: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 
65.37 
 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.S., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 No. 2274 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001217-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.S., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 No. 2275 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000580-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.D., A MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001218-2019 

 No. 2276 EDA 2022 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

    A

    A

    A

J-S43017-22  

             

             

             

   

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 

- 2 - 

J-S43017-22 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.I.A.-M.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2277 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000581-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 No. 2278 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001219-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B.A.-M.D., 
A MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 No. 2279 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000585-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

    A

    A

    A

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

         

             

             

           

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

- 3 - 

 No. 2280 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001221-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.I.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 No. 2281 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000582-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 No. 2282 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001222-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.I.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    A

    A

    A

J-S43017-22 

APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

             

             

             

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

:    No. 2283 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000583-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 No. 2284 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001220-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.B.A.I.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 No. 2285 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000586-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    A

    A

    A

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 

 No. 2286 EDA 2022 

- 4 - 

J-S43017-22 

             

             

             

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

- 5 - 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001223-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.I.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 No. 2287 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000584-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

 No. 2288 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001432-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.B.A.I.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000587-2021 

 No. 2289 EDA 2022 

    A

    A

    A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

J-S43017-22 

J-S43017-22 

EFORE:  DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:  

 

      FILED MARCH 17, 2023 

 

In  this  matter,  K.D.  (Father)  appeals  the  decrees  entered  by  the 

Philadelphia  County  Court  of  Common Pleas,  which  involuntarily  terminated 

his rights to his eight Children, pursuant to the Adoption Act.  See 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b).1  In addition to the termination decrees, Father 

also  appeals  the  orders  which  changed  the  goal  of  the  dependency 

proceedings from reunification to adoption.  Lastly, Father also argues that his 

counsel was ineffective and that the trial court was biased.  After review, we 

affirm the termination decrees and dismiss the goal-change appeals as moot.2  

The  relevant  procedural  and  factual  history  is  as  follows.    The  family 

came  to  the  attention  of  DHS  in  Summer  2019,  when  Mother’s  14-year-old 

daughter,  T.R.  alleged  abuse  by  both  Mother  and  Father.    Father  is  the 

____________________________________________ 

1 The subject Children are: 
 

•  S.T.S, daughter, age 14 
•  I.D, son, age 10  
•  Ab. D., son, age 8 
•  A.-R.D. 1 son, age 7 
•  A.-R.D. 2., son, age 6 
•  Aa.D., daughter, age 5  
•  M.D., son, age 3 
•  S.D., daughter, age 2 

t appears Father is not the biological father of S.T.S., but because Father’s 
signed the acknowledgement of paternity, DHS proceeded with termination.  
DHS also terminated the rights of the unknown biological father. 

 Mother had also appealed.  Her case is separately listed before this panel. 

- 6 - 

  B

  I

  2

 

stepfather of T.R.; T.R. is not the subject of these appeals.3  T.R. alleged that 

Mother beat her and forced her to sleep outside.  She also alleged that Father 

inappropriately touched her on her buttocks and breasts, made her stay in the 

bathroom while he showered, exposed himself to her, and on one occasion, 

licked the back of her ear. 

 

These disclosures caused DHS to investigate the wellbeing of Father’s 

seven  other  Children,  who  are  the  subject  of  this  case.4    The  Agency 

interviewed  the  Children  in  the  home.    At  that  time,  none  of  the  Children 

disclosed abuse, but the caseworker believed that the Children were afraid to 

speak up and had tried to convey to the caseworker that Father could overhear 

to  their  conversation.    Father  had  chosen  the  room  for  the  caseworker’s 

interview, and he could be seen visible pacing outside on the porch. 

 

On July 25, 2019, DHS obtained orders for protective custody for  the 

Children.    After  the  shelter  care  hearing,  the  Children  were  temporarily 

committed to DHS custody.  A subsequent disclosure revealed that one of the 

Children was beaten by Mother at Father’s direction, and that she was made 

to sleep outside as punishment.  The Child also alleged that she was forced to 

3 T.R.’s biological father was unknown.  The trial court previously changed the 
goal of T.R.’s dependency proceedings from reunification to another planned 
permanent living arrangement (APPLA), i.e., permanent long-term foster care 
until  the  age  of  majority.    Father  appealed  that  decision,  and  we  affirmed.  
See Interest of T.R., 283 A.3d 377 (Table), 2022 WL 2813796 (Pa. Super. 
2022) (non-precedential decision). 

 The youngest subject Child, S.D., was not yet born. 

  4

____________________________________________ 

- 7 - 

J-S43017-22 

J-S43017-22 

person. 

do chores in her underwear to ensure that she did not have any food on her 

 

In  September  2019,  the  Children  were  adjudicated  dependent.    The 

court  learned  that  Mother  had  given  birth  to  S.D.,  and  that  the  birth  was 

hidden from the agency.  The facts that gave rise to the adjudications of the 

older Children were a predicate for the removal and eventual adjudication of 

S.D.    The  juvenile  court  instituted  a  single  case  plan,  comprising  of  certain 

goals to aid Father with reunification.  The goals included: to attend supervised 

visitation  with  the  Children;  to  complete  programs  to  address  parenting, 

domestic  violence  and  anger  management;  to  submit  to  evaluations  for  his 

psychosexual behavior and parenting capacity; to obtain employment; and to 

obtain housing. 

 

Meanwhile,  investigations  into  the  parents’  alleged  abuse  continued.  

The  Children  subsequently  participated  in  a  forensic  interview  with 

Philadelphia  Children’s  Alliance,  where  the  Children  were  referred  for 

evaluations by Dr. Michelle Dominguez, M.D., a child abuse pediatrician at St. 

Christopher’s  Hospital  for  Children.  During  their  evaluations,  the  Children 

made  additional  disclosures.    They  claimed,  among  other  allegations,  that 

Father  would  punch  them  and  whip  them  with  extension  cords;  that  their 

refrigerator was chained shut so they could not get food; that Father forced 

them to eat the ants that were in their cereal; and that they were sometimes 

forced  to  stay  in  the  basement,  which  was  often  dark  and  flooded.    Dr. 

Dominguez  physically  examined  the  Children  and  noted  the  presence  of 

- 8 - 

J-S43017-22 

bruising consistent with inflicted trauma.  Father defended some of his actions, 

maintaining  that  he  merely  disciplined  the  Children  in  accordance  with  his 

Islamic faith.  He denied other allegations, which he said were fabricated by 

the Children because they were rebelling against his religion. 

In August 2021, the parents were arrested.  Father’s arrest resulted in 

a  no-contact  order,  which  suspended  visits  with  the  children.    Father  also 

failed to comply with the single case plan.  Although he completed the anger 

management and parenting programs, these objectives remained on the case 

plan  because  Father  continued  to  display  anger  during  the  visits  and  when 

speaking to the Children. 

DHS  eventually  petitioned  to  change  the  goal  of  the  dependency 

proceedings from reunification to adoption and to  terminate Father’s rights.  

The court held the termination hearing over several days on March 14, March 

28, and June 2, 2022.  On August 11, 2022, the court articulated its findings 

on  the  record  and  entered  decrees  terminating  Father’s  rights  to  each 

respective Child.  Father timely filed appeals.  In his consolidated Brief, Father 

presents the following issues for our review: 

1.  Whether  the  trial  court  committed  reversible  error, 
when  it  involuntarily  terminated  Father’s  parental 
rights where such determinations were not supported 
by clear and convincing evidence under the Adoption 
Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)? 

2.  Whether  the  trial  court  committed  reversible  error 
when  it  involuntarily  terminated  Father’s  parental 
rights  without  giving  primary  consideration  to  the 
effect  that  the  termination  would  have  on  the 
developmental,  physical  and  emotional  needs  of  the 

- 9 - 

J-S43017-22 

child[ren]  as  required  by  the  Adoption  Act,  23 
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)? 

3.  Whether  the  trial  court  abused  its  discretion  in 
granting  a  goal  change  to  adoption,  where  the  goal 
change  from  reunification  to  adoption  was  not 
supported by clear and convincing evidence? 

4.  Whether  Father’s  case  was  irreparably  harmed  by 
counsel’s  representation,  which  fell  below  ordinary 
attorney representation? 

5.  Whether  Father’s  case  was  irreparably  harmed  by 

judicial bias? 

Father’s Brief at 8. 

We begin with our well-settled standard of review: 

The  standard  of  review  in  termination  of  parental  rights 
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 
and  credibility  determinations  of  the  trial  court  if  they  are 
supported  by  the  record.  If  the  factual  findings  are 
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 
court  made  an  error  of  law  or  abused  its  discretion.  A 
decision  may  be  reversed  for  an  abuse  of  discretion  only 
upon  demonstration  of  manifest  unreasonableness, 
partiality,  prejudice,  bias,  or  ill-will.  The  trial  court's 
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 
the  record  would  support  a  different  result.  We  have 
previously  emphasized  our  deference  to  trial  courts  that 
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 
multiple hearings. 

In  re  T.S.M.,  71  A.3d  251,  267  (Pa.  2013) (citations  and  quotation  marks 

omitted). 

 

Our  Supreme  Court  has  repeatedly  stated  that  in  termination  cases, 

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 

265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108, 

1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive 

- 10 - 

J-S43017-22 

case involving…the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should 

review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports 

that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate could should not search the record 

for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).  

The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential 

standard and, to the extent that record supports the court’s decision, we must 

affirm  even  though  evidence  exists  that  would  also  support  a  contrary 

determination.”  In  re  P.Z.,  113  A.3d  840,  849  (Pa.  Super.  2015)  (citation 

omitted). 

Termination  of  parental  rights  is  governed  by  Section  2511  of  the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 
seeking  termination  must  prove  by  clear  and  convincing 
evidence  that  the  parent's  conduct  satisfies  the  statutory 
grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only 
if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 
termination  of  his  or  her  parental  rights  does  the  court 
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section 
2511(b):  determination  of  the  needs  and  welfare  of  the 
child[.] 

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). 

Clear  and  convincing  evidence  is  evidence  that  is  so  “clear,  direct, 

weighty  and  convincing  as  to  enable  the  trier  of  fact  to  come  to  a  clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).   

- 11 - 

J-S43017-22 

Critically,  we  may  uphold  a  termination  decision  if  any  proper  basis 

exists for the result reached.  C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201.   We need only agree 

with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc). 

Therefore,  we  review  the  trial  court’s  termination  of  Father’s  rights 

under Section 2511(a)(2), which provides: 

(a)  General  rule.--The  rights  of  a  parent  in  regard  to  a 
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 
following grounds: 

[…] 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 
his  physical  or  mental  well-being  and  the  conditions  and 
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 
will not be remedied by the parent. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). 

 

To  satisfy  the  requirements  of Section  2511(a)(2),  the  moving  party 

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2)  that  such  incapacity,  abuse,  neglect  or  refusal  caused  the  child  to  be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 

In  re  C.M.K.,  203  A.3d  258,  262  (Pa.  Super.  2019)  (citation  omitted).  

Parents are required to make diligent  efforts toward the reasonably prompt 

- 12 - 

J-S43017-22 

Super. 2010). 

assumption  of  full  parental  duties.  In  re  Z.P.,  994  A.2d  1108,  1117  (Pa. 

We note that the grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct  like  abuse  but  concern  parental  incapacity  that  cannot  be 

remedied.  See id.  This case, however, explicitly concerns abuse.  The trial 

court set forth its Section 2511(a)(2) findings on the record: 

[T]he testimony of Dr. Dominguez, which I found credible, 
was  that  these  children,  not  only  were  they  subject  to 
continued and repeated abuse, whether by denying food or 
being hit in the head with 2-by-4s, being hit with extension 
cords, being made to get into showers that were hot, and 
then  with  cords  that  were  run  under  cold  water,  being  hit 
with those cords, Dr. Dominguez went a step further from 
saying  that  that’s  abuse.    In  fact,  she  indicated  that  that 
meets the definition of child torture.  And while she testified, 
and, again, credibly, that neither [Ab.D, A-R.D. 1 or A.-R.D. 
2.]  disclosed  any  abuse,  the  physical  findings  on  those 
children’s bodies were consistent with the physical findings 
on the bodies of [T.R., S.T.S., and I.D.], all of whom disclose 
physical  abuse  in  the  manner  in  which  they  were  abused.  
And  so  the  fact  she  also  determine  that  based  on  photos 
review from [Ab.D.] and well as her physical examination of 
[I.D., T.S., and A.-R. D. 1, and A.-R.D. 2,] that the markings 
on [A.-R.D.1, A.-R.D. 2, and Ab.-D.’s] body were consistent 
with he physical abuse that was disclosed as to [T.R., S.T.S., 
and I.D.] in their PCA interviews. […] 

In  addition  to  what  the  children  disclosed  in  their  PCA 
interview  and  to  their  CUA  case  manager,  because  Ms. 
McNeill also testified that [I.D., T.R., and S.T.S.] disclosed 
abuse,  found  in  the  transcripts  that  were  entered  into 
evidence  that  were  part  of  this  court’s  prior  hearings, 
[S.T.S., I.D., and T.R.] testified in camera as to the abuse 
that they suffered.  And this court found them credible when 
they testified in camera.  All counsel was present for those 
hearings, except for TPR counsel, as she was appointed after 
those hearings. 

- 13 - 

J-S43017-22 

And so the testimony has been consistent each time these 
Children have disclosed as to what they were subjected to 
in  [Father’s]  and  [Mother’s]  home.    And  I  have  to  say,  I 
started out as a social worker working with families in the 
system.  I worked for nine years as a solicitor for DHS.  And 
I’ve been on the bench.  This is my fifth year.  I have never 
ever heard a doctor testify that what children suffered was 
torture.  I’m speechless. 

And  so  this  court  is  going  to  find  that  while  there  was  no 
testimony as to the younger children, the testimony of Dr. 
Dominguez as an expert that the fact that sexual abuse was 
found  as  to  [T.R],  and  physical  abuse  as  to  the  other 
Children,  all  of  the  Children  in  Mother  and  Father’s  care 
would be at risk.  And so I am terminating for all the Children 
under [Section] 2511(a)(2).  Specifically, [T.R., I.D., S.T.S., 
A.-R.D.  1,  A.-R.D.  2,  and  Ab.D.]  suffered  actual  abuse  at 
the hands of their parents consistent with the markings on 
their bodies. 

N.T., 91-94. 

On appeal, Father notes that termination under Section 2511(a)(2) was 

erroneous,  because  past  incapacity,  alone,  in  not  sufficient  to  terminate  a 

parent’s rights.  See  Father’s Brief at  26 (citing  In re Adoption of A.N.D., 

510 A.3d 31 (Pa. Super. 1986)).  Father  maintains  that DHS only put forth 

evidence of past behaviors and thus could not establish that termination was 

warranted.  Father also argues that because only the older Children disclosed 

abuse,  and  the  court  improperly  concluded  that  Father  abused  the  younger 

Children. 

These arguments merit no relief.  It has long been established that the 

use  of  prognostic  evidence  applies  to  both  dependency  cases,  as  well  as 

termination cases. See In re E.B., 83 A.3d 426, 433 (Pa. Super. 2013); see 

also  In  re  Angry,  522  A.2d  73,  74-75  (Pa.  Super.  1987).    The  court  may 

- 14 - 

J-S43017-22 

consider a parent’s previous actions, toward an older sibling, when assessing 

the risk that  the parent poses toward the younger  child.   The notion that  a 

court  is  barred  from  such  considerations  “ignores  the  possibility  that  if  the 

‘experiment’  proves  unsuccessful,  the  consequences  to  the  child  could  be 

seriously  detrimental  or  even  fatal.”  Angry,  522  A.2d  at  74-75  (quoting 

Matter of DeSavage, 360 A.2d 237, 241-42 (Pa. Super 1976)). 

Although not every Child made a disclosure, the court agreed with Dr. 

Dominguez’s expert opinion  that all the Children would be at risk of abuse.  

Moreover, some of the younger Children, who did not disclose abuse, evinced 

the  same  bruising  as  that  older  Children  who  verbalized  an  allegation.  

Although Father may have complied with some aspects of his single case plan 

objectives,  he  has  made  no  progress  toward  alleviating  the  causes  of  the 

Children’s dependency.  Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion when it 

concluded  that  Father’s  repeated  abuse  caused  the  Children  to  go  without 

parental care, and that such abuse cannot or will not be remedied.  The trial 

court did not err when it determined that DHS met its burden under Section 

2511(a)(2). 

Having discerned no error or abuse of discretion as to the first prong of 

the  bifurcated  termination  analysis,  we  next  address  second  prong  under 

Section 2511(b), which comprises of Father’s second appellate issue. 

The section provides: 

(b) Other  considerations.--The court in  terminating the 
rights  of  a  parent  shall  give  primary  consideration  to  the 
developmental,  physical  and  emotional  needs  and  welfare 

- 15 - 

J-S43017-22 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 
solely  on  the  basis  of  environmental  factors  such  as 
inadequate  housing,  furnishings,  income,  clothing  and 
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 
With  respect  to  any  petition  filed  pursuant  to  subsection 
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 
filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 

 

This Court has explained further: 

[S]ection  2511(b)  focuses  on  whether  termination  of 
parental  rights  would  best  serve  the  developmental, 
physical,  and  emotional  needs  and  welfare  of  the  child.   
In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), 
this  Court  stated,  “Intangibles  such  as  love,  comfort, 
security,  and  stability  are  involved  in  the  inquiry  into  the 
needs and welfare of the child.”  In addition, we instructed 
that the trial court must also discern the nature and status 
of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 
on 
that 
bond.  Id.  However, in cases where there is no evidence of 
a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer 
that  no bond exists.  In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 
(Pa.  Super.  2008).    Accordingly,  the  extent  of  the  bond-
effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of 
the particular case. Id. at 763. 

permanently 

severing 

child 

the 

of 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists, 

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child 

had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting 

- 16 - 

J-S43017-22 

bond to be too attenuated).  Moreover, the court is not required to use expert 

testimony  to  resolve  the  bond  analysis.    In  re  Z.P.,  994  A.2d  1108,  1121 

(citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)).    

“Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also 

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they 

have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.   Finally, we 

emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child 

is  a  major  aspect  of  the  Section  2511(b)  best-interest  analysis,  it  is 

nonetheless  only  one  of  many  factors  to  be  considered  by  the  court  when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.”  In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

Instantly,  the  caseworker  testified  that  there  was  no  bond  worth 

preserving between Father and each of the respective Children.  Though some 

Children  had  desired  to  have  contact  with  Mother,  none  requested  to  see 

Father.  I.D. was fearful of Father.  S.T.S. did not consider Father to be her 

biological  parent.    Moreover,  the  Children  also  demonstrated  positive 

behaviors after the parental visits were suspended.  The court also noted that 

the  two  youngest  Children  have  spent  more  of  their  life  in  foster  care  than 

they did with Father.  See generally N.T. 102-115 

On  appeal,  Father  argues  that  DHS  failed  to  prove  that  bonds  do  not 

exist  between  the  Children  and  Father.    See  Father’s  Brief  at  30.    Father 

argues that there was competing testimony as to the bonds, and that the trial 

court  failed  to  fully  consider  the  needs  and  welfare  of  the  Children  when  it 

- 17 - 

J-S43017-22 

parents. 

decided to side with the testimony of DHS rather than the testimony of the 

We find Father’s arguments unpersuasive.  We reiterate that when there 

no evidence  of a  bond between a parent and child, it  is  reasonable to  infer 

that  no  bond  exists.  K.Z.S.,  946  A.2d  at  762-63.    Furthermore,  the  mere 

existence of “competing testimony” does not mean the trial court’s ultimate 

determination was somehow deficient.  A trial court must necessarily resolve 

the competing evidence and testimony when rendering its factual findings and 

legal conclusions.  Lastly, Father also misunderstands the role of this Court.  

As  noted  above,  we  do  not  search  the  record  for  contrary  conclusions  or 

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d at 

1124.  Rather, we must affirm even if evidence exists that would also support 

a contrary determination. See P.Z., 113 A.3d at 849.  With this standard in 

mind, and upon our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law.   

Having concluded that the trial court properly terminated Father’s rights 

as to each Child, we turn our focus to Father’s third appellate issue.  Here, 

Father  claims  the  trial  court  erred  when  it  changed  the  goals  of  the 

dependency cases from reunification to adoption.  Because we have already 

concluded  that  termination  was  warranted,  we  dismiss  these  challenges  as 

moot.  See Interest of D.R.W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An 

issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter 

an order that has any legal force or effect.”). 

- 18 - 

J-S43017-22 

Next,  we  consider  Father’s  fourth  appellate  issue,  where  he  claims 

ineffective  assistance  of  counsel.    Father  claims  his  counsel  was  ineffective 

because  counsel  failed  to  object  to  certain  leading  questions.  See  Father’s 

Brief at 33.  Father also claims that his counsel failed to argue that Father’s 

disciplinary methods were informed by his Islamic faith. Id. 

Our  Supreme  Court  has  recognized  that  an  indigent  parent  has  a 

constitutional right to counsel in a termination case. In re J.T., 983 A.2d 771, 

774  (Pa.  Super.  2009)  (citing  In  re  Adoption  of  R.I.,  312  A.2d  601  (Pa. 

1973).    “The  right  to  counsel  in  parental  termination  cases  is  the  right  to 

effective assistance of counsel even though the case is civil in nature.” J.T., 

983  A.2d  at  774-75  (citing  In re Adoption of T.M.F.,  573  A.2d  1035  (Pa. 

Super. 1990) (en banc) (further citation omitted)).  “We [] review the record 

as a whole to determine whether or not the parties received a ‘fundamentally 

fair’ hearing; a finding that counsel was ineffective is made only if the parent 

demonstrates that  counsel’s ineffectiveness was ‘the cause of the decree of 

termination.” Id. at 775 (citations omitted). 

Upon  review,  we  do  not  find  that  counsel  was  ineffective.    Neither 

counsel’s  failure  to  object  to  certain  questions,  nor  his  supposed  failure  to 

contextualize  Father’s  religious  beliefs  was  a  cause  for  the  entry  of  the 

termination  decrees.    Quite  plainly,  the  driving  cause  of  the  termination  of 

Father’s rights was  his  “torture” of the  Children, his failure to address  such 

harm,  and  the  subsequent  effects  of  that  harm  on  the  Children.    Father’s 

fourth appellate issue is without merit. 

- 19 - 

J-S43017-22 

Finally,  in  his  fifth  appellate  issue,  Father  claims  the  trial  court 

demonstrated bias.  He alleges that the court only paid “lip service” to the fact 

that the family was Muslim.  See Father’s Brief at 35.  Father maintains that 

their “religious practices around discipline included using corrective teaching 

and  learning  the  Quran,  the  main  Muslim  scripture.”  Id.    Father  claims  the 

court did not inquire into the cultural values of the family. Id. 

We review challenges to a court's partiality for an abuse of discretion. 

See Commonwealth v. McCauley, 199 A.3d 947, 950 (Pa. Super. 2018).  

Both our Supreme Court as well as the Supreme Court of the United States 

have addressed how a judge's partiality cuts directly to an individual's right to 

due process: 

It is axiomatic that a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 
due  process.  See  U.S.  Const.  Amend.  XIV.    The  United 
States Supreme Court has recognized  that a litigant's  due 
process  rights  are  violated  when  the  circumstances  of  a 
judicial  decision  give  rise  to  an  unacceptable  risk  of 
actual bias.  Williams  v.  Pennsylvania,  --  U.S.  --,  136 
S.Ct.  1899,  1908  (2016).    Moreover,  the  appearance 
of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence 
in  the  administration  of  justice  as  the  actual  presence 
of bias or  prejudice.    Commonwealth  v.  Goodman,  311 
A.2d 651, 654 (Pa. 1973). 

However, simply because a judge rules against a defendant 
does not establish any bias on the part of the judge against 
that  defendant.  Commonwealth  v.  Travaglia,  661  A.2d 
352, 367 (Pa. 1995). 

Interest of D.J.B., 230 A.3d 379, 385 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting McCauley, 

199 A.3d at 950-51). 

- 20 - 

J-S43017-22 

We note several problems with Father’s challenge.  First, Father did not 

seek recusal during the hearing.  A party seeking recusal or disqualification 

based on judicial bias or impartiality is required to raise the objection at the 

earliest possible moment, or the party will suffer the consequences of being 

time barred.  Jordan v. Pennsylvania State University, 276 A.3d 751, 762 

(PA. Super. 2022) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not 

raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

appeal.”).    Second,  if  Father  means  to  argue  that  the  court’s  bias  was  not 

evinced until its ultimate decision, he has failed to demonstrate how.  Father’s 

brief  does  not  Father  cite  to  any  specific  instance  where  the  court  evinced 

bias, nor does Father cite to any pertinent legal authorities beyond the Judicial 

Code of Conduct.  It is well-established that the failure to develop an argument 

with citation to, and analysis of, pertinent authority results in waiver of that 

issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119.  For these reasons, we find the issue is 

waived. 

In  sum,  we  conclude  that  the  trial  court  did  not  error  or  abuse  its 

discretion when it determined DHS met its burden to terminate Father’s rights 

under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).  Given this conclusion, we dismiss Father’s 

goal change challenges as moot.  We further conclude that Father’s counsel 

was not ineffective, and we conclude that Father waived his claim that the trial 

court evinced bias. 

Termination decrees affirmed.  Goal change orders affirmed. 

Judge Nichols joins the memorandum. 

- 21 - 

Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/17/2023 

    J

  D

Judgment Entered. 

     

 

J-S43017-22 

case. 

- 22 -