  defendant  railroad  could 

presume that the plaintiff would be appointed the personal representative of 

his daughter’s estate because he had applied for letters of administration and 

had a prior right to be appointed under statute.  Id. at 468.  For support, the 

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6 Edwards did not need to post bond because she was the sole beneficiary of 
her late husband.  See W. Va. Code § 44-1-8(b). 
 

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McGuire court likened its reasoning to that in Beckman in which this Court 

held  that  a  creditor  of  the  decedent  could  file  suit  against  the  executor 

appointed in the decedent’s will prior to the probate of the will and issuance 

of letters testamentary.  As noted, the McGuire court quoted the Beckman 

court’s  holding  that  an  executor  “derives  his  authority  to  act  from  the  will.  

The granting of letters testamentary by the register of wills is a pro forma act, 

to give effect to the will of the testator.”   Id. at 468 (quoting  Beckman, 5 

A.2d at 627).  The McGuire court further quoted Beckman’s holding that the 

parties “may proceed on the presumption that (the executor appointed) will 

accept, and their action is valid until he actually renounces, or they have notice 

that  he  will  not  accept.”    Thus,  as  the  above  quoted  sections  show,  the 

McGuire court was equating the plaintiff father in its case with an executor 

named in a decedent’s will who is presumed to have accepted the appointment 

until that appointment is renounced. 

Finally,  we  address  two  other  arguments  raised  by  Norfolk  Southern.  

First, as noted, Norfolk Southern highlights that in D’Orazio, we stated that 

the “crucial factors” in applying the relation back doctrine in that case were 

that the plaintiff requested the letters of administration before the statute of 

limitations had run.  See D’Orazio, 406 A.2d at 552.  In that case, however, 

the plaintiff mother did not obtain the letters of administration until about a 

year-and-a-half after the statute had run, which was substantially longer than 

the delay in McGuire.  Thus, read in context, the D’Orazio court’s statement 

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McGuire.]”  Id. 

that it was “crucial” that the plaintiff request the letters before the statute had 

run was meant to answer the concern that the plaintiff mother was not granted 

the letters until “much longer after the statute’s running than [the plaintiff in 

Second, Norfolk Southern asserts that Lesho has no persuasive value 

because  (1)  it  is  a  Commonwealth  Court  decision,7  and  (2)  its  factually 

distinguishable  because,  unlike  the  defendants  in  Lesho,  Norfolk  Southern 

raises  its  statute  of  limitations  defense  at  its  first  opportunity.    The  second 

point  is  well  taken,  since  the  Lesho  court  observed  that  none  of  the 

defendants denied that the plaintiffs were administrators of their daughter’s 

estate until they were granted leave to file amended answers.   See Lesho, 

435 A.2d at 1343. 

Before that observation, however, the Commonwealth Court made clear 

that its decision rested on the plaintiffs timely filing their complaint and putting 

the defendants on notice that they were sued by the plaintiffs in their capacity 

as the personal representatives of the decedent’s estate. 

It is true that in every case cited by [the defendants], where the 
[relation back] doctrine has been applied, an application for letters 
was made before the statute of limitations expired.  Nevertheless, 
we feel compelled to apply the doctrine here because our analysis 
of  the  reasoning  used  in  McGuire  and  reiterated  in  the 
[Gasbarini]  demonstrates  that  it  must  likewise  prevail  here.  
Absolutely  nothing  was  changed  in  the  [plaintiffs’]  complaint  by 

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7 “Commonwealth Court decisions do not bind this Court, but we may consider 
them as persuasive authority.”  Cuth v. Cuth, 263 A.3d 1186, 1191 n.5 (Pa. 
Super. 2021) (citation omitted). 

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virtue  of  letters  of  administration  having  been  granted  to  them 
after the statute of limitations had run.  From the time the original 
complaint was filed, the [defendants] were aware that they were 
being sued for their alleged negligence resulting in the death of a 
named decedent.  Every element necessary to establish the two 
causes  of  action  against  the  [defendants]  was  set  forth  in  the 
complaint,  including  the  erroneous  fact  that  the  [plaintiffs]  had 
been appointed administrators of their daughter's estate. 
 

Id. 

 

Like the Commonwealth Court in Lesho, we read nothing in McGuire, 

D’Orazio  or  Gasbarini  as  precluding  the  conclusion  that  the  trial  court 

reached in this case.  Indeed,  Edwards was named the executor in her late 

husband’s  last  will  and  testament  and  timely  filed  her  FELA  action  in  which 

she averred that she was the personal representative of her late husband’s 

estate.  Like the defendants in  McGuire, D’Orazio, Gasbarini and Lesho, 

Norfolk  Southern  was  notified  before  the  statute  of  limitations  had  expired 

that  an  action  had  been  filed  against  it  by  a  plaintiff  “who  was,  at  least 

putatively, the personal representative of the decedent’s  estate.”  Prevish, 

692  A.2d  at  204.    While  it  may  be  preferable  that  the  plaintiff  seek 

appointment  before  the  statute  runs,  we  do  not  find  that  failure  to  do  so 

compels dismissal of a complaint when the plaintiff is the named executor and 

avers that she is the personal representative in the timely-filed complaint. 

Order affirmed.  Case remanded.  Jurisdiction relinquished. 

 

 

 

 

Judge McCaffery joins the Opinion. 

Judge Stabile files a Dissenting Opinion. 

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udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/21/2023 

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