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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.A.J.P., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: J.P., MOTHER 

    A

J-S04031-23  

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 26, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000359-2022 

 No. 2389 EDA 2022 

EFORE:  MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: 

FILED MARCH 16, 2023 

 

J.P. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas  of  Philadelphia  County  (trial  court)  granting  the  petition  filed  by  the 

Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) to involuntarily terminate 

her parental rights to K.A.J.P. (Child) (age two; d.o.b. July 2020) pursuant to 

the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and changing 

the permanency goal to adoption.1  She argues that  the trial court erred in 

____________________________________________ 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

  The  trial  court  also  involuntarily  terminated  the  parental  rights  of  all 
unknown putative fathers on August 26, 2022.  On August 30, 2022, the trial 
court granted DHS’s  petition to verify  the  deceased status of Child’s known 
putative father who had been identified on her birth certificate and fatally shot 
soon after her birth in 2020 before the completion of ordered paternity testing. 
 

 

 

  B

  1

  

J-S04031-23 

termination.  We affirm. 

the record. 

finding  that  DHS  provided  clear  and  convincing  evidence  to  support 

 

We take the following factual background and procedural history from 

the  trial  court’s  November  10, 2022  opinion  and  our  independent  review  of 

I. 

A. 

 

On  July  4,  2020,  Child  and  Mother  tested  positive  for  oxycodone  and 

fentanyl  at  the  time  of  Child’s  birth  at  the  Hospital  of  the  University  of 

Pennsylvania (HUP).  (N.T. Hearing, 6/27/22, at 16).  Mother stated that she 

took both prescribed and illegally obtained oxycodone and several medications 

for leg pain and for her diagnoses of anxiety, depression and post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD).  She could not explain the presence of fentanyl. 

 

DHS attempted to establish a safety plan with Mother near the time of 

Child’s  discharge,  but  deemed  the  resources  identified  by  Mother  as 

inappropriate.  DHS obtained an order of emergency protective custody and 

placed  the  then  two-week-old  infant  in  general  foster  care  with  the  foster 

parent who was still caring for her at the time of the termination hearing and 

is Child’s pre-adoptive resource (resource parent).2  On July 20, 2020, Mother 

____________________________________________ 

2 Child was briefly placed with maternal kin for four months for an unsuccessful 
attempt to place her in kinship care.  (See N.T. 6/27/22, at 41-43, 65); (N.T. 
8/26/22, at 34-35); (DHS Exhibit 1, at Orders, 1/15/21, 6/03/21, 10/06/21). 
 

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appeared with appointed counsel at a shelter care hearing at which the court 

found  that  emergency  foster  care  placement  was  necessary  and  authorized 

temporary removal of Child from  Mother’s custody.  (See DHS Exhibit 1, at 

Order, 7/20/20).3 

 

The court adjudicated Child dependent at a September 21, 2020 hearing 

and fully committed her to the custody of DHS, finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that Child was “without proper care or control … necessary for [her] 

physical,  mental,  or  emotional  health,  or  morals”  pursuant  to  the  Juvenile 

Act,4  42  Pa.C.S.  §  6302.    (DHS  Exhibit  1,  at  Order,  9/21/20).    The  court 

ordered a home assessment and visitation for the putative father’s parents.  

Although Mother’s counsel appeared at the adjudicatory hearing, she did not 

do so or challenge the court’s September 21, 2020 order. 

 

The  court  held  an  initial  permanency  review  hearing  on  January  15, 

2021.  Mother appeared and the court ordered her to achieve several goals in 

order to have Child returned to her.  Specifically, the court ordered that she 

provide  proof  of  her  housing  and  employment  to  the  Community  Umbrella 

Agency (CUA) case manager and report to the family court’s clinical evaluation 

unit (CEU) for a forthwith drug screen, coordination of random screens prior 

____________________________________________ 

3 The court also appointed the Defender Association of Philadelphia as legal 
counsel and guardian ad litem for Child. 

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 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375. 

  4

 

J-S04031-23 

to the next hearing, and monitoring of her self-referred treatment program.  

The court authorized the CUA to obtain a progress report and treatment plan 

from Mother’s drug and alcohol treatment provider and to supervise Mother’s 

visitation with Child unless all parties agreed to modify the visitation terms.  

Mother’s objectives were to address her drug use and mental health through 

treatment, to stabilize her housing and parenting ability through the Achieving 

Reunification  Center  (ARC),  to  visit  Child  as  ordered  by  the  court,  to  sign 

consents  and  provide  documentation  for  monitoring  of  her  treatment 

programs, and to obtain treatment for Child if needed.  (See N.T. 6/27/22, at 

22-23). 

 

The permanency plan stayed the same over the course of the case.  At 

each review, the court found that the CUA and DHS were making reasonable 

efforts  at  reunification,  but  that  Mother’s  participation  and  progress  were 

minimal.    (See  DHS  Exhibit  1,  at  Orders,  6/03/21,  10/06/21,  11/22/21, 

2/07/22,  6/27/22);  (N.T.  6/27/22,  at  33,  37,  41);  (Trial  Court  Opinion, 

11/10/22, at 13). 

 

Mother did not appear for the June 3, 2021 permanency review hearing, 

at which time Child was approaching her first birthday.  That summer, Mother 

missed  over  half  of  her  scheduled  visits  with  Child  and  the  court  ordered 

weekly  supervised  visits  on-site  at  the  CUA,  withdrawing  its  permission  for 

them  to  occur  in  a  community  setting.    Because  the  CUA  caseworker  was 

unable to obtain evidence of Mother’s drug and alcohol treatment progress, 

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J-S04031-23 

the  court  ordered  that  Mother  was  to  be  fully  assessed  for  treatment 

recommendations  at  the  CEU  rather  than  for  the  CEU  to  monitor  her 

treatment.    (See  DHS  Exhibit  1,  at  Orders,  6/03/21,  10/06/21,  11/22/21, 

2/07/22, 6/27/22). 

 

Despite an October 6, 2021 hearing  being continued by joint request, 

Mother  appeared  in  court.    The  court  ordered  her  to  have  a  drug  screen 

forthwith  on-site  at  the  CEU,  with  an  intake  assessment  and  random  drug 

screens  to  be  completed  before  the  next  hearing.    (See  DHS  Exhibit  1,  at 

Order,  10/06/21).    Mother  failed  to  appear  at  the  CEU,  at  the  next  review 

hearing or at any other review hearings until after the petition for involuntary 

termination was filed. 

 

On November 22, 2021, after the court discovered that Mother attended 

only  two  out  of  seven  of  her  most  recently  scheduled  visits  with  Child,  it 

reduced the visits from weekly to twice per month.   (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 

37); (DHS Exhibit 1, at Order, 11/22/21).  Appellant did not attend any visits 

with Child in December 2021 or January 2022. 

In  February  2022,  the  court  found  Mother’s  participation  minimal  and 

scheduled a goal change hearing for a court listing.  Mother’s twice monthly 

visits remained supervised at the CUA, with confirmation required twenty-four 

hours in advance.  The court awarded weekly visitation to putative paternal 

relatives that Child had not met.  (DHS Exhibit 1, at Order, 2/07/22). 

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J-S04031-23 

 

After  her  two-month  absence,  Mother  resumed  visitation  with  Child, 

attending five of the six scheduled visits in February and March.  In May and 

June,  she  attended  two  of  the  four  scheduled  visits,  arriving  late  for  both.  

(DHS Exhibit 2, at Visitation Summary, 5/03/22 and 6/15/22). 

B. 

1. 

 

On June 3, 2022, DHS filed a petition to involuntary terminate Mother’s 

parental  rights  (TPR  petition)  and  to  change  Child’s  permanency  goal  to 

adoption.  The court held two hearings on the TPR petition on June 27, 2022, 

and August 26, 2022.5  CUA case manager Kellie Lawson and visitation coach 

Dorian Williams testified on behalf of DHS.  Their testimony was “deemed to 

be credible and accorded great weight” by the trial court.  (Trial Ct. Op., at 

12). 

 

Ms. Lawson confirmed that Mother’s single case plan objectives included 

drug and alcohol and mental health counseling, parenting classes and to sign 

all consents and releases for herself and Child.  The only treatment information 

she was able to obtain was that Mother had been discharged from a suboxone 

maintenance program at Temple because it was not medically appropriate for 

her rehabilitative needs.  Although Mother signed up at Merakey for drug and 

____________________________________________ 

5 Mother appeared at the June 27, 2022 hearing but did not testify on her own 
behalf.    Mother  failed  to  appear  for  the  August  26,  2022  hearing,  but  her 
counsel was in attendance. 
 

- 6 - 

J-S04031-23 

alcohol  treatment,  she  was  discharged  for  non-attendance  and  told  Ms. 

Lawson that she had not been attending because she had housing problems, 

issues  with  her  legs,  work  and  too  many  demands  on  her  schedule.    Ms. 

Lawson called Mother about random drug screens on April 25, May 16, May 

23 and June 1, 2022, but Mother failed to provide them, stating it was due to 

her  schedule  of  living  with  her  daughter  in  Delaware  because  her  housing 

situation was not stable.6  She did restart drug treatment at Merakey on June 

21, 2022, but it was approximately a week before the TPR hearing (and weeks 

after the TPR petition was filed).  She produced positive drug screens on June 

27,  2022  (amphetamines  and  benzodiazepine)  and  August  10,  2022 

(benzodiazepine)  without  an  explanation  or  a  prescription.    (See  N.T., 

6/27/22, at 22-23, 26-28, 26-32, 34, 37, 60-61); (N.T., 8/26/22, at 36). 

 

Mother  obtained  part-time  employment  as  a  home  health  aide  and 

completed housing  training with ARC,  but she did not have housing for Ms. 

Lawson to assess.  She finally attended parenting classes after the TPR petition 

was filed, although they always had been part of the case plan.  (See N.T., 

6/27/22, at 31-32, 45, 61-62). 

 

Ms. Lawson testified that it would be in Child’s best interest to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to free Child for adoption by resource parent and that 

____________________________________________ 

6 Despite Mother’s representation that she was unavailable for drug testing, 
she  had  an  in-person  visit  with  Child  on  June  1,  2022,  at  the  CUA  in 
Philadelphia.  (See Visitation Summary, 6/15/22, Entry 6/01/22). 
 

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J-S04031-23 

Child would not suffer any irrevocable harm if Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated.    Child  is  happy,  healthy  and  bonded  with  resource  parent  who 

provides  her  with  care  and  comfort,  takes  her  to  doctor’s  appointments, 

supports her speech therapy and provides for all her needs.  (See id. at 52-

55, 58-59). 

2. 

 

Ms.  Williams  testified  that  she  supervises  almost  all  of  Mother’s  visits 

with Child, and that the quality and effort Mother put forth had regressed since 

when the case began.  In the beginning of the case, Mother would arrive to 

visits  on  time,  would  bring  things  for  Child  and  was  interested  in  knowing 

about Child and keeping her attention.  After those first few months, Mother 

was almost always late to any visits she actually attended, stopped bringing 

Child things like clothes and shoes, and did not interact with or ask questions 

about  Child.    Instead,  she  mostly  talked  about  her  life  with  Ms.  Williams, 

despite Ms. Williams’s encouragement to pay attention to Child.  (See N.T., 

8/26/22, at 8-21). 

Ms. Williams explained there was no recommendation to offer increased 

or  unsupervised  visitation  with  Child  because  Mother’s  progress  remained 

minimal throughout the life of the case, despite her attending five of six visits 

between February and April 2022.   For example, in May 2021, Ms. Williams 

noted that Mother had attended ten out of the last sixteen visits and was late 

seven out of the ten times she appeared.  (N.T. at 13).  Mother’s compliance 

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J-S04031-23 

continued to be minimal, only attending two of seven visits over the summer 

of  2021,  failing  to  attend  in  December  2021  and  January  2022,  continually 

arriving late for the visits she would make, and missing approximately half of 

her visits overall.  (See id. at 16-21); (see also N.T., 6/27/22, at 37, 40).  

Mother appeared “sluggish” at the visits during the first year of the case and, 

although  she  started  to  do  Child’s  hair  during  the  visits,  she  was  unable  to 

finish, which “was significant because [Child] had very little hair, and it took 

her a long time to  do the very little  that she has.”  (N.T., 8/26/22, at 20); 

(see id. at 17).  After the TPR petition was filed, Mother continued to miss 

one-third  to  one-half  of  her  visits,  which  the  court  had  permitted  to  occur 

weekly pending the conclusion of the TPR hearings.  (See N.T., 6/27/2022, at 

72); (DHS Exhibit 2, at Visit Summary at 6/15/22 and 8/15/22). 

 

Ms. Williams testified that there appeared to be no bond between Child 

and Mother.  (See N.T., 8/26/22, at 10).  Child is “comfortable,” but quiet and 

“just there” with Mother, who is “polite” with her daughter.  However, Child 

engages and plays with her paternal aunt who has visited her since April 2022 

and will hold Ms. Williams’s hand instead of Mother’s.  (Id. at 10-12, 19).  She 

is “a completely different person with the resource parent.”  (Id. at 11).  She 

makes sounds, smiles, stomps her feet in excitement, “makes … a high pitch 

squeaking noise” and “lights up” for the resource parent.  (Id. at 22); (see 

id. at 11, 21-22) (Child waits at the door for the resource parent when the 

visit is over, pulling Ms. Williams to the door to see if she can leave).  Although 

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Child had not begun talking in June 2022 at the time of the first TPR hearing,7 

by  August  she  began  early  intervention  and  was  repeating  whatever  the 

resource  parent  said.    (See  id.  at  11).    Child  treats  the  resource  parent’s 

home as her own, she “hovers” around the resource parent and follows her 

from room to room, and the resource parent is highly attentive to her.  (See 

N.T., 6/27/22, at 54, 57-59).  Ms. Williams testified that Child’s primary bond 

is with her resource parent.  (See N.T., 8/26/22, at 24). 

 

At the conclusion of the August 26, 2022 hearing, the court found clear 

and  convincing  evidence  to  involuntarily  terminate  Mother’s  parental  rights 

pursuant  to  23  Pa.C.S.  §  2511(a)(1),  (2),  (5)  and  (8)  and  23  Pa.C.S. 

§  2511(b). 

 

Mother  timely  appealed  and  filed  a  contemporaneous  Rule  1925(b) 

statement.  See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).  She argues that under the totality 

of the circumstances, the record does not reflect that she has manifested a 

____________________________________________ 

7  Mother  quotes  to  the  language,  “is  Mom  coming?”  from  the  hearing  to 
support her assertion that Child was asking about her.  (Mother’s Brief, at 8).  
However, a review of the transcript reveals that this quoted language was part 
of  DHS  counsel’s  question  to  Ms.  Lawson  about  whether  Mother  attended 
visits.   In fact,  because  Child was not yet speaking at the time of  the  June 
hearing, Mother’s claim that Child said this is impossible.  (N.T., 6/27/22, at 
48); (see id. at 52). 
 

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settled  purpose  to  relinquish  her  parental  claim  or  a  failure  or  refusal  to 

perform parental duties.  (See Mother’s Brief, at 10-11).8 

II. 

A. 

It is well-settled that the party seeking termination must provide clear 

and convincing evidence to do so.   See In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 

343, 358 (Pa. 2021).  “Clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony 

that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact 

to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.”  Id. (citation and brackets omitted).  The trial court terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1),(2), (5), (8) and (b) 

of the Adoption Act, which provides: 

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 
be  terminated  after  a  petition  filed  on  any  of  the  following 
grounds: 
 

____________________________________________ 

8 We review the orphans’ court’s order for an abuse of discretion.  See In re 
G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).  Moreover, 
“[w]e  give  great  deference  to  trial  courts  that  often  have  first-hand 
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.”  In re Interest of 
D.F.,  165  A.3d  960,  966  (Pa.  Super.  2017).    “We  must  employ  a  broad, 
comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial 
court’s decision is supported by competent evidence.”  In re S.H., 879 A.2d 
802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005).  “The trial court is free to believe all, part, or 
none  of  the  evidence  presented  and  is  likewise  free  to  make  all  credibility 
determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”   In re A.S., 11 A.3d 
473, 477 (Pa. Super. 2010).  “If competent evidence supports the trial court’s 
findings,  we  will  affirm  even  if  the  record  could  also  support  the  opposite 
result.”  Id. 
 

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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 
six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either 
has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to 
a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. 
 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 
or  refusal  of  the  parent  has  caused  the  child  to  be  without 
essential  parental  care,  control  or  subsistence  necessary  for  his 
physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the 
incapacity,  abuse,  neglect  or  refusal  cannot  or  will  not  be 
remedied by the parent. 
 

*    *    * 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a 
period  of  at  least  six  months,  the  conditions  which  led  to  the 
removal  or  placement  of  the  child  continue  to  exist,  the  parent 
cannot  or  will  not  remedy  those  conditions  within  a  reasonable 
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the 
removal  or  placement  of  the  child  within  a  reasonable  period  of 
time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the 
needs and welfare of the child. 
 

*    *    * 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 
months  or  more  have  elapsed  from  the  date  of  removal  or 
placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement 
of  the  child  continue  to  exist  and  termination  of  parental  rights 
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.  The rights 
of  a  parent  shall  not  be  terminated  solely  on  the  basis  of 
environmental  factors  such  as  inadequate  housing,  furnishings, 
income,  clothing  and  medical  care  if  found  to  be  beyond  the 
control of the parent.  With respect to any petition filed pursuant 
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

 

 

  (

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J-S04031-23 

J-S04031-23 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 
filing of the petition. 
 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). 

It  is  well-settled  that  “[w]e  need  only  agree  with  [the  trial  court’s] 

decision  as  to  any  one  subsection  of  Section  2511(a)  and  subsection  (b)  in 

order to affirm the termination of parental rights.”  Int. of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 

465, 473 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).  For the following reasons, we 

conclude that the trial court correctly determined that DHS met its burden of 

proof under subsections 2511(a)(1) and (b). 

B. 

 

Mother  argues  that  there  is  little  in  the  record  to  suggest  that  she 

manifested a settled purpose to relinquish her parental rights because in the 

period immediately preceding the filing of the TPR petition, she attended five 

out of six of her scheduled visits with her daughter.  (See Mother’s Brief, at 

13).    She  states  their  recent  interactions  have  been  appropriate,  with  her 

engaged throughout the visit and bringing food and planned activities.  (See 

id. at 15).  She also maintains that “although there had been somewhat of a 

hiatus,” she has restarted drug and alcohol treatment and parenting classes.  

(Id.  at  10).    According  to  Mother,  there  was  “little  presented  as  to  what 

conclusions may be gleaned from” her recent positive drug screens because 

Ms.  Lawson  is  not  a  drug  and  alcohol  professional.    (Id.  at  15).    She  also 

points to the fact that she maintained employment, has completed the housing 

program through ARC and would like to continue to apply for housing with the 

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agency’s assistance.  (See id.).  Under the totality of the circumstances, the 

record does not support Mother’s allegation. 

 

We  first  address  the  court’s  termination  of  Mother’s  parental  rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).  See Int. of K.M.W., supra at 473.  To prove 

grounds for termination under this section, the movant must demonstrate that 

the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim to a 

child or fails to perform parental duties for at least six months before the filing 

of the termination petition.  See id.; In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (same); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). 

Although  it  is  the  six  months  immediately  preceding  the 
filing of the petition that is most critical to the analysis, the court 
must  consider  the  whole  history  of  a  given  case  and  not 
mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.  The court 
must  examine  the  individual  circumstances  of  each  case  and 
consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination 
of his parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the 
totality  of  the  circumstances,  clearly  warrants  the  involuntary 
termination. 
 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 758 (citations omitted). 

 

This Court has held that “[p]arental duty is best understood in relation 

to the needs of a child.  A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support.”  

In  re  Adoption  of  A.C.,  162  A.3d  1123,  1129  (Pa.  Super.  2017)  (citation 

omitted).  These physical and emotional needs “cannot be met by a merely 

passive  interest  in  the  development  of  the  child.    Thus,  this  court  has  held 

that  the  parental  obligation  is  a  positive  duty  which  requires  affirmative 

performance.”    Id.  (citation  omitted).    In  other  words,  “[p]arental  duty 

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requires that the parent act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, 

and  not  yield  to  every  problem,  in  order  to  maintain  the  parent-child 

relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances.”  

Id. (citation omitted). 

A  parent  must  utilize  all  available  resources  to  preserve  the 
parental  relationship,  and  must  exercise  reasonable  firmness  in 
resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-
child relationship.  Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for 
a  more  suitable  or  convenient  time  to  perform  one’s  parental 
responsibilities  while  others  provide  the  child  with  [the  child’s] 
physical and emotional needs. 
 

Id. (citation omitted).9 

While  the  critical  period  for  evaluating  a  parent’s  conduct  is  the  six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the TPR petition, a case’s whole 

history remains relevant and courts should “not mechanically apply the six-

month statutory provision[.]”  In re C.M., 255 A.3d 343, at 364 (Pa. 2021); 

see  23  Pa.C.S.  §  2511(a)(1).    Finally,  “the  court  should  not  consider  any 

____________________________________________ 

9 Mother cites In re Adoption of Baby Girl Flemming, 369 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 
1977), for the principle that there must be an “affirmative indication of positive 
intent”  before  termination  of  parental  rights  can  occur.    (Mother’s  Brief,  at 
13).  However, the version of the Adoption Act containing such language has 
since been repealed and replaced.  Any language requiring a movant to prove 
a parent’s “affirmative indication of positive intent” has been replaced by the 
language  that  it  is  the  parent  who  has  the  positive  duty  to  preserve  the 
relationship by performing her parental duties.  See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 
Comment (Section 2511(a)(1)) “is derived from Section 1.2 of the 1925 Act 
which required a finding of abandonment for at least six months as codified in 
clause  (1).  However, the grounds for abandonment have been broadened; 
relinquishment of parental claim or failure or refusal to perform parental duties 
is now sufficient.”). 

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efforts  by  the  parent  to  remedy  the  conditions  described  therein  which  are 

first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.”  

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

The trial court explains that: 

… The record and testimony presented at the two-day Termination 
Hearing which began on June 27, 2022 and concluded on August 
26, 2022 demonstrated Mother’s ongoing inability to provide care 
for or control her Child.  Her failure to remedy the conditions that 
brought the Child into care indicated a continuing disregard of her 
parental  duties.    Specifically,  Mother  failed  to  provide  suitable 
housing  for  her  Child,  submitted  multiple  urinalysis  positive  for 
illegal narcotics, and failed to visit her Child on a consistent basis.  
The Child was adjudicated dependent in 2020.  Since then, Mother 
refused or proved unable to address her substance abuse issues 
and never developed a bond with the Child who has never resided 
with  Mother  at  any  point  in  her  life.    This  was  despite  constant 
recommendations  from  CUA  and  the  trial  court  to  address  her 
substance abuse issues and make positive progress in developing 
a bond and relationship with the Child. 
 

(Trial Ct. Op., at 9).  The record supports the court’s conclusion. 

DHS filed the TPR petition on June 3, 2022, making December 3, 2021, 

to June 3, 2022, the most relevant period for Section 2511(a)(1) purposes.  

However, we cannot mechanically apply this six-month period, as the entire 

life of the case is relevant. 

On December 3, 2021, Child was slightly less than a year-and-a-half old 

and had been removed from Mother’s custody for all but the first two weeks 

of  her  life  due  to  both  Child  and  Mother  testing  positive  for  oxycodone  and 

fentanyl.    (See  N.T.,  6/27/22,  at  16).    For  the  life  of  the  case,  the  court 

ordered  that  Mother  provide  proof  of  housing  and  employment  to  the  CUA, 

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report  to  the  CEU  for  a  drug  screen,  coordination  of  random  drug  screens, 

treatment  monitoring  and  supervised  weekly  visitation.    (See  id.  at  33).  

However, the court repeatedly found that Mother’s participation and progress 

were minimal.  (See id. at 33, 37, 41); (DHS Exhibit 1, at Orders, 6/03/21, 

10/06/21, 11/22/21, 2/07/22, 6/27/22).   Although consistent visitation and 

confirmation  of  treatment  and  sobriety  would  have  warranted  increased 

visitation,  Mother  failed  to  make  efforts  to  move  beyond  the  decreased 

visitation schedule of two visits per month.  (See N.T., 8/26/22, at 8-9, 16-

21).  After the first year of successful visits, the quality and effort Mother put 

forth with Child regressed, with Mother arriving late, missing visits, failing to 

pay attention to Child, appearing sluggish, unable to accomplish small tasks 

for Child such as doing her hair, and electing instead to try to talk with Ms. 

Williams  about  her  own  life.    (See  id.  at  8-21).    In  fact,  although  Mother 

originally was granted weekly supervised visits with Child, in November 2021, 

visitation  was  reduced  to  twice  per  month  because  of  her  failure  to  attend 

even half of the visits and her overall failure to complete case plan objectives.  

(See Orders, 6/03/21, 11/22/21).  Mother then failed to attend any visits with 

Child  in  December  2021  or  January  2022.    While  she  did  attend  five  of  six 

visits  over  February  and  March  2022,  she  only  attended  two  out  of  four 

scheduled visits in May and June 2022, arriving late for them both.  (See DHS 

Exhibit 2, Visitation Summary, at 5/03/22 and 6/15/22). 

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Mother did not appear at the CEU for the four scheduled random drug 

screens between April 25 and June 1, 2022, blaming it on her work schedule 

and the fact that she was living with a daughter in Delaware despite having 

an  in-person  visit  with  Child  in  Philadelphia  on  June  1,  2022.    (See  id.  at 

Visitation Summary, 6/15/22, entry 6/01/22); (N.T., 6/27/22, at 28-29). 

Prior to the filing of the TPR petition, Mother failed to provide information 

for monitoring of any self-referred drug treatment, with the only information 

the caseworkers were able to obtain being that she had been discharged from 

a  Temple  suboxone  maintenance  program  because  it  was  not  medically 

appropriate and from Merakey for failing to attend.  (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 

60);  (N.T.,  8/26/22,  at  14).    While  Mother  points  to  the  fact  that  she  has 

returned  to  drug  treatment  and  started  parenting  classes,  this  was  a  week 

before the TPR hearing, after the TPR petition was filed, and is not a relevant 

consideration for our review.   (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 27).  In fact, it bears 

noting  that  after  she  began  drug  treatment  in  June  2022,  Mother  produced 

positive drug screens on June 27, 2022 (amphetamines and benzodiazepine) 

and August 10, 2022 (benzodiazepine) despite the drugs not being prescribed.  

(See N.T., 8/26/22, at 31-32).  Although she obtained part-time employment 

as a home health aide and completed housing training with ARC, she did not 

obtain housing to enable her to care for Child.  (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 29-32, 

45, 61-62). 

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Based  on  the  foregoing,  DHS  provided  clear  and  convincing  evidence 

that Mother has failed to complete the objectives set by the court and DHS for 

reunification, and to  perform the parental duties necessary to provide Child 

with the essential care necessary for her physical and mental well-being.  The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that DHS presented sufficiently 

clear  and  convincing  evidence  to  support  termination  based  on  Section 

2511(a)(1). 

C. 

Having  determined  that  the  court  properly  found  that  termination  of 

Mother’s  parental  rights  was  appropriate  under  subsection  2511(a)(1),  we 

now  consider  whether  termination  is  in  Child’s  best  interest  pursuant  to 

subsection 2511(b). 

With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the 
effect that terminating the parental bond will have on the child.  
In  particular,  we  review  whether  termination  of  parental  rights 
would  best  serve  the  developmental,  physical,  and  emotional 
needs and welfare of the child.  It is well settled that intangibles 
such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 
inquiry into needs and welfare of the child. 

ne  major  aspect  of  the  “needs  and  welfare”  analysis 
concerns  the  nature  and  status  of  the  emotional  bond  that  the 
child has with the parent, with close attention paid to the effect 
on the child of permanently severing any such bond.  The fact that 
a child has a bond with a parent does not preclude the termination 
of parental rights.  Rather, the trial court must examine the depth 
of  the  bond  to  determine  whether  the  bond  is  so  meaningful  to 
the child that its termination would destroy an existing, necessary, 
and beneficial relationship.  Notably, where there is no evidence 
of a bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer 
that no bond exists. 

  O

 

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omitted). 

It is sufficient for the trial court to rely on the opinions of 
social workers and caseworkers when evaluating the impact that 
termination of parental rights will have on a child.  The trial court 
may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and 
stability the child might have with the foster parent. 
 

Int.  of  K.M.W.,  supra  at  475  (case  citations  and  most  quotation  marks 

 

Ms. Williams testified that there was no bond between Mother and Child.  

(See N.T., 8/26/22, at 10).  Although Child was comfortable with Mother, she 

was quiet and “just there,” and while Child would play with her paternal aunt 

whom  she  had  just  met  in  April  2022  and  would  hold  Ms.  Williams’s  hand 

instead of Mother’s, her relationship with Mother had not improved.  (Id. at 

10-12,  19).    Conversely,  Child  is  “a  completely  different  person  with  the 

resource parent,” smiling, excitedly interacting and lighting up with her.  (Id. 

at 11); (see id. at 21-22).  When Mother’s visit would end, Child would wait 

at the door looking for her resource parent to see if she could leave.  (See id. 

at 21-22).  Child treats resource parent’s home as her own and hovers around 

resource parent, who is highly attentive to her.  Resource parent provides care 

and comfort to Child and takes her to doctor’s appointments.  (See id. at 44, 

53).    Although  Child  was  not  talking  at  the  time  of  the  first  TPR  hearing  in 

June 2022, by August resource parent was taking her for  early intervention 

speech therapy and Child was repeating words resource parent said.  (See id. 

at 11, 33-34); (N.T., 6/27/22, at 57-59).  Both Ms. Lawson and Ms. Williams 

testified  that  Child’s  primary  bond  is  with  resource  parent,  who  is  a  pre-

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adoptive resource.  (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 54-55, 58-59); (N.T., 8/26/22, at 

24).  Ms. Lawson stated that terminating Mother’s parental rights to allow for 

the resource parent to adopt Child would not negatively impact her and would 

be in her best interest.  (See N.T., 6/27/22, at 52-53, 58-59).  Hence, the 

record  supports  the  trial  court’s  finding  that  the  credible  DHS  witnesses 

established that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve 

Child’s interest pursuant to Section 2511(b) and we find no abuse of discretion 

in its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child and to change her 

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goal to adoption. 

Decree affirmed. 

udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/16/2023 

 

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