IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

No. 1026 C.D. 2021 
Argued: February 7, 2023 

 
 

 
 

 

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v. 
 

 
 
v. 
 

andlord Service Bureau, Inc.;   
Michelle Williams; Collyer Realty 
Company, d/b/a Galasso Real Estate 
Services; Santo Policichio; Crown 
Real Estate and Management  
Services 
 
 
 
The City of Pittsburgh and Council 
of the City of Pittsburgh   
 
 
 
Realtors Association of 
 
Metropolitan Pittsburgh, a  
Pennsylvania Corporation Not for 
 
 
Profit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The City of Pittsburgh 
 
 
 
 
 
Apartment Association of  
 
Metropolitan Pittsburgh, a 
 
Pennsylvania Corporation 
 
 
Not for Profit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The City of Pittsburgh, a Home  
 
Rule City 
 
 
 
Appeal of: Landlord Service 
Bureau, Inc.; Michelle Williams; 
Collyer Realty Co., d/b/a Galasso 
Real Estate Services; Santo 
Policichio; and Crown Real Estate 
and Management Services; and  
 
Apartment Association of  
 
Metropolitan Pittsburgh   
 
 

 
 
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 L

 

BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT 

 

FILED:   March 17, 2023 

 

The appellants are Landlord Service Bureau, Inc., Michelle Williams, 

Collyer Realty Company d/b/a Galasso Real Estate Services, Santo Policichio, and 

Crown  Real  Estate  and  Management  Services  (collectively,  Landlord  Service 

Bureau),  and  Apartment  Association  of  Metropolitan  Pittsburgh  (Apartment 

Association) (collectively, Challengers).1  Challengers appeal an order of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court), which granted partial judgment 

on the pleadings to the City of Pittsburgh and the Council of the City of Pittsburgh 

(City Council) (collectively, City).2  Specifically, the trial court held that the City 

had authority to enact an ordinance  to require property owners to obtain a permit 

before  renting  their  properties  for  residential  use  and  to  take  certain  affirmative 

actions to qualify for a permit.  On appeal, Landlord Service Bureau argues that the 

trial court erred because the ordinance imposes affirmative duties, responsibilities, 

and  requirements  upon  the  conduct  of  its  business,  which  regulation  is  expressly 

prohibited under the Home Rule Law.3  For the reasons to follow, we reverse. 
 

PINION  

 O

   

BEFORE:  HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge 
 
 

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge 
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge 

 
 

   

1  Although  the  caption  lists  Realtors  Association  of  Metropolitan  Pittsburgh  (Realtors 
Association), the joint notice of appeal indicates that only Landlord Service Bureau and Apartment 
Association appealed the trial court’s order.  However, on October 6, 2021, this Court ordered that 
Realtors Association was precluded from participating in oral argument because it failed to file a 
brief on the merits.  Landlord Service Bureau and Apartment Association have filed a joint brief. 
2  Thereafter,  a  hearing  was  conducted  on  the  remaining  issue,  i.e.,  the  lawfulness  of  the  fees 
imposed  in  the  challenged  ordinance.    The  final  order  of  the  trial  court  held  that  the  fees  are 
unlawful.  Trial Court Op., 7/20/2021, at 5-6. 
3 Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, 53 Pa. C.S. §§2901-3171 (Home Rule Law).  

 

 

Background 

 

 

In 2015, City Council enacted an ordinance known as the Residential 

Housing  Rental  Permit  Program  (Rental  Ordinance  or  Ordinance).4    The  stated 

purpose  of  the  Ordinance  is  to  “ensure  rental  units  meet  all  applicable  building, 

existing structures, fire, health, safety, and zoning codes, and to provide an efficient 

system for compelling both absentee and local landlords to correct violations and 

maintain,  in  proper  condition,  rental  property  within  the  City  [of  Pittsburgh].”  

PITTSBURGH CODE §781.00.  To that end, the Ordinance requires “the registration of 

residential rental units within the City . . . so that an inventory of rental properties 

and  a  verification  of  compliance  can  be  made  by  City  officials.”    Id.  (emphasis 

added).  

 

 

Under  the  Rental  Ordinance,  no  rental  unit  can  be  leased,  rented,  or 

occupied without the owner first obtaining a permit from the City and designating a 

“responsible local agent.”5  PITTSBURGH CODE §781.02.  A “rental unit” is defined 

as  “any  dwelling  unit  or  residential  structure  containing  sleeping  units,  which  is 

leased or rented from the owner or other person in control of such units, to any tenant 

for a term exceeding fifteen (15) consecutive days within a thirty[(30)]-day period.”  

PITTSBURGH  CODE  §781.01(k).    The  Ordinance  exempts  hotels,  motels,  bed  and 

 

4  City  of  Pittsburgh,  Pa., Code  of  Ordinances  (PITTSBURGH CODE),  Title  VII,  art.  X:  Rental  of 
Residential  Housing  (2015).    The  Rental  Ordinance  repealed  Chapter  781  in  its  entirety  and 
enacted a new Chapter 781, known as the Residential Housing Rental Permit Program. 
5 A “responsible local agent” is “a natural person having his or her place of residence in Allegheny 
County  and/or  a  professional,  licensed  real  estate  management  firm  with  an  office  located  in 
Allegheny County, or an entity which is excluded from licensure by the [] Real Estate Licens[ing] 
[and  Registration]  Act,  [Act  of  February  19,  1980,  P.L.  15,  as  amended,  63  P.S.  §§455.101-
455.902,]  within  an  office  in  Allegheny  County  which  has  been  granted  legal  authority  by  the 
property owner in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth as the agent responsible for 
operating such property in compliance with the ordinances adopted by the City.”   PITTSBURGH 
CODE §781.01(l). 

 

2 

breakfast establishments, public housing units, dormitories, certified rehabilitation 

facilities, long-term medical care facilities, and owner-occupied rental units from its 

 

 

To qualify for  a rental permit, the owner must provide the following 

terms.  Id. 

information: 

(1)  The street address and block and lot number of the rental 
unit(s); 

(2)  The  number  and  types  of  rental  units  within  the  rental 
property; 

(3)  Name,  residence  address,  telephone  number,  and  where 
applicable  an  E-mail  address,  mobile  telephone  number,  and 
facsimile number of all property owners of the rental unit(s); 

(4)  Name,  residence  address,  telephone  number,  and  where 
applicable  an  E-mail  address,  mobile  telephone  number,  and 
facsimile number of the responsible local agent designated by the 
owner, if applicable;  

(5)  The name, residence address, telephone number and where 
applicable  an  E-mail  address,  mobile  telephone  number,  and 
facsimile number of the person authorized to collect rent from 
the tenants;  

(6)  The name, residence address, telephone number and where 
applicable  an  E-mail  address,  mobile  telephone  number,  and 
facsimile  number  of  the  person  authorized  to  make  or  order 
repairs or services of the property, if in violation of City or State 
codes, if the person is other than  the  owner or the responsible 
local agent;   

(7)  The  name,  address  and  telephone  number  of  any  lien-
holder(s)  on  the  rental  unit  or  the  real  property  on  which  the 
rental unit is located at time of annual registration. 
(8)  A  copy  of  a  current  valid  occupancy  permit[6]  for  the 
property shall be provided at the initial application. 

6 Rental unit owners pay separate application and permit fees to obtain an occupancy permit.   

 

3 

 

PITTSBURGH  CODE  §781.03(a).    This  information  goes  into  a  publicly  available 

database.  The annual fee for a rental permit is: $65 per unit for properties that house 

10 or fewer units; $55 per unit for properties that house between 11 and 100 units; 

and  $45  per  unit  for  properties  that  house  more  than  100  units,  plus  applicable 

charges.    PITTSBURGH  CODE  §781.05(b)(i).    Rental  property  owners  domiciled 

outside of Allegheny County must hire a licensed real estate management firm in 

Allegheny County to:  

(1)  Operat[e] the registered rental unit in compliance with all 
applicable City ordinances; and  

Provid[e] access to the rental unit in compliance with all 

2) 
applicable City ordinances; and  

[Be] designated . . . for acceptance of all legal notices or 

(3) 
services of process with respect to the rental units. 

PITTSBURGH CODE §781.03(e). 

 

The  Rental  Ordinance  authorizes  the  City’s  Department  of  Permits, 

Licenses, and Inspections (Department) to inspect each registered rental unit at least 

once every three years.   PITTSBURGH CODE §781.04.  The Ordinance requires the 

Department  to  promulgate  regulations  and  to  create  “a  manual  of  good  landlord 

practice,”  “a  performance-based  regulatory  system,”  a  “landlord  academy,” 

“incentives to encourage ‘good landlords,’” and “other best practices in the field of 

rental licensing.”  PITTSBURGH CODE §781.06(a)-(b).  It also requires the Department 

to “create an online database” for the public to access information related to rental 

properties and their inspections.  PITTSBURGH CODE §781.06(c).  Violations of the 

Ordinance are summary offenses, and the failure to register each rental unit can be 

sanctioned by a fine of $500 per unit per month.  PITTSBURGH CODE §781.09. 

  (

 

 

 

4 

 

 

Following  enactment  of  the  Rental  Ordinance,  Landlord  Service 

Bureau7 filed suit against the City seeking (1) a declaration that the Rental Ordinance 

was ultra vires, void, and unconstitutional and (2) a permanent injunction against its 

enforcement.8  Noting that a rental permit requires the owner to present a copy of its 

occupancy permit, Landlord Service Bureau  asserts that “owners of single-family 

dwellings constructed prior to 1958, have never been required to obtain occupancy 

permits . . . unless after 1958 the exterior dimensions of the single[-]family dwelling 

had  been  altered  resulting  in  an  expanded  footprint.”    Landlord  Service  Bureau 

Complaint  ¶21;  Reproduced  Record  17a-18a  (R.R.  __)  (emphasis  in  original).  

Landlord Service Bureau contends that requiring an occupancy permit and the other 

affirmative  requirements  in  the  Rental  Ordinance  constitute  a  regulation  of  its 

business, which a home rule municipality lacks power to do under the Home Rule 

Law. 

 

Landlord Service Bureau’s seven-count complaint also challenged the 

Rental Ordinance as violative of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.  

Specifically, the registration requirements impair the existing contracts (leases) of 

City landlords in violation of article I, section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 

PA. CONST.  art. I, §17.   The required appointment of an Allegheny County agent 

treats  similarly  situated  property  owners  differently  in  violation  of  the  equal 

protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.  See PA. CONST. art. I, §§1, 

26.    The  requirement  that  city  inspectors  may  enter  leased  rental  units  without 

permission of the owner or its lessee violates the Fourth Amendment to the United 

 

7 Landlord Service Bureau is made up of property owners and property managers engaged in the 
business of renting properties in the City.  Landlord Service Bureau Complaint ¶5; Reproduced 
Record at 14a (R.R. __). 
8 The docket number for this action was GD-15-023074.  R.R. 1a-7a. 

 

5 

States  Constitution,  U.S.  CONST.  amend.  IV,  and  article  I,  section  8  of  the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. art. I, §8.  The Rental Ordinance deprives 

rental  owners  of  the  right  to  enjoy  their  property  in  violation  of  substantive  and 

procedural  due  process  guaranteed  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  United 

States  Constitution,  U.S.  CONST.  amend.  XIV,  and  article  I,  section  9  of  the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. art. I, §9.  Finally, the permit fees are not 

reasonably related to the City’s costs to implement the Ordinance and, thus, impose 

an illegal revenue-generating tax on rental unit owners.   

 

 

Thereafter, the trial court entered an order to address the legal issues, 

and it stated as follows: 

4. 
The  matter  shall  be  bifurcated;  more  specifically  the 
Plaintiffs shall file Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings on the 
following  legal  issues  not  requiring  discovery  and  where  a 
decision  in  favor  of  the  Plaintiffs  and  against  the  Defendants 
would effectively terminate the litigation: (1) Is Ordinance ultra 
vires  in  violation  of  the  Home  Rule  Charter  and  Option  Plans 
Law;  (2)  Is  Ordinance  in  violation  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Constitution;  and  (3)  Is  Ordinance  in  violation  of  Real  Estate 
Licensing and Registration Act. 

Trial Court Order, 2/29/2016, at 1; R.R. 182a (emphasis added).  The “Plaintiffs” 

referred  to  Landlord  Service  Bureau,  Realtors  Association,9  and  Apartment 

Association,10 which also filed actions to challenge the Rental Ordinance.11  The trial 

 

9 The members of Realtors Association are Pennsylvania licensed real estate agents and property 
management firms, many of whom serve as agents for rental property within the City.  Realtors 
Association Complaint ¶2; R.R. 55a.  Additionally, some members of Realtors Association own 
property within the City.  Id. 
10 Apartment  Association  has over 200 members, some of whom  own more than 30,000 rental 
units within Allegheny County, including the City.  Apartment Association Complaint ¶2; R.R. 
88a. 
11 The docket number to Realtors Association’s action was GD-16-003277.  The docket number 
assigned  to  Apartment  Association’s  action  was  GD-16-007082.    They  raised  nearly  identical 

 

6 

court consolidated all three actions for discovery and motions for judgment on the 

pleadings  and  identified  Landlord  Service  Bureau’s  complaint  as  the  lead  docket 

number.    R.R.  109a-10a.    The  parties  to  all  three  actions  filed  cross-motions  for 

judgment on the pleadings at the lead docket number.  

On  July  25,  2017,  the  trial  court  denied  the  Plaintiffs’  motions  for 

judgment on the pleadings and granted the City’s motion for partial judgment on the 

pleadings.  The trial court held that the Rental Ordinance was a valid exercise of 

police powers, enacted to protect the health and safety of rental housing residents.  

“Without  an  identified  person  of  record, there  is nobody to notify of  violations.”  

Trial  Court  Op.,  7/25/2017,  at  3.    The  trial  court  held  that  the  Ordinance  “will 

positively impact neighborhoods by ensuring rental properties are safe;” further, if 

there is a violation, a  registered  contact person  will assist the City’s enforcement 

response.  Id. at 3-4. 

On  the  equal  protection  claim,  the  trial  court  concluded  that  the 

Ordinance’s exemption of hotels, dormitories, hospitals, and public housing, as well 

as the requirement that a rental owner appoint an Allegheny County agent, easily 

survived  a  rational  relationship  analysis.    City  Council  determined  that  non-

compliance  with  applicable  building  and  public  health  codes  in  rental  homes  or 

apartments was not a problem apparent in hotels, motels, dormitories or other owner-

occupied facilities, which satisfied substantive due process.  Finally, the trial court 

 

issues.  Similar to Landlord Service Bureau’s claims, they challenged the Ordinance as violating 
the Home Rule Law and Pennsylvania Constitution, including an equal protection challenge to the 
Ordinance classifications, which exempted owner-occupants, dormitories, and site-based Section 
8  housing,  42  U.S.C.  §§1404a-1406,  1434-1440,  from  the  Rental  Ordinance,  including  those 
property owners who do not reside or have an office in Allegheny County.  They also claimed that 
the  Rental  Ordinance  contravened  the  Pennsylvania  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  by  providing  a 
different  procedure  for  service  of  original  process  on  rental  unit  owners  and  impermissibly 
regulated the business and scope of licensed real estate agents and brokers. 

7 

 

 

 

held that the Ordinance did not violate the Real Estate Licensing and Registration 

Act, 63 P.S. §§455.101-455.902, because it does not relate to the sale or transfer of 

real property.12   

Appeal 

Challengers  filed  a  single  notice  of  appeal  of  the  trial  court’s  order 

entered in the lead docket number.  The caption of the notice of appeal contained 

multiple docket numbers to cover all the actions filed by Landlord Service Bureau, 

Realtors Association, and Apartment Association. 

On October 21, 2021, this Court entered a Rule to Show Cause why the 

appeal should not be quashed in light of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 

(Pa. 2018)  (requiring the filing of separate notices of appeal when a single order 

resolves more than one action listed on the trial court docket).  On November 15, 

2021, the Court ordered the parties to brief that question in their briefs on the merits 

of the appeal.   

 

 

On appeal,13 Challengers raise multiple issues, which we summarize as 

follows.  First, they argue that the appeal should not be quashed because the filing 

of a single notice of appeal at the lead docket number for several consolidated civil 

cases did not violate Walker or PA. R.A.P. 341(a).  Second, they argue that the trial 

court  erred  in  concluding  that  the  Rental  Ordinance  was  not  an  impermissible 

regulation of business forbidden by Section 2962(f) of the Home Rule Law, 53 Pa. 

 

12  The  City  filed  post-trial  motions,  which  were  denied  by  the  trial  court.    Trial  Court  Order, 
8/16/2021. 
13 Our review determines whether the trial court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.  
Hartman v. City of Allentown, 880 A.2d 737, 741 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). 

8 

 

 

 

C.S. §2962(f).  Third, they argue that the trial court erred in rejecting their various 

constitutional challenges to the Rental Ordinance.14   

Quashal of Appeal 

 

 

 

 

We first address whether the appeal should be quashed. 

Pennsylvania  Rule  of  Appellate  Procedure  341(a)  provides  that, 

“[e]xcept as prescribed in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be taken 

as of  right from  any final order of  a government  unit or trial  court.”    PA. R.A.P. 

341(a).  The Official Note to Rule 341 provides, in pertinent part: 

A  party  needs  to  file  only  a  single  notice  of  appeal  to  secure 
review of prior non-final orders that are made final by the entry 
of a final order, see K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 870-71 (Pa. 2003) 
(following trial); Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 54 (Pa. 
2012)  (summary  judgment).    Where,  however,  one  or  more 
orders  resolves  issues  arising  on  more  than  one  docket  or 
relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeal 
must be filed.  Malanchuk v. Tsimura, 137 A.3d 1283, 1288 (Pa. 
2016)  (“[C]omplete  consolidation  (or  merger  or  fusion  of 
actions) does not occur absent a complete identity of parties and 
claims; separate actions lacking such overlap retain their separate 
identities and require distinct judgments[.]”); Commonwealth v. 
C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111, 113 & n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quashing 
appeal taken by single notice of appeal from order on remand for 
consideration under Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 of two persons’ judgments 
of sentence). 

 

14 Challengers assert that the requirement for out-of-county rental unit owners to accept service of 
original  process  by  certified  mail  contravenes  the  Pennsylvania  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure,  in 
violation  of  procedural  due  process.    They  also  assert  the  Ordinance  subjects  rental  property 
owners  to  warrantless,  baseless  searches  in  violation  of  the  constitutional  protection  against 
unreasonable  searches  and  seizures;  requires  the  public  disclosure  of  private  information  in 
violation  of  their  state  constitutional  right  to  privacy;  and  modifies  existing  contracts  between 
landlords and tenants, which unconstitutionally impairs existing contracts. 

 

9 

PA. R.A.P. 341, Official Note (emphasis added).  In Walker, 185 A.3d at 976-77,15 

our Supreme Court interpreted Rule 341(a) as setting forth “a bright-line mandatory 

instruction to practitioners to file separate notices of appeal” for each docket.  The 

failure to do so results in quashal of the appeal.   

 

In Always Busy Consulting, LLC v. Babford & Company, Inc., 247 A.3d 

1033  (Pa.  2021),  our  Supreme  Court  reaffirmed  the  general  rule  in  Walker  that 

separate notices of appeal must be filed, and it confirmed that parties cannot, on their 

own initiative, consolidate matters for appellate review by filing a single notice of 

appeal from an order arising from multiple dockets.  Always Busy Consulting, 247 

A.3d at 1042.  It explained that “consolidation is a determination that must be made 

by  the  appellate  court,  at  its  discretion,  absent  a  stipulation  by  all  parties  to  the 

several appeals.”  Id. (quoting Walker, 185 A.3d at 976); see also PA. R.A.P. 513.16   

 

 

On the other hand, a single appeal may suffice in some circumstances.  

Such a circumstance includes where  

consolidation  of  the  dockets  was  sought  and  granted  in  the 
common  pleas  court,  and  there  existed  complete  identity  of 
parties  and  claims,  such  that  a  single  order  disposed  of  the 
litigation  which  involved  two  sides  of  the  same  coin,  i.e., 

 

15 In Walker, the Commonwealth filed a single notice of appeal from a single order which disposed 
of four separate motions to suppress evidence filed by four separate criminal defendants at four 
separate  docket  numbers.    The  matters  had  not  been  consolidated  in  either  the  trial  court  or 
Superior Court, and the parties did not request consolidation.  
16 It states: 

Where  there  is  more  than  one  appeal  from  the  same  order,  or  where  the  same 
question is involved in two or more appeals in different cases, the appellate court 
may, in its discretion, order them to be argued together in all particulars as if but a 
single  appeal.    Appeals  may  be  consolidated  by  stipulation  of  the  parties  to  the 
several appeals. 

PA. R.A.P. 513. 

 

10 

competing petitions to vacate and confirm the same arbitration 
award. 

Always Busy Consulting, 247 A.3d at 1043 (emphasis added).  Noting that a strict 

application of Walker would elevate form over substance, the Supreme Court held 

that “filing a single notice of appeal from a single order entered at the lead docket 

number  for  consolidated  civil  matters  where  all  record  information  necessary  to 

adjudication of the appeal exists, and which involves identical parties, claims and 

issues, does not run afoul of Walker, Rule 341, or its Official Note.”  Always Busy 

Consulting, 247 A.3d at 1043 (emphasis added). 

 

 

In  Commonwealth  v.  Young,  265 A.3d  462  (Pa.  2021),  our  Supreme 

Court again affirmed that separate appeals must be filed where an order concerns 

more  than  one  docket.    However,  it  also  observed  that  Walker  and  Always  Busy 

Consulting did not consider the interplay between Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure 341(a) and 902,17 which “permits the appellate court, in its discretion, to 

allow correction of the error, where appropriate.”  Young, 265 A.3d at 477.   

 

In  Young,  two  defendants  were  prosecuted  for  hazing  rituals  at  The 

Pennsylvania State University under separate docket numbers.  The common pleas 

court  consolidated  the  docket  numbers  for  each  defendant  for  trial,  and  the 

defendants filed an omnibus pre-trial motion listing all three docket numbers.  The 

court granted the motion, in part, issuing an opinion and order reflecting a double 

caption at the top, one for each defendant, listing  all three docket numbers.   The 

17 PA. R.A.P. 902.  It states, in pertinent part: 

 

Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but it is subject to such action as 
the  appellate  court  deems  appropriate,  which  may  include,  but  is  not  limited  to, 
remand of the matter to the lower court so that the omitted procedural step may be 
taken. 

Id. 

 

11 

 

 

Commonwealth filed two notices of appeal, one for each defendant.   Each notice 

contained the three docket numbers pertaining to that defendant.   

In  response 

to 

the  Superior  Court’s  show  cause  order, 

the 

Commonwealth argued that it should be permitted to amend its formatting error in 

its  notices  of  appeal.    However,  the  Superior  Court  quashed  the  appeals  under 

authority of Walker.   

Our Supreme Court reversed.  It agreed that the exception in Always 

Busy  Consulting  was  not  so  broad  as  to  encompass  the  order  at  issue  on  appeal 

because  the  docket  numbers  were  not  the  same  “sides  of  the  same  coin,”  i.e., 

different ways of litigating the exact same dispute, and there was no lead docket 

number.  Young, 265 A.3d at 475.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found merit in 

the Commonwealth’s contention that quashing its appeal would “elevate form over 

substance.”  Id.  It noted “another rule with a role to play in matters like this one: 

PA. R.A.P. 902 (manner of taking appeal).”  Young, 265 A.3d at 475.  Pennsylvania 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 902 permits an appellate court, in its discretion, to allow 

correction of a docket error, where appropriate.  Young, 265 A.3d at 477.  Rule 902 

“encourages, though it does not require, appellate courts to remand the matter to the 

lower court so that the procedural defect may be remedied.”  Young, 265 A.3d at 477 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 587-88 (Pa. 2014)).  Under Rule 

902,  a  procedurally  defective,  albeit  timely,  notice  of  appeal  can  be  corrected  to 

allow the appellate court to reach the merits.  Young, 265 A.3d at 477.  The Supreme 

Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court to reconsider the Commonwealth’s 

request to correct its error. 

 

Here, Challengers filed a single, joint notice of appeal at the lead trial 

docket number (GD-15-023074).  On the notice was a triple caption, one for each 

 

12 

plaintiff, and the three trial docket numbers, noting their  consolidation at the lead 

trial docket number (GD-15-023074).  Copies of the notice of appeal, however, were 

not also filed under the other two trial docket numbers (GD-16-003277 and GD-16-

00782).  See R.R. 8a-11a.   

 

Challengers argue that a single notice of appeal was appropriate, citing 

Always Busy Consulting.   Although they did not seek leave of  court to  remedy a 

procedural defect after this Court issued a rule to show cause, they do so in their 

joint brief on the merits, should the Court find Always Busy Consulting inapplicable.  

Challengers Brief at 18.  The City responds that this Court lacks discretion to remand 

for Challengers to correct defects in the filing of the notice of appeal.  There was no 

breakdown  in  court  operations,  as  in  Always Busy  Consulting,  and  there  was  not 

“true consolidation” of the docket numbers because the cases were not consolidated 

for trial.  Further, the notice of the appeal was not filed on all trial dockets, as in 

Young.   

 

We agree that the trial court’s consolidation of the cases for judgment 

on  the  pleadings  was  not  a  complete  consolidation.    See  PA.  R.A.P.  341(b)(1), 

Official Note.18  The cases did not involve identical parties and claims, particularly 

on the constitutional claims.  Nevertheless, the docket numbers were consolidated 

by the trial court for purpose of motions for judgment on the pleadings, specifically 

identifying the issues to be decided.   The trial court’s single order disposed of the 

legal issues on which the trial court ordered consideration.  The appeal from a single 

order  entered  at  the  lead  docket  number  has  all  record  information  necessary  to 

 

18 The Note cites Malanchuk v. Tsimura, 137 A.3d 1283, 1288 (Pa. 2016), for the proposition that 
“complete consolidation (or merger or fusion of actions) does not occur absent a complete identity 
of  parties  and  claims;  separate  actions  lacking  such  overlap  retain  their  separate  identities  and 
require distinct judgments[.]”  PA. R.A.P. 341, Official Note. 

 

13 

adjudicate the appeal.  Given these circumstances, we agree with Challengers that 

the dockets “merged” for partial judgment on the pleadings and, thus, fit within the 

narrow exception of Always Busy Consulting.   

 

Accordingly, the appeal will not be quashed.19  

A.  Home Rule Law 

The  Pennsylvania  Constitution  guarantees  the  right  of  home  rule.  

Article IX, section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: 

Municipalities shall have the right and power to frame and adopt 
home rule charters.  Adoption, amendment or repeal of a home 
rule charter shall be by referendum.  The General Assembly shall 
provide  the  procedure  by  which  a  home  rule  charter  may  be 
framed and its adoption, amendment or repeal presented to the 
electors.  If the General Assembly does not so provide, a home 
rule charter or  a procedure for framing and presenting a home 
rule charter may be presented to the electors by initiative or by 
the governing body of the municipality.  A municipality which 
has a home rule charter may exercise any power or perform any 
function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter 
or by the General Assembly at any time. 

PA.  CONST.  art.  IX,  §2.    Any  power  not  withheld  by  the  General  Assembly  is 

extended to a municipality that has adopted home rule.  See City of Philadelphia v. 

Schweiker, 858 A.2d 75, 84 (Pa. 2004) (holding that home rule municipality “may 

legislate  concerning  municipal  governance  without  express  statutory  warrant  for 

each new ordinance”).  However, the Home Rule Law extends home rule authority 

over matters “not denied by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, by statute or by [the] 

home rule charter.”  53 Pa. C.S. §2961; see City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of 

 

19 The City also argued in its brief that Challengers waived all issues on appeal because they failed 
to file post-trial motions.  Post-trial motions are filed following trial by jury or trial by a judge 
without a jury present.  PA.R.CIV.P. 227.1, Official Note.  However, a motion for post-trial relief 
may not be filed to orders disposing of motions for judgment on the pleadings.  Id. 

 

14 

Police,  Fort  Pitt  Lodge  No.  1,  161  A.3d  160,  170  (Pa.  2017)  (quoting  Spahn  v. 

Zoning Board of Adjustment, 977 A.2d 1132, 1143-44 (Pa. 2009)) (legislature “may 

limit the functions to be performed by home rule municipalities”).  In other words, 

“the  home  rule  charter  shall  not  give  any  power  or  authority  to  the  municipality 

contrary to or in limitation or enlargement of powers granted by statutes which are 

applicable to a class or classes of municipalities[.]”  53 Pa. C.S. §2962(a).  

Grants of municipal power “shall be liberally construed in favor of the 

municipality.”  53 Pa. C.S. §2961.  Thus, “[i]n analyzing a home rule municipality’s 

exercise of power, . . . we begin with the view that it is valid absent a limitation 

found in the Constitution, the acts of the General Assembly, or the charter itself, and 

we resolve ambiguities in favor of the municipality.”  Nutter v. Dougherty, 938 A.2d 

401, 411 (Pa. 2007) (quoting County of Delaware v. Township of Middletown, 511 

A.2d 811, 813 (Pa. 1986)). 

Further,  home  rule  “incorporates  and  reinforces  local  municipalities’ 

traditional  police  powers.”    Pennsylvania  Restaurant  and  Lodging  Association  v. 

City  of  Pittsburgh,  211  A.3d  810,  817  (Pa.  2019).    That  police  power  has  been 

described as that which “promote[s]  the health, safety and general welfare  of the 

people.”  Id. (quoting Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 314 (Pa. 1995)).  

The  police  power  authorizes  “broad  and  varied  municipal  activity  to  protect  the 

health, morals, peace and  good order of the  community.”    Adams  v.  City  of  New 

Kensington, 55 A.2d 392, 395 (Pa. 1947).  

On the other hand, Section 2962(f) of the Home Rule Law prohibits a 

home rule municipality from regulating the conduct of a business enterprise unless 

expressly authorized by another statute.  It states as follows: 

A  municipality  which  adopts  a  home  rule  charter  shall  not 
determine duties, responsibilities or requirements placed upon 

15 

 

 

 

 

businesses,  occupations  and  employers,  including  the  duty  to 
withhold,  remit  or  report  taxes  or  penalties  levied  or  imposed 
upon  them  or  upon  persons  in  their  employment,  except  as 
expressly provided by statutes which are applicable in every part 
of 
to  all 
municipalities  or  to  a  class  or  classes  of  municipalities.    This 
subsection shall not be construed as a limitation in fixing rates of 
taxation on permissible subjects of taxation. 

this  Commonwealth  or  which  are  applicable 

53 Pa. C.S. §2962(f) (emphasis added).  This Court and our Supreme Court have 

addressed the application of Section 2962(f) to several ordinances. 

In Smaller Manufacturers Council v. Council of City of Pittsburgh, 485 

A.2d 73 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984), this Court considered an ordinance that addressed the 

economic disruption caused by plant closings by requiring the employer to notify 

the City when a plant closed, or relocated, or reduced operations, affecting more than 

15%  of  plant  employees.    We  held  that  the  ordinance  was  invalid  under  former 

Section  302(d)  of  the  Home  Rule  Law20  because  it  regulated  the  “duties, 

responsibilities  or  requirements”  of  the  businesses.    53  Pa.  C.S.  §2962(f).    We 

reasoned that “if the City wishes to act in this area[,] it must be empowered to do so 

by the General Assembly.”  Smaller Manufacturers Council, 485 A.2d at 77. 

At issue in Building Owners and Managers Association of Pittsburgh 

v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  985  A.2d  711  (Pa.  2009),  was  an  ordinance  that  imposed 

requirements  on  city  contractors  providing  janitorial  and  security  services  to 

commercial buildings.  The ordinance required a contractor awarded a new contract 

to retain the employees of the prior contractor for 180 days after commencement of 

 

20 Act of April 13, 1972, P.L. 184, as amended, added by the Act of April 13, 1972, P.L. 184, 
formerly 53 P.S. §1-302(d), repealed by the Act of December 19, 1996, P.L. 1158, No. 177.  The 
language of former Section 302(d) was virtually identical to that found in Section 2962(f).  See 
Building Owners and Managers Association of Pittsburgh v. City of Pittsburgh, 929 A.2d 267, 270 
n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), aff’d, 985 A.2d 711 (Pa. 2009). 

16 

 

 

 

the new contract.21  The Supreme Court held that the ordinance placed affirmative 

duties  on  employers  in  violation  of  Section  2962(f)  of  the  Home  Rule  Law.    By 

prohibiting  a  contractor  from  releasing  any  employees  of  its  predecessor  for  180 

days,  the  ordinance  imposed  a  “‘requirement’  .  .  .  upon  the  new  contractor.”  

Building Owners and Managers Association of Pittsburgh, 985 A.2d at 714.   

In Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association, 211 A.3d 810, 

the  Supreme  Court  considered  two  City  ordinances.    The  first  required  local 

businesses  to  provide  paid  sick  leave  to  enhance  public  health,  and  the  second 

ordinance required building owners to train employees on disaster preparedness to 

protect building occupants and property.   

As to the first ordinance, our Supreme Court held that the City did not 

exceed its home rule authority in enacting the ordinance.  In reaching this decision, 

the  Court  relied  on  Section  16(c)  of  the  Disease  Prevention  and  Control  Law  of 

1955,22 which permits municipalities with departments of health to enact  “health-

related  ordinances  or  regulations.”    Pennsylvania  Restaurant  and  Lodging 

Association, 211 A.3d at 827.  The City satisfied the threshold requirement of being 

a municipality with a department of health, and the challengers did not dispute that 

paid sick leave advanced the cause of disease prevention and control.  Id. at 828-29.  

The  Supreme  Court  concluded  that  the  ordinance  represented  an  exercise  of  the 

City’s traditional police powers as well as its authority under the Disease Prevention 

 

21 The purpose of the ordinance was to protect certain non-supervisory workers who lost their jobs 
when their employer’s service contract was awarded to a new contractor.  Under the ordinance, 
any  contractor  awarded  a  new  service  contract  was  required  to  retain  most  employees  of  the 
previous contractor for a 180-day transition period.  The ordinance applied to contractors with five 
or  more  employees  providing  janitorial,  security,  or  building  maintenance  services  to  large 
commercial buildings within the City.  Any contractor violating the ordinance would be subject to 
fines, and the displaced employee was given a private right of action to enforce the ordinance. 
22 Act of April 23, 1956, P.L. (1955) 1510, as amended, 35 P.S. §521.16(c). 

17 

 

 

 

and Control Law of 1955.  The ordinance burdened local businesses, but it was a 

burden authorized by the Disease Prevention and Control Law of 1955.  As such, it 

satisfied the exception in Section 2962(f) of the Home Rule Law. 

 

On the second City ordinance, the Supreme Court reached a different 

conclusion.  This ordinance imposed “numerous complex and continuing obligations 

upon  owners  and  employees  of  ‘covered  properties,’”  to  ensure  that  the  building 

managers were capable of protecting building occupants and property.  Pennsylvania 

Restaurant and Lodging Association, 211 A.3d at 832.  The Supreme Court rejected 

the City’s arguments in defense of the ordinance, explaining as follows: 

Even if this case does not pronounce the ever-elusive bright-line 
rule, it enables us to bracket the gray area between what is and is 
not allowed by the limitations upon business regulation imposed 
by the Business Exclusion.  While [a paid sick days ordinance] 
certainly  burdens  [City]  employers,  it  clearly  falls  within  the 
ambit  of  the  City’s  express  statutory  authority  to  legislate  in 
furtherance of disease control and prevention. 

to 

sustain 

imposing 

[an  ordinance 

Conversely,  the  City  fails  to  identify  any  statutory  authority 
sufficient 
training 
requirements on certain building owners and employees].  While 
the  training  that  the  [ordinance]  mandates  may  well  have  a 
salutary  public  effect  in  disaster  management,  the  measure’s 
multifarious provisions simply want for any statutory authority, 
express  or  otherwise.    For  owners  and  operators  of  qualifying 
facilities, maintaining and securing those facilities is a major, if 
not principal, function, and the definitions of “security officer” 
and  “building  service  employee,”  are  sufficiently  broad  to 
capture, at least as to some properties, virtually every individual 
employed  by  the  building’s  management.    For  the  foregoing 
reasons, we must conclude that no statutory provision cited by 
the City comes close to authorizing such requirements. 

Id. at 837-38 (internal citations omitted).  The Supreme Court held that the second 

City ordinance violated the limits in Section 2962(f) of the Home Rule Law. 

 

18 

In  Apartment  Association  of  Metropolitan  Pittsburgh,  Inc.  v.  City  of 

Pittsburgh,  261  A.3d  1036  (Pa.  2021)  (Apartment  Association  II),  the  Supreme 

Court considered a challenge to an ordinance that prohibited landlords from refusing 

to  rent  to  persons  receiving  housing  assistance.    The  ordinance  supplemented  an 

existing  ordinance  prohibiting  other  forms  of  discrimination  in  housing.    The 

Supreme Court agreed with the association that the ordinance placed an affirmative 

duty on residential landlords by making them participate in an otherwise voluntary 

federal  housing  subsidy  program,  which,  in  turn,  involved  numerous  and 

burdensome requirements.  The City’s general police powers and the Pennsylvania 

Human  Relations  Act23  did  not  authorize  enactment  of  an  ordinance  prohibiting 

discrimination on the basis of source of income. 

Here, Challengers argue that the Rental Ordinance imposes “a farrago 

of  affirmative  duties  on  housing-provider  businesses”  without  an  underlying 

statewide  statute  to  authorize  such  regulation.    Challengers  Brief  at  22.    The 

Ordinance requires rental property owners to obtain a permit and allow inspections 

of each rental unit, with or without permission of the tenant; to report personal and 

private data to the City for disclosure to the public; and to designate a responsible 

local  agent  for  out-of-county  owners.    The  local  agent  must  be  a  property 

management company located in Allegheny County that will manage the rental unit; 

allow  City  officials  to  enter  their  properties  to  conduct  an  inspection;  and  accept 

legal process on behalf of the rental unit owner.   

The City argues that the Rental Ordinance  is authorized by its broad 

police power to protect the health and safety of rental housing residents.  This Court 

has already held that rental registration and inspection ordinances are a valid exercise 

23 Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§951-963. 

 

19 

 

 

 

 

of the police power.  City Brief at 18 (citing Berwick Area Landlord Association v. 

Borough  of  Berwick,  48  A.3d  524  (Pa.  Cmwlth.  2011);  Simpson  v.  City  of  New 

Castle, 740 A.2d 287 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999); McSwain v. Commonwealth, 520 A.2d 

527 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985)).  The Rental Ordinance simply requires the permitting and 

registration of a rental unit, without directing the day-to-day operation of the rental 

business,  to  ensure  compliance  with  building  codes  that  already  apply  to  rental 

owners.    Thus,  according  to  the  City,  the  Ordinance  does  not  implicate  Section 

2962(f) of the Home Rule Law. 

First,  the  rental  registration  and  inspection  ordinances  at  issue  in 

Berwick, Simpson, and McSwain were not as extensive in scope.  They required a 

permit but limited the inspections to periods of vacancies or required a warrant.  The 

Rental Ordinance goes beyond a permit and very occasional inspection.  Second, 

two of the cited cases involved ordinances that were authorized under the applicable 

borough code.  Third, even if the police power authorizes the Rental Ordinance, that 

power, in turn, is limited by Section 2962(f) of the Home Rule Law. 

Section 2962(f) prevents “regulations that burden commercial interest 

absent express authorization[.]”  Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association, 

211 A.3d at 832.  The Rental Ordinance imposes affirmative and numerous duties 

and requirements on businesses engaged in renting residential units, beyond just the 

registration and permitting of rental units.  The Ordinance requires inspections of 

rental  units  and  the  employment  of  a  licensed  real  estate  management  firm  in 

Allegheny County.  The Ordinance requires the creation of a landlord academy and 

a manual of good landlord practice.  To the extent this will require participation of 

landlords, it is a training that was held to be unauthorized for building managers in 

Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association.  The Ordinance directs the City 

20 

 

 

 

to create a database on rental units and their inspections and make this information 

available  to  the  public,  which  will  impact  landlords  by  having  their  contact 

information  and  other  personal,  identifying  information  accessible  to  the  public.  

PITTSBURGH CODE §781.06(c). 

 

To  adopt  such  affirmative  requirements,  the  City  needed  “express 

authorization,” Pennsylvania Restaurant and Lodging Association, 211 A.3d at 832, 

under  a  statute  “applicable  in  every  part  of  this  Commonwealth  or  which  [is] 

applicable to all municipalities or to a class or classes of municipalities.”  53 Pa. C.S. 

§2962(f).  The City asserts that this authority is found in Section 101 of its Home 

Rule Charter:  

The  City  of  Pittsburgh  has  all  home  rule  powers  and  may 
perform any function and exercise any power not denied by the 
Constitution, the laws of Pennsylvania, or this charter whether 
such powers or functions are presently available to the City or 
may  in  the  future  become  available.    The  powers  of  the  City 
shall be construed liberally in favor of the City, and the specific 
mention  of  particular  powers  in  this  charter  shall  not  be 
construed as limiting in any way the general power stated in this 
article.  All possible powers of the City, except as limited above, 
are  to  be  considered  as  if  expressly  set  forth  in  this  article 
whether such powers are presently available to the City, or may 
in the future become available. 

Home  Rule  Charter  of  the  City  of  Pittsburgh  (CITY  CHARTER)  §101  (emphasis 

added).  One power denied to the City is the power to impose “duties, responsibilities 

or requirements” upon the conduct of “businesses, occupations and employers.”  53 

Pa. C.S. §2962(f). 

The City argues that if it cannot enact its Rental Ordinance, it will have 

less power than a non-home rule counterpart, which would be contrary to law.  This 

Court has explained that “a home[]rule municipality cannot, except where specified 

21 

 

 

clearly by statute or the municipality’s own charter, find itself vested with less power 

than  a  non-home[]rule  counterpart.”    Apartment  Association  of  Metropolitan 

Pittsburgh,  Inc.  v.  City  of  Pittsburgh,  228  A.3d  960,  972  (Pa.  Cmwlth.  2020) 

(Apartment  Association  I)  (quoting  Pennsylvania  Restaurant  and  Lodging 

Association,  211  A.3d  at  824).    Here,  Section  2962(f)  of  the  Home  Rule  Law 

provides this “clear specification.”  Id.   

 

 

The City’s reliance on Berwick, 48 A.3d 524, Simpson, 740 A.2d 287, 

and McSwain, 520 A.2d 527, is misplaced.  Each case raised similar constitutional 

issues: equal protection, due process, and the Fourth Amendment.  However, none 

raised the issue of Section 2962(f) of the Home Rule Law.  In Berwick, 48 A.3d at 

535, the ordinance required landlords to prevent violations of the noise ordinance by 

their tenants; it did not impose any “additional civil/criminal liability upon owners 

other  than  that  which  is  imposed  by  existing  law.”    In  Simpson,  an  ordinance 

requiring an inspection before renewal of a two-year permit was held not to implicate 

the Fourth Amendment because a warrant was required.  In McSwain,24 an ordinance 

requiring  a  vacant  dwelling  to  pass  a  housing  code  inspection  before  it  could  be 

rented again was authorized by the municipality’s police powers.  The ordinances 

were expressly authorized by the applicable borough or city code.  Here, the Rental 

Ordinance imposes many more requirements upon rental unit owners,25 such as the 

 

24 The City of Farrell is a home rule municipality, but that fact is not mentioned in McSwain.  The 
challenge was to the constitutionality of a city inspection after a rental unit was vacated before it 
could be rented again. 
25 Rental unit owners must have an occupancy permit before they can apply for a rental permit.  
The rental permit application requires the property owner to provide the contact information for 
all property owners of the unit, the responsible local agent, the person authorized to collect rents, 
the  person  authorized  to  order  repairs  or  services  for  the  property,  and  any  lienholders.    This 
information  on  rental  properties  and  inspections  will  be  put  into  a  public,  online  database.  
PITTSBURGH CODE §781.06(c). 

 

22 

appointment of an agent in Allegheny County and a search without the owner’s or 

lessee’s permission.26 

Finally,  the  City  argues  that  the  Rental  Ordinance  is  similar  to  the 

ordinance upheld by this Court in Hartman v. City of Allentown, 880 A.2d 737 (Pa. 

Cmwlth.  2005).    In  Hartman,  a  home  rule  municipality  passed  an ordinance  that 

made  sexual  orientation  and  identity  a  prohibited  basis  of  discrimination  in 

employment,  housing,  and  public  accommodations.    The  anti-discrimination 

ordinance did not require businesses to do anything; rather, it was prohibitory in its 

effect.  As such, we held that the ordinance did not violate Section 2962(f) of the 

Home Rule Law.  We stated that “a narrow reading of Section 2962(f) of the Home 

Rule Law is consistent with the Legislature’s intent . . . that the phrase ‘regulation 

of business’ means affirmative duties being placed on businesses.”  Hartman, 880 

Hartman addressed an anti-discrimination ordinance that was amended 

to include sexual orientation and gender identity within its scope.  In contrast, the 

Rental Ordinance places affirmative and specific duties upon those in the business 

of  renting  real  property,  which  is  the  type  of  regulation  that  Section  2962(f) 

A.2d at 746.   

prohibits. 

The Rental Ordinance imposes numerous affirmative duties upon rental 

unit owners.  In light of the express limitations in Section 2962(f) of the Home Rule 

 

26 The City adopted the 2015 edition of the International Property Maintenance Code.  PITTSBURGH 
CODE §1004.01.  It provides that if entry into a structure or upon a premises is refused, the code 
official  shall  have  the  remedies  provided  by  law  to  secure  entry.    Section  104.3  of  the  2015 
International 
at 
Maintenance 
https://codes.iccsafe.org/content/IPMC2015/chapter-1-scope-and-administration#IPMC2015_ 
Ch01_SubCh02 (last visited March 17, 2023).  At argument, the City stated that a warrant would 
be  obtained  if  an  owner  or  lessee  refused  to  allow  the  Department  to  inspect  the  rental  unit.  
However, the Rental Ordinance does not require a warrant for inspection and does not refer to the 
2015 International Property Maintenance Code’s property inspection procedures. 

available 

Property 

Code, 

23 

 

 

 

 

Law,  we  conclude  that  the  City  was  without  authority  to  enact  the  Rental 

Ordinance.27 

Conclusion 

 

As  established  in  Berwick,  Simpson,  and  McSwain,  requiring  the 

registration of rental units is not the problem with the Rental Ordinance.  It is the 

inspection without permission of an owner and lessee, together with the obligation 

of rental unit owners to hire a responsible local agent, to follow best practices, to 

attend a landlord academy, and to have their registration and inspection information 

put on a public, online database that place affirmative “duties, responsibilities [and] 

requirements” on rental unit owners.  The City has not identified “a statute applicable 

in every part of this Commonwealth” that “expressly” authorized this wide-ranging 

regulation of the residential landlord business.  53 Pa. C.S. §2962(f).  Consequently, 

the  City  was  without  authority  to  enact  the  Rental  Ordinance  in  its  present 

configuration.  Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed. 

 

 

   _____________________________________________ 
             MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita 

 

27 Because we have concluded that the Rental Ordinance violates the Home Rule Law, we need 
not  address  Challengers’  constitutional  issues.    Department  of  Conservation  and  Natural 
Resources v. Office of Open Records, 1 A.3d 929, 936 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (a court should refrain 
from deciding constitutional issues when a dispute can be resolved on a statutory basis). 

24 

 

 

 

 

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

No. 1026 C.D. 2021 
 

 
 

 
 

 

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v. 
 

 
 
v. 
 

andlord Service Bureau, Inc.;   
Michelle Williams; Collyer Realty 
Company, d/b/a Galasso Real Estate 
Services; Santo Policichio; Crown 
Real Estate and Management  
Services 
 
 
 
The City of Pittsburgh and Council 
of the City of Pittsburgh   
 
 
 
Realtors Association of 
 
Metropolitan Pittsburgh, a  
Pennsylvania Corporation Not for 
 
 
Profit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The City of Pittsburgh 
 
 
 
 
 
Apartment Association of 
 
Metropolitan Pittsburgh, a 
 
Pennsylvania Corporation 
 
 
Not for Profit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The City of Pittsburgh, a Home  
 
Rule City 
 
 
 
Appeal of: Landlord Service 
Bureau, Inc.; Michelle Williams; 
Collyer Realty Co., d/b/a Galasso 
Real Estate Services; Santo 
Policichio; and Crown Real Estate 
and Management Services; and  
 
Apartment Association of  
 
Metropolitan Pittsburgh   

 
 
 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 L

 

ORDER 

AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 2023, the August 16, 2021, order 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is REVERSED. 

 

 

   _____________________________________________ 
             MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita