ON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

             

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J-A28025-22  

v. 

 

 

EITH PEASALL       

 

Appellant 

 No. 956 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 17, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County  
Criminal Division at No(s):  CP-51-CR-0002647-2012 

EFORE:  PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: 

 

 

     FILED MARCH 21, 2023 

 

Keith Peasall (“Peasall”)1 appeals from the order dismissing his petition 

for  relief  filed  pursuant  to  the  Post  Conviction  Relief  Act  (“PCRA”).2  

Additionally, Peasall’s appellate counsel, Earl G. Kauffman, Esquire (“Attorney 

Kauffman”),  has  filed  a  petition  to  withdraw  from  representation  and  an 

accompanying brief styled pursuant to  Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967).2  We grant counsel’s petition and affirm the PCRA court’s order. 

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1  The  record  reflects  that  the  appellant’s  actual  name  is  Tremaine  Millian; 
however, he uses several aliases, including “Keith Peasall,” and also goes by 
the nickname “Mukmin.”  See N.T., 9/23/13, at 19-21.   

 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.   

2 Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must proceed not 
under  Anders  but  under  Commonwealth  v.  Turner,  544  A.2d  927  (Pa. 
1998), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en 
(Footnote Continued Next Page) 

     

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  B

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In 2011, Peasall was arrested in connection with the 2007 homicide of 

Samere Taylor and charged with murder, possession of a firearm prohibited, 

and related crimes.  At the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth presented 

the  testimony  of  Devonne  Brinson,  who  testified  that  he  witnessed  Peasall 

shoot Taylor in the back near the corner of Dickenson and Bouvier Streets in 

South  Philadelphia.    On  the  scheduled  trial  date  of  September  23,  2013, 

following written and oral plea colloquies, Peasall entered a negotiated guilty 

plea to murder of the third degree and possession of a firearm prohibited.  The 

Commonwealth  agreed  to  nolle  prosequi  the  remaining  charges.    In 

connection  with  his  plea,  Peasall  admitted  to  killing  Taylor  and  agreed  with 

the  factual  summary  of  the  murder  as  read  into  the  record  by  the 

Commonwealth.   See N.T., 9/23/13, at 37-38, 48-50.  On that  same date, 

during  his  sentencing  hearing,  Peasall  apologized  to  Taylor’s  family  for 

murdering  Taylor  and  stated  that  the  shooting  resulted  from  Peasall’s  poor 

judgment and decision-making following a meaningless verbal altercation with 

Taylor.  Id. at 48-52.   The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Peasall 

to the negotiated aggregate sentence of eleven to twenty-two years in prison.  

____________________________________________ 

banc).    Although  Anders  and  Turner/Finley  are  close  cousins,  bearing 
similarities in that counsel is required to examine the record, present issues, 
and request permission to withdraw, there are also significant differences, as 
explained  infra.    See  Commonwealth  v.  Wrecks,  931  A.2d  717,  721-22 
(Pa. Super. 2007). 

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Peasall  did  not  file  a  motion  to  withdraw  his  guilty  plea,  a  post-sentence 

motion, or a direct appeal.   

On July 20, 2018, Peasall filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his first.  

Therein, he averred that the Commonwealth made a deal with Brinson to give 

him the lowest possible sentences (if not probation) on his open criminal cases 

in exchange for Brinson providing false testimony against Peasall.  See Pro Se 

PCRA Petition, 7/20/18, at 7; see also id. at 8 (alleging a violation of Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).3  The court appointed Dennis I. Turner, 

Esquire (“Attorney  Turner”), as  PCRA  counsel.   Attorney  Turner filed a “no-

merit” letter pursuant to Turner/Finley, indicating that following his review, 

he had determined that Peasall’s pro se petition was untimely, he could not 

satisfy any timeliness exception, and that his issues lacked merit.  On February 

4,  2021,  the  PCRA  court  issued  a  Pa.R.Crim.P.  907  notice  of  its  intent  to 

dismiss the petition without a hearing.  Peasall did not respond to the notice.  

On February 20, 2021, Attorney Turner filed a motion to withdraw.   

____________________________________________ 

3 In Brady, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violated due 
process  where  the  evidence  is  material  either  to  guilt  or  to  punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.  See Brady, 373 
U.S. at 87.  The Supreme Court subsequently held that the duty to disclose 
such evidence is applicable even if there has been no request by the accused, 
see  United  States  v.  Agurs,  427  U.S.  97,  107  (1976),  and  that  the  duty 
encompasses impeachment evidence as well as directly exculpatory evidence, 
see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 
 

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In  August  2021,  George  S.  Yacoubian,  Jr.,  Esquire  (“Attorney 

Yacoubian”)  entered  his  appearance.4    In  September  2021,  Attorney 

Yacoubian  filed  a  “no-merit”  letter  pursuant  to  Turner/Finley  wherein  he 

agreed with Attorney Turner’s assessment.  In  January and February  2022, 

the PCRA court issued additional Rule 907 notices of its intent to dismiss the 

petition.  Peasall did not respond to the notices.  On March 17, 2022, the PCRA 

court  entered  an  order  dismissing  Peasall’s  pro  se  petition  as  untimely  and 

meritless.  See Order, 3/17/22, at 1.  The order also indicated that Attorney 

Yacoubian  was  permitted  to  withdraw,  and  that  new  counsel  would  be 

appointed for Peasall’s PCRA appeal.  Id.  Attorney Kauffman thereafter filed 

a timely notice of appeal on Peasall’s behalf.  The PCRA court ordered Peasall 

to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement.  In response, Attorney Kauffman 

indicated  that  he  would  be  filing  an  Anders  brief  in  this  Court.    The  PCRA 

court did not file a Rule 1925(a) opinion.  In this Court,  Attorney Kauffman 

has filed a petition to withdraw, and an accompanying brief styled pursuant to 

Anders. 

At the outset of our review, we note that this case does not implicate 

Anders.    As  explained  above,  Anders  applies  to  direct  appeals  whereas 

Turner/Finley  applies  to  PCRA  cases.    This  Court  has  explained  the 

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4 The docket does not reflect any ruling by the PCRA court on Attorney Turner’s 
motion to withdraw from representation.   

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Turner/Finley, as follows: 

differences  between 

the 

requirements 

imposed  by  Anders  and 

Anders  counsel  is  not  permitted  to  withdraw  unless  the 
appeal is wholly frivolous, but Turner/Finley counsel is permitted 
to do so if the case lacks merit, even if it is not so anemic as to 
be deemed wholly frivolous.  Also, Anders counsel must not argue 
against  the  client’s  interests  while  Turner/Finley  counsel  must 
do so, articulating why the client’s claims have no merit. 

The heightened protection afforded to Anders appellants as 
compared to Turner/Finley petitioners/appellants arises because 
the  right  to  counsel  on  direct  appeal  and  the  right  to  the  direct 
appeal itself are constitutional ones.  By comparison, a first-time 
PCRA  petitioner’s  right  to  counsel  is  born  of  rule,  namely 
Pa.R.Crim.P.  904(C),  and  that  right  does  not  spring  from  the 
federal or state constitutions. 

Wrecks, 931 A.2d at 722 (citations omitted). 

Because  an  Anders  brief  provides  greater  protection  to  a  defendant, 

this Court may accept an Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley “no merit” 

letter.  See Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super. 

2011).  However, prior to addressing the merits of the issues raised for our 

review,  we  must  assess  whether  counsel’s  filings  satisfy  the  technical 

requirements of Turner/Finley.  See Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 

509, 510 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding that  “prior to addressing the merits of 

the  appeal,  we  must  review  counsel’s  compliance  with  the  procedural 

requirements for withdrawing as counsel”). 

Pursuant  to  Turner/Finley,  independent  review  of  the  record  by 

competent  counsel  is  required  before  withdrawal  on  collateral  appeal  is 

permitted.  See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009), 

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overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 

401  (Pa.  2021)  (abandoning  Pitts’s  approach  as  the  sole  procedure  for 

challenging  PCRA  counsel’s  effectiveness).    In  Pitts,  our  Supreme  Court 

explained that such independent review requires proof of: 

1.  A “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel detailing the nature and 

extent of his review; 
 

2.  The “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel listing each issue the 

petitioner wished to have reviewed; 
 

3.  The PC[R]A counsel’s “explanation,” in the “no-merit” letter, of 

why the petitioner’s issues were meritless; 
 

4.  The PC[R]A court conducting its own independent review of the 

5. The PC[R]A court agreeing with counsel that the petition was 

record; and 
 

meritless. 

Id. (citation and brackets omitted).  Further, counsel must also send a copy 

of the “no-merit” letter to the petitioner, along with a copy of the petition to 

withdraw, and inform the petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or to retain 

new counsel.  See Wrecks, 931 A.2d  at 721.  Substantial compliance with 

the  requirements  to  withdraw  as  counsel  will  satisfy  the  Turner/Finley 

criteria.    See  Commonwealth  v.  Karanicolas,  836  A.2d  940,  947  (Pa. 

Super.  2003).    If  the  brief  meets  these  requirements,  we  then  conduct  an 

independent review of the petitioner’s issues.  See Muzzy, 141 A.3d at 511. 

Our review discloses that Attorney Kauffman has substantially complied 

with  the  above  requirements.    In  the  Anders  brief,  Attorney  Kauffman 

detailed the nature and extent of his review of the case, listed each issue that 

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Peasall  wishes  to  have  reviewed,  and  explained  counsel’s  reasoning  for 

concluding that each of the issues are meritless.  See Anders’ Brief at 4-18.  

Attorney Kauffman has provided this Court with a copy of a letter dated August 

20,  2022,  which  he  sent  to  Peasall  informing  him  of  counsel’s  belief  that 

Peasall’s pro se petition was untimely filed, included no issues of arguable or 

legal  merit,  and  that  the  appeal  was  frivolous.    See  Letter,  8/20/22,  at 

unnumbered 1.  Attorney Kauffman also advised Peasall of his rights to retain 

replacement counsel or proceed pro se.  Id.  The letter does not indicate that 

a copy of the petition to withdraw or a copy of the Anders brief was attached 

to the letter.  Id.  However, the  petition  to withdraw  and the  Anders brief 

both  contain  a  certificate  of  service  which  indicates  that  a  copy  of  the 

document was sent to Peasall on August 20, 2022.  See Petition to Withdraw, 

8/20/22, at unnumbered 3; see also Anders Brief, 8/20/22, at unnumbered 

19.    Thus,  we  conclude  that  Attorney  Kauffman  has  substantially  complied 

with the requirements necessary to withdraw as counsel.  See Karanicolas, 

836 A.2d at 947.  We now independently review Peasall’s claims to ascertain 

whether they entitle him to relief. 

wished to raise, as follows: 

In the Anders’ brief, Attorney Kauffman listed the issues that Peasall 

1.  Whether [Peasall’s] PCRA petition was timely filed when it was 
filed  approximately  [four]  years  after  [the]  judgment  of 
sentence [became final] and there was no applicable statutory 
exception. 
 

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2.  Whether  prosecuting  attorneys  knowingly,  intelligently  and 
willfully  hid  the  fact  that  they  made  an  agreement  with  .  .  . 
Brinson  to  testify  falsely  against  [Peasall]  in  exchange  for  a 
lesser sentence. 
 

3.  Whether  [Peasall]  entered  the  negotiated  guilty  plea  out  of 
extreme fear and under extreme duress because [he] did not 
have  proof  that  the  [District  Attorney’s]  Office  made  an 
agreement with . . . Brinson to testify falsely against [Peasall] 
in exchange for a lesser sentence in the open cases . . . Brinson 
had. 
 

4.  Whether  .  .  .  Brinson  did  lie  when  asked  if  he  had  any 
agreement  with  the  [District  Attorney]  in  exchange  for  his 
testimony against [Peasall]. 
 

5.  Whether there was a Brady violation when the Commonwealth 

did not disclose the agreement. 
 

6.  Whether [Peasall] is factually innocent of the crimes he plead 
guilty to when he did not shoot anyone, was not in possession 
of any firearm, and was on 18th and Marris at the time of the 
crime. 
 

Anders’ Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted, issues reordered for 

ease of disposition). 

settled: 

Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.  
This  review  is  limited  to  the  findings  of  the  PCRA  court  and  the 
evidence of record.  We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it 
is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error.  This 
Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any  grounds  if  the 
record  supports  it.    Further,  we  grant  great  deference  to  the 
factual  findings  of  the  PCRA  court  and  will  not  disturb  those 
findings unless they have no support in the record.  However, we 
afford  no  such  deference  to  its  legal  conclusions.    Where  the 
petitioner  raises  questions  of  law,  our  standard  of  review  is  de 
novo and our scope of review plenary.  

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omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

Under the PCRA, any petition “including a second or subsequent petition, 

shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]”  42 

Pa.C.S.A.  §  9545(b)(1).    A  judgment  of  sentence  becomes  final  “at  the 

conclusion  of  direct  review,  including  discretionary  review  in  the  Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of the United States, and or at the 

expiration  of  time  for  seeking  the  review.”    Id.  §  9545(b)(3).    The  PCRA’s 

timeliness  requirements  are  jurisdictional  in  nature,  and  a  court  may  not 

address  the  merits  of  the  issues  raised  if  the  PCRA  petition  was  not  timely 

filed.  See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010). 

In the instant matter, Peasall’s judgment of sentence became final on 

October  23,  2013,  thirty  days  after  the  trial  court  entered  the  judgment  of 

sentence, and Peasall declined to  file a  notice of appeal  to this Court.  See 

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).  Thus, Peasall had until 

October  23,  2014  to  file  a  timely  PCRA  petition.    See  42  Pa.C.S.A.  § 

9545(b)(1).  The instant petition, filed on July 20, 2018, was filed nearly four 

years  after  the  judgment  of  sentence  became  final.    Therefore,  the  instant 

petition is facially untimely under the PCRA.   

Pennsylvania  courts  may  consider  an  untimely  PCRA  petition  if  the 

petitioner  can  plead  and  prove  one  of  three  exceptions  set  forth  under  42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), which provides:   

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(b) Time for filing petition.— 
 

(1)  Any  petition  under  this  subchapter,  including  a  second  or 
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 
judgment  becomes  final,  unless  the  petition  alleges  and  the 
petitioner proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 
interference by government officials with the presentation of 
the  claim  in  violation  of  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  this 
Commonwealth  or  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  the  United 
States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 
exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii)  the  right  asserted  is  a  constitutional  right  that  was 
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided 
in  this  section  and  has  been  held  by  that  court  to  apply 
retroactively. 

42  Pa.C.S.A.  §  9545(b)(1).    Any  PCRA  petition  invoking  one  of  these 

exceptions  “shall  be  filed  within  one  year  of  the  date  the  claim  could  have 

been  presented.”    Id.  §  9545(b)(2).    If  the  petition  is  untimely  and  the 

petitioner  has  not  pleaded  and  proven  a  timeliness  exception,  the  petition 

must be dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without 

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition.   See Commonwealth v. 

Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

 

In the Anders brief, Attorney Kauffman indicates that Peasall sought to 

invoke the “new fact” exception to the PCRA’s time bar as set forth in section 

9545(b)(1)(ii), which provides the PCRA court with jurisdiction to consider an 

untimely  petition  where  the  petitioner  alleges  and  proves  that  the  facts  on 

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which his claim is predicated were unknown to him and that he could not have 

ascertained those facts by the exercise of due diligence.  See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1)(ii); see also Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270-

72  (Pa.  2007).    Due  diligence  demands  that  the  petitioner  take  reasonable 

steps to protect his own interests.  See Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 

1164, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2001).  A petitioner must explain why he could not 

have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.  See 

Commonwealth  v.  Breakiron,  781  A.2d  94,  98  (Pa.  2001).    This  rule  is 

strictly  enforced.    See  Commonwealth  v.  Monaco,  996  A.2d  1076,  1080 

(Pa. Super 2010).   

 

According to Attorney Kauffman, Peasall claims that his petition is timely 

because he was not aware of any deals that the Commonwealth made with 

Brinson until July 12, 2018, approximately eight days before he filed his pro 

se  petition.    Attorney  Kauffman  explains  that  this  assertion  is  incorrect,  as 

Peasall was present in court on the day of his scheduled trial when the court 

and  the  parties  discussed  Brinson’s  criminal  history  and  the  possibility  of  a 

benefit on his open criminal case for his cooperation with the Commonwealth.  

Attorney Kauffman points out that this information was also discussed at the 

preliminary hearing.  On this basis, Attorney Kauffman concludes that Peasall 

is unable to satisfy the due diligence requirement of the “new fact” exception 

to the PCRA’s time bar.  

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Our  review  of  the  record  discloses  that  Brinson  testified  at  the 

preliminary hearing that he has known both Peasall and Taylor since his youth, 

and that in 2007, he witnessed Peasall shoot Taylor in the back at the corner 

of Dickenson and Bouvier Streets in South Philadelphia as Taylor was running 

away.  See N.T., 2/29/12, at 6, 9-10, 14.  Brinson indicated that the firearm 

used by Peasall was a “black snub nose seven” revolver, possibly a .38 or a 

.357.  Id. at 46-48.  Brinson explained that he did not inform police of the 

murder  committed  by  Peasall  until  November  2009,  when  Brinson  was 

“brought down on my previous matters concerning homicides.”  Id. at 16.  At 

that  time,  Brinson  provided  a  statement  to  police  regarding  the  murder  of 

Taylor by Peasall in 2007.  Id. at 17.  Brinson admitted that he was currently 

serving a sentence of five to ten years in prison for a firearms offense as well 

as another sentence of five to ten years in prison for a violation.  Id. at 22.  

Brinson  also  admitted  that  he  provided  the  November  2009  statement  to 

detectives about  the murder prior to receiving  his second sentence.   Id. at 

22.  Brinson stated that although he had an open criminal case at the time he 

provided his statement, the district attorney made no promises to him on his 

open criminal case, Brinson was not hoping for a deal on his open case, and 

his second prison sentence of five to ten years was not the result of any deal 

with  the  district  attorney.    Id.    The  prosecutor  indicated  that  Brinson  had 

received  immunity  regarding  Taylor’s  murder  for  his  testimony  against 

Peasall.  Id. at 28.  On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Brinson 

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Id. at 25-27.   

regarding  whether  his  second  sentence  was  the  result  of  a  deal  with  the 

Commonwealth after he provided police with his statement in November 2009.  

 

On the scheduled trial date of September 23, 2013, the court conducted 

a pretrial hearing on a motion in limine at which the prosecutor explained that 

Brinson wrote a letter to the police in November 2009 wherein he indicated 

that  he  had  witnessed  three  different  homicides  and  had  information  to 

provide  on  those  homicides.    See  N.T.,  9/23/13,  at  3-4.    The  prosecutor 

further  explained  that,  approximately  one  week  later,  Brinson  provided  his 

statement to police.  Id.  The prosecutor indicated that, although Brinson had 

indicated at the preliminary hearing that he was not hoping for a benefit on 

his open criminal case, she was “sure” that he was hoping for such a benefit.  

Id. at 13.   

 

Based  on  our  review,  we  conclude  that  Peasall  failed  to  establish  the 

“new facts” exception to the PCRA’s time bar.  Peasall was present in court at 

the  preliminary  hearing  on  February  29,  2012.    See  N.T.,  2/29/12,  at  9 

(wherein Brinson pointed at Peasall in the courtroom and identified him as the 

individual  who  shot  Taylor).    As  such,  Peasall  was  aware  on  that  date  that 

Brinson  had  an  open  criminal  case  when  he  provided  his  November  2009 

statement  to  detectives.    Peasall  would  also  have  known  on  that  date  that 

Brinson  lied  and  provided  false  testimony  that  Peasall  committed  Taylor’s 

murder.    Further,  given  Brinson’s  outright  denial  of  any  deal  with  the 

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Commonwealth at the preliminary hearing and the prosecutor’s silence on this 

line  of  questioning,  Peasall  should  have  exercised  due  diligence  in 

investigating  whether  Brinson  provided  false  testimony  at  the  preliminary 

hearing  as  part  of  an  undisclosed  deal  with  the  Commonwealth.    However, 

rather than exercising such due diligence, Peasall did nothing. 

Peasall was also present in court eighteen months later on his scheduled 

trial date of September 23, 2013, when the prosecutor explained that Brinson 

sent a letter to police in November 2009 indicating that he had information 

regarding three homicides, and that the prosecutor believed that Brinson sent 

the letter hoping for “a benefit” on his open criminal case.  See N.T., 9/23/13, 

at 13.  The prosecutor also disclosed that Brinson sent a subsequent letter to 

the  Commonwealth  indicating  that  he  was  “he  wasn’t  going  to  cooperate 

anymore because he had not gotten what he wanted.”  Id. at 13-14.  Defense 

counsel confirmed that a copy of Brinson’s letter to the Commonwealth was 

provided  to  Peasall  one  week  prior  to  trial.    Id.  at  13.    Thus,  the  record  is 

clear  that  Peasall  was  aware  on  September  23,  2013,  that  Brinson  was 

cooperating  with  the  Commonwealth,  that  he  had  expected  some  kind  of 

benefit  from  the  Commonwealth,  and  that  he  was  refusing  to  cooperate  in 

Peasall’s case because he did not receive the anticipated benefit.  Accordingly, 

Peasall failed to identify any “new fact” which was unknown to him and could 

not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.  Thus, based 

on our independent review,  we conclude that the record supports the PCRA 

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court’s determination that Peasall’s petition should be dismissed as untimely 

is supported by the record.5   

 

We  further  conclude  that,  even  if  Peasall  had  satisfied  the  “new  fact” 

exception to the PCRA’s time bar, his issues are meritless.  The statements 

made by a criminal defendant during a plea colloquy bind the defendant.  See 

Commonwealth  v.  Muhammad,  794  A.2d  378,  384  (Pa.  Super.  2002).  

Thus,  a  defendant  cannot  assert  grounds  for  withdrawing  the  plea  that 

contradict statements made at that time of the plea.  See Commonwealth 

v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999) (holding that a defendant 

is bound by the statements he makes during his plea colloquy and may not 

assert  grounds  for  withdrawing  the  plea  that  contradict  statements  made 

when he pled).   

 

Here, as explained above, Peasall completed both written and oral plea 

colloquies  in  which  he  admitted  to  murdering  Taylor.    See  Written  Plea 

Colloquy, 9/23/13, at 1; see also N.T., 9/23/13, at 25-36.  Indeed, prior to 

conducting the oral colloquy, the trial court specifically advised Brinson that 

“you are bound by the answers that you give me here in open court . . . [a]nd 

what that means is that you’re forever stuck with the answers that you give 

____________________________________________ 

5 Although we do not have the benefit of an opinion from the PCRA explaining 
its determination that Peasall’s pro se petition should be dismissed as untimely 
and  meritless,  see  Order,  3/17/22,  at  1,  this  Court  may  affirm  the  PCRA 
court’s ruling on any valid basis appearing of record.  See Commonwealth 
v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 451 (Pa. Super. 2018). 

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me.”    N.T.,  9/23/13,  at  27.    Peasall  agreed  with  the  Commonwealth’s 

summary of the facts upon which the plea was based, including that in 2007, 

Peasall fatally shot and killed Taylor by a single gunshot to his back.  Id. at 

37-38.  Based on these colloquies, the trial court found Peasall’s negotiated 

guilty plea to murder of the third degree and possession of a firearm prohibited 

to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Id. at 38.   

The  matter  then  immediately  proceeded  to  a  sentencing  hearing  at 

which  Peasall  exercised  his  right  of  allocution.    See  N.T.,  9/23/13,  at  48.  

Peasall  initially  stated,  “I  stand  here  and  I  take  full  responsibility  for  my 

actions . . . in the death of [Taylor].”  Id.  Peasall continued: 

I  would  like  to  also  say  to  [Taylor’s]  family,  [his]  mother, 
which I have always had a close  relationship with  – a friend for 
many years.  We grew up together – that I know my words are 
not sufficient to replace her son. I hope that she can find in her 
heart the ability to  forgive me for my actions because from day 
one of this incident . . . from day one – I’m sorry – of this incident, 
it has been eating at me like cancer. 

 

Id. at 48-49.  Peasall went on the explain that the murder occurred because 

he reacted to a very petty and small verbal confrontation with Taylor and used 

extremely poor judgment and decision-making in handling the situation.  Id. 

at 49-50.   

 

Here, Peasall is bound by his admission that he shot and killed Taylor.  

See  Muhammad,  794  A.2d  at  384;  see  also  Stork,  737  A.2d  at  790-91.  

Thus, his claims that he is innocent, that Brinson provided false testimony as 

part  of  an  undisclosed  deal  with  the  Commonwealth,  and  that  the 

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Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose exculpatory 

evidence (i.e., an undisclosed deal with Brinson to provide false testimony), 

are  meritless.    Accordingly,  based  on  our  independent  review,  we  conclude 

that the record supports the PCRA court’s determination that the issues Peasall 

sought to raise are meritless.   

We therefore grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the PCRA 

court order dismissing Peasall’s pro se petition.   

Petition granted.  Order affirmed.   

udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/21/2023 

 

 

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