NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

             

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v. 

 

 

URNELL RUDOLPH NELSON       

 

Appellant 

 No. 614 MDA 2022 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 30, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County  
Criminal Division at No(s):  CP-22-CR-0001113-2012 

EFORE:   PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:            FILED: MARCH 16, 2023 
 

Purnell  Rudolph  Nelson  (“Nelson”)  brings  this  pro  se  appeal  from  the 

order  denying  his  third  petition  filed  under  the  Post  Conviction  Relief  Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

 

Nelson  was  implicated  in  the  December  15,  2011,  shooting  death  of 

Travis Vogelsong. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, on December 19, 

2012, Nelson openly pled guilty to third degree murder - mentally ill. He was 

sentenced to serve a term of incarceration of fifteen to forty years on February 

14, 2013.  

Nelson filed a timely PCRA petition on September 16, 2013. Appointed 

counsel  was  permitted  to  withdraw,  and  the  PCRA  court  denied  relief  on 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

     

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December  18,  2013.  On  January  17,  2017,  Nelson  filed,  pro  se,  his  second 

PCRA petition, and the PCRA court denied relief on March 21, 2017. 

 

 

On September 1, 2021, Nelson filed the instant PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court dismissed the petition on March 30, 2022. This timely appeal followed. 

On April 25, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order directing Nelson to 

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement within twenty-one days, i.e., May 16, 2022. 

Nelson failed to comply. Rather, in a pro se letter to the Clerk of Courts dated 

May 18, 2022, and filed in the PCRA court on May 23, 2022, Nelson requested 

additional  time  to  file  his  Rule  1925(b)  statement.  The  PCRA  court  denied 

Nelson’s request for  an extension of time on June 8, 2022. The PCRA court 

received Nelson’s untimely Rule 1925(b) statement on June 16, 2022. In his 

Rule 1925(b) statement, Nelson asserts his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to advise him of the right to file post-trial and sentencing motions and 

so  his  right  to  appeal  should  be  reinstated  nunc  pro  tunc.”  Rule  1925(b) 

Statement, 6/16, 22, at 1. 

 

In  his  appellate  brief,  Nelson  argues  that  the  PCRA  court  erred  and 

abused its discretion in failing to grant him an extension of time to file his Rule 

1925(b)  statement.  See  Appellant’s  Brief  at  8-10.  Nelson  alleges  that 

extraordinary  circumstances  prevented  him  meeting  the  filing  deadline. 

Specifically,  Nelson,  who  suffers  a  mental  disability,  claims  that  a  Covid-19 

outbreak in his prison unit kept him under quarantine and prevented him from 

requesting  an  extension  of  time  until  the  restriction  was  lifted.  See  id. 

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Therefore, we are compelled to address the ramifications of Nelson’s failure to 

file the court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement in a timely manner. 

 

Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d 

317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed 

unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. See id. 

 

A  Rule  1925(b)  statement  “is  a  crucial  component  of  the  appellate 

process because it allows the trial court to identify and focus on those issues 

the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d 

1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020). Rule 1925(b)(4)(vii) directs that “[i]ssues not 

included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions 

of 

this  paragraph  (b)(4)  are  waived.”  Pa.R.A.P.  1925(b)(vii). 

In 

Commonwealth  v.  Lord,  719  A.2d  306  (Pa.  1998),  our  Supreme  Court 

established  the  bright-line  rule  that  “in  order  to  preserve  their  claims  for 

appellate  review,  [a]ppellants  must  comply  whenever  the  trial  court  orders 

them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule 

1925. Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” 

Id. at 309. See also Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (Pa. 2011) 

(Pa.R.A.P.  1925  “obligates  an  appellant  to  file  and  serve  a  Rule  1925(b) 

statement, when so ordered”). 

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Regarding appeals under the PCRA, our Supreme Court has reiterated 

that “a litigant appealing from the denial of PCRA relief is required to strictly 

comply with the provisions of Rule 1925(b), or his or her appellate issues are 

deemed to be waived.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 224 A.3d 682, 700 (Pa. 

2020) (citation omitted). 

However, Rule 1925(b)(2) permits a party to seek an extension for filing 

a Rule 1925(b) statement “for good cause shown.” Examples of good cause 

as provided in the note to Rule 1925(b)(2) include the retaining or appointing 

of new counsel, “a serious delay in the transcription of the notes of testimony 

or  in  the  delivery  of  the  order  to  appellate  counsel.”  Id.  The  note  to  Rule 

1925(b)(2) further explains that “nunc pro tunc relief is allowed when there 

has  been  a  breakdown 

in 

the  process  constituting  extraordinary 

circumstances.  …  Courts  have  also  allowed  nunc  pro  tunc  relief  when  ‘non-

negligent  circumstances,  either  as  they  relate  to  appellant  or  his  counsel’ 

occasion delay.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2), note. 

Also,  our  Supreme  Court  clarified  that  “an  appellant  who  seeks  an 

extension of time to file a Statement must do so by filing a written application 

with the trial court, setting out good cause for such extension, and requesting 

an  order  granting  the  extension.”  Commonwealth  v.  Gravely,  970  A.2d 

1137,  1143  (Pa.  2009).  An  appellant’s  failure  to  seek  an  extension  as 

prescribed by Rule 1925(b) will result in waiver of the additional issues not 

timely raised.  

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In  addition,  we  note 

that  Nelson  directs  our  attention 

to 

Commonwealth v. Pruden, 2256 EDA 2020, 268 A.3d 404 (Pa. Super. filed 

November 5, 2021), a non-precedential memorandum decision of this Court 

to support his request that the matter be remanded for a hearing to address 

whether  he  is  entitled  to  nunc  pro  tunc  acceptance  of  his  Rule  1925(b) 

statement.1  See  Appellant’s  Brief  at  9-11.  In  Pruden,  the  appellant  had 

difficulty  complying  with  the  timing  requirements  of  Rule  1925(b).  Pruden 

alleged  his  noncompliance  was  caused  by  mailing  delays  that  postponed 

timely receipt of the trial court’s order and Covid-19 emergency restrictions 

at the courthouse. Pruden sent multiple letters to the trial court explaining his 

difficulty in timely filing his Rule 1925(b) statement and seeking an extension 

of  time.  However,  the  trial  court  did  not  address  the  concerns  in  Pruden’s 

letters. Rather, the trial court entered an order that “denied and dismissed” 

the appeal. 

In concluding that Pruden’s request for relief should be considered by 

the  trial  court,  we  observed  that  “[the  a]ppellant’s  Letter  …  offered  further 

factual  averments  that  [the  a]ppellant’s  delay  was  neither  intentional  nor 

negligent.” Pruden, 2256 EDA 2020, 268 A.3d 404, at *12. We further noted 

that “[w]hile [the a]ppellant’s concise statement was untimely, his contentions 

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1 Under amended Pa.R.A.P. 126, non-precedential decisions are not binding 
but may be cited as “persuasive” authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2) (stating 
that unpublished non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after 
May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value). 

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within  his  letters  …,  if  supported  by  evidence  deemed  credible  by  the  trial 

court, may demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or a breakdown in the 

judicial  process  that  warrant  relief  from  waiver  for  untimeliness.”  Id. 

Consequently, we remanded the matter to the trial court to conduct a hearing 

to address whether Pruden’s untimely Rule 1925(b) statement warrants nunc 

pro  tunc  relief  due  to  a  breakdown  in  the  judicial  process  or  other 

extraordinary circumstances. See id. 

Instantly, our review of the record reflects that, on April 25, 2022, the 

PCRA court ordered Nelson to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. The deadline for 

filing the statement was May 16, 2022. Nelson sent a letter addressed to the 

Clerk  of  Court,  which  was  dated  May  18,  2022,  two  days  beyond  the  filing 

deadline.  In  the  letter  that  contained  a  “Re:”  line  stating:  “Delay  in  Filing 

Concise Statement,” Nelson attested the following: 

• my housing  unit  has been under  [quarantine]  for the last two 
weeks because of COVID-19. And 

• just now, today to be exact, I was able to make it down to the 
library for only 45 minutes. 

•  This  was  not  sufficient  time  for  me  to  complete  the  concise 
statement. 

Please I am asking for more time to file my concise statement. 

 

 

 

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etter,  5/18/22,  at 1.  The record  further  reflects  that  on  June  8,  2022,  the 

PCRA  court  denied,  as  untimely  filed,  Nelson’s  request  for  an  extension  of 

time. See Order 6/8/22, at 1. 

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As Nelson explains in his brief, he “attempted to remedy the [timeliness] 

problem as soon as the quarantine was lifted.”2 Appellant’s Brief at 9. If the 

averments  in  Nelson’s  letter  concerning  the  Covid-19  outbreak  and  multi-

week quarantine are true, these are circumstances caused through no fault of 

his own. As was the case in Pruden, if proven, the circumstances raised by 

Nelson may warrant nunc pro tunc relief. 

However,  we  need  not  follow  Pruden’s  lead,  as  we  have  Nelson’s 

proposed 1925(b) statement, and we conclude that even if it had been timely 

filed, Nelson would be due no relief as he has not established his current, third 

PCRA petition was eligible for an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. 

We must raise issues with the timeliness of a PCRA petition sua sponte: 

Because  the  time  limitations  established  by  the  PCRA  are 
jurisdictional  in  nature,  a  court  lacks  jurisdiction  to  address  the 
claims  raised  in  an  untimely  petition.  The  PCRA  provides  that  a 
petition for relief must be filed within  one year of the date final 
judgment  is  entered.  A  judgment  becomes  final  for  purposes  of 
the  PCRA  at  the  conclusion  of  direct  review  or  after  the  time 
provided for seeking direct review has lapsed, if no direct review 
has been taken.  

ommonwealth  v.  Liebensperger,  904  A.2d  40,  45  (Pa.  Super.  2006) 

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(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

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2 We note that in his brief Nelson has cited to two exhibits to support his claim 
that his housing unit was under quarantine and that he wrote additional letters 
explaining  the  circumstances  and  requesting  an  extension  of  time.  See 
Appellant’s Brief at 9. However, we have not been able to locate these items 
in the certified record. 

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Here, Nelson was sentenced on February 13, 2013, and his judgment of 

sentence  became  final  on  March  15,  2013.  Therefore,  the  PCRA’s  one  year 

time-bar expired on March 17, 2014.3 This current petition, filed in 2021, is 

patently untimely, unless Nelson pleaded and proved that an exception to the 

time-bar applied. 

 

In his petition, Nelson alleged that his mental illness prevented him from 

knowing earlier that trial counsel ineffective for failing to raise on appeal the 

trial  court’s  failure  to  advise  him  of  his  right  to  file  post-sentence  motions. 

See  PCRA  Petition,  9/1/2021,  at  3.  He  argued  this  constituted  a  previously 

unknown fact, therefore qualifying for an exception to the time-bar under 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Nelson bore the burden of establishing his petition 

was subject to the previously unknown fact exception. See Commonwealth 

v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012). 

 

Broad claims of mental illness generally do not qualify as a previously 

unknown fact under section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 

A.3d 173, (Pa. 2014). The one narrow exception to this general rule is if the 

petitioner can establish he was mentally incompetent during the time he was 

eligible to timely raise the claim under the PCRA. See id., at 178.  

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3 We note that a PCRA petition needed to be filed on or before Monday, March 
17, 2014, because March 15, 2014, was a Saturday. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 
(stating  that,  for  computations  of  time,  whenever  the  last  day  of  any  such 
period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, such day shall be 
omitted from the computation). 

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Here, Nelson merely alleged that he is mentally ill. Since his claim is one 

of trial counsel  ineffectiveness,  he was required to plead  and prove that  he 

was mentally incompetent from March 15, 2013, to March 17, 2014. To the 

contrary, he has not pleaded that he was incompetent at that time, whether 

he  was  mentally  ill  at  that  time,  or  even  what  mental  illness  he  claims  to 

suffer. Further, Nelson was represented by counsel for the purpose of his first, 

timely PCRA petition in 2013. Even if we were to find that he was incompetent 

at that time, he would be required to establish PCRA counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise this claim at that time. As a result, his third PCRA petition 

did not qualify for an exception to the time-bar. The PCRA court therefore did 

not  have  jurisdiction  to  entertain  his  untimely  third  petition,  and  properly 

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denied relief. 

Order affirmed. 

udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 03/16/2023 

 

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