NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellee 

           

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OBERT L. ROHRBACH       

 

 

 

v. 

 

 

   

   

  R

   

 

Appellant 

No. 1696 MDA 2021 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 15, 2021 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County 
Criminal Division at No(s):  CP-06-CR-0004178-2016 
 

EFORE:  OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                   FILED: MARCH 16, 2023 

Appellant,  Robert  L.  Rohrbach,  appeals  from  the  order  entered  in  the 

Berks County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition brought 

under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1  We affirm.  

This Court has previously set forth the facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows: 

On the evening of December 18, 2015, [Appellant] was at 
home with his girlfriend and victim, Deni[e]se McAvoy.  At 
some point that evening, they went upstairs to the bedroom 
and an argument ensued, which was heard by the next door 
neighbor.  Ms. McAvoy lay down in the spare bedroom while 
[Appellant] went to bed in the master bedroom. 

n  the  afternoon  of  December  19,  2015,  [Appellant] 
contacted his estranged mother and asked her to come over 
to his house because something horrible had happened.  The 
mother came and he eventually told her that his girlfriend, 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

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J-S28037-22  

Ms.  McAvoy,  was  dead.    His  mother  called  the  police  and 
told them that [Appellant] told her he had killed Ms. McAvoy.  
When  the  first  police  officer  arrived  and  encountered 
[Appellant]  for  the  first  time,  [Appellant]  said,  “I  did  it.  I 
have mental problems. I killed her.”  More officers arrived 
and  they  found  Ms.  McAvoy’s  body  in  bed  in  the  spare 
bedroom.    The  officers  also  found  two  handwritten  notes 
from  [Appellant].    One  said:  “Call  Police.    Suicide.  
Downstairs  bathroom.    Upstairs  middle  bedroom.”    The 
other  had  a  short  explanation  of  [Appellant]  and  Ms. 
McAvoy’s tumultuous relationship and  a short will.   At the 
end it stated, “God forgive me.”  The officers also found a 
makeshift noose in the downstairs bathroom. 

n  autopsy  of  Ms.  McAvoy’s  body  was  performed  by  Dr. 
Supriya Kur[u]villa.  She determined after her examination 
that the manner of death should be classified as a homicide. 

here  was  no  dispute  that  [Appellant]  was  the  only  other 

person present when Ms. McAvoy died…. 

upriya Kuruvilla, M.D., performed the autopsy and opined 
that  the  manner  of  death  was  homicide.    Dr.  Kuruvilla 
testified  that  Ms.  McAvoy  died  from  “complications  arising 
from blunt force injury to the abdomen.”  The initial blow or 
blows  were  “to  the  abdominal  wall  which  resulted  in 
laceration  of  the  pancreas,”  which  in  turn  caused  a 
hemorrhage.    Those  injuries  led  to  the  colon  leaking  fecal 
matter  into  the  abdominal  area,  causing  a  fatal  infection.  
Dr.  Kuruvilla  stated  that  the  injury  would  not  result  in 
immediate death and estimated that the inflammation and 
complications occurred over a period ranging from “several 
hours to a couple of days.”  As to the initial damage to the 
pancreas,  she  explained  that  “less  than  .2  percent  of 
injuries” in blunt force trauma cases are to the pancreas, as 
the organ is well-protected since it sits towards the back of 
the  body.    The  doctor  testified  that  the  force  required  to 
cause  injury  to  that  organ  is  substantial  and  “usually 
requires a very focused and hard force in the middle of the 
abdomen which would then crush the pancreas against the 
spine and then produce injury.”  Dr. Kuruvilla stated that a 
fall  down  the  stairs  or  other  type  of  fall  would  not  cause 
pancreatic  lacerations “unless there’s a fall onto an object 
that  would  explain  that  kind  of  impact.”    Additionally,  Ms. 

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McAvoy  exhibited  several  injuries  to  her  face  that  were  in 
various states of healing. 

amuel  Land,  M.D.,  a  forensic  pathologist,  who  the 
Commonwealth  had  retained  to  review  Dr.  Kuruvilla’s 
findings, testified on behalf of [Appellant].  While he agreed 
that blunt force trauma caused injury to the pancreas and 
ruptured the colon, Dr. Land declined to rule the manner of 
death as a homicide or accidental.  Instead, he concluded it 
was  undetermined.    Dr.  Land  stated  that  a  fall  down  the 
stairs would be an atypical cause of such injuries, “but had 
there been something on the steps, something heavy, let’s 
take a barbell and this woman had fallen onto the barbell, 
that  would  be  a  possibility.”    Dr.  Land  testified  that  he 
reviewed all the police reports, including the notes written 
by [Appellant], which did not change his opinion. 

  Ms. McAvoy had been engaged to a man who developed 
cancer and died on May 15, 2014.  Tara Shinn, Ms. McAvoy’s 
work  manager,  testified  that  Ms.  McAvoy  and  [Appellant] 
began dating about two weeks later.  Shortly thereafter, Ms. 
McAvoy  began  coming  to  work  smelling  of  alcohol  and 
occasionally  with  bruises  on  her  face.    The  two  spoke  in 
private  and  Ms.  McAvoy  indicated  that  [Appellant]  was 
responsible for the injuries.  Ms. McAvoy stopped coming to 
work as of July 11, 2014, and was officially terminated on 
August 12, 2014. 

rs.  Shinn  shared  her  concerns  with  Pamela  Rodriguez,  a 
fellow  co-worker.    Mrs.  Rodriguez  was  friends  with  Ms. 
McAvoy and noticed that the abuse had escalated after Ms. 
McAvoy and [Appellant] moved in together, which she said 
happened sometime in the fall.  On at least three occasions, 
Ms. McAvoy showed Mrs. Rodriguez injuries and asked her 
to take photographs as proof.  Mrs. Rodriguez took photos 
on November 7, November 20 and December 4, 2014.  Ms. 
McAvoy  told  Mrs.  Rodriguez  to  keep  the  evidence  in  case 
something happened to her. 

n  December  9,  2014,  Ms.  McAvoy  called  Mrs.  Rodriguez 
crying and requesting Percocet that Mr. Rodriguez had due 
to a back injury.  Mrs. Rodriguez left work and went to Ms. 
McAvoy’s home and observed severe injuries.   “The whole 
left  side  of  her  face  and  her  shoulder  were  black,  like  not 

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black and blue, but black.  Like her face was so swollen she 
was  unrecognizable.”    Knowing  that  Ms.  McAvoy  had  an 
outstanding  warrant  for  unspecified  alcohol  charges,  Mrs. 
Rodriguez reported her to the police to force Ms. McAvoy’s 
removal from the home. 

fter Ms. McAvoy was released from jail, their socialization 
significantly  decreased.    However,  on  May  10,  2015,  Ms. 
McAvoy  showed  up  at  the  Rodriguez  home  nearly  naked, 
bleeding and bruised.  Mr. Rodriguez testified that he called 
his wife, who left work to come home.  The two decided to 
call the police.  The officer took no action as Ms. McAvoy did 
not want to pursue charges. 
 

*     *     * 
 
Wilson Serrano-Aponte lived next door to Ms. McAvoy and 
[Appellant].  Their homes shared a wall and on December 
18,  2015,  the  day  before  Ms.  McAvoy  died,  he  heard 
“screaming  between  a  man  and  a  lady  ...  [the]  lady 
screaming  like  stop,  stop,  please  stop.”    The  screams 
started at approximately 10:30 p.m. and went on for five to 
fifteen minutes.  

nother neighbor, Wendy Bobst, lived close to [Appellant]’s 
house  and  would  see  Ms.  McAvoy  walking  around  the 
neighborhood.   They would chat a couple times per week.  
Ms. Bobst noticed bruising and cuts on multiple occasions; 
on  one  of  these,  Ms.  McAvoy’s  eyes  were  almost  swollen 
shut  and  her  face  was  bruised.    Eventually,  Ms.  McAvoy 
asked Ms. Bobst to write down a list of names and numbers.  
Ms. Bobst did so and Ms. McAvoy instructed her to contact 
those  persons  if  anything  ever  happened  to  her.    Those 
names included Pamela Rodriguez and Tara Shinn. 

inally,  Erinn  Fortson,  an  employee  of  Laurel  House,  a 
domestic  violence  agency  that  provided  shelter  and 
counseling,  testified  that  on  November  23,  2015,  Ms. 
McAvoy called to inquire about shelter.  The two spoke and 
Ms. McAvoy stated she would call back but never did. 

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J-S28037-22 

ommonwealth v. Rohrbach, 1500 MDA 2018, unpublished memorandum, 

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at 1-3 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 27, 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 417, 218 A.3d 

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On  April  12,  2018,  a  jury  convicted  Appellant  of  third-degree  murder 

and aggravated assault.  The court sentenced Appellant on May 8, 2018, to 

an aggregate term of 16 to 40 years’ incarceration.  On March 27, 2019, this 

Court  affirmed  the  judgment  of  sentence,  and  our  Supreme  Court  denied 

allowance of appeal on October 1, 2019.  See id.   

On October 2, 2020, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition, and 

the court subsequently appointed PCRA counsel.  On August 2, 2021, PCRA 

counsel filed a Turner/Finley “no merit” letter and a motion to withdraw as 

counsel.2  On September 23, 2021, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent 

to  dismiss  the  petition  without  a  hearing  per  Pa.Crim.P.  907,  and  granted 

counsel’s  petition  to  withdraw.    Appellant  did  not  respond,  and  the  court 

denied  PCRA  relief  on  November  15,  2021.    Appellant  timely  filed  a  pro  se 

notice of appeal on December 14, 2021, per the prisoner mailbox rule.3  On 

December 28, 2021, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant complied 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Turner,  518  Pa.  491,  544  A.2d  927  (1988); 
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). 

  Appellant’s  PCRA  petition  was  postmarked  December  14,  2021.    See 
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 
616 Pa. 625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (explaining prisoner mailbox rule provides 
that pro se prisoner’s document is deemed filed on date he delivers it to prison 
authorities for mailing). 

  3

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on January 19, 2022.   

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J-S28037-22 

389 (2019) (internal citations omitted).   

Appointed  PCRA  counsel  …  was  ineffective  for  failing  to 
investigate  Pamela  and  Miguel  Rodriguez,  and  discover 
evidence  of  their  criminal  activities,  arrests,  and  or 
convictions to support Appellant’s PCRA claim that they had 
“motivation to lie.”   

ppointed  PCRA  counsel  …  provided  ineffective  assistance 
of  counsel,  when  he  failed  to  search  the  entire  record  for 
meritorious  PCRA  issues  not  recognized  or  raised  by 
Appellant in his pro se PCRA petition, and document the act 
of  searching  the  record  for  meritorious  issues  in  his 
Turner/Finley letter, and finding none.   
 

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J-S28037-22 

 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

(Appellant’s Brief at 2).4   

“Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under 

the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA 

court  is  supported  by  the  evidence  of  record  and  is  free  of  legal  error.”  

Commonwealth  v.  Parker,  249  A.3d  590,  594  (Pa.Super.  2021)  (quoting 

____________________________________________ 

4 We note that  Appellant’s argument section  in his brief raises many issues 
that are not included in the “statements of questions involved” or preserved 
in  his  Rule  1925(b)  statement.    Specifically,  Appellant  raises  the  following 
claims  of  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel:  1)  trial  counsel’s  failure  to 
comprehensively  cross-examine  Ms.  Rodriguez  about  various  details  in  her 
testimony to undermine her credibility; 2) trial counsel’s inaccurate claim in 
the opening statement that the medical experts would state that they could 
not rule out the possibility that Ms. McAvoy’s cause of death was a fall, when 
neither the Commonwealth nor the defense expert testified as such during the 
trial; and 3) direct appeal counsel’s failure to develop the issues that counsel 
raised on appeal.  As these particular claims were not preserved in Appellant’s 
Rule 1925(b) statement, they are waived on appeal.  See Commonwealth 
v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 
A.3d  1275  (2011)  (explaining  general  rule  that  issues  not  raised  in  concise 
statement will be deemed waived for review; concise statement must properly 
specify error to be addressed on appeal).   

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Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2013)).  “The 

PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them, and we 

review the court’s legal conclusions  de novo.”  Commonwealth v. Prater, 

256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d 

386 (2021).   

 

In his first issue on appeal, Appellant argues that PCRA counsel failed to 

properly  investigate  and  evaluate  Appellant’s  claim  that  trial  counsel  was 

ineffective for failing to discover evidence of Pamela and Miguel Rodriguez’s 

criminal activities.  Appellant claims that his ineffective assistance claim had 

merit because Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez sold drugs to Ms. McAvoy.  Appellant 

asserts  that  trial  counsel  had  no  reasonable  basis  for  failing  to  discover 

evidence  of  their  criminal  activities  and  use  it  during  cross-examination  to 

demonstrate  their  “motivation  to  lie.”    Appellant  asserts  that  he  was 

prejudiced  by  trial  counsel’s  failure  because  Mrs.  Rodriquez  was  the  only 

witness to testify that Ms. McAvoy stated that Appellant caused her injuries.  

Appellant  concludes  that  PCRA  counsel’s  failure  to  properly  investigate  this 

claim  and  discover  evidence  of  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Rodriguez’s  criminal  activity 

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and this Court must grant relief.  

We disagree.   

“Counsel 

is  presumed  to  have  rendered  effective  assistance.”  

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020),  appeal 

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).   

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[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances 
of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 
process  that  no  reliable  adjudication  of  guilt  or  innocence 
could have taken place.  The burden is on the defendant to 
prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying 
claim  is  of  arguable  merit;  (2)  that  counsel  had  no 
reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; 
and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is 
the 
a  reasonable  probability 
proceedings would have been different.   
 

the  outcome  of 

that 

Commonwealth  v.  Sandusky,  203  A.3d  1033,  1043  (Pa.Super.  2019), 

appeal  denied,  654  Pa.  568,  216  A.3d  1029  (2019)  (internal  citations  and 

quotation  marks  omitted).    The  failure  to  satisfy  any  prong  of  the  test  for 

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail.  Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).   

“The  threshold  inquiry  in  ineffectiveness  claims  is  whether  the 

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis 

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]”  Commonwealth 

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175, 

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting  Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)).  “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing 

to  pursue  a  baseless  or  meritless  claim.”    Commonwealth  v.  Poplawski, 

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers, 

847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)).   

 

“Once  this  threshold  is  met  we  apply  the  ‘reasonable  basis’  test  to 

determine  whether  counsel’s  chosen  course  was  designed  to  effectuate  his 

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client’s  interests.”    Commonwealth  v.  Kelley,  136  A.3d  1007,  1012 

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).   

The  test  for  deciding  whether  counsel  had  a  reasonable 
basis  for  his  action  or  inaction  is  whether  no  competent 
counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the 
alternative,  not  chosen,  offered  a  significantly  greater 
potential  chance  of  success.    Counsel’s  decisions  will  be 
considered  reasonable  if  they  effectuated  his  client’s 
interests.    We  do  not  employ  a  hindsight  analysis  in 
comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may 
have taken.   
 

Commonwealth  v.  King,  259  A.3d  511,  520  (Pa.Super.  2021)  (quoting 

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).   

 

“To  demonstrate  prejudice,  the  petitioner  must  show  that  there  is  a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceedings would have been different.  [A] reasonable probability is a 

probability  that  is  sufficient  to  undermine  confidence  in  the  outcome  of  the 

proceeding.”  Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312 

(2014)  (internal  citations  and  quotation  marks  omitted).    “[A]  criminal 

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious 

as  to  deprive  the  defendant  of  a  fair  trial,  a  trial  whose  result  is  reliable.”  

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).   

 

Instantly,  PCRA  counsel  addressed  Appellant’s  claim  that  trial  counsel 

was  ineffective  for  failing  to  investigate  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Rodriguez  in  his  “no 

merit” letter.  PCRA counsel concluded that Appellant’s claim lacked arguable 

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merit  because  any  evidence  of  Mr.  or  Mrs.  Rodriguez’s  alleged  illegal  drug 

activity would have been irrelevant and inadmissible at trial.  We agree with 

PCRA  counsel’s  assessment.    Any  evidence  demonstrating  that  Mr.  or  Mrs. 

Rodriguez sold drugs to Ms. McAvoy was not relevant to how Ms. McAvoy died 

under the facts of this case.  See Pa.R.E. 401 (stating: “Evidence is relevant 

if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would 

be without  the evidence; and (b)  the fact  is of  consequence in  determining 

the action”).  Likewise, evidence of Mr. or Mrs. Rodriguez’s alleged illegal drug 

activity  would  have  been  inadmissible  for  impeachment  purposes  on  cross-

examination.  See Pa.R.E. 608(b)(1) (stating: “[T]he character of a witness 

for  truthfulness  may  not  be  attacked  or  supported  by  cross-examination  or 

extrinsic  evidence  concerning  specific  instances  of  the  witness’  conduct”).  

Further,  we  fail  to  see  how  such  evidence  demonstrates  that  Mr.  and  Mrs. 

Rodriguez  had  a  “motivation  to  lie”  during  their  testimony,  as  Appellant 

suggests.   

Additionally,  we  agree  with  PCRA  counsel’s  conclusion  that  Appellant 

could not demonstrate prejudice in light of the photographs of Ms. McAvoy’s 

injuries, and testimony of Ms. Shinn, Mr. Serrano-Aponte, Ms. Bobst, and Ms. 

Fortson, all which corroborated the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez.  See 

Spotz, supra.  Thus, PCRA counsel properly assessed Appellant’s claim and 

correctly determined that it was without merit.  As counsel cannot be found 

ineffective for failing to advance a meritless claim, Appellant’s first issue on 

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appeal fails.  See Poplawski, supra.  

 

In his second issue on appeal, Appellant asserts that PCRA counsel failed 

to properly examine the record to determine whether there were additional 

instances  of  trial  counsel’s  ineffectiveness.    Appellant  argues  that  the  “no 

merit”  letter  was  deficient  because  PCRA  counsel  “did  not  include  any 

additional  errors  that  Appellant  expected  him  to  develop  and  add  in  an 

amended petition with the assistance of counsel.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 9-10).  

Appellant further avers that PCRA counsel failed to speak with Appellant on 

the phone or in person despite multiple requests to do so.  Appellant contends 

that “it defies logic to think that a pro se litigant, ignorant of the law, could 

possibly  identify  claims  of  trial  counsel’s  ineffectiveness,  or  assist  [PCRA] 

counsel with this task, when [PCRA] counsel was in the exclusive possession 

of  both  the  trial  transcript  and  the  discovery  file.”    (Id.  at  25).    Appellant 

concludes  that  PCRA  counsel  provided  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  by 

failing  to  consult  with  Appellant  and  review  the  record  to  identify  all 

meritorious issues.  We disagree.   

Before  counsel  can  be  permitted  to  withdraw  from  representing  a 

petitioner  under  the  PCRA,  Pennsylvania  law  requires  counsel  to  file  a  “no-

merit”  brief  or  letter  pursuant  to  Turner  and  Finley.    Commonwealth  v. 

Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940 (Pa.Super. 2003).   

The  independent  review  necessary  to  secure  a  withdrawal  request  by 

counsel requires proof that:  

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1.  PCRA  counsel,  in  a  “no-merit”  letter,  has  detailed  the 
nature and the extent of his review;  

. PCRA counsel, in the “no-merit” letter, lists each issue the 

petitioner wishes to have reviewed;  

. PCRA counsel must explain, in the “no-merit” letter, why 

petitioner's issues are meritless;  

. The PCRA court must conduct its own independent review 

of the record; and  

. The PCRA court must agree with counsel that the petition 

  2

  3

  4

  5

is meritless. 
 

Commonwealth v. Merritt, 827 A.2d 485, 487 (Pa.Super. 2003).   

If the court agrees with counsel that the claims are without 
merit,  the  court  will  permit  counsel  to  withdraw  and  deny 
relief.  By contrast, if the claims appear to have merit, the 
court will deny counsel’s request and grant relief, or at least 
instruct counsel to file an advocate’s brief.   
 

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal 

citations omitted).   

 

Instantly,  PCRA  counsel  affirmed  in  the  “no  merit”  letter  that  he 

reviewed the entire record in this case, including “the notes of testimony of 

the  trial  and  the  sentencing,  the  appellate  briefs,  and  the  Superior  Court 

memorandum opinion.”  (Tuner/Finley “No Merit” Letter, filed 8/2/21, at 3-

4).    PCRA  counsel  further  stated  that  he  corresponded  extensively  with 

Appellant by way of letters to fully understand and evaluate the issues that 

Appellant wished to pursue.  PCRA counsel’s averments are supported by the 

contents  of  the  “no  merit”  letter,  which  contains  a  careful  and  nuanced 

evaluation  of  each  issue  that  Appellant  wished  to  review  and  explains  why 

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those issues lack merit.  Further, the PCRA court conducted an independent 

review  of  the  record  and  agreed  with  PCRA  counsel’s  assessment  that 

Appellant’s PCRA petition was without merit.    

Appellant fails to provide any support for his assertion that PCRA counsel 

was required to speak with Appellant on the phone or in person to evaluate 

possible  PCRA  claims.    We  decline  Appellant’s  invitation  to  expand  the 

requirements set forth in Turner and Finley.  PCRA counsel communicated 

with  Appellant  via  written  correspondence,  asking  detailed  questions  to 

understand  Appellant’s  issues  and  inquiring  into  details  that  could  not  be 

gleaned from the record.  There is no indication that PCRA counsel’s chosen 

form  of  communication  hampered  his  ability  to  assess  and  evaluate 

Appellant’s claims.  The record demonstrates that PCRA counsel satisfied the 

mandates of Turner and Finley.  See Merritt, supra.  As such, there is no 

merit  to  Appellant’s  claim  that  PCRA  counsel’s  review  of  this  case  was 

insufficient.5  See Sandusky, supra.  Accordingly, we affirm.   

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5  As  discussed  above,  Appellant’s  brief  raises  additional  claims  of  trial  and 
direct  appeal  counsel’s  ineffectiveness  not  preserved  in  Appellant’s  Rule 
1925(b) statement.  To the extent that Appellant is arguing that PCRA counsel 
was ineffective for failing to raise these newly identified claims, we note that 
Appellant’s  brief  fails  to  properly  develop  or  support  this  argument.  
Specifically,  Appellant  fails  to  properly  address  the  reasonable  basis  and 
prejudice  prongs  as  applied  to  PCRA  counsel,  trial  counsel,  or  direct  appeal 
counsel.  The failure to develop a meaningful argument for all three parts of 
the  test  is  fatal  to  Appellant’s  claim  that  PCRA  counsel  provided  ineffective 
assistance.    See  Sandusky,  supra  at  1044  (stating  boilerplate  allegations 
and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or ensuing prejudice cannot 
satisfy petitioner’s burden to prove that counsel was ineffective).   

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Order affirmed.  

Judgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 03/16/2023 

 

 

    J

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