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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

JAMES D. HOLLAND AND SANDRA C. 
HOLLAND 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

 

 

 

Appellants 

ARTSOCKS CUSTOM CABINETS 

AND HOME IMPROVEMENTS LLC AND 
CHARLES T. HARTSOCK, III       

 No. 1655 MDA 2021 

Appeal from the Order Entered December 9, 2021 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Civil Division at 
No(s):  2020-00902 

EFORE:   DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: 

FILED:  MARCH 17, 2023 

Hartsocks  Custom  Cabinets  and  Home  Improvement  LLC  (“LLC”)  and 

Charles T. Hartsock, III (“Hartsock”), (collectively, “Appellants”), appeal from 

the order denying their petition to open and/or strike a default judgment and 

granting  James  D.  Holland  and  Sandra  C.  Holland’s  (collectively,  the 

“Hollands”)  motion  for  attorney’s  fees.  We  affirm  the  portion  of  the  order 

denying  the  petition  and  quash  the  appeal  from  the  portion  of  the  order 

granting attorney’s fees.  

According to the Hollands’ complaint, in September 2019, the Hollands 

hired  the  LLC  to  renovate  their  kitchen.  Hartsock  solely  owns  the  LLC  and 

serves  as  its  primary  employee.  The  Hollands  paid  Appellants  a  deposit  of 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

     

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the work.  

$3,000, and the work was to be completed by early November 2019. However, 

the  project  was  delayed  and  in  December  2019,  Appellants  left  the  project 

while it was still incomplete. The Hollands hired a different contractor to finish 

On January 2, 2020, the Hollands filed a civil complaint against both the 

LLC  and  Hartsock,  individually,  in  magisterial  district  court.  The  magisterial 

district judge found in favor of the Hollands and awarded them damages, plus 

fees and costs, in the amount of $2,986.47. 

 

On  July  30,  2020,  the  LLC  filed  a  notice  of  appeal  of  the  magisterial 

district court’s judgment to the Court of Common Pleas of Huntington County. 

The  Prothonotary  issued  a  rule  to  file  a  complaint.  The  Hollands  filed  a 

complaint against Appellants on August 20, 2020, naming both the LLC and 

Hartsock  as  separate  defendants.  The  Hollands  served  the  complaint  upon 

Appellants by sending a single copy, addressed to both the LLC and Hartsock 

in  a  cover  letter,  to  their  joint  address  of  record  via  First  Class  Mail.  Their 

addresses of record were set forth in the magisterial district court case record 

and were the same for both the LLC and Hartsock, namely 2764 Lincoln Way 

West, Suite 3, Chambersburg, PA 17202. In addition to the damages originally 

sought  in  the  magisterial  district  court  case,  the  Hollands’  complaint  also 

asserted a claim for attorney’s fees, raising the total damages to $4,795.72. 

 

Appellants failed to file an answer to the complaint. The Hollands sent a 

notice of intention to take default judgment on October 7, 2020 to Appellants 

via First Class Mail at their joint address of record. The Hollands sent a single 

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copy of the notice to Appellants, addressed to both the LLC and Hartsock in a 

cover letter. The notice itself bore a caption naming both the LLC and Hartsock 

as  separate  defendants.  Appellants  failed  to  respond.  The  Hollands  filed  a 

praecipe  to  enter  default  judgment  and  the  Prothonotary  entered  a  default 

judgment  against  Appellants  on  February  1,  2021,  in  the  amount  of 

$4,795.72.  

 

Approximately seven months later, the Hollands attempted to execute 

on their judgment by having a sheriff’s sale scheduled for August 27, 2021. 

Appellants filed an emergency motion to stay the execution of judgment the 

day  before  the  sheriff’s  sale,  which  was  granted.  On  September  8,  2021, 

Appellants  filed  a  petition  to  open  and/or  strike  the  default  judgment.  The 

court heard argument on the petition and denied it on December 9, 2021. In 

its order denying the petition, the court also granted the Hollands’ motion for 

attorney’s fees. The court ordered the Hollands to submit an itemized list of 

their attorney’s fees within 14 days of the date of the order so the court could 

determine  the  appropriate  amount  of  fees.  However,  Appellants  filed  the 

instant appeal before the court had the opportunity to rule on the amount of 

fees.1  

____________________________________________ 

1  Although  orders  denying  petitions  to  open/strike  default  judgments  are 
interlocutory,  they  are  immediately  appealable  as  of  right.  See  Pa.R.A.P. 
311(a)(1); Keller v. Mey, 67 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa.Super. 2013). Therefore, although 
the issue of the determination of the amount of attorney’s fees is outstanding, 
the portion of the order denying Appellants’ petition to open and/or strike is 
appealable as of right. 

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Appellants raise the following issues: 

1.  Did  the  trial  court  err,  as  a  matter  of  law,  by  excusing 
violations of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding service 
of documents through the application of Pa. R. Civ. P. 126 
and denying Appellants’ petition to strike default judgment? 

2.  Did the trial court err by denying Appellants’ petition to 
open default judgment? 

3.  Did  the  trial  court  err  by  awarding  attorney  fees  to 
Appellees  when  Appellants  did  not  act  in  a  manner 
supporting fees under 42 Pa. C.S.[A.] § 2503, no findings of 
fact  were  made  by  the  trial  court  as  to  the  awarding  of 
attorney  fees,  and  the  trial  court  1925  opinion  does  not 
identify a single section of § 2503(7) or § 2503(9) to which 
the parties’ conduct would support a fee award? 

Appellants’ Br. at 9. 

Opening  and  striking  a  judgment  are  different  remedies  subject  to 

different  standards.  “A  petition  to  strike  a  judgment  is  a  common  law 

proceeding which operates as a demurrer to the record.”  Resolution Trust 

Corp. v. Copley Qu-Wayne Assocs., 683 A.2d 269, 273 (Pa. 1996) (citation 

omitted).  “A  petition  to  strike  a  judgment  may  be  granted  only  for  a  fatal 

defect  or  irregularity  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  record.”  Id.  (citation 

omitted). “When deciding if there are fatal defects on the face of the record 

for the purposes of a petition to strike a judgment, a court may only look at 

what  was  in  the  record  when  the  judgment  was  entered.”  Cintas  Corp.  v. 

Lee’s Cleaning Servs., Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. 1997). On appeal, “our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” U.S. Bank 

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n.9 (Pa.Super. 2017). 

Nat'l Ass'n for Pa. Hous. Fin. Agency v. Watters, 163 A.3d 1019, 1028 

“A  petition  to  open  a  default  judgment  is  an  appeal  to  the  equitable 

powers of the court.” Smith v. Morrell Beer Distribs., Inc., 29 A.3d 23, 25 

(Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted). We review an order ruling on a petition 

to open a default judgment for “a manifest abuse of discretion or error of law.” 

Id. (citation omitted). A default judgment may be opened when the moving 

party  has:  “(1)  promptly  filed  a  petition  to  open  the  default  judgment,  (2) 

provided  a  reasonable  excuse  or  explanation  for  failing  to  file  a  responsive 

pleading, and (3) pleaded a meritorious defense to the allegations contained 

in the complaint.” Myers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 986 A.2d 171, 175-76 

(Pa.Super. 2009). The failure to satisfy any one prong of this test will result 

in denial of the petition to open. Watters, 163 A.3d at 1028.  

Appellants  first  claim  the  court  erred  in  denying  the  petition  to  strike 

because there is a fatal defect on the face of the record. Appellants point out 

that  the  Hollands  served  only  one  copy  of  the  complaint  and  subsequent 

documents, including the notice of intention to take default judgment, to both 

Appellants. They assert the Rules of Civil Procedure require service upon each 

defendant  individually  and  the  trial  court  improperly  excused  the  allegedly 

improper  service  of  the  default  notice  by  reference  to  Rule  126.  Appellants 

thus argue the judgment should have been stricken.  

The  procedures  for  appealing  a  judgment  from  a  magisterial  district 

court  are  set  forth  in  the  Pennsylvania  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  Governing 

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Actions and Proceedings Before Magisterial District Judges. Under Rule 1002, 

an  aggrieved  party  has  30  days  after  the  date  of  the  entry  of  judgment  to 

appeal  from  that  judgment  “by  filing  with  the  prothonotary  of  the  court  of 

common pleas a notice of appeal[.]” Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1002(A). Thereafter, if 

the appellant was the defendant in the action before the magisterial district 

judge, as in the instant case, the appellant “shall file” with the notice of appeal 

“a praecipe requesting the prothonotary to enter a rule as of course upon the 

appellee to file a complaint within twenty (20) days after service of the rule 

or suffer entry of a judgment of non pros.” Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1004(B).  

Then, pursuant to Rule 1005, “[t]he party filing a complaint under Rule 

1004 shall forthwith serve it upon the opposite party in the appeal by leaving 

a copy for or mailing a copy to the address as shown in the magisterial district 

court  records[.]”  Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J.  1005(D).  “The  address  of  the  appellee  for 

the purpose  of service shall be  the address as listed on the  complaint form 

filed in the office of the magisterial district judge or as otherwise appearing in 

the records of that office.” Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1005(A). 

Here,  the  record  reflects  that  the  Hollands  sent  via  First  Class  Mail  a 

cover  letter  addressed  to  both  Appellants,  along  with  one  copy  of  the 

complaint. The complaint clearly captioned both Appellants as defendants in 

the action. The complaint was mailed to Appellants’ address set forth in the 

magisterial  district  court  records  –  2764  Lincoln  Way  West,  Suite  3, 

Chambersburg, PA 17202 – which was the same address for both Appellants. 

Appellants do not dispute that this address was their address of record. Rule 

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1005  only  requires  that  the  complaint  be  served  at  the  opposite  party’s 

address  of  record.  The  Hollands  did  just  that.  The  Hollands  thus  properly 

served the complaint upon Appellants.  

Appellants  similarly  claim  the  default  judgment  should  be  stricken 

because a single notice of the intention to take default judgment was mailed 

to  both  Appellants,  instead  of  being  sent  to  each  Appellant  individually. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.1(a) provides: 

(2) No judgment of non pros for failure to file a complaint 
or  by  default  for  failure  to  plead  shall  be  entered  by  the 
prothonotary  unless  the  praecipe  for  entry  includes  a 
certification  that  a  written  notice  of  intention  to  file  the 
praecipe was mailed or delivered 

(ii) in the case of a judgment by default, after the failure 
to plead to a complaint and at least ten days prior to the 
date  of  the  filing  of  the  praecipe  to  the  party  against 
whom  judgment  is  to  be  entered  and  to  the  party’s 
attorney of record, if any. 

(4) The notice and certification required by this rule may not 
be waived. 

Pa.R.C.P. 237.1(a)(2)(ii), (4).  

Here, the Hollands complied with the letter of the rule. Rule 237.1 on its 

face does not require separate notice (or prohibit joint notice). The Hollands 

mailed  their  notice  of  intention  to  take  default  judgment  to  the  address  of 

record  for  both  Appellants,  and  the  caption  in  the  notice  clearly  listed  both 

Appellants  as  parties.  Appellants,  once  again,  do  not  dispute  that  they 

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of record.  

received the notice or that the address to which it was sent was their address 

Moreover, even if the Hollands were required to send two copies of the 

notice,  under  the  doctrine  of  substantial  compliance,  the  trial  court  may 

“overlook  any  procedural  defect  that  does  not  prejudice  a  party’s  rights.” 

Womer  v.  Hilliker,  908  A.2d  269,  276  (Pa.  2006)  (citation  omitted) 

(emphasis removed); see also Pa.R.C.P. 126 (“The court at every stage of 

any such action or proceeding may disregard any error or defect of procedure 

which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties”). Appellants do not 

allege they suffered any harm or were prejudiced in any way by receiving only 

one copy of the notice, instead of two. The trial court here did not find waiver, 

which  Rule  237.1(a)(4)  prohibits,  but  rather  found  the  allegedly  improper 

service excused as not affecting any party’s substantial rights. Thus, we agree 

with  the  trial  court’s  determination  that  no  fatal  defect  or  irregularity  was 

apparent on the face of the record. Accordingly, this claim fails. 

Appellants next argue the court erred in denying their petition to open 

judgment.  They  claim  they  had  a  reasonable  excuse  for  failing  to  file  a 

responsive pleading and promptly filed the petition when they learned of this 

lawsuit. Hartsock testified at his deposition that after judgment was entered 

in the magisterial district court, he entrusted his former assistant to “handle” 

the matter. N.T. Deposition of Charles T. Hartsock, III, 10/13/21, at 42-43. 

He stated that his assistant filed the instant appeal and that he was not aware 

that she filed it. Id. at 41, 51-52. He also said he did not realize that he was 

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personally a defendant in the magisterial district court case, and he thought 

the judgment was entered against only the LLC. Id. at 17-18.  

Hartsock further testified that his assistant received the complaint, the 

notice of intention to take default judgment, and the entry of default judgment 

at the Lincoln Way West address as part of her standard duties, but she never 

brought these filings to his attention and instead filed them in the LLC’s regular 

business records. Id. at 19-20, 63-64, 80-81. Hartsock asserted he did not 

learn that a judgment had been entered against him until the sheriff arrived 

at his house to issue a sheriff’s sale notice in August 2021. Id. at 13-14. He 

stated he then looked at his business files and found the documents. Id. at 

64.  Hartsock  testified  he  hired  an  attorney  within  one  week  of  locating  the 

filings. Id. at 14-15, 71-72.  

Appellants  also  argue  they  set  forth  meritorious  defenses  to  the 

complaint. They note there is no cause of action properly pled against Hartsock 

in his individual capacity and there are no allegations suggesting that piecing 

the corporate veil is appropriate. Appellants’ Br. at 36, 39. Appellants further 

aver the LLC did not breach the contract and the delay in the kitchen project 

was caused by the Hollands.  

The court found Appellants failed to satisfy the first two prongs of the 

test  for  opening  a  default  judgment.  It  determined  the  petition  was  not 

promptly  filed  and  Appellants’  explanation  for  failing  to  file  a  responsive 

pleading was not reasonable. Trial Ct. Op. at 20-21.  

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Regarding  the  first  prong  of  the  test  for  opening  a  default  judgment, 

“[t]he timeliness of a petition to open a judgment is measured from the date 

that  notice  of  the  entry  of  the  default  judgment  is  received.”  Digital 

Communications Warehouse, Inc. v. Allen Investments, LLC, 223 A.3d 

278,  285  (Pa.Super.  2019)  (citation  omitted).  The  law  does  not  establish  a 

specific time within which a petition to open a judgment must be filed to qualify 

as timely. Rather, it directs the court to consider the length of time between 

discovery of the entry of the default judgment and the reason for the delay. 

Id. at 285-86. “In cases where the appellate courts have found a ‘prompt’ and 

timely filing of the petition to open a default judgment, the period of delay has 

normally been less than one month.” US Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 

986, 995 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

Here,  the  default  judgment  was  entered  on  February  1,  2021. 

Appellants’ petition to open and/or strike the default judgment was filed on 

September 8, 2021, approximately seven months later. Accordingly, we agree 

with the trial court that this was not a prompt filing, and therefore, we discern 

no abuse of discretion on the first prong. 

As to the second prong, “[w]hether an excuse is legitimate is not easily 

answered  and  depends  upon  the  specific  circumstances  of  the  case.  The 

appellate courts have usually addressed the question of legitimate excuse in 

the context of an excuse for failure to respond to the original complaint in a 

timely fashion.” Mallory, 982 A.2d at 995 (citations omitted). 

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court stated: 

In  concluding  Appellants  did  not  provide  a  reasonable  explanation  for 

failing  to  file  a  responsive  pleading,  the  court  found  Hartsock’s  attempt  to 

blame his assistant for failure to respond not credible. Trial Ct. Op. at 18. The 

If  Defendant  Hartsock  is  to  be  believed,  he  engaged  [his 
secretary] to serve as attorney for both himself and the LLC, 
and relied on her to litigate [Appellants’] appeals before this 
[c]ourt  with  no  meaningful  oversight  whatsoever.  .  .  .[I]t 
defies  belief  that  any  business  owner  would  have  his 
secretary serve as his attorney. Even assuming, arguendo, 
that this is precisely what occurred, such an act is patently 
unreasonable, and was taken by Defendant Hartsock, acting 
on behalf of himself and the LLC, at his own peril.  

Id. at 19 (footnote omitted). The court also rejected Hartsock’s claim that he 

was unaware he was personally a defendant in the magisterial district court 

action because he participated in that case and the notice of entry of judgment 

clearly showed judgments entered against him and the LLC separately. Id. at 

17-18.  

We find no abuse of discretion.  Appellants failed to offer a reasonable 

excuse for their inaction. According to Hartsock’s testimony, he designated his 

assistant to “handle” this matter. Although he claims that she did not bring 

the  complaint  or  the  notice  of  intention  to  take  default  judgment  to  his 

attention, he admitted that they were filed in the LLC’s business records, which 

were readily accessible to him. See N.T. Hartsock Depo. at 64. Appellants also 

failed  to  produce  the  assistant  as  a  witness  or  offer  any  other  evidence  to 

support their claim. See Dominic’s Inc. v. Tony's Famous Tomato Pie & 

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Restaurant,  Inc.,  214  A.3d  259,  270  (Pa.Super.  2019)  (stating  that  the 

petitioning  party  in  a  default  judgment  bears  the  burden  of  producing 

sufficient evidence to substantiate its claims). Moreover, the LLC is a corporate 

entity,  not  a  layperson,  and  should  have  had  in  place  the  proper  means  to 

monitor  its  legal  claims.  See  Kelly  v.  Siuma,  34  A.3d  86,  94  (Pa.Super. 

2011); Myers, 986 A.2d at 178. We agree with the court that the facts in this 

case do not amount to an oversight, an unintentional omission, or a mistake 

that would permit the opening of the default judgment. See Flynn v. Am. W. 

Airlines, 742 A.2d 695, 699 (Pa.Super. 1999). Rather, any harm suffered by 

Appellants was the result of Hartsock’s decision to delegate responsibility for 

the matter to a non-lawyer, without supervision or follow-up. Thus, Appellants’ 

argument fails.2 

In  their  final  issue,  Appellants  claim  that  the  court  erred  in  awarding 

attorney’s fees to the Hollands. Since the trial court has not yet determined 

the amount of attorney’s fees, the portion of the order granting the Holland’s 

motion for attorney’s fees is not a final order because the order did not dispose 

of  all  claims  as  required  by  Pa.R.A.P.  341(b)(1).  We  therefore  quash  that 

portion of the appeal as interlocutory. 

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2  Since  we  find  that  Appellants  failed  to  satisfy  the  “prompt  filing”  and 
“reasonable excuse” prongs, we do not address their argument regarding the 
“meritorious defense” prong. See Siuma, 34 A.3d at 94. 

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Appeal  from  that  portion  of  the  order  denying  Appellants’  petition  to 

open and/or strike is affirmed. Appeal from that portion of the order granting 

attorney’s fees is quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/17/2023 

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