NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

             

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v. 

 

 

ARGARET M. FITZPATRICK 

 

Appellant 

 No. 1489 MDA 2021 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 13, 2021 
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):  
CP-67-CR-0001040-2018 

EFORE:  KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* 

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: 

FILED MARCH 20, 2023 

Margaret  M.  Fitzpatrick  (Appellant)  appeals  from  the  judgment  of 

sentence  entered  in  the  York  County  Court  of  Common  Pleas,  following  her 

jury convictions of theft by deception, receiving stolen property, and theft by 

failure to make required disposition of funds.1  Appellant avers the trial court 

abused its discretion in: (1) denying her Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 speedy-trial motion; 

(2)  admitting  Pa.R.E.  404(b)  evidence  of  prior  bad  acts;  and  (3)  imposing 

aggravated-range  sentences  and  running  them  consecutively,  for  an 

aggregate sentence of two to four years’ imprisonment.  We affirm. 

 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3922(a)(1), 3925(a), 3927(a). 

     

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I.  Facts & Procedural History 

The underlying facts are not in dispute.   Appellant falsely held herself 

out to the public as  an attorney, and she  headed a non-profit organization, 

Mediation  Ministries  and  Litigation  Alternatives,  which  purported  to  help 

vulnerable individuals.  See Trial Ct. Op., 1/4/22, at 21.  She met the victim 

in this matter, John Nicholson (the Victim), at church.  Id. at 2. 

The Victim previously worked 

as  a  manual  laborer  until  2008  when  he  became  physically 
disabled as the result of multiple back, elbow, and neck surgeries 
for which he continues to take prescribed Fentanyl to manage the 
physical  pain.    [The  Victim’s]  inability  to  work  .  .  .  led  to 
depression  and  financial  hardships,  and  [he]  takes  different 
psychotic medications to manage his depression.   
 

[The  Victim’s]  disabilities  and  dire 

financial  situation 
prompted him to obtain help from Appellant to manage his money 
as he was not thinking clearly at the time and could not mentally 
manage his money by himself due to his depression and different 
prescribed medications. 

fter being out of work for several years, [the Victim] applied 
for Social Security Disability with Appellant’s assistance in June of 
2012. 
 

Trial Ct. Op., 1/4/22, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted & paragraph breaks added).  

  A

At that time, the Victim was approximately 47 years old.  See N.T. Jury Trial, 

9/7-9/21, at 116. 

The trial court summarized: 

Appellant  [executed]  an  “Appointment  of  Representative” 
document, which appointed  [her] as  the payee of  [the Victim’s] 
Social Security benefits.  [The Victim] believed that Appellant, as 
the assigned payee of his benefits and an attorney, would manage 
his funds on his behalf and trusted that she would appropriately 

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handle his finances.  Appellant told [the Victim] she would use his 
Social Security money to pay his bills, including rent and utilities. 

n 2013, [the Victim] was awarded Social Security benefits[, 
as well as] $23,000 in back pay for the time that he waited for his 
application to be approved, which was deposited into Appellant’s 
account for the purposes of paying [the Victim’s] bills.  

owever,  [the  Victim]  began  receiving  eviction  notices,  his 
electricity was turned off, and his medical bills and car insurance 
were not paid.  [The Victim] reassigned Pastor James McCoy . . . 
as his . . . new representative payee, and [the Victim’s] bills were 
paid on time by Pastor McCoy with [the Victim’s] Social Security 
monies. 
 

However, neither Pastor McCoy nor [the Victim] ever received 
the  $23,000  in  back  pay  from  Appellant,  despite  [the  Victim] 
confronting Appellant and asking for his money.  . . .  At the time 
of trial, Appellant had still not returned [the Victim’s] $23,000 . . . 
nor  provided  an  explanation  of  what  she  had  done  with  that 
money. 
 

  I

  H

Trial Ct. Op., 1/4/22, at 2-3 (footnotes omitted & paragraph break added). 

On January 5, 2018, the Commonwealth filed an information, charging 

Appellant  with  theft  by  deception,  receiving  stolen  property,  and  theft  by 

failure to make required disposition of funds.  A jury trial was scheduled for 

August 2, 2021. 

On  July  29,  2021,  four  days  before  the  scheduled  trial,  the 

Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to admit evidence of Appellant’s prior 

bad  acts  under  Pa.R.E.  404(b).    First,  Appellant  had  another  pending  York 

County criminal case2 (York County Charges), in which she was charged with 

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2 This case was docketed at York County docket CP-67-CR-0007490-2018. 
 

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theft by failure to make required disposition of funds.  Second, in Cumberland 

County,  Appellant  had  pleaded  nolo  contendere  to  theft  by  unlawful  taking 

(Cumberland County Plea).3  In both matters, Appellant was alleged to: have 

held herself out to be an attorney; promoted Mediation Ministries as a non-

profit that assisted the elderly and others in need; have been named as the 

attorney-in-fact  for  the  elderly  victims,  who  suffered  from  dementia  or 

cognitive issues; and acquired the victims’ funds — $182,000 and $17,500, 

respectively —  but  failed  to  use  those  funds  for  the  victims’  benefit,  as  she 

had agreed to.  The Commonwealth argued the evidence was admissible to 

show Appellant uses a common scheme, plan, or design, as well as Appellant’s 

intent to deceive.  See N.T., 8/5/21, at 128. 

On August 2, 2021, the instant case was called for trial, as scheduled.  

N.T.,  8/2/21,  at  2.    However,  the  trial  court  and  parties  addressed  the 

Commonwealth’s  outstanding  motion  in  limine,  and  the  court  determined  it 

would conduct a hearing, and thus trial would not commence that day.  See 

id. at 15.  Appellant then stated that both parties agreed the Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 

adjusted run date would fall “possibly [that] week.”  Id.  Appellant argued this 

new  delay  should  be  attributed  to  the  Commonwealth,  who  had  “filed  the 

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3 This other Cumberland County matter was docketed at trial docket CP-21-
CR-0000497-2019.  This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on direct 
appeal.  Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 1318 MDA 2020 (unpub. memo.) 
(Pa.  Super.  May  24,  2021)  (rejecting  Appellant’s  claim  her  nolo  contendere 
plea was not voluntarily entered). 
 

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incredibly  late”  Rule  404(b)  motion  and  notice.    Id.  at  16.    The  assistant 

district attorney responded she “came in late to the [case]” and did not “find 

out  about  the”  Cumberland  County  Plea  until  the  prior  week,  when  she 

“Googled [Appellant’s] name[.]”  Id. at 14, 23.  The Commonwealth further 

argued Appellant had no credible notice argument, as Appellant knew of her 

own criminal cases and thus there was no surprise.  Id. at 23.  The trial court 

indicated it would find, contrary to Appellant’s argument, the additional time 

to be excludable.  Id. at 29. 

Three days thereafter, on August 5, 2021, the trial court conducted a 

hearing  on  the  Commonwealth’s  motion  in  limine.4    By  this  time,  the  York 

County Charges had been nolle prossed by the Commonwealth, for Rule 600 

reasons.5  Nevertheless, relatives of the victims in both cases, as well as police 

detectives  and  county  agency  employees  who  investigated  claims  of  the 

elderly abuse, testified.  Appellant did not present any witnesses or evidence. 

The trial court issued its decision on August 30th, granting the motion 

in part and denying it in part.  With respect to the York County Charges — in 

4 We note the motion in limine was heard by the Honorable Maria Musti Cook, 
President Judge.  Thereafter, the Honorable Harry Ness presided over trial and 
sentencing. 

  See  N.T.,  8/2/21,  at  4-5  (Commonwealth  acknowledging  York  County 
Charges  “will  be  dismissed  by  the  Commonwealth  due  to  due  diligence 
issues”); Trial Ct. Op., 1/4/22, at 19 (Appellant was not convicted on the York 
County charge “due to Rule 600”). 
 

  5

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which there was no conviction and no proof of the offense charged — the trial 

court limited the admission of evidence to Appellant’s: (1) holding herself out 

in the community as an attorney and prior judge; and (2) founding Mediation 

Ministries, a faith-based organization, to assist the elderly and disabled.  Trial 

Ct. Op., 8/30/21, at 4-5.  With respect to the Cumberland County plea, the 

trial court permitted the same evidence, as well as evidence that the victim 

was  elderly  and  suffered  from  early  onset  of  Alzheimer’s  disease,  and 

Appellant acquired more than $17,500 of the victim’s funds, but failed to use 

the funds for the benefit of the victim.  See id. at 5. 

Thereafter, a jury trial commenced on  September 7, 2021.  Appellant 

also filed a Rule 600 motion, which was denied.  The Victim testified  to the 

underlying facts, as summarized above.  Pertinently, witnesses also testified 

about  Appellant’s  Cumberland  County  Plea  and  York  County  Charges,  as 

permitted by the trial court’s Rule 404(b) ruling.  Appellant did not testify or 

present any evidence.  The jury found her guilty of all three charges: theft by 

deception,  receiving  stolen  property,  and  theft  by  failure  to  make  required 

disposition of funds. 

On October 13, 2021, the trial court imposed the following aggravated-

range sentences, to run consecutively: (1) one to two years’ imprisonment for 

theft by deception; and (2) one to two years’ imprisonment for theft for failure 

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to make required disposition of funds.6  Appellant filed a timely post-sentence 

motion,  which  was  denied.    She  then  took  this  timely  appeal  and  complied 

with  the  court’s  order  to  file  a  Pa.R.A.P.  1925(b)  statement  of  errors 

complained of on appeal.7 

1.  Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying [Appellant’s] 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 where, even if it 
had  not  already  violated  Rule  600,  the  Commonwealth  filed  a 
complex  motion  requiring  testimony  from  eight  witnesses  only 
four  days  before  trial  was  scheduled  to  begin  and  offered  no 
evidence of due diligence? 

.    Did  the  trial  court  abuse  its  discretion  in  allowing  extensive 
evidence of the allegations from one case at [Appellant’s] trial on 
another  case,  as  the  court  misconceived  the  “common  scheme” 
exception to Rule 404(b), the evidence in question fit no exception 
to the rule, and the evidence was more prejudicial than probative 
in any event? 

.    Did  the  sentencing  court  abuse  its  discretion  in  running  two 
aggravated-range terms of incarceration consecutively despite the 
fact  that  both  convictions  were  premised  on  taking  the  same 
money from the same person?  

  2

  3

II.  Statement of Questions Presented 

Appellant presents the following issues for our review: 

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6 The sentence for receiving stolen property merged. 

  Appellant  requested  bail  pending  appeal,  which  the  trial  court  denied.  
Shortly after filing her notice of appeal, she filed, on November 12, 2021, in 
this  Court  a  petition  for  review  of  that  decision.    The  trial  court  issued  an 
opinion setting forth its reasoning, and this Court denied relief on December 
27th.  See Order, 73 MDM 2021 (Pa. Super. Dec. 27, 2021). 
 

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ppellant’s Brief at 4. 

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III.  Rule 600 – Speedy Trial 

In his first issue, Appellant avers the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying her Rule 600 motion.  We first note the relevant standard of review 

and guiding Rule 600 principles: 

In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of a trial 
court’s  decision  is  whether  the  trial  court  abused  its  discretion.  
Judicial  discretion  requires  action  in  conformity  with  law,  upon 
facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing 
and due consideration.   An abuse of discretion is  not merely an 
error  of  judgment,  but  if  in  reaching  a  conclusion  the  law  is 
overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly 
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, 
as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused. 
 

Commonwealth  v.  Carl,  276  A.3d  743,  748  (Pa.  Super.  2022)  (citation 

omitted), pet. appeal filed, Aug. 8, 2022, 337 MAL 2022 (Pa.). 

[Rule] 600 provides that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written 
complaint  is  filed  against  the  defendant  shall  commence  within 
365  days  from  the  date  on  which  the  complaint  is  filed.”  
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a).  In computing the Rule 600 deadline, 
however, we do not necessarily count all time following the filing 
of  the  complaint.    Rather,  “periods  of  delay  at  any  stage  of  the 
proceedings 
the 
Commonwealth  has  failed  to  exercise  due  diligence  shall  be 
included  in  the  computation  of  the  time  within  which  trial  must 
commence.  Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the 
computation.”  Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). 

the  Commonwealth  when 

caused  by 

he Rule 600 analysis thus entails three steps: 

  T

 

First,  Rule  600(A)  provides  the  mechanical  run  date.  
Second,  we  determine  whether  any  excludable  time 
exists pursuant to Rule 600(C).  We add the amount of 
excludable  time,  if  any,  to  the  mechanical  run  date  to 
arrive at an adjusted run date. 
 

This Court has explained: 

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If  the  trial  takes  place  after  the  adjusted  run  date,  we 
apply  the  due  diligence  analysis  set  forth  in  Rule 
600([D]).  . . .  Rule 600[ ] encompasses a wide variety 
of  circumstances  under  which  a  period  of  delay  was 
outside  the  control  of  the  Commonwealth  and  not  the 
result of the Commonwealth’s lack of diligence.  Any such 
period of delay results  in an extension of the run date.  
Addition  of  any  Rule  600[  ]  extensions  to  the  adjusted 
run  date  produces  the  final  Rule  600  run  date.    If  the 
Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to trial on 
or before the final run date, the trial court must dismiss 
the charges. 

Carl, 276 A.3d at 749 (some citations omitted).  “The Commonwealth bears 

the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that it acted with due 

diligence throughout the proceedings.”  Id. at 748 (citation omitted). 

We also consider the dual public policy concerns behind Rule 600: 

Rule  [600]  serves  two  equally  important  functions:  (1)  the 
protection  of  the  accused’s  speedy  trial  rights,  and  (2)  the 
protection of society.  . . .   

o  long  as  there  has  been  no  misconduct  on  the  part  of  the 
Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial 
rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner 
consistent  with  society’s  right  to  punish  and  deter  crime.    In 
considering [these] matters . . . , courts must carefully factor into 
the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual 
accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law 
enforcement as well. 
 

Carl, 276 A.3d at 748 (citations omitted).  

We reiterate the Commonwealth filed a complaint on January 5, 2018, 

and  trial  commenced  three  years  and  eight  months  later,  on  September  7, 

2021.    On  appeal,  Appellant  sets  forth  four  periods  of  excludable  delay, 

totaling  674  days.    Pertinently,  she  included  the  period  between  March  2 

 

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through November 2, 2020 (245 days), which we note overlaps with both the 

statewide  and  York  County  judicial  emergencies  declared  for  the  COVID-19 

pandemic.8  Appellant’s Brief at 35.  Based on her figures, Appellant contends 

the adjusted run date was November 9, 2020.  Id.  In this argument, Appellant 

emphasizes the 18 day-span between November 2 and 20, 2020, should not 

be excluded.  Id. at 35-37.  She acknowledges “Rule 600 was suspended due 

to the COVID-19 pandemic at certain points in 2020 and 2021[, but argues it] 

was  not  suspended  under  the  [October  8,  2020,9]  declaration  in  effect  at 

[that]  time.”    Id.  at  36.    Appellant  also  reasons  “the  Commonwealth  [sic] 

conducted numerous trials during this period.”  Id. at 35 (citation omitted).   

In the alternative, Appellant asserts the adjusted run date was August 

9,  2021,  if  the  court  were  to  include  an  additional  273  days  of  delay 

(November 2, 2020, through August 2, 2021,) due to “the re-suspension of 

jury  trials  in  York  County,  followed  by  two  defense  continuances.”10    See 

8  See  531  Jud.  Admin.  Docket  (order)  (Pa.  Mar.  16,  2020);  19th  Judicial 
District, M 2020 (order) (York Co. Mar. 17, 2020); Appellant’s Brief at 35.   
 

On appeal, Appellant does not cite a reason why this period should be 
excluded.    See  Appellant’s  Brief  at  35.    In  her  Rule  600  motion,  however, 
Appellant attributed this period to two defense requests for a trial continuance.  
Appellant’s Motion for Dismissal  Pursuant  to Pa.R.Crim.P.  600, 9/7/21, at 6 
(Rule 600 Motion). 

 See Declaration, 19th Judicial District, 31 MM 2020 (York Co. Oct. 8, 2020). 

0 In her appellate brief, Appellant arrives at the August 9, 2021, adjusted run 
date  by:  (1)  starting  with  the  November  9,  2020,  date;  and  (2)  adding  18 
(Footnote Continued Next Page) 

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Appellant’s Brief at 37; Appellant’s Rule 600 Motion at 7.  Appellant maintains, 

however, the Commonwealth’s July 29th, “last-second filing” of its motion in 

limine  showed  a  lack  of  due  diligence,  especially  where  the  York  County 

Charges  were  filed  years  earlier,  in  2018.    Appellant’s  Brief  at  39,  40.  

Appellant contends: “the Commonwealth never provided any reason for [its] 

11th-hour filing[;]” and “the needlessly belated filing . . . prevented trial from 

[commencing] as scheduled.”  Id. at 39, 41.  We conclude no relief is due. 

We  summarize  that  on  March  16,  2020,  the  Pennsylvania  Supreme 

Court declared a general statewide judicial emergency due to the COVID-19 

pandemic.    The  Court  authorized  President  Judges  to  declare  judicial 

emergencies in their respective judicial districts, and to suspend the operation 

of Rule 600 within their districts.  531 Jud. Admin. Docket (order at 1, 2) (Pa. 

Mar.  16,  2020).    The  following  day,  York  County/19th  Judicial  District 

President  Judge,  the  Honorable  Joseph  Adams,  declared  a  local  judicial 

days — the period from November 2 to 20, 2020.  Appellant’s Brief at 35-36 
(“[T]he  adjusted  run  date  would  be  November  9,  2020,  if  [the  18  days 
between  November  2  and  20,  2020,]  were  included  in  the  Rule  600 
calculations, but would be August 9, 2021 if this period were excluded.”).  This 
calculation,  however,  is  mistaken,  as:  (1)  there  are  273  days  between 
November 9, 2020, and August 9, 2021; and (2) the starting date, November 
9th, falls within the November 2nd to 20th period. 

n the other hand, Appellant’s Rule 600 motion referred to a 273-day 
“additional period of delay,” which resulted from the suspension of jury trials 
in York County, followed by two defense continuances.  Appellant’s Rule 600 
Motion at 7.  We incorporate this argument into our discussion above. 
 

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emergency, and specified the operation of Rule 600 would be suspended for 

the duration.  No. M 2020 (order) (19th Judicial District, Mar. 17, 2020). 

The general statewide judicial emergency ended on June 1, 2020.  See 

531 & 532 Jud. Admin. Docket (order at 1) (Pa. May 27, 2020).  However, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided that local emergencies would continue 

to  remain  in  full  force  and  effect.    Id.    Accordingly,  through  multiple  York 

County orders issued from May of 2020 through April of 2021, the York County 

judicial emergency continued through at least June 30, 2021.11  Pertinently, 

most of these orders specified the operation of Rule 600 would be suspended.  

11  We  note  that  on  February  11,  2021,  the  York  County  President  Judge 
declared the local judicial emergency was extended through June 30, 2021.  
On April 7th, the President Judge issued a declaration extending the judicial 
emergency through September 30th. 
 

On  July  1,  2021,  however,  the  President  Judge  filed  a  “Request  for 
Emergency Judicial Order” with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, requesting, 
inter  alia:  (1)  acknowledgment  of  the  declaration  of  judicial  emergency 
through August 31, 2021; and (2) permission to use advance communication 
technology to conduct court proceedings through August 31, 2021.  On July 
2nd,  the  Supreme  Court  allowed  the  use  of  advanced  communication 
technology through August 31, 2021, but denied relief “[i]n all other respects.”  
No. 31 MM 2020 (order) (Pa. July 2, 2021). 

n  light  of  the  foregoing,  an  issue  could  be  raised  as  to  when  the 
Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court  ceased  to  recognize  or  authorize  a  judicial 
emergency in York County.  We emphasize, however, that Appellant has not 
raised such a question for our review, and thus we do not reach it.  Instead, 
we note the trial court found August 9, 2021, to be the adjusted run date — 
to  which  Appellant  agrees  in  her  alternative  argument.    See  Trial  Ct.  Op., 
1/4/22, at 9; Appellant’s Brief at 37.  We limit our review to the arguments 
presented in her appellate brief. 
 

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February 28, 2021. 

Additionally, declarations, issued November 24, December 9, and December 

21, 2020, and January 7, 2021, stated jury trials would be suspended through 

This  Court  has  had  occasion  to  review  one  such  York  County  order, 

issued May 27, 2020, which stated in pertinent part: 

.  .  .  I  declare  a  judicial  emergency  in  the  19th  Judicial  District 
through August 31, 2020.   During the emergency, the following 
shall apply: 
 

*     *     * 

(3) Suspend statewide rules pertaining to the rule-based 
right of criminal defendants to a prompt trial. 

ny  postponement  caused  by  the  judicial  emergency  shall  be 
considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable 
time for purposes of the application of Rule 600. . . . 
 

Carl, 276 A.3d at 747, quoting No. 31 MM 2020 (order) (19th Judicial District, 

May 27, 2020).  This Court held the plain language of this order “clearly and 

simply  direct[ed]  that  rule-based,  ‘prompt  trial’  time  computations  [were] 

suspended for the duration of the judicial emergency at hand.”  Carl, 276 A.3d 

In light of the foregoing, we disagree with Appellant’s contention that 

the  adjusted  run  date  was  November  9,  2020.    This  argument  ignores  the 

ongoing,  extended  COVID-19  judicial  emergency  that  was  declared  in  York 

County through at least June 30, 2021, along with the specific pronouncement 

that the operation of Rule 600 would be suspended.  See Carl, 276 A.3d at 

 

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at 750. 

750. 

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Accordingly,  we  consider  Appellant’s  alternative  proposed  date  of 

August 9, 2021 — which the trial court found to be the adjusted run date.12  

See  Trial  Ct.  Op.,  1/4/22,  at  9;  Appellant’s  Brief  at  37.    The  trial  court 

reasoned:  the  Commonwealth  had  filed  its  July  29,  2021,  motion  in  limine 

before that date; Appellant’s case was called to trial on August 2nd; but the 

“court decided to postpone the commencement of trial to hear the [motion] 

just three days later on August [5th], which was before the August [9th] run 

date.”  Trial Ct. Op., 1/4/22, at 9.  The court thus found the delay was caused 

by  the  court  itself,  and  not  any  lack  of  due  diligence  on  the  part  of  the 

Commonwealth.  Id. 

The  trial  court’s  reasoning,  however,  does  not  address  Appellant’s 

challenge to the late timing of the Commonwealth’s motion.  See Appellant’s 

Rule 600 Motion at 8 (“There is no valid explanation consistent with diligence 

for why the Motion in Limine could not have been filed and litigated any time 

in  the  past  year.”).    The  assistant  district  attorney’s  representation,  at  the 

August 2, 2021, hearing, that she “came in late to the [case]” and “happened 

to do a Google search” one week earlier, does not explain why prior assigned 

prosecutors  could  not  discover,  with  due  diligence,  Appellant’s  two  criminal 

matters — one of which was in the same county.  See N.T., 8/2/21, at 23. 

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12 This  argument is consistent with  Appellant’s statements at the August 2, 
2021, hearing.  See N.T., 8/2/21, at 15 (Appellant’s counsel stating, “We both 
agree that this case is pushing Rule 600 possibly this week.”). 
 

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Nevertheless, we also consider, as the trial court pointed out, that the 

court conducted a hearing on the motion in limine on August 5, 2021, merely 

three days after the initial call of the case for trial, and still within the adjusted 

run date of August 9th.  The court did not issue a decision until 14 days later, 

on August 30th, and trial commenced one week after that, on September 7th.  

Furthermore, Appellant has not established the timing of the Commonwealth’s 

filing was intentional and undertaken “in an effort to evade [her] fundamental 

speedy  trial  rights.”    See  Carl,  276  A.3d  at  748.    We  must  also  “carefully 

factor . . . the collective right of the community to vigorous law enforcement,” 

an issue that Appellant has not addressed.  See id.  Finally, we observe that 

a  large  portion  of  the  excludable  time  resulted  from  the  COVID-19  judicial 

emergency.    On  balance,  we  decline  to  find  the  trial  court  abused  its 

discretion —  that  it  overrode  or  misapplied  the  law  or  acted  with  partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill will.  See Carl, 276 A.3d at 748.  Accordingly, we do not 

disturb the order denying Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. 

IV.  Admission of Rule 404(b) Prior Bad Acts 

Next, Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting the Rule 404(b) 

evidence of prior bad acts.  We note “the admissibility of evidence is within 

the discretion of the trial court,” and an appellant bears a “heavy burden” to 

show  the  court  abused  its  discretionary  power.    Commonwealth  v.  Saez, 

225 A.3d 169, 177 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted). 

This Court has explained: 

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Rule 404(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provides that 
“evidence  of  other  crimes,  wrongs,  or  acts  is  not  admissible  to 
prove  the  character  of  a  person  in  order  to  show  action  in 
conformity therewith.”  [Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1).]  However, “evidence 
of  other  crimes,  wrongs,  or  acts  may  be  admitted  for  other 
purposes,  such  as  proof  of  motive,  intent,  preparation,  plan,  or 
knowledge . . . .” [Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).]   

herefore,  evidence  of  other  crimes  or  acts  may  be  admitted  if 
such  evidence  proves  “a  common  scheme,  plan  or  design 
embracing commission of two or more crimes so related to each 
other  that  proof  of  one  tends  to  prove  the  others.”    A  common 
scheme  may  be  relevant  to  establish  any  element  of  a  crime, 
where intent may be shown through a pattern of similar acts. 

he degree of similarity is an important factor in determining the 

admissibility of other crimes or bad acts under this exception. 
 

Saez, 225 A.3d at 178 (some citations omitted & paragraph break added). 

Additionally, Rule 404(b)  “evidence  is  admissible only if the probative 

value  of  the  evidence  outweighs  its  potential  for  unfair  prejudice.”    Pa.R.E. 

404(b)(2).  With respect to the common plan exception, 

[r]elevant . . . will be the habits or patterns of action or conduct 
undertaken  by  the  perpetrator  to  commit  crime,  as  well  as  the 
time,  place,  and  types  of  victims  typically  chosen  by  the 
perpetrator.  Given this initial determination, the court is bound 
to engage in a careful balancing test to assure that the common 
plan evidence is not too remote in time to be probative.  . . . 

T]he  court  must  balance  the  potential  prejudicial  impact  of  the 
evidence with such factors as the degree of similarity established 
between  the  incidents  of  criminal  conduct,  the  Commonwealth’s 
need to present evidence under the common plan exception, and 
the  ability  of  the  trial  court  to  caution  the  jury  concerning  the 
proper use of such evidence by them in their deliberations. 
 

Saez, 225 A.3d at 180 (citation omitted & paragraph break added).  Finally, 

we  note,  “In  balancing  the  probative  value  of  the  evidence  against  its 

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(citation omitted). 

prejudicial  impact,  .  .  .  a  trial  court  ‘is  not  required  to  sanitize  the  trial  to 

eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration.’”  Id. at 180-81 

Here, Appellant challenges the admission of the evidence relating to her 

Cumberland County Plea.13  She first claims the trial court “misconceived the 

‘common scheme’ exception,” which she maintains applies to acts that are a 

part  of  the  same  single,  overarching  plan.    Appellant’s  Brief  at  45,  47.  

Appellant  contends  that  while  the  instant  case  and  the  Cumberland  County 

Plea  share  “similarities,”  “they  were  not  part  of  single  plan  or  a  common 

scheme.”  Id. at 47, citing Commonwealth v. Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114, 1143 

(Pa.  2017)  (Donahue,  J.,  dissenting).    Instead,  Appellant  asserts,  the  two 

cases have “glaring differences.”  Appellant’s Brief at 49.  For example, she 

reasons,  in  the  other  case,  she  “took  complete  control  of  [that  victim’s] 

medical  care  and  placement[,]  prevent[ed  her]  family  members  and  others 

from seeing her[,]” and engaged in “a baroque scheme involving the sale of 

properties 

[and] 

thefts  masquerading 

as  donated 

real 

estate 

commissions[.]”14  Id. at 49.  However, the instant charges reflect a “more 

13  Appellant  presents  no  argument  concerning  the  admission  of  the  limited 
evidence pertaining to the York County Charges. 

4  Additionally,  in  the  Cumberland  County  Plea,  as  part  of  the  police 
investigation, an individual wore a wire during a conversation with Appellant.  
See Appellant’s Brief at 49. 
 

  1

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pedestrian  character,”  where  Appellant  allegedly  “acted  as  a  representative 

payee in order to intercept a 48-year-old’s retroactive disability payment and 

use it for her own purposes.”  Id. at 49-50. 

Finally, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding 

the prior bad acts evidence was more probative than prejudicial.  Appellant’s 

Brief at 51.  She contends the evidence against her “was not overwhelming,” 

and  indeed,  “the  jury  never  heard  any  explanation  of  what  did  ultimately 

happen  to  [the  Victim’s]  retroactive  payment[.]”    Id.  at  55.    Furthermore, 

Appellant claims, where testimony about the Cumberland County Plea “took 

up almost 100 pages of” the trial transcript, it produced “a second mini-trial” 

as to those charges.  Id. at 53-54.  No relief is due. 

Here, the trial court found the prior bad acts evidence was admissible 

to establish a common scheme, plan, or design.  In comparing this case to the 

Cumberland County Plea, the court reasoned: 

What this Court finds distinctive is that [Appellant] holds herself 
out to the purported victims and their families, as a lawyer  and 
judge  or  former  judge,  who  created  a  non-profit  organization, 
namely  Mediation  Ministries,  to  assist  the  elderly  and  homeless 
veterans.  [Appellant] persuades the elderly or disabled individual 
to  name  [her]  as  joint  attorney-in-fact  and  then  eventually 
becomes the sole attorney-in-fact with power and control over the 
purported victim’s finances.   
 

Trial  Ct.  Op.,  8/30/21,  at  5.    We  agree  with  the  trial  court  that  Appellant’s 

conduct  in  both  cases  was  “distinctive,”  where  there  were  so  many 

overlapping or identical details.  See id. 

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Furthermore, we disagree with Appellant’s reasoning that the common 

scheme exception applies only to incidents or conduct that is a part of a single 

criminal  act.    See  Appellant’s  Brief  at  47.    In  support,  Appellant  cites  the 

dissenting opinion in Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114, which has no binding authority.  

Instead,  as  stated  above,  evidence  may  be  admitted  under  Rule  404(b)  to 

prove a common scheme, plan, or design: (1) to “establish any element of a 

crime, where intent may be shown through a pattern of similar acts;” or (2) 

to  show  the  perpetrator’s  habits,  patterns  of  action,  or  conduct  “to  commit 

crime, as well as the time, place, and types of victims typically chosen by the 

perpetrator[.]”    Saez,  225  A.3d  at  178,  180.    Indeed,  in  affirming  the 

admission of Rule 404(b) evidence in Hicks, the majority considered that the 

evidence  “present[ed]  a  ‘virtual  signature’  for  purposes  of  proving  common 

scheme, intent and identity.  They are not mere insignificant details of crimes 

of the same class, where there is nothing distinctive to separate them from, 

for example, common street crimes.”  Hicks, 156 A.3d at 1128. 

Finally, we disagree with Appellant’s contention that the trial court erred 

in  finding  the  probative  value  of  the  evidence  outweighed  the  potential  for 

prejudice.    See  Appellant’s  Brief  at  51.    Here,  the  court  found  Appellant’s 

“repeated acts” were relevant to the case.  Trial Ct. Op., 8/30/21, at 7.  As 

stated  above,  a  court  “is  not  required  to  sanitize  the  trial  to  eliminate  all 

unpleasant  facts  from  the  jury’s  consideration.”    Saez,  225  A.3d  at  180.  

Accordingly, we do not disturb the court’s Rule 404(b) ruling. 

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V.  Discretionary Aspects of Sentence 

In her final issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her 

aggregate  sentence  of  two  to  four  years’  imprisonment.    She  avers  the 

imposition  of  consecutive,  aggravated-range  sentences,  where  the  offenses 

were “based on theft of the same money from the same person,” resulted in 

an unduly harsh sentence.  Appellant’s Brief at 58 (Pa.R.A.P. 2119 statement). 

We first consider whether she has properly preserved this issue. 

It is well settled that, with regard to the discretionary aspects of 
sentencing, there is no automatic right to appeal. 
 

.  .  .  To  reach  the  merits  of  a  discretionary  sentencing 
issue, we conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 
whether  appellant  filed  a  timely  notice  of  appeal, 
Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 
modify  sentence,  Pa.R.Crim.P.  720;  (3)  whether 
appellant’s  brief  has  a  fatal  defect,  Pa.R.A.P.  2119(f); 
and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the 
sentence  appealed  from  is  not  appropriate  under  the 
Sentencing Code[.] 

 substantial question will be found where an appellant 
advances  a  colorable  argument  that  the  sentence 
imposed is either inconsistent with a specific provision of 
the  Sentencing  Code  or  is  contrary  to  the  fundamental 
norms  which  underlie  the  sentencing  process.    At  a 
minimum,  the  Rule  2119(f)  statement  must  articulate 
what  particular  provision  of  the  code  is  violated,  what 
fundamental  norms  the  sentence  violates,  and  the 
manner in which it violates that norm. 

  A

 

Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 585-86 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(some  citations  omitted).    Generally,  a  challenge  to  the  imposition  of 

consecutive sentences, as opposed to concurrent, does not raise a substantial 

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question.  Id. at 586, citing Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 612 

(Pa.  Super.  2005).    However,  a  claim,  that  “the  decision  to  sentence 

consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face to 

be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue[,]” may raise a 

substantial question.  Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 587. 

Here,  Appellant  filed  a  timely  post-sentence  motion,  which  raised  the 

issues  she  now  presents,  as  well  as  a  timely  notice  of  appeal.    See 

Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 585.  Additionally, her brief includes a Rule 2119(f) 

concise statement  of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal.   See 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).  The Rule 2119(f) statement relies on Mastromarino and 

avers  the  consecutive  sentences  in  this  case  was  excessive  in  light  of  the 

criminal conduct at issue — namely, that the two theft convictions were “based 

on theft of the same money from the same person[.]”  Appellant’s Brief at 58.   

However, we conclude Appellant has not raised a substantial question 

invoking this Court’s review.  Her Rule 2119(f) statement  fails to “articulate 

what  particular  provision  of  the  [Sentencing  C]ode  is  violated,  what 

fundamental norms the sentence violates, and the manner in which it violates 

that norm.”  See Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 586.  Indeed, nowhere in her brief 

does Appellant address any provision of the Sentencing Code or sentencing 

guidelines.    Furthermore,  we  disagree  that  her  aggregate  two  to  four-year 

sentence was “excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue[.]”  See 

id.  at  585,  587-88  (reviewing  in  detail  the  particular  facts  of  case  in 

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considering  whether  appellant  raised  a  substantial  question  in  challenging 

consecutive imposition of 53 sentences, for aggregate term of 25 to 58 years’ 

imprisonment).    The  trial  court  extensively  addressed  its  reasons  for  the 

sentence: Appellant preyed on elderly individuals, who were unable to manage 

their  finances;  she  gained  access  to  these  victims  through  a  nonprofit 

organization;  her  manipulation,  dishonesty,  and  “egregious  behavior  of 

deceitfully taking substantial amounts of money” “has significantly worsened 

the [Victim’s life] by leaving [him] barely able to financially support [his] basic 

needs[;]” the Victim suffered “financial stress, mental stress, and heartache 

as a result of Appellant’s” conduct; and her “actions have caused substantial 

irreparable harm and ongoing damage to the Victim[.]”  Trial Ct. Op., 1/4/22, 

at 18.  The trial court emphasized that Appellant has not returned the Victim’s 

$23,000 funds “nor provided an explanation of what she has done with that 

money.”  Id. at 3.  We decline to find Appellant’s total sentence of two to four 

years  falls  within  the  “extreme  cases”  where  the  imposition  of  consecutive 

sentences  supports  a  substantial  question.    See  Mastromarino,  2  A.3d  at 

587,  citing  Commonwealth  v.  Dodge,  859  A.2d  771  (Pa.  Super.  2004) 

(appellant did raise substantial question in claiming imposition of consecutive 

sentences,  for  aggregate  58½  to  124  years’  imprisonment,  for  “numerous, 

largely property offenses”).  See also Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 587 (noting 

Dodge’s own acknowledgment that “its decision is not to be read [as a] rule 

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that  a  challenge  to  the  consecutive  nature  of  a  standard  range  sentence 

always raises a substantial question or constitutes an abuse of discretion”). 

As  we  conclude  Appellant  has  failed  to  argue  the  violation  of  any 

particular  Sentencing  Code  provision  and  has  not  raised  a  substantial 

question,  we  do  not  review  the  merits  of  her  sentencing  challenge.    See 

Mastromarino, 2 A.3d at 585. 

VI.  Conclusion 

In  sum,  we  deny  relief  on  Appellant’s  challenges  to  the  denial  of  her 

Pa.R.Crim.P.  600  motion,  the  admission  of  Pa.R.E.  404(b)  prior  bad  acts 

evidence; and the discretionary aspects of her sentence.  We thus affirm the 

judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins the memorandum.  

Judge Kunselman concurs in the result. 

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udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 03/20/2023 

 

 

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