: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 
: 

J-S03003-23  

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.B., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER 

 No. 2601 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered September 19, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0000208-2020 

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.B., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER 

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 19, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000215-2022 

 No. 2602 EDA 2022 

EFORE:  BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: 

 

 

      FILED MARCH 21, 2023 

T.B. (“Father”) appeals from the September  19, 2022 decree granting 

the petition filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) 

to  involuntarily  terminate  his  parental  rights  to  his  son,  K.B.,  born  in 

    A

    A

 

 

 

 

  B

  

J-S03003-23 

January 2020.1    Father  also  appeals  from  the  September  19,  2022  order 

changing K.B.’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6351.  We affirm the termination decree and the goal change order. 

We  summarize  the  factual  and  procedural  history  as  follows.    DHS 

received a referral in January 2020, as a result of Mother giving birth to K.B. 

while incarcerated.2  N.T., 9/19/22, at 6-7.  Mother had a prior history with 

DHS, as well as a history of drug usage and mental illness.   Id. at 7.  As a 

result of positive testing for illegal substances, K.B. was hospitalized for five 

weeks for treatment of withdrawal symptoms.  Id. at 7-8.    

On  February  10,  2020,  as  K.B.  was  ready  for  discharge  from  the 

hospital, DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody (“OPC”) and placed him 

with his maternal aunt (“Maternal Aunt”), a pre-adoptive resource.  Id. at 8.  

Following a shelter care hearing, the court ordered twice weekly supervised 

visitation at the agency and an assessment of Father’s home.  On May 5, 2020, 

the trial court adjudicated K.B. dependent and maintained his placement with 

Maternal Aunt, where he has remained.  The court established a placement 

1  In separate decrees, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of 
K.B.’s mother, K.B. (“Mother”), and any unknown father.  Neither Mother nor 
any  unknown  father  appealed  those  decrees  or  participated  in  the  instant 
appeal. 

    Mother  did  not  identify  Father  or  list  him  on  the  birth  certificate.    N.T., 
9/19/22, at 8, 25.  Nevertheless, Father contacted DHS and participated in all 
hearings.  Id. at 25, 28.   

  2

____________________________________________ 

- 2 - 

J-S03003-23 

visitation.   

goal of return to parent or guardian and continued twice weekly supervised 

 

Throughout  K.B.’s  dependency,  Father  was  required  to  satisfy  the 

following  permanency  objectives  aimed  at  reunification:  1)  comply  with 

services, supervised visitation, and all court orders; 2) provide proof of income 

and adequate housing; and 3) complete a Behavioral Health Services (“BHS”) 

evaluation, a Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) assessment, three random drug 

screens, and a parenting program at Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”).  

Id. at 28.  The court further directed Father to, inter alia, sign releases and 

provide  medical  documentation.    Id.  at  DHS  Exhibit  3,  Permanency  Review 

Order, 12/6/21.3  

The 

juvenile  court  characterized  Father’s  compliance  with  the 

permanency  plan  as  vacillating  between  minimal  and  moderate.    Notably, 

Father neglected  to  participate in a  second  behavioral health  evaluation, as 

ordered  in  December  2021,  until  April  2022.    Id.  at  32,  60.    He  failed  to 

provide  proof  of  income,  and,  despite  signing  releases,  he  failed  to  provide 

medical  documentation.    Id.  at  28-29,  38,  51-52,  54,  61,  63.    Further, 

Father’s visitation, which remained supervised and was reduced by the court 

to weekly in December 2021, was inconsistent, with a ten-month interruption 

between October 18, 2021, and August 10, 2022.  Id. at 38, 41, 55, 97.   

____________________________________________ 

3  While there appears to be a missing page or two from DHS Exhibit 3, we 
observe that the dependency record is part of the certified record.   

- 3 - 

On March 31, 2022, DHS filed a petition for the termination of parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), as well as 

a  petition  for  a  change  of  K.B.’s  permanency  goal  from  reunification  to 

adoption.  The trial court held a hearing on the petitions on  September 19, 

2022.    Mother  and  Father  were  each  present  and  represented  by  counsel.  

K.B.,  then  thirty-two  months  old,  was  represented  by  Emily  Cherniack, 

Esquire.4  DHS presented the testimony of Anajah Custus, the case manager 

with community umbrella agency (“CUA”).5  Attorney Cherniack presented the 

testimony of Patricia Kinkle, the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) 

program director.6  Mother and Father each testified on their own behalf.   

At  the  time  of  the  hearing,  Mother  and  Father  were  residing  together 

with a younger child, who is not part of the instant proceedings.  Mother was 

serving as Father’s home health care aide.  Id. at 9-11, 30.  As it relates to 

4  Attorney Cherniack was identified as both the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and 
the child advocate.  Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to verify sua 
sponte that the court appointed counsel to represent a child pursuant to 23 
Pa.C.S.  § 2313(a),  and  if  counsel  served  in  a  dual  role,  that  the  court 
determined before appointment that there was no conflict between a child’s 
best and legal interests.  See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 
2020).  If a child is “too young to be able to express a preference as to the 
outcome of the proceedings,” there is no conflict between a child’s legal and 
best interests, and a child’s subsection 2313(a) right to counsel is satisfied by 
an attorney- GAL who represents the attorney-GAL’s view of the child’s best 
interests.  See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018). In this case, 
because  K.B.  was  32  months  old  at  the  time  of  the  subject  proceeding,  we 
conclude that his statutory right to counsel was satisfied. 

  The notes of testimony incorrectly identify Ms. Custus’ first name as Amajah. 

  The notes of testimony misname Ms. Kinkle as Ms. Kinchloe. 

  5

  6

____________________________________________ 

- 4 - 

J-S03003-23 

one aspect of Father’s argument,  Father  testified  that he has disintegrating 

disc  disease  and  numerous  herniated  discs,  as  well  as  diabetes,  high  blood 

pressure,  and  weight  issues.    Id.  at  101,  107.    He  explained,  “Sometime  I 

might need help cooking, sometime I might need help putting my clothes on.  

It depends on how I feel at the particular time, you know.”  Id. at 115. 

On September 19, 2022, the trial court involuntarily terminated Father’s 

parental rights to K.B. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and 

(b)  and  by  separate  order  the  court  changed  K.B.’s  permanency  goal  from 

reunification  to  adoption.    Father  timely  filed  notices  of  appeal,  along  with 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).  This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte. 

Father  presents  the  following  issues,  which  we  reorder  for  ease  of 

disposition:   

A.  Whether  the  trial  court  committed  reversible  error  when  it 
involuntarily  terminated  [Father]’s  parental  rights  where  such 
determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence 
under the Adoption Act[,] 23 [Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), and 
(8)?] 

B.  Whether  the  trial  court  committed  reversible  error  when  it 
involuntarily terminated [Father]’s parental rights without giving 
primary  consideration  to  the  effect  that  the  termination  would 
have on the developmental physical and emotional needs of the 
child as required by the Adoption Act[,] 23 [Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?] 

. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion when it 
changed  the  goal  to  adoption  because  the  goal  of  adoption  was 
not in the best interest of the child[?] 

  C

Father’s brief, unnumbered at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

- 5 - 

J-S03003-23 

J-S03003-23 

We  review  orders  that  involuntarily  terminate  parental  rights  for  an 

abuse of discretion, which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a 

determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by 

competent  evidence.”    In  re  Adoption  of  C.M.,  255  A.3d  343,  358  (Pa. 

2021).  When applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial 

court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by 

the record.  Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021).  “Where 

the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate 

court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error 

of law or abuse of discretion.”  In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 

(Pa. 2021).  An appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, 

or ill-will.”  Id.  

Termination  of  parental  rights  is  governed  by  §  2511  of  the  Adoption 

Act.    If  the  trial  court  determines  the  petitioner  established  grounds  for 

termination under § 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, then the court 

must assess the petition under § 2511(b), which focuses on the child’s needs 

and welfare.  In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).   

In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to  23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),  (2),  (5), (8),  and  (b).  We have long 

held  that,  in  order  to  affirm  a  termination  of  parental  rights,  we  need  only 

agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of  § 2511(a), as well as 

§ 2511(b).  See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

- 6 - 

J-S03003-23 

We analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) and 

(b),7 which provide as follows: 

(a)  General  rule.--The  rights  of  a  parent  in  regard  to  a 
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 
following grounds: 

(2)  The  repeated  and  continued  incapacity,  abuse, 
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 
to  be  without  essential  parental  care,  control  or 
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 
abuse,  neglect  or  refusal  cannot  or  will  not  be 
remedied by the parent. 

. . . . 

. . . . 

(b) Other  considerations.--The court in  terminating the 
rights  of  a  parent  shall  give  primary  consideration  to  the 
developmental,  physical  and  emotional  needs  and  welfare 
of the child.  The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 
solely  on  the  basis  of  environmental  factors  such  as 
inadequate  housing,  furnishings,  income,  clothing  and 
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.  
With  respect  to  any  petition  filed  pursuant  to  subsection 
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 
filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b). 

____________________________________________ 

7  While  we  conduct  our  analysis  under  §  2511(a)(2),  we  note  that 
§ 2511(a)(5) and § 2511(a)(8) are not applicable to Father because K.B. was 
not removed from Father’s care.  See In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1200 n.5 
(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (stating that § 2511(a)(5) and (8) did not provide 
a basis for terminating the father’s parental rights when he was incarcerated 
at the time of the child’s removal from the mother’s care). 

- 7 - 

J-S03003-23 

With  regard  to  the  termination  of  parental  rights  pursuant  to 

§ 2511(a)(2), we have indicated: 

In  order  to  terminate  parental  rights  pursuant  to  23  Pa.C.S.A. 
§ 2511(a)(2),  the  following  three  elements  must  be  met:    (1) 
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 
be  without  essential  parental  care,  control  or  subsistence 
necessary  for  his  physical  or  mental  well-being;  and  (3)  the 
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 
not be remedied. 

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted).  “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct.  To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.”  In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting In re 

Adoption  of  C.D.R.,  111  A.3d  1212,  1216  (Pa.Super.  2015))  (internal 

citation omitted).  “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the 

reasonably  prompt  assumption  of  full  parental  responsibilities.”   Matter  of 

Adoption  of  M.A.B.,  166  A.3d  434,  443  (Pa.Super.  2017)  (quoting  In  re 

N.A.M.,  33  A.3d  95,  100  (Pa.Super.  2011)).    As  such,  “A  parent’s  vow  to 

cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity 

or  availability  of  services,  may  properly  be  rejected  as  untimely  or 

disingenuous.”  In re S.C., supra at 1105 (In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 

(Pa.Super. 2010).  

As it specifically relates to a physical or mental impairment, it is well-

settled  that  §  2511(a)(2)  provides  the  statutory  basis  for  “terminating 

- 8 - 

J-S03003-23 

involuntarily the rights of a parent with a physical or mental impairment.”  In 

re  Adoption  of J.J.,  515  A.2d  883,  893  (Pa.  1986).    Our  Supreme  Court 

emphasized, “the focus in such cases is the effect which an impairment has 

on  the  person’s  ability  to  provide  parental  care,  not  the  mere  fact  of 

impairment.  .  .  .”    Id.    As  such,  the  Court  stated,  “The  fact  that  a  parent 

suffers  from  a physical or mental disability is  not,  and  never  was,  the  only 

relevant  factor  in  determining  whether  his  or  her  parental  rights  should  be 

terminated,  or  whether  there  should  be  a  different  legal  standard  applied.” 

Id. 

In  concluding  that  DHS  satisfied  the  statutory  grounds  to  terminate 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), the trial court emphasized 

Father’s  lack  of  ability  to  carry  out  his  own  activities  of  daily  living  as 

demonstrated  by  his  need  for  Mother  as  a  home  health  aide.    Trial  Court 

Opinion, 11/16/22, at 2.  The court stated, 

With  regard  to  [Father],  he  has  not  demonstrated  an  ability  to 
independently care for [K.B.].  The  testimony was that  [Father] 
needs a home health aide.  That at times he’s unable to cook for 
himself, he is also unable to take care of some of his own daily life 
activities,  including  getting  .  .  .  dressed,  that  weighs  serious 
concerns  with  the  [c]ourt,  that  without  a  home  health  aide 
[Father] would not be able to independently care for this child. 

N.T., 9/19/22, at 149-50. 

Father  challenges  the  termination  of  his  parental  rights  pursuant  to 

§ 2511(a)(2)  by  baldly  asserting  that  he  completed  his  reunification 

objectives.  Father states: 

- 9 - 

J-S03003-23 

In the instant matter, evidence demonstrates [F]ather’s attempt 
at establishing a loving relationship with his child because he was 
compliant with objectives and [F]ather was ready for his son to be 
returned to his care[.]  Father through his efforts to remain close 
to  his  child  and  attempting  to  complete  [FSP  (“Family  Service 
Plan”)] objectives, exhibited that he was trying to eradicate any 
neglect or abuse, that caused him to be placed in foster care. 

In [In Interest of C.M.E., 448 A.2d. 59, 63 (Pa. 1982)], [this] 
Court  stated  that  “even  if  there  has  been  a  long  separation 
occasioned  by  parental  neglect  or  incapacity,  termination  of 
parental  rights  cannot  be  ordered  if  there  is  a  reasonable 
possibility  that  the  causes  and  conditions  which  led  to  the 
separation  can  be  remedied  and  the  family  restored.”    [C.M.E., 
488  A.2d.  at  63].    Father  has  demonstrated  his  commitment  to 
remain  close  to  his  child  because  he  visits  and  had  a  good 
relationship with his child.  Furthermore, DHS has not proved that 
he could not remedy such conditions. 

Father’s brief, unnumbered at 8 (citations to record omitted). 

A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for 

termination under § 2511(a)(2).  Looking first at Father’s physical impairment 

and  its  effect  on  his  ability  to  parent  K.B.,  we  reiterate,  at  the  time  of  the 

hearing,  Mother  and  Father  were  residing  together,  with  Mother  serving  as 

Father’s home health care aide.  Id. at 9-11.  Father testified that, inter alia, 

he  has  disintegrating  disc  disease  and  numerous  herniated  discs.    N.T., 

9/19/22,  at  101,  107.    As  a  result  of  such  conditions,  he  requires  aid  and 

assistance.  Id. at 101, 117.  Ms. Custus, the CUA case manager, expressed 

her  concerns  as  to  Father’s  “ability  to  care”  for  the  child  considering  his 

physical condition.  Id. at 61-62. 

Beyond Father’s physical limitations, the record reveals that Father also 

failed to complete some of his reunification objectives.  While Father provided 

- 10 - 

J-S03003-23 

a  copy  of  his  residential  lease,  participated  in  parenting  classes,  submitted 

eight drug screens8, and eventually completed both of the required behavioral 

health evaluations, he failed to document his total income or medical records.  

Id. at 28-30, 35-37, 51-54, 61, 63.  The most substantial failure related to 

Father’s  inconsistent  participation  in  the  supervised  visitations  with  K.B.  

Significantly, there was a ten-month gap in visitation from October 18, 2021, 

to August 10, 2022.  Id. at 41, 55, 97.  Ms. Custus testified that, although 

visits were available to Father during this period, Father declined to participate 

because of his personal conflicts with CUA staff and Maternal Aunt.  Id. at 39-

40, 42, 55, 97-101, 111.  As a result, Ms. Custus indicated that reunification 

was no longer an option, explaining: 

Q. Has reunification with [F]ather been ruled out at this point? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Why is that? 

Id. at 45-46. 

A. Given the length of time it’s taken for the child to be reunified 
with father, the lack of compliance with documentation, the lack 
of visits [-] consistent visitation. 

Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court 

in  concluding  that  termination  pursuant  to  §  2511(a)(2)  is  warranted.    The 

record substantiates that Father’s incapacity and refusals have caused K.B. to 

be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for  his 

____________________________________________ 

8    Although  Father  tested  positive  for  opioids,  he  documented  that  he  was 
prescribed  opioids  for  pain  related  to  his  disc  conditions.    N.T.,  9/19/22,  at 
107. 

- 11 - 

J-S03003-23 

physical  or  mental  well-being.    Further,  the  conditions  and  causes  of  same 

cannot  or  will  not  be  remedied.    See  In  re  Adoption of M.E.P.,  supra  at 

1272.  Father suffers from an ongoing physical disability that limits his ability 

to provide his son parental care without the assistance of a home health aide.  

More importantly, Father demonstrated his refusal to perform parental duties 

by electing to forego ten months of supervised visitation with his son simply 

because he did not get along with some of the providers and his son’s kinship 

foster  parent,  Maternal  Aunt.    In  essence,  Father  elevated  his  disdain  for 

certain  individuals  over  the  needs  of  his  child.    This  palpable  evidence  of 

Father’s  refusal  to  accept  his  parental  obligation  supports  the  trial  court’s 

finding  of  grounds  for  termination  under  §  2511(a)(2),  and  we  reject  any 

eleventh-hour assertions concerning Father’s future compliance.  See In re 

S.C., supra at 1105.   

Next, we review the trial court’s needs and welfare analysis pursuant to 

§ 2511(b).  Our Supreme Court outlined this inquiry as follows: 
 

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 
court  “shall  give  primary  consideration  to  the  developmental, 
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.”  23 Pa.C.S. 
§  2511(b).    The  emotional  needs  and  welfare  of  the  child  have 
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 
comfort, security, and stability.”  In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 
(Pa.Super. 2012).  In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], 
this  Court  held  that  the  determination  of  the  child’s  “needs  and 
welfare”  requires  consideration  of  the  emotional  bonds  between 
the  parent  and  child.    The  “utmost  attention”  should  be  paid  to 
discerning  the  effect  on  the  child  of  permanently  severing  the 
parental  bond.    In  re  K.M.,  53  A.3d  at  791.    However,  as 
discussed  below,  evaluation  of  a  child’s  bonds  is  not  always  an 
easy task. 

- 12 - 

J-S03003-23 

In re T.S.M., supra at 267. 

When  evaluating  a  parental  bond,  “[T]he  court  is  not  required  to  use 

expert testimony.  Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well.  Additionally, § 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.”  

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).  Moreover, “the mere 

existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily 

result  in  the  denial  of  a  termination  petition.”    T.S.M.,  supra  at  267.    The 

Court  directed  that,  in  weighing  the  bond  considerations  pursuant  to 

§ 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.”  Id. 

at 269.  The T.S.M. Court observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number 

of  years,  and  we  have  an  obligation  to  see  to  their  healthy  development 

quickly.    When  courts  fail  .  .  .  the  result,  all  too  often,  is  catastrophically 

maladjusted children.”  Id. 

Furthermore, 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 
aspect  of  the  §  2511(b)  best-interest  analysis,  it  is  nonetheless 
only  one  of  many  factors  to  be  considered  by  the  court  when 
determining what is in the best interest of the child. 

In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 
comfort,  security,  and  stability  the  child  might  have 
with the foster parent. . . . 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

at 103) (cleaned up). 

 

- 13 - 

J-S03003-23 

As to subsection (b), the trial court reasoned, “[T]here was no evidence 

to support a parent-child bond existed  between Father and  [K.B.].  Prior to 

August of 2022, Father had not visited [K.B.] since October of 2021, therefore, 

[K.B.]  would  not  suffer  irreparable  harm  if  freed  for  adoption.”    Trial  Court 

Opinion, 11/16/22, at 2 (citations to record omitted). 

As  best  we  can  discern  from  his  brief,  Father  contends  that  the  trial 

court erred  in failing to consider  his relationship  with  K.B. and the effect of 

termination on K.B.’s needs and welfare.  Father’s brief, unnumbered at 9-14.  

Father’s argument  mostly reiterates  his attempts  to satisfy his reunification 

objectives, frames his relationship with K.B., and highlights the importance of 

maintaining the parent-child bond, generally.  Id. at 12-14. 

Again, the certified record supports the trial court’s needs and welfare 

analysis.    Contrary  to  Father’s  characterization  of  a  beneficial  parent-child 

bond,  the  record  evinces  the  lack  of  a  bond  between  K.B.  and  Father.    As 

noted supra, there was a ten-month gap in visitation from October 18, 2021, 

to August 10, 2022.  N.T., 9/19/22, at 41, 55, 97.  Further, when Father did 

participate in visitation, it never progressed beyond supervised visits and the 

court decreased it from twice weekly to weekly in December 2021.  Id. at 38.  

When asked to describe the nature of visitations, Ms. Custus explained, “For 

the two visits that did happen this year it was reported that [Father] is having 

trouble engaging with [K.B.], [K.B.] cries during the visits, it’s very difficult 

for him to maintain.”  Id. at 42.  Pointing to the current nature of visitation, 

- 14 - 

J-S03003-23 

stated: 

Ms. Custus indicated that there was no bond between Father and K.B.  She 

Q.  In  your  opinion  is  there  a  parent  child  relationship  between 
[F]ather and [K.B.]?  

A. No. 

Q. Why do you say that? 

A.  Due  to  the  inconsistent  nature  of  visits[,  Father]  has  not 
allowed time for [K.B.] to bond[,] which is why [K.B.] reacts the 
way that he does now when there are visits.  

Id.  at  46.    Ms.  Custus  further  noted  that  K.B.  does  not  ask  to  see  Father, 

whom  he  refers  to  as  “the  man.”    Id.    As  a  result,  Ms.  Custus  opined  that 

termination of Father’s parental rights would not cause K.B. irreparable harm.  

Id. at 47. 

 

More importantly, K.B. has resided with Maternal Aunt, his pre-adoptive 

kinship  foster  parent,  for  the  entire  thirty-one-month  period  since  his 

discharge from the hospital in February 2020.  Id. at 8.  As to the relationship 

between K.B. and Maternal Aunt, Ms. Custus testified: 

Q. So what is the current relationship like between [K.B.] and the 
resource parent? 

A. [K.B.] is very bonded with the resource parent. 

Q. So who does [K.B.] look to then when he’s sick, hungry or hurt? 

A. The resource parent. 

Q. Who takes [K.B.] to medical appointments? 

A. The resource parent. 

Q. Who provides for [K.B.] and takes care of daily needs? 

A. The resource parent. 

- 15 - 

J-S03003-23 

A. Yes. 

A. Yes. 

A. Yes.  

Id. at 47-48. 

Id. at 47.  As such, noting the length of time K.B. had been placed, Ms. Custus 

further expressed that K.B. should be freed for adoption.  She stated: 

Q.  If  child  were  freed  for  adoption  would  the  current  resource 
parent be interested in providing permanency? 

Q. Do you think it is in the best interest of [K.B.] to be freed for 
adoption at this time? 

Q. Why do you think that? 

A.  Beings  as  though  we  are  approaching  three  years  with  this 
case, I think it would be in the best interest of [K.B.] for him to 
seek a goal that much [sic] appropriate. 

Q. Do you believe at this point that reaching permanency for this 
child is of utmost importance? 

Similarly,  the  CASA  program  director,  Patricia  Kinkle,  confirmed  both 

the bond between K.B. and Maternal Aunt and the lack of bond between K.B. 

and Father.  She noted, 

[K.B.] is extremely bonded to [Maternal Aunt] because that is who 
has been caring for him for his entire life.  He does not have much 
of  a  relationship  with  .  .  .  his  father,  he  has  not  had  consistent 
visits at any point in his life with his father.  At the visits, the few 
visits  that  [F]ather  has  had  with  [K.B.,]  he  has  struggled  to 
console  him  when  he’s  upset,  he  struggled  to  meet  any  of  the 
basic needs because he does not have a relationship with [K.B.].   

Id. at 93-94.   

As highlighted supra, Father’s contact with K.B. was infrequent, Father 

refused to attend the supervised visitations scheduled at the agency due to 

- 16 - 

J-S03003-23 

his  disagreements  with  caseworkers  and  Maternal  Aunt,  and  there  is  no 

evidence that a positive parental relationship exists between Father and K.B., 

who  looks  to  Maternal  Aunt  for  parental  care,  comfort,  and  control.  

Accordingly,  the  certified  record  supports  the  trial  court’s  finding  that 

terminating  Father’s  parental  rights  serves  K.B.’s  developmental,  physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to § 2511(b).   

Father’s third issue presents a challenge to the trial court’s dependency 

order changing the permanency goal of K.B. to adoption.  We review decisions 

changing a placement goal for an abuse of discretion.  In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 

1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).  When considering a petition for a goal change for a 

dependent child, the trial court must  determine the  matters set forth at 42 

Pa.C.S.  §  6351(f)  of  the  Juvenile  Act.    In  re  S.B.,  943  A.2d  973,  978 

(Pa.Super. 2008).  In making these determinations, the best interests of the 

child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court.   In re 

A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa.Super. 2011).  Considering Father’s failure 

to pursue visitation with his son, the sheer amount of time K.B. has spent in 

pre-adoptive kinship foster care with Maternal Aunt, and the need for K.B. to 

achieve  stability  in  his  own  life,  the  trial  court’s  decision  to  change  the 

permanency goal to adoption was well within its discretion.  Accordingly, we 

do not disturb it. 

- 17 - 

Based  on  the  foregoing,  we  affirm  the  decree  terminating  Father’s 

parental  rights  and  affirm  the  order  changing  the  permanency  goal  to 

Termination decree and goal change order affirmed.  

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/21/2023 

    J

  D

Judgment Entered. 

     

 

J-S03003-23 

adoption. 

- 18 -