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J-A29034-22  

2023 PA SUPER 43 

IN RE: ESTATE OF KATHRYN V. 
RUHLMAN 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: DIANE C. RUHLMAN 

 No. 642 WDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered May 16, 2022, 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County, 
Orphans' Court at No(s):  No. 2022-098. 

EFORE:  BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J. 

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:  

 

 

     FILED: MARCH 16, 2023 

Diane  C.  Ruhlman,  Administrator  C.T.A.  of  the  Estate  of  Kathryn  V. 

Ruhlman,  appeals  from  the  orphans’  court’s  refusal  to  probate  an  after-

discovered will as untimely.  Upon review, we reverse.  

The orphans’ court made the following findings of fact: 

Petitioner  Diane  C.  Ruhlman  is  the  adult  stepdaughter-in-law  of 
decedent, Kathryn  V. Ruhlman ("Decedent").  Decedent died on 
December 18, 2021.  After Decedent's death, Petitioner gathered 
Decedent's personal effects from her room at Greystone Estates.  
Among  these  personal  effects  was  a  Last  Will  and  Testament 
executed by Decedent on March 23, 1990 ("1990 Will").  Petitioner 
presented the 1990 Will for admission to probate on February 4, 
2022.  Letters of Administration C.T.A. were granted to Petitioner 
by  the  Register  of  Wills  of  Mercer  County,  Pennsylvania  on 
February  4,  2022.    On  March  22,  2022,  Petitioner  discovered 
another Last Will and Testament of Decedent in a safe deposit box 
Decedent  had  at  a  bank,  which  second  Will  was  executed  by 
Decedent on October 25, 2000 ("2000 Will").  The Court finds the 
Petitioner's  testimony  credible.    The  Court  finds  that  Petitioner 
was  unaware  of  the  existence  of  the  2000  Will  until  she  gained 
access to the safe deposit box, and it was inventoried. The Office 
of the Attorney General, appearing parens patriae and contesting 

    A

 

   

 

  B

  

the  petition,  does  not  dispute  the  facts  but  rather  argues  the 
applicable law as discussed below. The petition presently in front 
of the Court [which sought to have the 2000 Will probated instead 
of the 1990 Will] was filed on April 5, 2022, which is 14 days after 
the  discovery  of  the  2000  Will,  and  three  months  and  18  days 
after decedent's death. 

rial Court Opinion, 5/16/22, at 1-2 (formatting altered). 

Notably, in the 1990 Will, Decedent gave all her estate to her husband, 

Carl  V.  Ruhlman,  unless  he  pre-deceased  her,  in  which  case  she  gave  her 

estate  as  follows:    one-third  to  St.  Paul  Homes1  and  two-thirds  to  her 

stepchildren, Faye D. Shaw and Ronald L. Ruhlman in equal shares.  In 1999, 

Decedent’s husband died; she survived him. 

 

In  the  2000  Will,  however,  Decedent  gave  all  her  estate  to  her 

stepchildren, Faye D. Shaw and Ronald L. Ruhlman, per stirpes.  No bequest 

  T

 

was made to St. Paul Homes. 

Ruhlman filed a petition to the orphans’ court to probate the 2000 Will.  

The orphans’ court treated this petition, which was filed directly with the court 

and  not  the  Register  of  Wills,  as  an  appeal  challenging  the  validity  of  the 

previously  probated  1990  Will.    Following  a  hearing,  the  orphans’  court 

concluded  that  the  petition  was  untimely  and  denied  Ruhlman’s  request  to 

probate the after-discovered, 2000 Will. 

J-A29034-22 

____________________________________________ 

1 St. Paul Homes’ interest in this matter is represented by the Attorney General 
of the Commonwealth Pennsylvania.  

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Ruhlman  filed  this  timely  appeal.    Ruhlman  and  the  orphans’  court 

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. 

On appeal, Ruhlman raises the following single issue for our review: 

 

 

When  the  Administrator  [C.T.A.],  61  days  after  probate  of  the 
first-discovered  will,  petitions  under  20  Pa.C.S.  Section  908 
(appeal  from  probate  authorized  if  filed  within  one  year  from 
probate  of  the  earlier  will)  to  probate  a  valid  after[-]discovered 
and later-dated will, does the Orphans' Court err as a matter of 
law by involving 20 Pa.C.S. Section 3138 (register authorized to 
admit to probate a later will when presented within 3 months of 
testator's  death)  and  denying  the  petition  on  the  ground  it  was 
filed  109  days  after  the  decedent's  death,  thereby  frustrating 
testator's intentions as expressed in the later will? 

Ruhlman’s Brief at 5.   

 

Ruhlman argues that the orphans' court committed an error of law by 

applying section 3138 of the Probate Code instead of section 908 in the instant 

matter  and  concluding  that  Ruhlman’s  petition  to  probate  the  after-

discovered,  2000  Will  was  untimely.    By  doing  so,  she  claims  the  court 

thwarted Decedent’s clear intention to revoke her 1990 Will and distribute her 

estate under her 2000 Will, deemed by all as valid in every respect.  Ruhlman’s 

Brief at 8, 10-11.   

Our standard of review in this matter is as follows: 

When  reviewing  a  decree  entered  by  the  Orphans'  Court,  this 
Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error 
and  the  court's  factual  findings  are  supported  by  the  evidence. 
Because the Orphans' Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines 
the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we will not reverse 
its credibility  determinations absent an abuse of that discretion. 
However, we are not constrained to give the same deference to 
any resulting legal conclusions. The Orphans' Court decision will 

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not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion or a 
fundamental error in applying the correct principles of law. 

In  re  Fiedler,  132  A.3d  1010,  1018  (Pa.  Super.  2016)  (citations  and 

quotation marks omitted).  

section 908 provides: 

Two  sections  of  the  Probate  Code  are  relevant  to  this  appeal.    First, 

Any party in interest seeking to challenge the probate of a will or 
who  is  otherwise  aggrieved  by  a  decree  of  the  register,  or  a 
fiduciary  whose  estate  or  trust  is  so  aggrieved,  may  appeal 
therefrom to the court within one year of the decree . . . . 

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a).  

Second, section 3138 provides: 

If  a  later  will  or  codicil  is  submitted  to  the  register  for  probate 
within three months of the testator's death but after the register 
shall have probated an earlier instrument, the register, after such 
notice as he deems advisable, but with at least ten-days' notice to 
the  petitioner  who  presented  the  probated  instrument  if  he  has 
not  requested  probate  of  the  later  will  or  codicil,  shall  have  the 
power  to  open  the  probate  record,  receive  proof  of  the  later 
instrument or instruments and amend his probate record. 

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3138.   

Here,  the  orphans’  court  concluded  that  section  3138  exclusively 

controls the circumstance where another will is submitted for probate after a 

prior  will  has  already  been  probated.    Trial  Court  Opinion,  5/16/22,  at  2.  

Because  Ruhlman  submitted  the  2000  Will  more  than  3  months  after 

decedent’s death, outside the timeframe set forth in section 3138, the court 

concluded  that  Ruhlman’s  petition  was  untimely  and  denied  probate  of  the 

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2000 Will.  The court viewed the deadline as a “hard” or jurisdictional deadline 

which precluded it from acting despite the Decedent’s intent.  It further found 

that there were no extraordinary circumstances present in the case to justify 

probate of the 2000 Will.  Id. at 3.   

In  making  its  decision,  the  orphans’  court  relied  upon  this  Court’s 

decision in In re Estate of Peles, 739 A.2d 1071 (Pa. Super. 1999).  In that 

case, Mary Peles’ 1958 will was probated shortly after her death on May 14, 

1997.  Subsequently, a 1971 codicil was discovered.  Fourteen months after 

Peles died and thirteen months after the 1958 will was probated, a petition to 

probate the 1971 codicil was submitted to the register.  The register deemed 

the petition untimely pursuant to section 3138 and denied admission of the 

codicil  to  probate.    Two  months  later,  petitioners  appealed  to  the  orphans’ 

court, which affirmed the register’s decision.   

On appeal to this Court, the petitioners argued that the time limitations 

in sections 3138 and 908 should be liberally construed to effectuate the intent 

of the decedent.  We rejected this argument and concluded that, because the 

petition was submitted to the register more than 3 months after the death of 

the decedent, the register was bound by the time limit of section 3138 and 

could  not  open  the  probate  record  to  admit  the  later  codicil.    We  therefore 

affirmed the orphans’ court’s decision denying probate of the after-discovered 

will.  We further noted:  

The one-year period for an appeal from probate of a will, provided 
in  Section  908  of  the  Probate  Code,  does  not  govern  the  time 
period  in  which  to  submit  a  later  codicil  for  probate.  The  three-

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J-A29034-22 

month time limit applicable to submission of a later will or codicil 
is found in Section 3138 of the Probate Code. In the instant case, 
Appellants'  appeal  to  the  trial  court  from  the  decree  of  the 
Register,  denying  probate  of  the  later  codicil,  was  timely  under 
Section  908,  as  it  was  filed  within  one  year  of  the  decree. 
However,  Appellants  have  failed  to  explain  their  initial  fourteen 
months' delay in submitting the codicil for probate.  Although their 
appeal may have been timely, Appellants' initial submission of the 
later codicil was not timely. 

Id. at 1074 n. 5. 

Following  the  Peles  decision,  the  Legislature  amended  section  908  in 

2006.  In the Comment to the amended statute, the Legislature explained: 

The addition of the phrase “seeking to challenge the probate of a 
will”  in  subsection  (a)  is  designed  to  preserve  the  intent  of  the 
original  enactments  of  this  section  and  §  3138,  which  was  to 
provide parties in interest with a way to challenge a will that had 
already been probated by the register, including the ability to 
offer a later will or codicil even though the period for the 
register to amend the record under § 3138 has expired.  The 
assertion  in  footnote  five  of  In  re  Estate  of  Peles,  739  A.2d 
1071, 1074 (Pa. Super. 1999) that this section ‘does not govern 
the time period in which to submit a later codicil for probate’ was 
inconsistent with the intent of this section and § 3138, which set 
forth  alternative  and  not  exclusionary  procedures.  It 
brought an unintended result in Schrader Will, 21 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 
197-98  (Orphans'  Ct.  Div.,  Bradford  Ct.  Com.  Pl.  2001).  
Therefore,  the  addition  of  the  phrase  is  intended  explicitly  to 
overrule 
in  Schrader  Will  regarding  such 
interpretation  of  this  section.  Section  3138  was  originally 
enacted  as  an  additional  remedy  to  the  process  under  § 
908.  A petitioner who seeks to amend or challenge a probated 
will may under § 3138 submit a later will or codicil directly to the 
register  within  three  months  of  the  testator's  death.  If  the 
petitioner cannot meet the three-month deadline, the later 
will or codicil may still be admitted if the one-year statute 
of limitations period under § 908 has not yet expired. 

the  holding 

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J-A29034-22 

(emphasis added).   

20  Pa.C.S.A.  §  908  Joint  State  Government  Commission  Comments—2005 

The  Commonwealth,  appearing  parens  patriae  on  behalf  of  St.  Paul 

Homes,  claims  that  this  amendment  did  not  displace  Peles.  It  argues  that 

“the text of [a] statute shall control in the event of a conflict between its text 

and  [any]  comments  or  report”  submitted  by  a  committee  involved  in  the 

drafting of its provision citing the Statutory Construction Act.  It further claims 

that a will must first be presented to the register for review before appealing 

to  the  orphans’  court;  otherwise,  it  constitutes  an  impermissible  collateral 

attack.  Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that this Court is required to 

give effect to both “a general provision in a statute” and “a special provision 

in the same or another statute” if the two appear to conflict.  According to the 

Commonwealth,  the  Peles  court  accomplished  this,  by  recognizing  that 

section 908 and 3138 address different issues.  Commonwealth’s Brief at 20-

21.  We disagree.   

Resolution  of 

this  matter 

involves 

statutory 

interpretation.  

Statutory interpretation is a question of law therefore our standard of review 

is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.  Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 

A.3d 1204, 1211 (Pa. 2013). “In all matters involving statutory interpretation, 

we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et seq., which 

provides  that  the  object  of  interpretation  and  construction  of  statutes  is  to 

ascertain 

and 

effectuate 

the 

intention 

of 

the 

General 

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J-A29034-22 

(citation omitted).   

Assembly.”   Commonwealth  v.  McCoy,  962  A.2d  1160,  1166  (Pa.  2009) 

Generally,  a  statute's  plain  language  provides  the  best  indication  of 

legislative  intent.   Id.   We  will  only  look  beyond  the  plain  language  of  the 

statute  when  words  are  unclear  or  ambiguous,  or  the  plain  meaning  would 

lead to “a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1 

Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1).  Therefore, when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, 

if  the  language  is  clear,  we  give  the  words  their  plain  and  ordinary 

meaning.  Hall, 80 A.3d at 1211.   

Where, however, there is a conflict or ambiguity, we may resort to the 

tools of statutory construction.  See Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 11 A.3d 

960, 965 (Pa. 2011).  In so doing, we keep in mind that such tools are used 

as  an  aid  in  uncovering  the  intent  of  the  Legislature,  which  is  always  the 

objective  in  matters  of  statutory  construction.    See  Commonwealth  v. 

Baker,  690  A.2d  164,  167  (Pa.  1997).    When  interpreting  or  applying  a 

statute, it is appropriate to consider official comments.  1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1939; 

Young v. Kaye, 279 A.2d 759 (Pa. 1971). Lessner v. Rubinson, 592 A.2d 

678,  680  (Pa.  1991).    Furthermore,  when  interpreting  a  statute,  we  must 

presume  that  the  Legislature  did  not  intend  to  produce  “an  absurd  or 

unreasonable result.”  See, e.g., Raymond v. Raymond, 279 A.3d 620, 630 

(Pa. Super. 2022) (citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c)) (further citation omitted).   

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However, before considering the intent of section 908 and its interplay 

with section 3138, a brief history of the statutes and estate  law is helpful to 

our analysis of this case.   

Prior to 1967, the register of wills had no power to revoke the probate 

of a will, i.e., the initial act undertaken to establish a document as a decedent’s 

valid will.  Notably, the register’s act of probate constituted an adjudication or 

judgment that the document submitted was the last will of a decedent.  The 

only procedure for attacking the validity of a will was to appeal from probate 

to  the  orphans’  court.    In  re  Sebik’s  Estate,  150  A.  101  (Pa.  1930);  see 

also Mangold v. Neuman, 91 A.2d 904,  905 (Pa. 1952) (stating  it  is well 

settled  that  the  only  procedure  for  attacking  the  validity  of  a  will  or  codicil 

is by  an  appeal  from  probate).    Thus,  once  the  register  probated  a  will  or 

codicil, no other document could be probated unless the probated will was set 

aside by the orphans’ court on appeal; the register did not have that authority.  

For many years, this was the only procedure to challenge a probated will.  

In 1967, the Legislature enacted section 308 of the Register of Wills Act, 

1967,  Oct.  9,  P.L.  417  §  2,  the  predecessor  of  section  3138,  to  provide  an 

additional procedure for probating a later-discovered will or codicil.  In limited 

circumstances,  the  Legislature  authorized  a  register  to  open  the  probate 

record and set aside a probated will.  Critically, a challenge at the register of 

wills  must  occur  within  3  months  of  the  decedent’s  death,  and  the  register 

must give at least 10 days’ notice to the petitioner who probated the first will 

(if  it  was  a  different  person)  prior  to  amending  the  probate  record.  

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Notwithstanding  this  newly  enacted  statute,  the  procedure  that  existed  for 

years under section 908 and caselaw remained, i.e., an appeal within one year 

to the orphans’ court to set aside a probated will. 

Recognizing the misapplication of section 908 and 3138 after the Peles 

decision,  the  Legislature  then  amended  section  908.    It  added  to  existing 

language  regarding  appeals  to  the  orphans’  court  that  an  interested  party 

“seeking to challenge the probate of a will” could appeal to the orphans’ court.  

Thus, the plain language of the statute clearly permits an individual seeking 

to  challenge  a  document  already  probated  by  the  register  to  appeal  to  the 

orphans’  court  within  the  time  prescribed,  namely  within  one  year  of  the 

decree.  The additional language clarifies that the appeal process in section 

908  may  still  be  used  as  a  means  to  challenge  a  probated  will  or  codicil 

contrary to Peles, and in addition to the procedure set forth in section 3138.2 

The  Comment  to  section  908  confirms  this  and  clearly  explains  the 

Legislature’s intent behind the 2006 amendment, which is consistent with the 

body  of  the  statute  and  prior  law  as  explained  above.    Specifically,  the 

Comment  indicates  that  the  General  Assembly  intended  to  change  existing 

____________________________________________ 

2 The applicability of Peles to this case is questionable for two reasons.  First, 
at  the  time  of  Peles,  section  908  did  not  include  this  additional  language.    
Thus,  the  Peles  court  did  not  consider  the  same  version  of  section  908.  
Second, we observe that the footnote in Peles is dicta.  The only issue before 
the Peles court was whether the later-discovered codicil, which was found 14 
months  after  the  original  will  was  probated,  was  submitted  timely  to  the 
register.    Peles  did  not  consider  whether  a  later-discovered  codicil  or  will, 
which was found within the one-year time period from the time the original 
will was probated, could be submitted to the orphans’ court for approval. 

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caselaw which precluded a petitioner from submitting a later-discovered will 

or codicil to probate if it was not submitted to the register within three months 

of  the  decedent’s  death.    It  further  explained  that  section  3138  is  not  an 

exclusive procedure but rather was enacted to provide an alternative method 

for having a later-discovered will or codicil probated.  As such, the Comment 

specifically provides that a later-discovered will or codicil may be submitted 

directly to the orphans’ court for probate so long as it is presented within a 

year of the previously probated will.  

Our interpretation adheres to the rules of statutory construction, which 

allows  us  to  consider  the  Comment  to  the  statute.    Contrary  to  the 

Commonwealth’s argument, the statute and comment do not conflict.  Indeed, 

we  would  be  remiss  to  ignore  such  a  blatant  statement  of  the  Legislature’s 

intent.    When  the  General  Assembly  acts  to  make  clear  that  a  court's 

interpretation is inconsistent with its legislative intent, we should follow the 

guidance  of  the  Legislature  and,  where  possible,  amend  earlier  erroneous 

interpretations.  See Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 722 A.2d 657, 661 n. 3 

(Pa. 1998) (“actions undertaken in subsequent sessions of the Legislature are 

relevant in interpreting a statute which was passed in a previous session of 

the Legislature.”).   

Further,  we  would  reach  an  “unreasonable  result,”  which  the  rules 

require us to avoid, if we read section 908 in a way that prevents the clear 

intent of a decedent from being realized.  It is logical that the Legislature did 

not  intend  to  severely  shorten  the  time  in  which  an  interested  party  could 

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present an after-discovered will or codicil for probate when it enacted section 

3138, an alternative means to probate a second will or codicil.  It also makes 

sense that the Legislature would limit  the time frame for the register to set 

aside a previously probated will (i.e., 3 months) and keep greater authority 

with the orphans’ court to do so (i.e., 1 year) given the foregoing history.3   

 

Consequently, we conclude that an interested party, pursuant to section 

908 of the Probate Code, may present a later-discovered will or codicil directly 

to the orphans’ court for probate as an appeal to set aside a prior will,  as long 

as the petition is filed within a year of the original probate.   Based upon our 

interpretation of the relevant statutes, we further conclude that the orphans’  

court erred in applying section 3138 of the Probate Code instead of section 

908 in this case when it denied Ruhlman’s request to probate the 2000 Will.  

Decedent’s 1990 Will was probated on February 4, 2022, and Ruhlman filed 

her petition seeking probate of the 2000 Will on April 5, 2022.  This filing was 

well within the one-year time frame set forth in section 908.  Accordingly, we 

reverse  the  orphans’  court’s  order  denying  Ruhlman’s  request  to  probate 

Decedent’s 2000 Will and remand to the orphans’ court for further proceedings 

in accordance with this opinion. 

____________________________________________ 

3  We  note  that  this  procedure  is  comparable  to  the  procedure  relating  to 
default  judgments.    Initially,  a  default  judgment  may  be  entered  by  the 
prothonotary after the requisite 10-day notice is given.  However, in order to 
have it opened, a petition must be presented to the court; the matter is not 
reconsidered  and  resolved  by  the  prothonotary,  but  instead,  such  petition 
must be presented to the court of common pleas.   

 

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Order reversed.  Remanded with instructions.  Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/16/2023 

 

    J

  D

 

J-A29034-22 

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