NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

SHAWNEE BALTRUSAITIS       

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

             

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Appellant 

 

 

v. 

YDNEY SCHILPP 

 No. 920 MDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered June 3, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Civil Division at 
No(s):  2022-00414 

EFORE:   STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:       FILED: MARCH 21, 2023 

 

Appellant  Shawnee  Baltrusaitis  appeals  from  the  June  3,  2022,  order 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County, which denied her 

petition for a preliminary injunction.1  After a careful review, we affirm. 

____________________________________________ 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

 It is well-settled that an order denying or granting a preliminary injunction 
is  an  interlocutory  order  appealable  as  of  right  pursuant  to  Pa.R.A.P. 
311(a)(4).  See  Pa.R.A.P.  311(a)(4)  (“An  appeal  may  be  taken  as  of 
right…from…[a]n order that grants or denies…an injunction[.]”); In re: Trust 
under Deed of Trust of Nell G. Jack, Settlor dated May 29, 1981, 284 
A.3d  451  (Pa.Super.  2022)  (holding  order  denying  or  granting  preliminary 
injunction  is  immediately  appealable  as  of  right).  To  the  extent  Appellee 
contends  the  trial  court’s  order  is  not  appealable  as  of  right  because  it  is 
subject  to  the  exception  under  Rule  311(a)(4)(ii),  which  provides  generally 
that an order granting or denying an injunction is not immediately appealable 
if it was entered “[a]fter a trial but before entry of the final order[,]” we note 
the  trial  court  did  not  hold  a  trial  on  the  claims  raised  in  Appellant’s  civil 
(Footnote Continued Next Page) 

   

     

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The  relevant  facts  and  procedural  history  are  as  follows:  On  May  23, 

2022, Appellant filed a complaint averring that, on November 30, 2020, she 

purchased a male Rottweiler (“Mushu”) for herself using her own funds, and 

she  arranged  to  have  Mushu  transported  to  Pennsylvania  from  Arkansas  at 

her  own  expense.    Appellant  averred  she  never  gifted,  sold,  or  transferred 

ownership of Mushu to any other person, and “[i]t was common knowledge in 

the  community  that  [she]  was  the  only  owner  of  Mushu.”  Appellant’s 

Complaint, filed 5/23/22, at ¶ 11.  

Appellant averred Appellee was romantically involved with her son, Tyler 

Baltrusaitis (“Tyler”), and resided with him in a house located in Factoryville, 

Pennsylvania.  Appellant owned the Factoryville house, and Appellee paid rent 

to Appellant.  Mushu spent time at this house in Factoryville.  When the young 

couple’s romantic relationship ended, Appellee moved out of the Factoryville 

house  on  April  28,  2022,  taking  Mushu  with  her.  Appellant  averred  that, 

despite  repeated  requests,  Appellee  refused  to  return  Mushu.  Accordingly, 

Appellant filed a civil complaint raising claims of conversion and replevin, as 

____________________________________________ 

complaint. See Pa.R.C.P. 1038 (pertaining to trial without jury); Morgan v. 
Millstone Resources Ltd., 267 A.3d 1235 (Pa.Super. 2021) (discussing the 
application of Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4)(ii)). Rather, the trial court held a hearing 
limited to Appellant’s petition for special relief, i.e., a preliminary injunction. 
See  Pa.R.C.P.  1531  (pertaining  to  hearings  on  requests  for  preliminary 
injunctions);  In  re:  Trust  under  Deed  of  Trust  of  Nell  G.  Jack,  Settlor 
dated May 29, 1981, supra (noting a court will ordinarily issue a preliminary 
injunction only after written notice and hearing).  

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Appellant.  

well  as  seeking  a  permanent  injunction  directing  the  return  of  Mushu  to 

Additionally, on May 23, 2022, Appellant filed a petition for a preliminary 

injunction  wherein  she  made  factual  allegations  similar  to  those  in  her 

complaint.  Appellant requested the trial court enter a preliminary injunction 

ordering  the  immediate  return  of  Mushu  to  the  Factoryville  house  and/or 

otherwise  to  Appellant.    On  June  3,  2022,  the  trial  court  held  a  hearing  on 

Appellant’s petition for a preliminary injunction.   

At the hearing, Appellant confirmed Appellee was romantically involved 

and  resided  with  Tyler  in  Appellant’s  home  in  Factoryville.  When  Appellee 

moved in, Tyler had two cats.  N.T., 6/3/22, at 6-7.  Appellant indicated that, 

in  2020,  outside  the  presence  of  Appellee,  she  discussed  with  Tyler  the 

possibility of purchasing a dog.  Id. at 9.  She was going through a divorce 

and  chemotherapy  treatment,  and  she  wanted  Tyler  to  have  something 

positive if she died.  Id. at 8, 73-74.  

Following  the  conversation,  she  began  looking  for  a  dog  in  June  or 

August of 2020, and after talking to a breeder in Arkansas in October of 2020, 

she gave the breeder $2,500.00 to purchase and transport a male Rottweiler 

puppy to Pennsylvania. Id. at 11.  She noted the dog was born on October 

20, 2020, she alone signed a  purchase contract as the buyer on November 

30, 2020, and she alone picked up the dog when it arrived at the Tunkhannock 

Walmart parking lot on January 21, 2021.  Id. at 15-18.  She noted that, upon 

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Id. at 18.   

the dog’s arrival, she posted on social media “welcome to the family, Mushu.”  

Appellant admitted Tyler gave her $1,000.00 towards the purchase of 

the dog.  Id. at 12.  She also admitted that, after the purchase, Mushu resided 

at the Factoryville residence with Tyler and Appellee, and Appellee named the 

dog “Mushu.”  Id. at 26-27, 81.  Appellant testified she visited the Factoryville 

home at least once a week to clean, cook food, plow the snow, cut the grass, 

and let the dog out. Id. at 8. However, Appellant denied she ever transferred 

ownership of Mushu to anyone or discussed giving Mushu to Appellee.  Id. at 

27.  She noted she purchased a crate, collar, dog bed, food, bowls, and other 

supplies for Mushu.  Id. at 29-32.  Also, when the family went on a vacation 

in  August  of  2021,  she  paid  for  Mushu’s  stay  at  a  kennel.    Id.  at  34.    She 

admitted Tyler and/or Appellee also purchased dog food for Mushu, as well as 

took the dog to the veterinarian.  Id. at 82.  

Appellant  testified  that,  on  April  28,  2022,  she  received  a  phone  call 

from Tyler  indicating Appellee had moved out of  the Factoryville house and 

taken Mushu with her.  Id. at 37.  Appellant went to the Factoryville house on 

April 29, 2022, and she discovered Appellee had returned for more items.  Id. 

at 39.  Appellant asked Appellee, “where’s my dog?”  Id.  Appellee responded, 

“he’s  mine.”    Id.    Appellant  testified  she  informed  Appellee  that  Mushu 

belonged to her and, until Mushu was returned, she would not allow Appellee 

to  remove  any  more  items  from  the  house.    Id.  at  39.    Appellant  testified 

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Appellee said she would bring Mushu back to the house, thus Appellant waited 

at  the  Factoryville  house.    Id.    However,  instead  of  returning  with  Mushu, 

Appellee returned with several other people and began removing items from 

the house.  Id. at 39-42.  Appellant testified Appellee never returned Mushu 

to  her,  and  she  later  discovered  Appellee  had  purchased  a  dog  license  for 

Mushu a week prior to moving out of  the Factoryville house. Id.  at 43, 47.  

Appellant subsequently bought a license for the dog for that same year-2022. 

Id. at 53. 

Appellant  testified  she,  as  well  as  Tyler,  are  attached  to  Mushu,  who 

reciprocates the attachment.  Id. at 47.  She testified she sought a preliminary 

injunction because she is fearful Appellee will hide Mushu or give him away to 

someone else.  Id. at 49.  She testified Mushu is “unique,” and the attachment 

she has with him cannot be replaced with money.  Id. at 52.  

Tyler  confirmed  he  and  Appellee  dated,  and  they  lived  together  in 

Appellant’s house  in Factoryville.   Id. at 96-97.  In 2020, he and Appellant 

discussed getting a dog, and Appellant contracted with a breeder for a male 

Rottweiler.    Id.    He  gave  Appellant  $1,000.00  towards  the  purchase  of  the 

dog, Mushu; however, Appellee contributed in no way towards the purchase 

or selection of the dog.  Id. at 98.  He denied Appellee ever owned Mushu; 

however, he admitted she sometimes paid for dog food and took Mushu to the 

veterinarian.  Id. at 100-01.  He also admitted he and Appellee trained Mushu, 

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and they were “very hands on with him.”  Id. at 102. He denied he ever gave 

Mushu to Appellee or that he referred to Mushu as Appellee’s dog.  Id.  

Tyler confirmed Appellee moved out of the Factoryville house on April 

28, 2022, and the week before, she told him she was going to move out.  Id. 

at 104.  Because he did not want to be present to watch Appellee move her 

belongings, he left the house at 10:00 a.m. on April 28, 2022, and when he 

returned at 9:30 p.m., both Appellee and Mushu were gone.  Id. at 104-05.  

Additionally, Mushu’s crate, dog food, leashes, and collars were gone.  Id. at 

106.   

He  testified  that,  prior  to  April  28,  2022,  he  and  Appellee  had  no 

conversation  about  her  taking  Mushu.  Id.  at  105.  Accordingly,  Tyler 

immediately  called  Appellee  and  asked  her  if  she  had  Mushu.    Id.  at  107.  

Appellee told Tyler that Mushu was her dog, so she took him with her.  Id.   

Appellee then told Tyler that he could have Mushu or the cats.   Id. at 111. 

Tyler denied he ever told Appellee that Mushu was her dog.  Id.  

Tyler  testified  he  was  very  upset  when  he  realized  Mushu  had  been 

taken by Appellee.  Id. at 108.  He indicated the dog was “his best friend,” 

and he was 100% bonded with him.  Id. at 110.   

During the cross-examination of Tyler, the following relevant exchange 

occurred: 

Q: You were living with [Appellee]? 

A: She was living at—we were both living at [Appellant’s] house, 
yes. 

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Q: And was that your first Christmas together in December of that 
year? 

Q: At the [Factoryville] residence? 

Q: Where [Appellant] did not live. 

A: Yes, sir. 

A: Yes, sir. 

A: Yes, sir. 

A: I got us a dog. 

Q: You got us the dog? 

A: Yes. 

Q: What did you get [Appellee] for Christmas? 

Q: Okay. What did you get [Appellee]? 

A:  I  got  her  other  presents  for  that  year,  but  I  got  it  together 
collectively for us the dog. 

Q: What other presents did you get for [Appellee]? 

A: I got with the dog, I – 

Q: No, what other presents did you get [Appellee] for Christmas 
that year? 

A:  Besides  that,  I  got  the  dog,  I  got  dog  toys  for  her  and 
everything  and  whatever  else  I  got  her  that  year,  I  don’t 
remember. 

Q:  And  it  is  your  statement  that  you  never  gave  the  dog  to 
[Appellee]? 

However, Tyler admitted he sent text messages to Appellee wherein he 

referred to Mushu as her dog.   Id. at 121.  In text messages from Tyler to 

Appellee on April 1, 2021, and November 4, 2021, Tyler stated: 

You don’t even like the dog I got you….I hope you like your 

dog in this cage all day tomorrow. 

*** 

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A: Yes. 

d. at 117-18.  

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F—ing dog I bought for you….I’m sorry I got you a dog….You 
got to get up for crap, play with your dog….You can’t even take 
care of your own dog. 

Tyler  admitted  that,  from  the  text  messages,  it  appeared  he  told 

Appellee  Mushu  belonged  to  her.    Id.  at  130.    Tyler  admitted  that  some 

receipts  from  the  veterinarian  list  Appellee  as  the  owner  while  other 

documents  from  the  veterinarian  list  him  and  Appellee  collectively  as  the 

owners.  Id. at 134, 141-42.  He indicated Appellee took Mushu to some of 

the veterinarian visits, as well as paid for some of the visits.  Id. at 134-37.  

Also,  Appellee  purchased  food  for  Mushu,  and  Mushu  never  lived  with 

Appellant.  Id. at 137.  Tyler admitted Appellee got a dog license for Mushu 

on April 21, 2022, which was one week before she left the Factoryville home 

with Mushu.  Id. at 132.   

 

Judith Smith, who is Appellant’s mother, testified Appellant told her she 

was going to buy a dog in 2020.  Id. at 163.  Appellant never told Ms. Smith 

that the dog was a gift for Appellee.  Id.  Ms. Smith admitted that, during the 

past Christmas holiday, the dog was at Appellant’s house in Tunkhannock, and 

Appellee “[t]ook the dog back to the house…in Factoryville.”  Id. at 164.  

 

Samantha  Baltrusaitis  (“Samantha”),  who  is  Appellant’s  daughter, 

testified Appellant purchased Mushu in 2020 as a “family dog.”  Id. at 171.  

She never heard Appellant or Tyler “refer to Mushu as [Appellee’s] dog.”  Id.  

d. at 126-27, 130. 

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She indicated that on April 28, 2022, she was at her father’s house when Tyler 

arrived very upset.  Id. at 175.  

 

Megan  Smith,  who  is  Appellant’s  sister,  testified  Appellant  told  her  in 

2020 that she was buying a dog for herself.  Id. at 177-78.  Appellant never 

discussed giving the dog to Appellee as a gift, and she never heard Appellee 

say that Mushu belonged to her.  Id.  

 

Appellee  testified  she  currently  lives  with  her  aunt  in  Tunkhannock; 

however, she previously lived in Factoryville with Tyler.  Id. at 183.  Appellant 

owned the house in Factoryville, and Appellee paid rent to her.   Id. at 193. 

She indicated that, during the first year the couple lived together, Tyler gave 

her a dog as a Christmas gift.  Id. at 184.  Specifically, on Christmas morning, 

she and Tyler went downstairs, and “he pulled up a picture on his phone of 

Mushu  and  was  like  Merry  Christmas.”    Id.    She  noted  Mushu  was  not  yet 

ready to be delivered to Pennsylvania, so Tyler did not physically present her 

with the dog at this time.  Id.  She chose the name “Mushu” for the dog.  Id. 

at 183.  She testified that, in addition to Mushu, she received a dog bed, dog 

collar, a dog leash, and dog toys for Christmas from Tyler.  Id. at 185.  She 

did not receive any non-dog related gifts from Tyler for Christmas that year.  

Id.   

 

Appellee testified Tyler never told her that Mushu did not belong to her. 

Id. at 186.  She indicated “it was a common fact that [Mushu] was given to 

[her] as a Christmas gift.”  Id. at 187.  She told Tyler that Mushu was “the 

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best Christmas gift  I’ll ever get in my  life because I always wanted a dog.”  

Id.  From the beginning, she was under the impression that Mushu was her 

dog.  Id. at 188.  She confirmed Tyler sent her several text messages during 

their  relationship  wherein  he  referred  to  Mushu  as  “her  dog.”    Id.  She 

specifically testified Tyler told her he bought the dog for her, and “he would 

hold [it] over her head quite frequently.”  Id. at 212.  She indicated that, prior 

to the instant dispute, she was unaware that Appellant had contributed money 

towards the purchase of Mushu, and she was under the impression Tyler had 

fully purchased Mushu as a gift for her.  Id. at 211-12.   

 

Appellee  testified  she  paid  for  bills  related  to  Mushu,  including 

veterinarian bills.  Id. at 188.  She testified that, aside from one time when 

Tyler  took  Mushu  to  the  veterinarian  because  she  was  at  work,  she  always 

took Mushu to the veterinarian by herself.  Id. at 191.  She indicated Appellant 

neither  paid  for  any  of  the  veterinarian  bills  nor  reimbursed  Appellee  for 

expenses related to Mushu.  Id. at 195.  She testified that, when the family 

went on a vacation, she arranged for Mushu to stay with her friends, who had 

pit bulls, but Appellant offered to pay for Mushu to stay at a kennel instead. 

Id.  Appellee and Tyler drove Mushu to the kennel, and they picked him up 

after the vacation.  Id. at 196-97. 

 

Appellee testified that during the time she lived in the Factoryville house 

Appellant  often  appeared  unannounced.  Id.  at  200-02.  She  indicated 

Appellant cleaned the house and folded the laundry. Id. She testified Appellant 

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“never came over to see the dog. [S]he came over to take care of her son, 

Tyler.”  Id. at 202.  Appellant indicated Mushu never stayed overnight with 

Appellant at the home in Tunkhannock.  Id.  She also testified Mushu never 

wore the collar, which was purchased by Appellant.  Id.  

 

Appellee testified the following occurred as she was removing her items 

from the Factoryville house on April 29, 2022: 

So, we were like walking around taking a count of like okay, 
we  need  to  grab  the  furniture  from  here,  from  here,  and  then 
[Appellant] like rips into the driveway….And she was like what are 
you doing? I’m like moving out my stuff. And she’s like where’s 
my dog? And I was like…he’s not your dog, he’s my dog. And she 
was like he’s my dog. I bought him, he’s mine.  And I was like no, 
I received him as a Christmas gift.  I am his main caregiver.  I do 
everything for him, he is my dog. And she was like if you don’t 
give  me  my  dog,  I’m  calling  and  having  you  all  arrested  for 
trespassing.  Like get out of my house.  And I was like I need to 
get my stuff.  And she was like I need my dog.  

Appellee testified she did not bring Mushu back to the Factoryville house 

because  “he’s  [her]  dog.”  Id.  at  206.    She  admitted  that,  after  Appellant 

confronted her during the move-out, she told Appellant she would bring Mushu 

back  to  the  Factoryville  house.    Id.  at  208.    She  indicated  she  said  this  to 

Appellant because she was scared and wanted to be able to move out the rest 

of her belongings.  Id. at 207-08.  Appellee confirmed Mushu currently lives 

with her at her aunt’s house.  Id.  She testified she loves Mushu like a mother 

loves her son. Id. at 212.  

d. at 204-05.  

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On  cross-examination,  Appellee  acknowledged  Appellant  purchased 

food, a dog bed, and a crate for Mushu.  Id. at 219.  She testified she believed 

Appellant purchased the items because she was an “overbearing mother” who 

often  paid  for  Tyler’s  expenses.    Id.  at  224.    Appellee  indicated  Appellant 

never told her that Mushu belonged to Appellant or expressed any interest in 

removing Mushu from the Factoryville house.  Id.  She acknowledged she did 

not tell Tyler she was going to take Mushu when she moved out.  Id. at 220.  

 

Nancy Naylor, who is Appellee’s mother, testified that in November of 

2020, Tyler and Appellee were eating dinner at her house.  Id. at 231.  After 

dinner, Appellee went to use the bathroom, and “Tyler came up to [Ms. Naylor] 

with his phone and he said look what I’m giving [Appellee] for Christmas this 

year.”    Id.    Ms.  Naylor  testified  Tyler  showed  her  a  photo  of  a  Rottweiler 

puppy.  Id. at 232.  Tyler told Ms. Naylor the puppy wouldn’t be available until 

after Christmas.  Id.  Ms. Naylor told Tyler Appellee would love the present 

because she had always wanted a puppy.  Id.   

Ms. Naylor testified that, on Christmas day, Appellee texted her a photo 

of the puppy.  Id. at 233.  She indicated Appellee was “ecstatic” over receiving 

the puppy.  Id.  She further testified Tyler reported to her that Appellee was 

thrilled with receiving the dog, which in turn made Tyler happy.  Id. at 235. 

To her knowledge, Tyler did not get Appellee any other present for Christmas 

that year.  Id.  She indicated Tyler referred to Mushu as “[Appellee’s] dog.” 

Id.  

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On re-direct examination, Appellant testified she never authorized Tyler 

to give Mushu to Appellee.  Id. at 240.  She indicated she had no idea Tyler 

“might be planning on giving [Mushu to Appellee] as a Christmas gift,” and 

had she known, she would have said “no.”  Id.   

On  re-direct  examination,  Tyler  testified  he  “did  not  get  the  dog  for 

[Appellee],  [he]  got  the  dog  for  [them]  as  like  as  a  family,  but  it  wasn’t 

specifically for [Appellee].”  Id. at 243.  He denied he gave Mushu to Appellee 

as  a  Christmas  gift  or  that  he  told  Appellee’s  mother  he  was  going  to  get 

Appellee  a  dog  as  a  Christmas  gift.    Id.  at  244.    He  indicated  that  since 

Appellant’s  name  is  on  the  bill  of  sale  for  Mushu  he  believes  it  would  have 

been impossible for him to transfer ownership to Appellee.  Id.    

On June 3, 2022, the trial court entered an order  denying Appellant’s 

petition for a preliminary injunction.  This appeal followed on June 20, 2022. 

The trial court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and 

Appellant timely complied.  On  August 22, 2022, the trial court filed  a Rule 

1925(a) opinion. 

Questions Involved” (verbatim): 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues in her “Statement of 

1.  The trial court committed an abuse of discretion, committed an 
error  of  law  and/or  fact  and/or  failed  to  conduct  a  reasoned 
analysis of the evidence presented in that the Court found that 
Appellant did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of 
the case so as to be entitled to entry of a preliminary injunction. 

2.  The trial court committed an abuse of discretion, committed an 
error  of  law  and/or  fact  and/or  failed  to  conduct  a  reasoned 
analysis of the evidence presented in that the Court failed to 

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issue an injunction or to analyze all of the evidence presented 
at the hearing. 

3.  The trial court committed an abuse of discretion, committed an 
error  of  law  and/or  fact  and/or  failed  to  conduct  a  reasoned 
analysis  of  the  evidence  presented  in  that  the  Court  did  not 
analyze  all  of  the  factors  necessary  to  determine  whether  a 
preliminary injunction should be issued. 

4.  The trial court committed an abuse of discretion, committed an 
error  of  law  and/or  fact  and/or  failed  to  conduct  a  reasoned 
analysis of Appellant’s claims for replevin and conversion. 

5.  The trial court committed an abuse of discretion, committed an 
error  of  law  and/or  fact  and/or  failed  to  conduct  a  reasoned 
analysis  should  this  Court  conclude  that  anyone  else  besides 
Appellant owns and at all relevant times hereto, owned the dog 
in question. 

6.  [Appellant  reserves  the  right  to  supplement  this  Statement 
upon  receipt  of  the  trial  court  transcript.]—the  Rule  1925(b) 
Statement  was  not  updated  after  receipt  of  the  trial  court 
transcript. 

Initially,  we  note  that,  in  her  appellate  brief,  Appellant  specifically 

indicates she is withdrawing issue four as a stand-alone assignment of error.2  

Id. at 20.  Further, regarding issue six, Appellant presents no argument, and 

there is no indication she has supplemented her issues.  

 

Regarding  her  remaining  issues,  which  are  interrelated,  Appellant 

addresses the issues together in one argument section.  In essence, Appellant 

____________________________________________ 

2 In any event, we note the trial court explained it did not rule on Appellant’s 
substantive replevin and conversion claims, which were raised in Appellant’s 
civil  complaint,  because  the  June  3,  2022,  hearing  pertained  solely  to 
Appellant’s  request  for  a  preliminary  injunction.  Trial  Court  Opinion,  filed 
8/22/22,  at  9  n.4.  Notably,  on  July  15,  2022,  Appellee  filed  an  answer  to 
Appellant’s civil complaint, and thus, the underlying matter is ongoing.  

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ppellant’s Brief at 4-5 (italics omitted). 

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contends  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  her  request  for  a  preliminary 

injunction.    She  asserts  she  met  all  the  prerequisites  for  the  entry  of  a 

preliminary injunction, and thus, the trial court erred in denying her petition.   

Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, 

which  we  review  for  an  abuse  of  discretion.    Morgan  Trailer  Mft.  Co.  v. 

Hydraroll, Ltd., 759 A.2d 926, 932 (Pa.Super. 2000). 

[I]n reviewing  preliminary injunction orders, “an appellate court 
is to conduct a searching inquiry of the record. Accordingly,…the 
scope  of  review  in  preliminary  injunction  matters  is  plenary.” 
Warehime v. Warehime, 580 Pa. 201, 209 n.7, 860 A.2d 41, 46 
n.7  (2004).  With  regard  to  the  standard  of  review,  appellate 
review  of  a  trial  court’s  order  granting  or  denying  preliminary 
injunctive relief is “highly deferential.”  Summit Towne Centre, 
Inc.  v.  Shoe  Show  of  Rocky  Mount,  Inc.,  573  Pa.  637,  646, 
828 A.2d 995, 1000 (2003). 

  
Hendricks v. Hendricks, 175 A.3d 323, 329-30 (Pa.Super. 2017) (footnote 

Under  this  highly  deferential  standard  of  review,  an 
appellate court…examines the record to determine if there were 
any  apparently  reasonable  grounds  for  the  action  of  the  court 
below.  “Apparently reasonable grounds” exist to support a lower 
court’s  denial  of  injunctive  relief  where  the  lower  court  has 
properly found that any one of the six essential prerequisites for 
a preliminary injunction is not satisfied.  

EIU Healthcare Pennsylvania v. Com., 628 Pa. 573, 104 A.3d 495, 501 

  S

(2014) (quotations and some quotation marks omitted). 

 

The six essential prerequisites that a moving party must demonstrate 

to obtain a preliminary injunction are as follows: 

(1)  an  injunction  is  necessary  to  prevent  immediate  and 
irreparable  harm  that  cannot  be  adequately  compensated  by 

omitted).   

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damages;  (2)  greater  injury  would  result  from  refusing  an 
injunction than from granting it, and, concomitantly, that issuance 
of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties 
in  the  proceedings;  (3)  a  preliminary  injunction  will  properly 
restore the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior 
to  the  alleged  wrongful  conduct;  (4)  the  activity  it  seeks  to 
restrain is actionable, that its right to relief is clear, and that the 
wrong is manifest, or, in other words, must show that it is likely 
to prevail on the merits; (5) the injunction it seeks is reasonably 
suited  to  abate  the  offending  activity;  and  (6)  a  preliminary 
injunction  will  not  adversely  affect  the  public  interest.  See 
Summit Towne Ctr., Inc., [supra,] 828 A.2d [at] 1001[.] For a 
preliminary injunction to issue, every  one of these prerequisites 
must be established; if the petitioner fails to establish any one of 
them, there is no need to address the others.  Allegheny Cnty. 
v. Commonwealth, 518 Pa. 556, 544 A.2d 1305, 1307 (1988). 

n re: Trust under Deed of Trust of Nell G. Jack, Settlor dated May 29, 

1981, 284 A.3d at 457. See SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania, supra. 

A  decision  addressing  a  request  for  a  preliminary  injunction  generally 

requires  extensive  fact-finding  by  the  trial  court  because  the  moving  party 

must establish it is likely to prevail on the merits.  See Summit Towne Ctr., 

Inc., supra, 828 A.2d at 1001.  Simply put, “the moving party must establish 

a prima facie  right  to relief….If the moving  party’s right  to relief is unclear, 

then a preliminary injunction should not issue.” Synthes USA Sales, LLC v. 

  I

 

Harrison, 83 A.3d 242, 249 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations omitted). 

 

Here,  we  note  the  trial  court  summarized  the  relevant  testimony  and 

made extensive factual findings, which are supported by the record.  Moreover, 

the  trial  court  determined  that,  based  on  the  evidence,  Appellant,  who  was 

the moving party, failed to demonstrate her right to relief is clear and/or that 

she is likely to prevail on the merits. We find no error in this regard and, thus, 

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we  conclude  the  trial  court  had  apparently  reasonable  grounds  to  deny  the 

preliminary injunction.3 See SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania, supra. 

Here,  the  basis  for  Appellant’s  request  for  injunctive  relief  is  a  dog, 

Mushu.  Pennsylvania law considers dogs to be personal property.  See Snead 

v.  Society  for  Prevention  of  Cruelty  to  Animals  of  Pennsylvania,  929 

A.2d  1169  (Pa.Super.  2007);  Desanctis  v.  Pritchard,  803  A.2d  230 

(Pa.Super. 2002).  Thus, in order to demonstrate she is likely to prevail on 

the merits and/or has a clear right to relief, Appellant, as the moving party, 

must  establish  a  prima  facie  case  that  she,  as  opposed  to  Appellee,  is  the 

rightful owner of Mushu, and Appellee, without justification, is unreasonably 

withholding Mushu from her.4   

____________________________________________ 

3 Contrary to Appellant’s assertion in her second issue, we conclude the trial 
court  properly  examined  the  evidence  presented  at  the  hearing  and  made 
relevant  factual  findings.  See  Trial  Court  Opinion,  filed  8/22/22,  at  2-5. 
Further, contrary to Appellant’s assertion in her third issue, we conclude the 
trial court properly analyzed the essential prerequisites that a moving party 
must demonstrate to obtain a preliminary injunction. See id. at 5-9. In any 
event, as indicated supra, the trial court has “apparently reasonable grounds” 
to deny a preliminary injunction if the petitioner fails to establish any one of 
the essential prerequisites, and, thus, there is no need to address the others. 
SEIU  Healthcare  Pennsylvania,  supra,  104  A.3d  at  501  (quotation 
omitted). 

  Under  Pennsylvania  case  law,  conversion  is  “the  deprivation  of  another’s 
right  of  property  in,  or  use  or  possession  of,  chattel,  or  other  interference 
therewith,  without  the  owner’s  consent  and  without  lawful  justification.”  
McKeeman v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d 655, 659 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 
2000)  (quotation  omitted).  A  person  may  incur  liability  for  conversion  by 
“[u]nreasonably  withholding  possession  from  one  who  has  the  right  to  it.”  
Martin v. National Sur. Corp., 437 Pa. 159, 262 A.2d 672, 675 (1970). The 
(Footnote Continued Next Page) 

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as follows: 

Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court reasoned 

 
It  was  undisputed  that  [Appellant]  arranged  for  the 
purchase of the puppy, signed a bill of sale for the puppy, partially 
paid for the puppy, and purchased a dog license for the dog for 
the  year  2022.  However,  these  undisputed  facts  are  not 
dispositive of [Appellant’s] ownership of the dog.  Both [Appellee] 
and Tyler provided testimony contradicting [Appellant’s] claim of 
ownership.  Tyler paid for almost half of the cost for the puppy, 
and  he  acknowledged  that  in  text  messages  to  [Appellee],  he 
referred to Mushu as [Appellee’s] dog.  Tyler also admitted that 
he got the dog for himself and [Appellee] for Christmas. [Appellant 
testified  that  she  discussed  the  purchase  of  the  dog  with  Tyler 
because she wanted Tyler to have something positive if she died 
during chemotherapy. Appellee testified Tyler gave her the dog as 
a Christmas gift.]   

All  parties  acknowledged  that  [Appellee]  named  the  dog.  
[Appellee]  took  the  dog  to  almost  all  of  the  veterinarian 
appointments.    She  also  purchased  a  dog  license  for  the  dog  in 
2022, prior to [Appellant’s] purchase of a dog license for Mushu.  
Furthermore,  the  dog  lived  with  Tyler  and  [Appellee]  from  the 
moment  he  was  picked  up  by  [Appellant],  and  the  dog  never 
stayed  with  [Appellant]  at  her  home.    In  view  of  these  factors, 
[Appellant] failed to show that she is likely to prevail on the merits 
of her case [or that her right to relief is clear since], considering 
all  the  evidence  presented,  it  is  still  unclear  as  to  who  owns 
Mushu.  

___________________________________________ 

action  of  replevin  is  founded  upon  the  wrongful  taking  and  detention  of 
property  and  seeks  to  recover  property  in  the  possession  of  another.  See 
Brandywine  Lanes,  Inc.  v.  Pittsburgh  National  Bank,  284  A.2d  802 
(Pa.Super.  1971)  (en  banc).    Equitable  principles  are  applicable  to  a  legal 
action in replevin.  See id. “A plaintiff in a replevin action need not set up title 
good  against  the  whole  world  but  must  show  good  title  as  against  the 
defendant in possession. In addition to good title, the plaintiff must show that 
[s]he is entitled to immediate possession of the property in question.” Id. at 
806 (citations omitted). 

  _

   

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Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/22/22, at 8-9 (footnote omitted). 

We  agree  with  the  trial  court  that  Appellant’s  alleged  ownership  of 

Mushu, to the exclusion of Appellee, forms the basis for Appellant’s request 

for preliminary injunctive relief. Moreover, in light of the conflicting evidence 

presented at the preliminary  injunction hearing related thereto, we find the 

trial court did not err in holding Appellant failed to demonstrate her right to 

relief  is  clear.  Thus,  “‘apparently  reasonable  grounds’  exist  to  support  [the 

trial] court’s denial of injunctive relief[.]” SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania, 

supra, 104 A.3d at 501 (quotation omitted). 

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

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Affirmed. 

udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/21/2023 

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