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J-S01017-23  

PPEAL OF: C.M. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.R.S, A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1070 WDA 2022 
 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022, 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 
Civil Division at No(s):  CP-02-AP-0000030-2022. 
 

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.S., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER 

 No. 1071 WDA 2022 
 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022, 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 
Orphans' Court at No(s):  CP-02-AP-0000029-2022. 
 

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.S., A MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER 

 No. 1072 WDA 2022 

    A

    A

    A

 

 

 

 

   

  

J-S01017-23 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022, 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 
Orphans' Court at No(s):  CP-02-AP-0000031-2022. 

EFORE:   BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:  

 

FILED:  March 17, 2023 

In this consolidated matter, C.M. (Mother) appeals the orders entered 

by the Allegheny County Orphans’ Court, which involuntarily terminated  her 

rights to her three daughters, Z.S. (age 5), S.R.S. (age 4), and L.S. (age 22 

months), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), 

(8); (b).1  After careful review, we affirm. 

In its thorough Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court set forth 

the following procedural and factual history: 

Z.S.  was  born  [in  January]  2017.    S.[R.]S.  was  born  [in 
March]  2018.    In  the  summer  of  2020,  [the  Allegheny 
County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (OCYF)] had 
some  contact  with  the  family  regarding  allegations  of 
substance  abuse  by  the  parents  and  inadequate  medical 
care for the Children.  It is unclear to the court whether the 
family was offered services at that time.  [In October 2020], 
OCYF  received  another  referral  because  Mother  tested 
positive  for  opiates  and  methadone  at  the  time  of  L.S.’s 
birth.  Based upon L.S.’s neonatal exposure to methadone, 
she had to be admitted to the Newborn Intensive Care Unit 
(NICU) at Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh.  On October 4th, 
2020, OCYF caseworkers met with the parents and Mother 
admitted to using heroin throughout her pregnancy.  OCYF 
referred Mother to the POWER [(Pennsylvania Organization 
for Women in Early Recovery)] Program to undergo a drug 

____________________________________________ 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

 The orphans’ court also terminated the rights of B.S. (Father), who did not 
appeal. 

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  B

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J-S01017-23 

and  alcohol  evaluation.    Mother  completed  a  drug  and 
alcohol  assessment  on  October  5th,  2020  and  was 
recommended  to  attend  in-patient  treatment.    Shortly 
thereafter,  Mother  was  admitted  to  UPMC  McKeesport 
Hospital’s Inpatient Rehabilitation program for a detox and 
in-patient treatment.  On that same day, OCYF obtained an 
Emergency  Custody  Authorization  (ECA)  for  Z.S.  and 
S.[R.]S. and the Children were removed from their parent’s 
care. 

On October 20th, 2020, Z.S. and S.[R.]S. were placed in the 
foster home of [the Foster Family].  On October 21st, 2020, 
L.S. was released from the hospital.  OCYF obtained an ECA 
on her that same day and she was also placed in [the same] 
foster  home.    On  October  26th,  2020,  Mother  was 
successfully  discharged  from  her  inpatient  treatment 
program at UPMC McKeesport.  Mother was recommended 
to  continue  her  treatment  through  an  intensive  outpatient 
program. 

On November 17th, 2020, the court adjudicated the Children 
dependent.  The Court ordered them to remain in placement 
with the [Foster Family].  Mother was ordered to engage in 
an appropriate level of drug and alcohol treatment, comply 
with  random  screens,  attend  a  parenting  program,  and  to 
attend the Children’s medical appointments.  Mother’s visits 
were ordered to be supervised. 

A  Permanency  Hearing  was  held  on  February  18th,  2021.  
The court ordered the Children to remain in placement with 
[the  Foster  Family].    Mother  was  found  to  be  in  minimal 
compliance  and  to  have  made  minimal  progress  toward 
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original 
placement.  The court ordered Mother to complete drug and 
alcohol treatment, attend random screens, and to attend a 
coached  parenting  program.    The  court  found  that  Mother 
had  been  attending  her  methadone  maintenance  program 
but had not been attending random urine screens.  During 
this  reporting  period,  it  was  discovered  that  S.[R.]S.  had 
twenty-three cavities.  S.[R.]S. had dental surgery on March 
30th, 2021, to address the cavities. 

A  Permanency  Hearing  was  held  on  May  13th,  2021.    The 
court ordered the Children to remain in their placement with 
the [Foster Family].  The court found that Mother had made 

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minimal  compliance.    During  this  reporting  period,  Mother 
attended  most  of  the  Children’s  medical  and  service 
provider  appointments  but  was  not  engaged  in  an 
appropriate level of drug and alcohol treatment.  The court 
ordered  Mother  to  attend  drug  and  alcohol  treatment,  to 
sign  releases,  to  submit  to  random  urine  screens,  and  to 
participate  in  coached  visitation.    Mother’s  visits  were 
ordered  to  remain  supervised  with  permission  to  increase 
the frequency at the agreement of all parties.  Mother began 
coached visitation in April of 2021. 

A Permanency Hearing was held on August 25th, 2021.  The 
court ordered the Children to remain in placement with the 
[Foster  Family].    The  court  found  Mother  to  be  minimally 
compliant and to have made minimal progress.  During this 
reporting  period,  Mother  had  been  compliant  with  her 
methadone maintenance program, had undergone an intake 
for intensive outpatient program and attended some of the 
Children’s medical appointments. 

Mother  completed  a  POWER  interview  on  November  15th 
2021.  She was referred to Pathway to Care and Recovery 
for  a  full  drug  and  alcohol  assessment.    A  Permanency 
Hearing  was  held  on  November  18th,  2021.    The  court 
ordered  the  Children  to  remain  in  the  placement  of  the 
[Foster  Family].    The  court  found  that  Mother  was 
moderately compliant but had only made minimal progress.  
Mother  was  compliant  with  her  methadone  maintenance 
program  but  was  not  participating  in  intensive  outpatient 
treatment.    During  this  reporting  period,  Mother  had  not 
attended  any  of  the  Children’s  medical  appointments  but 
was participating in coached visitation.  The court ordered 
the  parents  to  submit  to  urine  screens  and  appointed  the 
foster  parents  as  secondary  medical  and  educational 
decision-makers. 

A Permanency Hearing was held on March 2nd, 2022.  The 
court ordered the Children to remain in their placement with 
the  [Foster  Family].    The  court  found  Mother  to  be  in 
minimal  compliance  and  to  have  made  minimal  progress.  
During  this  reporting  period,  Mother  was  attending  her 
methadone maintenance program but was not in intensive 
outpatient  treatment.    She  also  had  not  competed  any 
random urine screens and had not attended any medical or 
behavioral  appointments  for  the  Children.    OCYF  filed  the 

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J-S01017-23 

termination petitions on March 21, 2022.  Mother underwent 
a  POWER  evaluation  on  April  12th,  2022  and  was 
recommended  for  outpatient  treatment.    Mother  also 
submitted  a  urine  screen,  the  evaluation,  and  the  results 
were indicative of relapse. 

Dr.  Patricia  Pepe  was  the  court-ordered  psychologist 
assigned  to  evaluate  the  family  for  the  Dependency  and 
Termination  matters.    As  part  of  the  evaluation  process, 
Mother was expected to undergo an individual psychological 
evaluation and an interactional evaluation with the Children.  
Mother failed to appear for an individual evaluation on April 
20th,  May  19th,  and  June  8th  of  2022.    During  Mother’s 
interactional  evaluation  on  May  24th,  2022,  Dr.  Pepe 
reported  that  Mother  positively  engaged  with  the  Children 
and  had  a  good  understanding  of  each  of  the  Children’s 
developmental  functioning.    Dr.  Pepe  opined  that  Mother 
exhibited  positive  and  appropriate  parenting  skills.  
However,  Dr.  Pepe  expressed  concerns  over  Mother’s 
inability to meet her court-ordered goals and what appeared 
to be an “eleventh hour” attempt to gain compliance.  Dr. 
Pepe found this troubling as the Children had been in care 
for eighteen months. 

Dr. Pepe also conducted an interactional evaluation with the 
Children and the Foster Parents.  Dr. Pepe reported that the 
Children were thriving in their foster home and appeared to 
be  receiving  excellent  care.    She  further  opined  that  the 
Children exhibited multiple bonding behaviors suggestive of 
positive and primary attachment toward the Foster Parents.  
Dr.  Pepe  concluded  that  the  Children  had  developed  a 
primary  attachment  to  their  Foster  Parents  and  perceived 
them as their primary and psychological parents. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/22 (T.C.O.) at 2-6 (citations to the record omitted). 

 

The  orphans’  court  granted  the  termination  petitions  on  August  12, 

2022.    The  court  terminated  Mother’s  rights  to  each  respective  Child  under 

the same grounds  – 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(2), (5), (8), and  (b).   Mother 

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J-S01017-23 

timely filed these appeals.  She has submitted a consolidated Brief, presenting 

the following issues for our review: 

1.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 
matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily 
terminate  Mother’s  parental  rights  pursuant  to  23 
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(2), (5) and (8)? 

2.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 
matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of 
proving  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence  that 
termination  of  Mother’s  parental  rights  would  best 
serve  the  needs  and  welfare  of  the  Child[ren] 
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (b)? 

Mother’s Brief at 10. 

We begin with our well-settled standard of review: 

The  standard  of  review  in  termination  of  parental  rights 
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 
and  credibility  determinations  of  the  trial  court  if  they  are 
supported  by  the  record.  If  the  factual  findings  are 
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 
court  made  an  error  of  law  or  abused  its  discretion.  A 
decision  may  be  reversed  for  an  abuse  of  discretion  only 
upon  demonstration  of  manifest  unreasonableness, 
partiality,  prejudice,  bias,  or  ill-will.  The  trial  court's 
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 
the  record  would  support  a  different  result.  We  have 
previously  emphasized  our  deference  to  trial  courts  that 
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 
multiple hearings. 

In  re  T.S.M.,  71  A.3d  251,  267  (Pa.  2013) (citations  and  quotation  marks 

omitted). 

 

Our  Supreme  Court  has  repeatedly  stated  that  in  termination  cases, 

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 

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J-S01017-23 

265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108, 

1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive 

case involving…the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should 

review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports 

that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate could should not search the record 

for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).  

The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential 

standard and, to the extent that record supports the court’s decision, we must 

affirm  even  though  evidence  exists  that  would  also  support  a  contrary 

determination.”  In  re  P.Z.,  113  A.3d  840,  849  (Pa.  Super.  2015)  (citation 

omitted). 

Termination  of  parental  rights  is  governed  by  Section  2511  of  the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 
seeking  termination  must  prove  by  clear  and  convincing 
evidence  that  the  parent's  conduct  satisfies  the  statutory 
grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only 
if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 
termination  of  his  or  her  parental  rights  does  the  court 
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section 
2511(b):  determination  of  the  needs  and  welfare  of  the 
child[.] 

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). 

Clear  and  convincing  evidence  is  evidence  that  is  so  “clear,  direct, 

weighty  and  convincing  as  to  enable  the  trier  of  fact  to  come  to  a  clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

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J-S01017-23 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).   

Critically,  we  may  uphold  a  termination  decision  if  any  proper  basis 

exists for the result reached.  C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201.   We need only agree 

with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc). 

Therefore, we review Mother’s first appellate issue insofar as it concerns 

the termination of her rights under Section 2511(a)(2), which provides: 

(a)  General  rule.--The  rights  of  a  parent  in  regard  to  a 
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 
following grounds: 

[…] 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 
his  physical  or  mental  well-being  and  the  conditions  and 
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 
will not be remedied by the parent. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). 

 

To  satisfy  the  requirements  of Section  2511(a)(2),  the  moving  party 

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2)  that  such  incapacity,  abuse,  neglect  or  refusal  caused  the  child  to  be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 

In  re  C.M.K.,  203  A.3d  258,  262  (Pa.  Super.  2019)  (citation  omitted).  

- 8 - 

J-S01017-23 

Parents are required to make diligent  efforts toward the reasonably prompt 

assumption  of  full  parental  duties.  In  re  Z.P.,  994  A.2d  1108,  1117  (Pa. 

Super. 2010).   We  note that  the  grounds for  termination  are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct like abuse but concern parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied.  See id.   

Instantly, Mother concedes that OCYF established the first two elements 

of the Section 2511(a)(2) inquiry.  She recognizes that her substance abuse 

rendered her incapable of providing the Children with parental care.  However, 

Mother maintains OCYF failed to provide the third element – that the cause of 

the  incapacity  cannot  or  will  not  be  remedied.    She  cites  her  consistent 

methadone treatment and her compliance with the other aspects of her family 

service  plan,  including  parenting  and  visitation  goals.  See  Mother’s  Brief  at 

27.  She argues that she  is in a  better place  in  her life,  and  that it was an 

abuse of discretion for the orphans’ court to find that the conditions that led 

to removal have yet to be remedied. Id. at 27-28. 

Mother  displayed  varying  levels  of  compliance  with  the  reunification 

plan.    The  record  of  the  permanency  reviews  indicated  that  Mother  was,  at 

times, fairly consistent when it came to participation in parenting programs, 

the Children’s medical care, and visitations.    It bears noting,  however, that 

the orphans’ court concluded that Mother was minimally compliant with her 

reunification plan as a whole.  In any event, as Mother and the orphans’ court 

recognize, this case was first and foremost about Mother’s drug use.  On that 

point, the orphans’ court found: 

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J-S01017-23 

Mother’s substance abuse was the most significant concern 
for  the  family  and  the  reason  the  Children  were  removed 
from  her  care.    As  such,  drug  and  alcohol  treatment  has 
been a long-standing goal for Mother.  As a part of this goal, 
she was expected to obtain sobriety, to follow through with 
drug and alcohol treatment, to continue medication assisted 
treatment of her methadone program, to submit to random 
screens  and  to  sign  releases  of  information.    Mother  has 
struggled  with  nearly  every  expectation  contained  within 
this goal except for her methadone maintenance program. 

FN  1:    It  should  be  noted  that  OCYF  was  unable  to 
confirm Mother’s consistent participation in a methadone 
maintenance  program.    However,  the  court  recognizes 
that  many  of  these  programs  are  not  responsive  to 
OCYF’s requests for records or compliance reports. 

Mother has not been in [an] appropriate level of drug and 
alcohol treatment outside the roughly two weeks she spent 
at  UPMC  McKeesport’s  inpatient  detox  program  in  2020.  
Upon her release from this program, she was recommended 
for intensive outpatient treatment.  Mother has not followed 
through with this recommendation since it was made nearly 
two years ago.  Mother reported to OCYF that she has been 
diagnosed  with  [Chronic  Obstructive  Pulmonary  Disease 
(COPD)] and identified it as a barrier for complying with her 
drug and alcohol treatment goals.  Despite several requests 
from  the  OCYF  caseworker,  Mother  never  provided  the 
agency  with  confirmation  of  this  diagnosis.    The  court  did 
not  find  Mother’s  claims  of  poor  health  to  be  a  legitimate 
barrier  to  her  participation  in  drug  and  alcohol  treatment 
goals.  Mother chose not to engage in the appropriate level 
of drug and alcohol treatment for nearly two years despite 
it  being  court  ordered  after  every  single  Permanency 
Hearing. 

Mother has not submitted to a single urine screen for OCYF 
during  the  pendency  of  the  case,  despite  being  called  in 
thirty-four times.  Mother did appear at the Allegheny Health 
Department’s  Drug  Screening  Office  five  times  but  was 
unable to provide a urine sample.  Mother reported that she 
was physically unable to produce a urine sample while in the 
presence  of  a  female  drug  screener  at  the  Health 
Department.  However, she was able to produce a sample 
at  her  methadone  clinic  and  at  POWER.    Mother  reported 

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J-S01017-23 

that the method of screening at these locations was different 
than at the Health Department.  The Court did not find this 
to be a plausible explanation.   Mother  has been unable to 
substantiate  her  claims  that  she  was  living  a  drug  free 
lifestyle.    As  recently  as  April  of  2022,  Mother  provided  a 
urine sample for POWER that was indicative of relapse.  For 
these  reasons,  the  court  finds  that  Mother  did  not 
satisfactorily complete her drug and alcohol treatment goal. 

T.C.O. at 9-11 (citations to the record omitted) (footnote original). 

Upon review, we conclude that the record supports the orphans’ court 

determination that Mother was unable or unwilling to remedy her substance 

abuse.    Initially,  we  observe  that  a  parent’s  prolonged  use  of  a  prescribed 

addiction  medication  does  not  necessarily  mean  the  parent  is  unable  or 

unwilling to remedy the substance abuse issues that led to the child’s removal.  

If this sort of prolonged, but prescribed, treatment continues to be essential, 

courts should not construe the need for such treatment to be an automatic 

bar to reunification.  Although the courts may infer that the parent’s fragile 

recovery poses safety concerns, the ultimate question is whether ingestion of 

such medication renders the parent unable to provide essential parental care.  

If  a  parent  can  provide  proper  care,  notwithstanding  the  continued  use  an 

addiction  treatment  drug,  then  it  would  appear  that  the  third  element  of 

Section 2511(a)(2) would be not be established. 

But that is not the case here.  First, as the orphans’ court noted, Mother 

did  not  provide  confirmation  that  she  was  consistent  with  her  methadone 

treatment program.  We appreciate the candor of orphans’ court Footnote 1, 

which articulated the bureaucratic difficulty that OCYF ran into when trying to 

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obtain  reports  from  the  clinic.    While  parents  have  an  obligation  to 

demonstrate  their  compliance  with  their  reunification  plan,  we  remind  the 

Agency that it has the ultimate burden of proving termination.  We expect the 

Agency to work with parents to overcome these bureaucratic difficulties, given 

that a dependency cases typically last for many months.  That said, this case 

does not turn on whether Mother was consistent in a monitored methadone 

Instead, the orphans’ court determined that Mother’s failure to provide 

drug screens was significant.  Without such screens, the court could not ensure 

that  Mother  was  able  to  remedy  her  substance  abuse  issues  and  provide 

essential  care.    Indeed,  the  one  screen  Mother  did  provide,  late  in  the 

dependency  case,  indicated  that  Mother  had  relapsed.2    The  record  also 

indicated that  Mother had used methadone  and opiates around the time of 

the  L.S.’s  birth.    Thus,  to  the  extent  that  Mother  maintained  a  methadone 

Regarding  Mother’s  missed  drug  screens,  the  orphans’  court  was  not 

persuaded  by  Mother’s  excuse  that  she  had  COPD.3    But  even  assuming 

____________________________________________ 

2  Confidentiality  regulations  prohibited  the  POWER  witness  from  revealing 
what drug Mother tested positive for; however, a positive test for methadone 
would not constitute a relapse. See N.T., at 9; 18. 

 As to whether Mother actually had COPD, our review is impeded by the lack 
of documentation.  On one hand, if Mother seeks to raise her condition as a 
defense, she must provide documentation of the same.  On the other hand, 
when the goal is reunification, the Agency  must make reasonable efforts to 
(Footnote Continued Next Page) 

  3

regiment, it does not mean that Mother was otherwise drug-free. 

treatment program. 

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J-S01017-23 

Mother  had  COPD,  such  an  ailment  does  not  excuse  her  failure  to  provide 

screens.  Perhaps if Mother missed a small number of screens due to COPD 

complications, we might find such an excuse reasonable.  But Mother did not 

provide  a  single  drug  screen  until  the  end  of  the  dependency  proceedings.  

Moreover, parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably 

prompt  assumption  of  full  parental  duties.  Z.P.,  994  A.2d  at  1117.    The 

Children  were  in  placement  for  approximately  23  months.    If  Mother  had 

physical  difficulty  complying  with  the  screens,  due  to  COPD,  then  special 

accommodations could have been made.  Evidently, Mother never brought the 

matter to the attention of the court.  The orphans’ court did not err when it 

made a negative inference from Mother’s missed drug screens. 

In sum, the record supports the court’s determination that Mother was 

unable or unwilling to remedy her substance abuse issues, because: she did 

not  provide  screens  indicating  that  she  was  negative  for  drugs  besides  her 

prescribed methadone; and because she evinced a possible relapse; and to a 

lesser degree, because she could not verify her consistent participation in the 

methadone program.  Thus, the court did not err or abuse its discretion when 

overcome these types of obstacles.  Although Mother signed some releases, 
the record is unclear whether Mother signed a release enabling OCYF to find 
out Mother’s exact medical history.  

e emphasis this point, because it exemplifies the problem courts encounter 
during  dependency  and  termination  proceedings.    Ascertaining  the  best 
interests  of  the  child  is  difficult  enough  without  that  decision  turning  on 
whether a party followed through with important paperwork. 

  W

____________________________________________ 

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J-S01017-23 

J-S01017-23 

2511(a)(2).  

it  determined  that  OCYF  established  grounds  for  termination  under  Section 

Having discerned no error or abuse of discretion as to the first prong of 

the  bifurcated  termination  analysis,  we  next  address  the  orphans’  court’s 

findings  under  Section  2511(b),  which  Mother  challenges  in  her  second 

appellate issue. 

The section provides: 

(b) Other  considerations.--The court in  terminating the 
rights  of  a  parent  shall  give  primary  consideration  to  the 
developmental,  physical  and  emotional  needs  and  welfare 
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 
solely  on  the  basis  of  environmental  factors  such  as 
inadequate  housing,  furnishings,  income,  clothing  and 
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 
With  respect  to  any  petition  filed  pursuant  to  subsection 
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 
filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 

 

This Court has explained further: 

[S]ection  2511(b)  focuses  on  whether  termination  of 
parental  rights  would  best  serve  the  developmental, 
physical,  and  emotional  needs  and  welfare  of  the  child.   
In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), 
this  Court  stated,  “Intangibles  such  as  love,  comfort, 
security,  and  stability  are  involved  in  the  inquiry  into  the 
needs and welfare of the child.”  In addition, we instructed 
that the trial court must also discern the nature and status 
of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 
that 
on 
bond.  Id.  However, in cases where there is no evidence of 
a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer 

permanently 

severing 

child 

the 

of 

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that  no bond exists.  In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 
(Pa.  Super.  2008).    Accordingly,  the  extent  of  the  bond-
effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of 
the particular case. Id. at 763. 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists, 

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child 

had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting 

bond to be too attenuated).  Moreover, the court is not required to use expert 

testimony  to  resolve  the  bond  analysis.    In  re  Z.P.,  994  A.2d  1108,  1121 

(citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)).    

“Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also 

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they 

have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.   Finally, we 

emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child 

is  a  major  aspect  of  the  Section  2511(b)  best-interest  analysis,  it  is 

nonetheless  only  one  of  many  factors  to  be  considered  by  the  court  when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.”  In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

The orphans’ court issued the following findings as part of the Section 

2511(b) analysis: 

Moving to the best interests analysis, the court considered 
several  factors  including  the  safety  needs  of  the  Children, 

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the  nature  of  the  bond  between  the  Children  and  Mother, 
and the relationship between the Children and their Foster 
Parents.    Mother  has  struggled  to  provide  safety  and 
stability  during  periods  of  supervised  visitation.    Multiple 
service providers have reported that Mother was unable to 
properly  supervise  all  three  Children  together,  even  with 
Father’s  help.    Despite  a  lengthy  tenure  with  a  coached 
parenting  program,  Mother’s  parenting  abilities  have  not 
improved.    Additionally,  the  court  is  not  confident  that 
Mother has been living a substance free lifestyle.  She has 
never  been  in  an  appropriate  level  of  treatment  and  has 
shown  signs  of  relapse  as  recent  as  the  Spring  of  2022.  
Substance  abuse  by  one  or  both  parents  significantly 
increase safety concerns for the Children living in the home.  
Based  upon  Mother’s  inability  to  address  her  substance 
abuse  concerns  and  her  parenting  deficits,  the  court  does 
not  believe  that  she  could  adequately  provide  a  safe  and 
stable environment for the Children. 

With respect to the bond between Mother and the Children, 
the court has little evidence to support the notion that one 
even exists, particularly with [the 22-month-old] L.S. as she 
does not generally seek Mother out for comfort or support.  
Dr.  Pepe  opined  that  L.S.  appears  largely  indifferent  to 
Mother.  The older girls do have a level of comfortability with 
Mother  and  do  appear  to  enjoy  their  visits  with  her.  
However, they do not view her as their psychological parent 
and  do  not  have  a  primary  attachment  to  her.    To  the 
contrary,  the  Children  appear  to  have  a  very  strong  bond 
with  their  Foster  Parents.    Dr.  Pepe  reported  that  the 
Children exhibited multiple bonding behaviors suggestive of 
primary  attachment  to  the  Foster  Parents  and  appeared 
genuinely happy in their presence.  She further opined that 
the Children would seek them out for assistance and viewed 
them as psychological parents.  The former and current case 
managers [for a service provider] reported that the Children 
appeared  happy  in  their  foster  home.    OCYF  caseworker, 
Rick  Ogden,  reported  that  the  Children  were  doing  “really 
well” and were bonded with their foster parents.  The foster 
parents have been a great source of support for the Children 
and have been involved in all their services and activities.  
The Children have been in their care since October of 2020 
and  Dr.  Pepe  opined  that  [the  Children]  would  be  at 

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significant  risk  for  psychological  problems  if  they  were 
removed from the foster home. 

In any termination case, the court must consider the effects 
of severing the bond between parent and child and whether 
it is in the child’s best interests.  In this case, the court finds 
that  the  bond  between  the  Children  and  Mother  is  not 
beneficial  or  necessary  and  that  the  Children  would  not 
suffer  irreparable  harm  if  their  relationship  with  Mother 
ceased.    The  court  recognizes  that  there  would  be  likely 
some  [discord]  but  believes  that  the  Foster  Parents  could 
provide  the  support  needed  to  overcome  any  negative 
impact  from  termination.    Dr.  Pepe  shared  a  similar 
sentiment, opining that the Foster Parents’ strong bond and 
commitment  to  the  Children  would  help  to  mitigate  any 
issues  resulting  from  the  termination  of  Mother’s  parental 
rights.  For these reasons, the court found that terminating 
Mother’s parental rights would best suit the developmental, 
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the Children. 

T.C.O. at 13-15 (citations to the record omitted). 

On appeal, Mother argues that termination under Section 2511(b) was 

unfounded.  She cites the fact that  the Children were excited and happy to 

see her.  Mother also notes that she is appropriate with the Children during 

the  visits.    Mother  states  that  she  loves  the  Children,  and  her  involvement 

adds value to their lives. See Mother’s Brief at 32-33. 

Upon  review,  we  first  note  that  a  parent’s  own  feelings  of  love  and 

affection, alone, do not prevent the termination of parental rights. Z.P., 994 

A.2d at 1121.  Although the Children are affable during the visits, the same 

should not be confused with a beneficial or necessary parental bond.  Mother’s 

inability  to  make  progress  in  her  reunification  plan  meant  that  the  Children 

did  not  have  substantive  visits  with  Mother  throughout  the  dependency 

proceedings; Mother’s visits always remained supervised.  That the Children 

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have done well during the visits is a testament to the Foster Parents’ attention 

to the Children’s healthy development.  Thus, it comes as no surprise that the 

Children consider their Foster Parents to be their primary attachments.  It was 

not  manifestly  unreasonable  for  the  orphans’  court  to  find  that  relationship 

between Mother and the Children were too attenuated.  For these reasons, we 

discern  no  error  or  abuse  of  discretion  when  the  orphans’  court  found  that 

termination would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare under Section 

2511(b). 

In sum, the orphans’ court properly concluded that OCYF met its burden 

by  clear  and  convincing  evidence  that  termination  was  warranted  under 

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Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate:   3/17/2023 

 

 

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