NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

             

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v. 

 

 

ONATHAN TUNNELL       

 

Appellant 

 No. 1241 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 5, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 
at No(s):  CP-46-CR-0004019-2021 

EFORE:  MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                        FILED MARCH 22, 2023 

 

Jonathan Tunnell (Tunnell) appeals from the April 5, 2022 judgment of 

sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial 

court)  following  his  convictions  for  first-degree  murder,  possession  of  a 

firearm and carrying a firearm without a license.1  We affirm. 

I. 

 

We  glean  the  following  facts  from  the  certified  record.    On  June  14, 

2021, a maintenance worker at the Fairfield Inn near the King of Prussia mall 

entered one of the rooms in the hotel because a fire alarm had been sounding 

inside for several hours.  He discovered the body of the victim, Henry Palmen, 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 907(b), & 6106(a)(1). 

     

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on  the  floor.    An  autopsy  confirmed  that  the  victim  had  died  from  a  single 

gunshot wound to the head at close range.  Law enforcement recovered a cell 

phone,  backpack,  candy-type  edibles,  a  white  envelope  containing  pills  and 

other  personal  affects  in  the  room.    The  narcotics  were  identified  as 

alprazolam, Etizolam and Adderall, as well as various THC products and a vape 

pen.  Law enforcement believed that some of the drugs were for personal use 

while others appeared to be for sale. 

 

Detective  Michael  Laverty  responded  to  the  scene  and  examined  the 

victim’s cell phone.  He discovered several conversations that he believed to 

be  related  to  selling  narcotics,  including  a  recent  exchange  with  a  contact 

labeled as “Big John – Robyn Guy.”  N.T., 4/4/22, at 63.  The victim gave Big 

John the address of the hotel and said that he had a “box of flower” arriving 

at “D’s” on Monday.  Id. at 64.  Big John responded that he had $6,000 to 

spend.  Detective Laverty believed this exchange indicated that Big John was 

purchasing marijuana from the victim.  He also located a photo on the victim’s 

phone of a shipping label for a package that had been delivered that day.  The 

victim  texted  a  contact  named  Deanna  Moore  regarding  the  package’s 

progress and when it had been marked as delivered. 

 

Detectives obtained a search warrant for the address where the package 

was  to  be  delivered  and  executed  it  that  day.    They  had  already  identified 

Tunnell as a possible suspect based on the subscriber information for the “Big 

John”  number  in  the  victim’s  phone.    During  the  search  of  the  home,  they 

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found a digital scale, marijuana and mail with Tunnell’s name on it.  They did 

not recover  the package.  Detectives recovered  surveillance  footage from a 

neighboring house that showed Tunnell entering the home around 12:35 PM.  

Approximately  15  minutes  later,  the  package  was  delivered  and  Tunnell 

carried the box off the porch and placed it in a trash can outside.  Ten minutes 

later he retrieved the box from the trash and placed it in Moore’s vehicle. 

Detectives also obtained surveillance footage from the Fairfield Inn, the 

area surrounding the King of Prussia Mall, and SEPTA.  Video depicted Tunnell 

getting off a bus at the mall and entering the Fairfield Inn around 10:21 AM.  

Approximately 20 minutes later he was depicted walking back toward the mall.  

Because he was depicted entering the hotel but not leaving, law enforcement 

determined he had exited the building through a back door that was not under 

surveillance.  He then got back on a bus line to the Norristown Transportation 

Center. 

The following day, detectives obtained a pen register and trap and trace 

order for Tunnell’s cell phone and used the information to identify the phone’s 

location.    The  order  informed  investigators  of  all  incoming  and  outgoing 

communications  but  they  did  not  listen  to  any  calls  or  read  any  messages.  

Using  the  order,  United  States  Marshalls  located  Tunnell  leaving  a  Microtel 

Hotel and getting on a bus and placed him under arrest.  They recovered his 

cell phone during his arrest. 

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Investigators  obtained  a  search  warrant  for  Tunnell’s  room  at  the 

Microtel  Hotel.    They  recovered  a  backpack,  two  storage  totes,  a  shopping 

bag, sneakers and grey sweatpants.  The backpack contained baggies, pills, a 

bag containing a green substance and rolling papers.  One of the storage totes 

contained ten packages of a marijuana-like substance, a sealed package with 

smaller individually-sized marijuana packages and a baggie containing pills.  

The pills were similar to those recovered at the Fairfield Inn crime scene.  The 

other storage tote contained prayer rugs, clothes, paperwork and a wallet with 

Tunnell’s  identification.    In  addition  to  the  narcotics  and  paraphernalia,  the 

other bags in the room contained various personal items.  The narcotics were 

identified  as  methamphetamine,  fentanyl,  marijuana,  Etizolam  and  other 

prescription medications. 

Investigators also obtained a search warrant for Tunnell’s cell phone and 

examined the information from his phone, his phone records from AT&T, and 

the information from the victim’s phone during the time period of June 13 to 

June 15, 2021.  Tunnell and the victim exchanged messages and the victim 

told Tunnell that he had “a box of flower landing at D’s Monday.”  N.T., 4/5/22, 

at 53.  Tunnell responded that he had $6,000 to spend.  The victim later texted 

Tunnell that he was traveling to the area from Raleigh and would be checking 

in to the Fairfield Inn by 8 AM.  Analysis of Tunnell’s cell site usage showed 

that his phone traveled from Philadelphia to King of Prussia on the morning of 

the murder, and that he searched online for the Fairfield Inn several times.  

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The phone activity was in the vicinity of the homicide during the time in which 

it  occurred.    The  phone  then  traveled  to  the  area  where  the  package  was 

delivered  before  returning  to  the  Microtel  Hotel.    The  next  day,  the  phone 

searched for crime and murder news in the King of Prussia area. 

After his arrest, Tunnell waived his Miranda2 rights and agreed to speak 

with detectives.3  In relevant part, Tunnell admitted that he had planned to 

meet with the victim to buy marijuana but first claimed that the victim stood 

him up.  While he initially said that the victim was supposed to come to him 

for  the  sale,  when  detectives  told  him  about  the  surveillance  footage,  he 

conceded that he went to the Fairfield  Inn.   He then asserted that he went 

into  the  victim’s  hotel  room  and  bought  a  pound  of  marijuana  but  that  the 

victim was alive when he left.  He further admitted to picking up the victim’s 

package  containing  nine  pounds  of  marijuana  from  Moore’s  home.    When 

asked how he thought the victim died, Tunnell first guessed that he had had 

a seizure.  After further questioning, he then said that the victim had shorted 

him  in  a  prior  deal  and  was  supposed  to  compensate  him  in  the  instant 

exchange.  When Tunnell arrived at the hotel, he told the victim that he would 

not pay him because the victim had “played” him in the past.  The two began 

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2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

 The videotaped interview was played at Tunnell’s trial. 

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to tussle and Tunnell shot him once in the head, but he said that he had been 

aiming for the victim’s shoulder. 

Tunnell filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of 

the pen register and trap and trace order, including the evidence recovered 

from  his  room  at  the  Microtel  Hotel,  the  information  on  his  phone  and  his 

confession.  Tunnell argued that the application submitted for the pen register 

and  trap  and  trace  order  was  undated  and,  as  a  result,  could  not  establish 

probable cause for the order.  The trial court had granted the application on 

June  15,  2021,  the  day  after  the  victim’s  body  was  discovered.    Following 

argument, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. 

Tunnell  ultimately  proceeded  to  a  jury  trial  and  was  convicted  of  the 

above-mentioned charges.  The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment 

for the charge of first-degree murder and concurrent sentences of 4 to 8 years’ 

imprisonment  for  carrying  a  firearm  without  a  license  and  9  to  18  months’ 

imprisonment  for  possession  of  a  firearm.    He  filed  a  post-sentence  motion 

challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence to support his conviction 

for first-degree murder, which the trial court denied.  He and the trial court 

have complied with Pa. R.A.P. 1925. 

 

On appeal, Tunnell challenges the denial of his motion to suppress and 

the sufficiency and weight of the evidence to support his conviction for first-

degree murder. 

II. 

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We  first  address  Tunnell’s  challenge  to  the  denial  of  his  suppression 

motion.4  He contends that the undated application for the pen register and 

trap  and  trace  warrant  was  facially  defective.    He  argues  that  because  the 

application was undated, it  is  impossible to determine when the affidavit of 

probable cause was presented to the issuing authority.  He concludes that the 

record does not establish when the affidavit of probable cause was presented 

to the issuing authority and, as a result, the application was defective and all 

evidence  obtained  as  a  result  of  the  warrant  must  be  suppressed.5    We 

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge 
to  a  trial  court’s  denial  of  a  suppression  motion  is  limited  to 
determining  whether  the  factual  findings  are  supported  by  the 
record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts 
are  correct.    [Because]  the  prosecution  prevailed  in  the 
suppression  court,  we  may  consider  only  the  evidence  of  the 
prosecution  and  so  much  of  the  evidence  for  the  defense  as 
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 
a  whole.    Where  the  record  supports  the  factual  findings  of  the 
trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if 
the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. 
 

Commonwealth v. Postie, 110 A.3d 1034, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 
omitted). 

 The Commonwealth argues that Tunnell has waived this claim through failure 
to cite to pertinent authority and by raising  a different legal argument than 
that presented in his motion to suppress, namely, that because the application 
was undated, it is impossible to determine when the affiant appeared before 
the issuing authority.  While the argument section of his brief is lacking, we 
(Footnote Continued Next Page) 

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disagree. 

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A. 

 

Applications for pen register and trap and trace orders are governed by 

the  Wiretapping  and  Electronic  Surveillance  Control  Act  (Wiretap  Act).    An 

application must include: 

(1)  The  identity  and  authority  of  the  attorney  making  the 
law 
identity  of  the 
application  and  the 
enforcement agency conducting the investigation. 

investigative  or 

2) A certification by the applicant that the information likely to 
be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being 
conducted by that agency. 

  (

  (

3)  An  affidavit  by  an  investigative  or  law  enforcement  officer 
which establishes probable cause for the issuance of an order or 
extension of an order under section 5773. 
 

18 Pa. C.S. § 5772(b).  The court may grant the application and issue an order 

“if  the  court  finds  that  there  is  probable  cause  to  believe  that  information 

relevant  to  an  ongoing  criminal  investigation  will  be  obtained  by  such 

installation  and  use  on  the  targeted  telephone.”    18  Pa.  C.S.  §  5773(a).  

Orders  properly  issued  pursuant  to  the  Wiretap  Act  also  meet  the  warrant 

requirements  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  to  the  federal  constitution.  

Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 227 A.3d 358, 371-72 (Pa. Super. 2020). 

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are able to discern the basis of his claim and our review is not hampered, so 
we decline to find waiver on that basis.  See In re Estate of Tomcik, 286 
A.3d 748, 756 (Pa. Super. 2022) (declining to find waiver based on violation 
of  Rule  of  Appellate  Procedure  2119).    Additionally,  his  challenge  to  the 
undated application is substantially the same or at least fairly suggested by 
the argument he made in his suppression motion.  See Motion to Suppress, 
2/9/22, at ¶¶ 8-12; Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(v).  Accordingly, we decline to find 
waiver on that basis as well. 
 

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The trial court explained its rationale for denying the motion as follows: 

First,  this  court  acknowledged  that  in  this  case  there  was  an 
application signed by the appropriate [assistant district attorney], 
there  was  an  affidavit  which  was  signed  by  the  appropriate 
detective,  and  the  reviewing  court,  Judge  Demchick-Alloy, 
reviewed those, indicated that she approved after swearing in the 
affiant,  and  she  signed  and  dated  the  order.    Based  upon  this 
reasoning,  this  court  concluded  that  there  was  no  violation  that 
would  support  suppression  of  the  evidence.    Accordingly,  this 
court  properly  denied  the  motion  to  suppress.    As  stated  by 
defense  counsel,  there  is  simply  no  case  law  to  support  his 
position, and as noted by the Commonwealth all the application 
requirements had been satisfied.  Therefore, the application itself 
was not defective.  Additionally, any defect in the application was 
remedied when Judge Demchick-Alloy, the reviewing court, issued 
the  order,  approving  the  application.    For  these  reasons, 
suppression was denied. 
 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/22 at 32 (citations omitted, cleaned up). 

We  discern  no  abuse  of  discretion.    The  application  for  the  order  was 

supported  by  probable  cause,  which  Tunnell  does  not  dispute.    Section 

5772(b) does not include any date requirement for an application under that 

section.    Moreover,  we  observe  that  the  application  includes  information 

gleaned from the investigation on June 14 and June 15, 2021, and the order 

granting the application was dated June 15, 2021.  Thus, the record supports 

the conclusion that the application was submitted to the issuing authority on 

the day the order was signed, which was the day after the victim’s body was 

discovered.    Without  any  period  of  time  elapsing  between  the  investigation 

that developed Tunnell as a suspect and the day that the court issued the pen 

register and tap and trace order, there is no danger that the probable cause 

would  have  dissipated  before  the  order  was  signed.    Finally,  our  review 

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confirms that the trial court’s order complied with the requirements of Section 

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5773.  Accordingly, no relief is due. 

B. 

Next, Tunnell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent to kill the 

victim.6  He contends that his confession was the only evidence introduced at 

trial that bore on his mindset at the time of the crime, and it established only 

that  he  accidentally  shot  the  victim  in  the  head  during  their  struggle,  even 

though he was only aiming for his shoulder.7  This claim is meritless. 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 
is whether  viewing  all the evidence admitted at trial  in the light 
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  In applying [this] test, we may not weigh the 
evidence  and  substitute  our  judgment  for  the  fact-finder.    In 
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 
the  Commonwealth  need  not  preclude  every  possibility  of 
innocence.    Any  doubts  regarding  a  defendant’s  guilt  may  be 
resolved  by  the  fact-finder  unless  the  evidence  is  so  weak  and 
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 
drawn from the combined circumstances. 
 

Commonwealth  v.  Lopez,  57  A.3d  74,  79  (Pa.  Super.  2012)  (citation 
omitted). 

 The Commonwealth contends that Tunnell has waived this claim by failing to 
specify that he was challenging the intent element in his Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) 
statement.    However,  the  trial  court  was  able  to  glean  his  argument  and 
(Footnote Continued Next Page) 

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6 Our standard of review is well-settled: 
 

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A  person  is  guilty  of  first-degree  murder  if  the  Commonwealth 

establishes  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  “(1)  a  human  being  was  unlawfully 

killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for the killing; and (3) the defendant 

acted with malice and a specific intent to kill.”  Commonwealth v. Thomas, 

54  A.3d  332,  335  (Pa.  2012);  18  Pa.C.S.  2502(a).    An  intentional  killing  is 

“willful,  deliberate  and  premeditated,”  and  intent  to  kill  can  be  formed  in  a 

fraction of a second.  Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1269 (Pa. 

2016) (citation omitted).  “[T]he specific intent to kill may be inferred where 

. . . the accused uses a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body.”  

Id. (holding that intent to kill was established when defendant shot the victim 

in the back of the head). 

Additionally, we note that “[t]he Commonwealth may sustain its burden 

of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means 

of  wholly  circumstantial  evidence.”    Commonwealth  v.  Gause,  164  A.3d 

532, 541 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).  “Finally, the trier of fact while 

passing  upon  the  credibility  of  witnesses  and  the  weight  of  the  evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.”  Id.  On appeal, 

this court evaluates the full record to determine whether sufficient evidence 

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address it in its opinion based on the defense Tunnell presented at trial, which 
mirrors the claim he now raises on appeal.  See Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/22, 
at  43-45.    Accordingly,  we  decline  to  find  this  issue  waived.    See 
Commonwealth v. Sipps, 225 A.3d 1110, 1113 (Pa. Super. 2019). 
 

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was presented to support each element of the crime charged; however, we do 

not second-guess the jury’s factual determinations. 

Tunnell’s sufficiency argument merely requests that this Court credit the 

self-serving  statement  he  gave  to  law  enforcement  after  his  arrest,  even 

though the jury apparently rejected that statement in reaching its verdict on 

the charge of first-degree murder.  Viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the evidence established that Tunnell arranged to purchase 

narcotics from the victim, even though he was dissatisfied with a previous sale 

and felt that the victim had “played” him.  He brought a firearm with him to 

the hotel where he met the victim and fired a shot into his head, undoubtedly 

a vital organ of the body.  See Cash, supra.  Relying on information he had 

received from the victim prior to their meeting, he then left the scene of the 

murder and proceeded to the address where the victim had marijuana shipped 

and retrieved the package containing the drugs.  This evidence is sufficient to 

support the conclusion that Tunnell intentionally killed the victim in retaliation 

for  the  previous  sale  and  to  obtain  the  package  of  marijuana  that  he  knew 

would be delivered to the victim that day.  This claim is meritless. 

Finally,  Tunnell  argues  that  the  trial  court  abused  its  discretion  by 

denying his motion for a new trial and holding that the verdict was not against 

C. 

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the weight of the evidence.8  Much like his sufficiency  claim,  this argument 

hinges on the weight the jury afforded to Tunnell’s confession.  He argues that 

he had no motive to kill the victim, who was a valuable source of narcotics.  

He asserts that the killing was accidental following a “tussle” when he refused 

to  pay  full  price  for  the  narcotics,  even  though  he  intended  to  continue  his 

business relationship with the victim.  Tunnell’s Brief at 19. 

“An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is 

addressed to the discretion of the trial court.”  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 

820 A.2d 795, 805-06 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).  “Trial judges, in 

reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not 

sit as the thirteenth juror.  Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine 

that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight 

that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny 

justice.”    Commonwealth  v.  Widmer,  744  A.2d  745,  752  (Pa.  2000) 

(quotations omitted).  A new trial is appropriate only when the verdict “is so 

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8  When  evaluating  a  challenge  to  the  weight  of  the  evidence  to  support  a 
conviction,  this  court  does  not  reweigh  the  evidence  presented  at  trial,  but 
rather  evaluates  the  trial  court’s  denial  of  the  motion  for  a  new  trial  for  an 
abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 
2013).  An abuse of discretion occurs “where the course pursued represents 
not  merely  an  error  of  judgment,  but  where  the  judgment  is  manifestly 
unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that 
the  action  is  a  result  of  partiality,  prejudice,  bias  or  ill-will.”    Id.  (citation 
omitted).  A trial court’s determination that the verdict  was not against the 
weight of the evidence is “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting a 
new trial.”  Id. (citation omitted). 

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contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.”  Commonwealth 

v. Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).  “[T]he 

evidence must be so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the 

conscience of the court.”  Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 326 

(Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

Again, Tunnell’s argument depends on the veracity of his statement to 

police.   As  the trial  court observed, Tunnell’s statement changed drastically 

throughout the course of the interrogation.  He began by denying ever going 

to the Fairfield Inn, then contended that the victim was alive when he left the 

hotel,  then  finally  stated  that  he  shot  the  victim  accidentally  during  their 

“tussle.”    His  statement  changed  materially  each  time  the  interrogating 

officers revealed new information from their investigation and he was forced 

to admit to prior lies.  Under those circumstances, the trial court concluded 

that the jury disregarded Tunnell’s explanation of the shooting as incredible 

and  self-serving.    See  Trial  Court  Opinion,  7/8/22,  at  41-42.    Further,  our 

review of the record reveals that the remaining evidence against Tunnell was 

not “so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience 

of the court.”  Akhmedov, supra.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse 

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its discretion in denying relief on this claim. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

   

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oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/22/2023 

 

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  D

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Judgment Entered.