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J-S03001-23  

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.A., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: E.A., MOTHER 

 No. 2202 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 5, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0000950-2020 

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.A.A., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: E.A., MOTHER 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 5, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000089-2022 

 No. 2203 EDA 2022 

EFORE:  BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: 

 

 

FILED MARCH 21, 2023 

 

 

E.A.  (“Mother”)  appeals  from  the  decree  terminating  involuntarily  her 

parental  rights  to  her  child,  N.A.,1  born  August  2020,  as  well  as  the  goal 

____________________________________________ 

1  The captions use  two different conventions for the child’s initials.  Within 
this memorandum, we use only the first and last initial for the child, N.A. 

    A

    A

 

 

 

 

  B

  

change  order  entered  the  same  date  that  changed  N.A.’s  permanent 

placement goal to adoption.2  We affirm. 

 

We glean the following from the certified record.  In August 2020, N.A. 

was removed from Mother’s care upon discharge following her birth and placed 

in  foster  care  by  the  Philadelphia  Department  of  Human  Services  (“DHS”).  

N.A.  was  adjudicated  dependent  and  remained  in  foster  care.3    Mother 

appealed,  and  this  Court  affirmed  the  court’s  dependency  order.    See 

Interest of N.A., 256 A.3d 9 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision).  

The concerns of DHS with regard to Mother were manyfold:  her mental health 

and history with DHS, which included termination of her parental rights to all 

four of her older children; testing positive for marijuana in the early stages of 

her  pregnancy  with  N.A.;  unstable  housing;  and  her  inability  to  retain 

information regarding personal safety, childcare, developmental stages, and 

decision-making about who should be in the child’s life.  Given these concerns, 

Mother’s  objectives  included  mental  health  treatment,  obtaining  secure 

housing  and  employment,  and  completing  parenting  classes.    Mother  had 

weekly visits with N.A., as well as virtual visits during the pandemic, though 

Mother missed several of the virtual visits.  Early visits between Mother and 

N.A. were conducted at an aunt’s house, while later visits were moved to the 

____________________________________________ 

2  The trial court also entered a separate decree terminating the rights of N.A.’s 
unknown father.  No appeal from that decree has been taken and no father 
has been identified.  This Court consolidated Mother’s appeals sua sponte.   

  The foster parents, S.E. and L.E., are a pre-adoptive resource for N.A. and 
had already adopted two of Mother’s older children.  

  3

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J-S03001-23 

J-S03001-23 

regarding COVID-19. 

offices of the community umbrella agency (“CUA”) due to the aunt’s concerns 

 

On  February  11,  2022,  DHS  filed  a  petition  to  involuntarily  terminate 

Mother’s parental rights  pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §  2511(a)(1),  (2),  (5), (8), 

and  (b).    It  also  filed  a  petition  seeking  to  change  N.A.’s  permanency  goal 

from reunification to adoption.   

The trial court conducted a hearing on August 5, 2022.4  DHS presented 

the testimony of Ro Faye, who was the initial CUA caseworker assigned to the 

family,  as  well  as  Alexis  Hylton,  who  was  the  currently-assigned  CUA 

caseworker.    Mother  testified  on  her  own  behalf.    At  the  conclusion  of  the 

hearing,  the  trial  court  declined  to  terminate  pursuant  to  §  2511(a)(1)  but 

terminated Mother’s rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8,) and (b), as well 

as a separate order changing N.A.’s permanency goal to adoption.   

 

Mother  timely  filed  the  instant  notices  of  appeal  from  the  termination 

decree and goal change order concurrently with concise statements of matters 

complained of on appeal.  The trial court issued a notice of compliance with 

Pa.R.A.P.  1925(a),  directing  us  to  its  reasoning  as  transcribed  during  the 

____________________________________________ 

4  At the time of the hearing, N.A. was two years old and was represented by 
her guardian ad litem (“GAL”)/child advocate.  See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 
1092  (Pa.  2018)  (holding  that  “an  attorney-GAL  who  is  present  and 
representing a child’s best interests can properly fulfill the role of [23 Pa.C.S. 
§] 2313(a) counsel where, as here, the child at issue is too young to be able 
to express a preference as to the outcome of the proceedings”).  GAL filed a 
letter with this Court joining the brief of DHS. 

- 3 - 

August  5,  2022  hearing.    Mother  raises  the  following  issues  for  our 

1.  Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abused its discretion 
where  it  determined  that  the  requirements  of  23  Pa.C.S.A. 
2511(a) to terminate E.A.’s parental rights were met. 
 

2.  Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abused its discretion 
where it determined the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.A. 2511(b) 
were met. 
 

3.  Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abused its discretion 
where it determined that the permanency goal for N.A. should 
be changed to adoption. 

Mother’s brief at 3. 

We  begin  with  our  standard  of  review  for  matters  involving 

involuntary termination of parental rights: 

he  standard  of  review  in  termination  of  parental  rights  cases 
requires  appellate  courts  to  accept  the  findings  of  fact  and 
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 
by  the  record.   If  the  factual  findings  are  supported,  appellate 
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 
or abused its discretion.  A decision may be reversed for an abuse 
of 
of  manifest 
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.  The trial 
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 
the record would support a different result.  We have previously 
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. 

demonstration 

discretion 

upon 

only 

  T

In re Adoption of B.G.S., 245 A.3d 700, 704 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up).  

“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented 

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts 

in the evidence.”  Interest of G.M.K., 255 A.3d 554, 560 (Pa.Super. 2021) 

(cleaned up).  “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we 

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J-S03001-23 

consideration: 

 

will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.”  In re 

Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is  governed  by  §  2511  of  the  Adoption 

Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed 

by the needs and welfare of the child. 

ur case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must 
engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.  
Initially,  the  focus  is  on  the  conduct  of  the  parent.    The  party 
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that  the  parent’s  conduct  satisfies  the  statutory  grounds 
for termination delineated  in  [§]  2511(a).    Only  if  the  court 
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 
the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b):  determination of the needs 
and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the 
child.    One  major  aspect  of  the  needs  and  welfare  analysis 
concerns  the  nature  and  status  of  the  emotional  bond  between 
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 
of permanently severing any such bond. 

  O

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).   

 

We  have  defined  clear  and  convincing  evidence  as  that  which  is  so 

“clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to 

a  clear  conviction,  without  hesitance,  of  the  truth  of  the  precise  facts  in 

issue.”  In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned 

up).    Termination is  proper  when  the  moving  party  proves  grounds  for 

termination under any subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b).  T.B.B., 

supra at 395.  To affirm, we need only agree with the  trial court as to any 

one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b).  See In re B.L.W., 843 

A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).   

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J-S03001-23 

J-S03001-23 

follows:   

Here, we focus our analysis on § 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as 

(a)  General  Rule.—The  rights  of  a  parent  in  regard  to  a  child 
may  be  terminated  after  a  petition  filed  on  any  of  the  following 
grounds: 
 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 
by  the  court  or  under  a  voluntary  agreement  with  an 
agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 
removal  or  placement,  the  conditions  which  led  to  the 
removal  or  placement  of  the  child  continue  to  exist  and 
termination  of  parental  rights  would  best  serve  the  needs 
and welfare of the child. 

. . . . 

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.  The rights 
of  a  parent  shall  not  be  terminated  solely  on  the  basis  of 
environmental  factors  such  as  inadequate  housing,  furnishings, 
income,  clothing  and  medical  care  if  found  to  be  beyond  the 
control of the parent.  With respect to any petition filed pursuant 
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 
filing of the petition. 
 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. 

To  satisfy  § 2511(a)(8),  the  petitioner  must  show  three  components: 

(1) that the child has been removed from the care of the parent for at least 

twelve months; (2) that the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights would best 

serve  the  needs  and  welfare  of  the  child.    In  re  Adoption  of  J.N.M.,  177 

A.3d 937, 943 (Pa.Super. 2018).   

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J-S03001-23 

Unlike  other  subsections,  § 2511(a)(8)  does  not  require  the  court  to 

evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to 

the placement of the children.  In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa.Super. 

2017).  “[T]he relevant inquiry” regarding the second prong of § 2511(a)(8) 

“is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied and thus 

whether  reunification  of  parent  and  child  is  imminent  at  the  time  of  the 

hearing.”  In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.Super. 2009).  Further, the Adoption 

Act prohibits the court from considering “any efforts by the parent to remedy 

the conditions described [in the petition] which are first initiated subsequent 

to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.”  23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).     

Although § 2511(a) generally focuses on the behavior of the parent, the 

third prong of § 2511(a)(8) specifically “accounts for the needs of the child.”  

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).  This Court 

has recognized “that the application of [§ 2511(a)(8)] may seem harsh when 

the parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that 

had led to the removal of her children.”  In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 

502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006).   

However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led 
to  removal  of  a  child  continue  to  exist  after  a  year,  the  statute 
implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 
while  a  parent  attempts  to  attain  the  maturity  necessary  to 
assume parenting responsibilities.  The court cannot and will not 
subordinate  indefinitely  a  child’s  need  for  permanence  and 
stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. 
Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates 
only  a  short  period  of  time,  to  wit  [18]  months,  in  which  to 

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J-S03001-23 

Id.   

complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child 
who has been placed in foster care. 
 

In granting termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), the trial court found 

that  after  two  years,  Mother  lacked  the  capacity  to  parent  N.A.  and  her 

incapacity was not likely to be remedied at any point in the near future.  See 

N.T. Hearing, 8/5/22, at 91-93.  The trial court acknowledged that Mother had 

made some positive strides, but that “even with the services in place, some 

of which [Mother] has taken advantage of, some of which she has not, those 

circumstances that brought [N.A.] into care continue to exist . . . two years 

in.  [I]t’s not likely that that’s going to change at any point in the near future.”  

Id. at 94.   

Mother  concedes  that  the  first  prong,  removal  for  a  period  exceeding 

twelve months, has been met.  See Mother’s brief at 23.  However, she avers 

that DHS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the second and third 

prongs  of  §  2511(a)(8).    Mother  claims  that  she  met  all  goals  by  obtaining 

stable housing and employment, attending the parenting capacity evaluation, 

visiting with N.A., and attending an online parenting class.  Id. at 25.  As to 

the third element, Mother argues that her relationship with N.A. has improved 

over  time  and  that  it  would  not  be  in  N.A.’s  best  interests  to  sever  that 

relationship.  Id. at 26. 

Mother’s argument ignores the testimony of the CUA caseworkers who 

focused  their  concerns  on  Mother’s  capacity  to  parent  notwithstanding  her 

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J-S03001-23 

improved housing and employment situations.  According to Ms. Faye, Mother 

displayed an inability to properly care for N.A. during supervised visitations, 

including  age-appropriate  activities  and  foods,  bottle  making,  feeding,  and 

burping,  and  what  to  do  when  N.A.  began  crying.    In  fact,  it  appeared  to 

Ms. Faye that Mother was unable to retain even the most basic parenting skills 

despite repeated CUA staff instructions, N.A. being her fifth child, and having 

previously partaken in parenting classes before N.A.’s birth.  See N.T., 8/5/22, 

at  12-13,  18.    In  addition,  while  Mother  was  initially  engaging  during  the 

visitations, her attention would wane, and she would have difficulty remaining 

focused  on  caring  for  N.A.  during  the  latter  portions  of  the  visit  without 

redirection by the CUA staff.  Often, Mother was distracted by video calls and 

text messaging during visits.  Id. at 15, 17-19, 21.  Notably, Mother did not 

progress  beyond  supervised  visits  because  once  her  active  engagement 

ceased after the first thirty or so minutes, “there was a lot of help needed” 

and  “engagement  of  all  of  the  office  staff.”    Id.  at  22-23.    Finally,  Mother 

voluntarily discharged herself from her mental health treatment, despite that 

being one of her goals.  Id. at 66, 86, 89.   

Based upon  these  facts, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of 

law  in  the  trial  court’s  crediting  of  the  caseworkers’  testimony  and  the 

conclusion  that  the  conditions  leading  to  N.A.’s  removal  continued  to  exist 

more than twelve months after her removal.  Likewise, we discern no abuse 

of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s conclusion that termination best 

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J-S03001-23 

513.   

served the welfare of N.A. pursuant to § 2511(a)(8).  She has spent her entire 

life with her pre-adoptive foster parents.  Thus, the court was well within its 

discretion  to  prioritize  the  needs  for  permanency  and  stability  of  N.A.  over 

Mother’s  claim  that  she  was  ready  for reunification.    See  R.J.S.,  supra,  at 

Next, we consider whether the trial court committed an error of law or 

abuse  of  discretion  pursuant  to §  2511(b).    As  explained  above, §  2511(b) 

focuses on the needs and welfare of the child, which includes an analysis of 

any emotional bond that N.A. may have with Mother and the effect of severing 

that  bond.   L.M., supra at  511.    The  key  questions  when  conducting  this 

analysis  are  whether  the  bond  is  necessary  and  beneficial  and  whether 

severance  of 

the  bond  will  cause 

the  child  extreme  emotional 

consequences.   J.N.M.,  supra  at  944  (quoting In  re  E.M.,  620  A.2d  481, 

484–85 (Pa. 1993)).  It is important to recognize that the existence of a bond, 

while  significant,  is  only  one  of  many  factors  courts  should  consider  when 

addressing §  2511(b).   In  re  Adoption  of  C.D.R.,  111  A.3d  1212,  1219 

(Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)).  

Other factors include “the safety needs of the child, and . . . the intangibles, 

such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the 

foster parent.”  Id. 

As with § 2511(a)(8), Mother argues that her relationship with N.A. has 

improved over time.  See Mother’s brief at 29-30.  Mother points us to her 

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J-S03001-23 

testimony  that  she  has  an  “amazing”  relationship  with  N.A.,  that  they  play 

together during visits, and N.A. rests next to Mother when she is tired.  See 

id.  Finally, Mother notes that she has matured greatly since N.A. was born 

and that she has been able to engage more with N.A. as N.A. has gotten older.  

See id. at 30.   

In relation to § 2511(b), the trial court concluded as follows: 

And the testimony of CUA, both Ms. Faye and Ms. Hylton, is that 
while [N.A.] does know who her mother is and has a bond with 
her, it’s not that of a parent child.  It’s more that of a aunt/niece, 
someone she’s coming to visit on a consistent basis and that, in 
fact,  [N.A.’s]  primary  bond  and  attachment  to  individuals  as 
parents is that of her foster parents with whom she’s resided since 
she  was  discharged  from  [the  hospital].    And,  in  fact,  the 
testimony  from  both  CUA  worker[s],  which  again  I  did  find 
credible,  is  that  [N.A.]  would  be  negatively  impacted  if,  in  fact, 
she was removed from that home and returned to [Mother] amid 
the concerns that [Mother] could not adequately care for her.  
 

nd  so,  this  court  is  going  to  find  that  given  the  lack  of  parent 
child bond between Mother and [N.A.] and the parent/child bond 
between [N.A.] and her current foster parents, there would not be 
any  detrimental  impact  to  [N.A.]  in  terminating  involuntarily 
[Mother’s] parental rights. 

. . . .  

  A

N.T., 8/5/22, at 95-96 (capitalization altered). 

 

Ms. Faye testified that although N.A. “has an attachment to [Mother], 

it’s about the extent that you would have with an aunt.”  N.T. 8/5/22, at 40.  

From  N.A.’s  perspective,  Ms.  Faye  opined  that  her  parents  are  the  foster 

parents and she has accepted the foster parents’ home as her own.  See id.  

It is to the foster parents whom she looks for comfort, safety, and stability.  

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J-S03001-23 

See  id.  at  39.    While  Ms.  Faye  noted  that  Mother  clearly  had  a  “genuine 

interest in” N.A., the child, “for the most part,” treated Mother “the same way 

she treated other office staff[.]”   Id. at 22.  As such, Ms. Faye opined that 

N.A. would not suffer any irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were terminated.  

See id. at 40.   

Ms. Hylton, the current caseworker, echoed these conclusions:  the pre-

adoptive foster parents meet N.A.’s daily needs, they are to whom she looks 

for comfort, safety, and stability, and it is the foster parents with whom she 

has a parent/child bond.  See id. at 69.  N.A. refers to S.E. as “mom” and L.E. 

as “dad.”  Id.  With respect to Mother, Ms. Hylton testified that it  is “not a 

really strong bond.  [N.A.] responds to [Mother], but it’s not as a mom.  . . . 

It’s not as a mother/daughter bond.  It’s more of she’s visiting with someone.”  

Id. at 70.     

 

We defer to the court’s assessment of the caseworkers’ testimony as it 

is supported by the record.   The court was within its discretion to conclude 

that  Mother  is  not  able  to  meet  the  needs  and  welfare  of  N.A.  and  that 

terminating Mother’s rights best serves N.A.’s needs and welfare.  Accordingly, 

no relief is due with respect to the termination decree. 

Finally, we turn to the goal change order, which we review for an abuse 

of discretion.  In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).  When considering 

a goal change petition, “[t]he best interests of the child, and not the interests 

of the parent, must guide the trial court.  As this Court has held, a child’s life 

simply  cannot  be  put  on  hold  in  the  hope  that  the  parent  will  summon  the 

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ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”  In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 

1089 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).   

Mother contends that the goal change was premature because Mother 

was working on her objectives and had a relationship with N.A.  See Mother’s 

brief at 31.  As noted, N.A. has been in the same foster home since she was 

discharged from the hospital.   Stated succinctly, while we commend Mother 

for  the  strides  she  has  made  in  improving  her  housing  and  employment 

situations, the record is replete with evidence that Mother lacks the capacity 

to  provide  adequate  care  to  N.A.    Given  Mother’s  inability  to  retain  basic 

parenting skills, her voluntary withdrawal from mental health treatment, the 

amount of time N.A. has spent in foster care, and the need for N.A. to achieve 

stability in her own life, the court’s decision to change the permanency goal 

was well within its discretion.  

Based  on  the  foregoing,  we  affirm  the  decree  terminating  Mother’s 

parental rights and the order changing the permanency goal to adoption. 

Decree affirmed.  Order affirmed.  

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oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/21/2023 

    J

  D

 

Judgment Entered.