NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

             

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v. 

 

 

OSALIO SUCHITE       

 

Appellant 

 No. 1588 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 6, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County  
Criminal Division at No(s):  CP-09-CR-0000028-2021 

EFORE:  PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: 

FILED MARCH 16, 2023 

Rosalio  Suchite  brings  this  appeal  from  the  judgment  of  sentence 

following  his  convictions  for  involuntary  deviate  sexual  intercourse  with  a 

child.  He  is  attempting  to  reverse  his  designation  as  a  Sexually  Violent 

Predator (“SVP”) and to obtain resentencing for his judgment of sentence that 

he is alleging is excessive. We affirm. 

In 2019, Suchite and his wife traveled with their two young sons from 

Guatemala to the United States. In May 2020, Suchite moved into a separate 

residence, where both of his sons visited him until September 2020. The boys 

disclosed  that  during  the  visits  Suchite  repeatedly  sexually  abused  them. 

Investigators were contacted and Suchite was arrested in November 2020. He 

was  charged  with  two  counts  each  of  Rape  of  a  Child,  Involuntary  Deviate 

Sexual  Intercourse  with  a  Child,  Aggravated  Indecent  Assault  of  a  Child, 

     

    R

   

 

 

  B

   

  

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Aggravated Indecent Assault — Complainant is less than 13 years of age, and 

Indecent Assault — Complainant is less than 13 years of age. 

On August 27, 2021, Suchite entered a counseled, open guilty plea to 

two  counts  of  Involuntary  Deviate  Sexual  Intercourse  with  a  Child,  and  the 

Commonwealth  nolle  prossed  the  remaining  charges  as  part  of  the  plea 

agreement.  The  trial  court  ordered  the  preparation  of  a  presentence 

investigative  report  (“PSI”)  and  an  assessment  by  the  Pennsylvania  Sexual 

Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”) for a determination of whether Suchite 

fits the criteria of an SVP. 

On  April  6,  2022,  the  trial  court  conducted  an  SVP  hearing  and  a 

sentencing  hearing.  At  the  SVP  portion  of  the  hearing  the  Commonwealth 

presented the report and detailed testimony of Kristen F. Dudley, Psy.D. (“Dr. 

Dudley”), a licensed clinical psychologist and member of the SOAB since 2016. 

Suchite  presented  testimony  from  Barry  Zakireh,  Ph.D.,  a  licensed  clinical 

psychologist and former member of the SOAB. At the conclusion of the SVP 

hearing, the court determined that the Commonwealth had met its burden of 

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Suchite should be classified 

as an SVP. Immediately after the trial court reached its SVP conclusion, the 

court  sentenced  Suchite  to  serve  an  aggregate  term  of  incarceration  of 

nineteen to forty years. 

 

Suchite filed a timely post-sentence motion seeking reconsideration of 

his  sentence.  The  trial  court  held  a  hearing  and  denied  relief.  This  timely 

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appeal followed. Both Suchite and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.  Suchite  now  presents  issues  challenging  whether  the  Commonwealth 

properly established that he is an SVP and whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in fashioning his judgment of sentence. 

 

Suchite  first  argues  the  trial  court  erred  in  finding  that  he  is  an  SVP. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 15-22. Suchite contends the Commonwealth failed to 

present clear and convincing evidence to support the finding. Suchite claims 

Dr.  Dudley’s  testimony  did  not  establish  “that  [Suchite]  has  an  increased 

likelihood  of  reoffense.”  Id.  at  19.  He  further  alleges  that  “[t]he 

Commonwealth’s own expert concedes that, with the treatment which he is 

required to receive as a condition of this sentence, [Suchite] will no longer be 

likely to reoffend.” Id. at 20. We disagree. 

When  considering  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  support  an  SVP 

designation, we apply the following standard of review: 

In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court, 
must  be  able  to  conclude  that  the  fact-finder  found  clear  and 
convincing  evidence  that  the  individual  is  an  SVP.  As  with  any 
sufficiency  of  the  evidence  claim,  we  view  all  evidence  and 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  We  will  reverse  a  trial  court’s  determination  of 
SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and 
convincing  evidence  that  each  element  of  the  statute  has  been 
satisfied. 

ommonwealth  v.  Hollingshead,  111  A.3d  186,  189  (Pa.  Super.  2015) 

  C

(citation and brackets omitted). 

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SORNA1 defines an SVP as an individual who has been convicted of one 

of  the  enumerated  offenses,  and  “who  is  determined  to  be  a[n  SVP]  under 

section  9799.24  (relating  to  assessments)  due  to  a  mental  abnormality  or 

personality disorder  that  makes  the  individual  likely to engage in  predatory 

sexually  violent  offenses.”  42  Pa.C.S.A.  §  9799.12.  Further,  an  act  is 

considered  “predatory”  under  SORNA  if  it  is  “directed  at  a  stranger  or  at  a 

person with whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained 

or promoted, in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.” 

Id. 

Section  9799.24(a)  of  SORNA  provides  that  “a  court  shall  order  an 

individual  convicted  of  a  sexually  violent  offense  to  be  assessed  by  the 

[SOAB].”  42  Pa.C.S.A.  §  9799.24(a);  see  also  id.  §  9799.12  (defining 

sexually violent offense). Following the entry of such an order, the SOAB is 

responsible for conducting an assessment to determine whether the individual 

should  be  classified  as  an  SVP.  Id.  §  9799.24(b).  The  assessment  must 

consider the following fifteen factors: 

whether the instant offense involved multiple victims; whether the 
defendant exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense; 
the  nature  of  the  sexual  contact  with  the  victim(s);  the 
defendant’s relationship with the victim(s); the victim(s)’ age(s); 
whether the instant offense included a display of unusual cruelty 
by  the  defendant  during  the  commission  of  the  offense;  the 
victim(s)’  mental  capacity(ies);  the  defendant’s  prior  criminal 
record; whether the defendant completed any prior sentence(s); 

____________________________________________ 

1 SORNA stands for Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41. 

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whether  the  defendant  participated  in  available  programs  for 
sexual  offenders;  the  defendant’s  age;  the  defendant’s  use  of 
illegal drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental illness, 
behavioral 
mental 
characteristics that contribute to the defendant’s conduct; and any 
other  factor  reasonably  related  to  the  defendant’s  risk  of 
reoffending. 

abnormality; 

or  mental 

disability, 

ollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190 (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

  H

9799.24(b)(1)-(4). After the SOAB completes its assessment, the trial court 

holds a hearing to “determine whether the Commonwealth has proved by clear 

and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n SVP].” Id. § 9799.24(e)(3). 

 

Here,  the  trial  court  stated  that  “the  Commonwealth  clearly  and 

convincingly met its burden of establishing that [Suchite] met the statutory 

criteria  to  be  classified  as  an  SVP  pursuant  to  Pennsylvania  statutory  and 

decisional law.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/22, at 19. Our review of the record 

agrees with this observation. 

 

During the SVP hearing, Dr. Dudley offered detailed testimony regarding 

her  assessment  of  Suchite.  Addressing  the  initial  seven  factors,  Dr.  Dudley 

noted that this matter involved multiple victims, Suchite did not exceed the 

means  necessary  to  achieve  the  offenses,  the  nature  of  the  sexual  contact 

was sodomy to the point of ejaculation, the relationship between Suchite and 

the victims was significant because he is their biological father, and the age 

of the victims, 7 and 4 years old, is significant because they are too young to 

engage in sexual activity with anyone. See N.T., 4/6/22, at 11-13. These five 

assessment factors suggest an SVP classification. See id. at 19. The remaining 

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two factors offer some mitigation as Dr. Dudley observed that there was no 

unusual cruelty displayed during the commission of the crimes and, aside from 

their ages, the victims were of normal mental capacity. See id. at 13. 

 

Dr. Dudley also addressed the three factors pertaining to Suchite’s prior 

offense history. She noted that Suchite has no known criminal history.  See 

id. at 13-14. Regarding completion of prior sentences, Dr. Dudley observed 

that because Suchite lacked a known criminal history, the completion of prior 

sentences was not a relevant factor. See id. at 14. Dr. Dudley further stated 

that,  in  relation  to  participation  in  sexual  offender  programs,  “[b]ecause 

[Suchite] has no criminal history and no criminal history of sexually offending, 

there was no legal reason for him to have attended treatment of any kind.” 

See id. 

 

The next four factors concern the characteristics of the individual being 

assessed. Dr. Dudley offered testimony reflecting upon Suchite’s age of 28 at 

the  time  of  the  report  and  its  relevance  because  “literature  suggests  that 

defendants under the age of 30 at the time of the arrest and conviction have 

a  statistically  greater  risk  of  reoffense  compared  to  older  defendants.”  Id. 

Also,  one  of  the  victims  reported  that  Suchite  smoked  marijuana,  but  it  is 

unknown  whether  Suchite  was  using  any  illegal  drugs  at  the  time  of  the 

offenses. See id. at 15. Further, Dr. Dudley discussed Suchite’s mental illness, 

disability,  or  abnormality  with  a  detailed  explanation  concerning  how  she 

reached the diagnosis of  Pedophilic Disorder, incest only.  See id. at 15-17. 

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Dr.  Dudley  also  noted  that,  based  on  the  information  that  she  had  it  was 

unknown what behavioral characteristic contributed to Suchite’s conduct. See 

id. at 16. In addition, Dr. Dudley explained that,  in  reaching the diagnosis, 

factors considered to be important included the age of the victims, the three-

year  span  over  with  the  abuse  occurred,  the  fact  that  Suchite  warned  the 

victims not to tell anyone. See id. at 16-17. 

 

Finally, Dr. Dudley offered the following to support her opinion that there 

is  an  increased  risk  of  Suchite  reoffending:  “By  virtue  of  the  diagnosis  of 

Pedophilic Disorder, by virtue of having acted upon it, … he is at higher risk of 

reoffending. There is hope that, … if he receives treatment that he will be able 

to learn to manage his impulses, … control his deviate sexual impulses, but at 

present there is no known cure and he remains a risk.” Id. at 18. Dr. Dudley’s 

testimony, viewed as a whole, was sufficient to support a finding that Suchite 

is an SVP. 

 

Nevertheless,  Suchite  highlights  Dr.  Dudley’s  concession  that,  “with 

treatment …, Suchite will no longer be likely to reoffend.” Appellant’s Brief at 

20. However, that is a misrepresentation of the above-cited testimony offered 

by  Dr.  Dudley.  Rather,  Dr.  Dudley  opined  that  “[t]here  is  hope”  treatment 

could  assist  Suchite  in  learning  to  “manage  his  impulses”  and  “control  his 

deviate  sexual  impulses.”  Dr.  Dudley’s  “hope”  is  not  a  concession  that 

treatment will result in Suchite being no longer likely to reoffend. 

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J-S40006-22 

 

In  addition,  Dr.  Dudley  offered  an  assessment  concerning  whether 

Suchite demonstrated predatory behavior. She stated, “[Suchite] engaged in 

anal sex with both of his biological children beginning when they were 5 and 

4-years old, [respectively]. He sodomized them on many different occasions 

when they would visit him at his home. He engaged in sexual activity with his 

children  –  when  [Suchite]  engaged  in  sexual  activity  with  his  children,  he 

exploited his relationship with them in whole or in part for the purpose of his 

own  sexual  gratification.”  Id.  at  19.  As  the  trial  court  opined,  “[Suchite’s] 

actions  toward  his  children  unquestionably  meet  the  definition  of  predatory 

behavior for the purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. Section 9799.12.” Trial Court Opinion, 

8/5/22, at 21. Consequently, Dr. Dudley ultimately offered her opinion that 

Suchite “does meet [the] criteria to be classified as a[n SVP].” Id. at 19. 

Upon  review,  we  conclude  that  the  evidence  presented  at  the  SVP 

hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports 

the  trial  court’s  finding  that  Suchite  should  be  classified  as  an  SVP.  See 

Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 189. As the trial court observed,  

Dr.  Dudley  provided  clear  and  convincing  testimony  as  to 
not  only  [Suchite’s]  mental  abnormality,  but  also  as  to  the 
presence  of  predatory  behavior.  Her  conclusions  were  wholly 
supported  not  only  by  the  evidentiary  record,  but  by  common 
sense  as  well.  Accordingly,  [the  trial  court]  found  that  the 
Commonwealth  clearly  and  convincingly  met  its  burden  of 
establishing that [Suchite] suffers from a mental abnormality, and 
that  he  engaged  in  predatory  behavior.  [Suchite]  therefore 
undeniably meets the criteria to be classified as an SVP pursuant 
to Pennsylvania statutory and decisional law. 
 

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Trial  Court  Opinion,  8/5/22,  at  22.  We  may  not  disturb  the  trial  court’s 

credibility determinations on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909 

A.2d  315,  320  (Pa.  Super.  2006)  (stating  that  “[i]t  is  not  for  this  Court  to 

overturn  the  credibility  determinations  of  the  fact-finder.”).  Further,  our 

review confirms that Dr. Dudley’s testimony, which was credited by the trial 

court, was sufficient to support her conclusion. Accordingly, we cannot grant 

Suchite relief on this issue. 

 

Suchite last argues that the trial court erred in fashioning his sentence. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 23-29. Suchite claims the trial court failed to consider 

his  rehabilitative  needs,  history  and  character,  such  as  his  troubled 

upbringing, when it imposed a sentence that was excessive and unduly harsh. 

See id. at 27. Further, he alleges that the court only relied upon the nature 

of the offense and other improper factors, such as family incidents involving 

behavior  for  which  Suchite  had  never  been  charged.  See  id.  at  27-29. 

Accordingly, he asserts that the trial court failed to consider pertinent factors 

in forming his sentence. 

Our  standard  of  review  is  one  of  abuse  of  discretion.  Sentencing  is  a 

matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence 

will  not  be  disturbed  on  appeal  absent  a  manifest  abuse  of  discretion.  See 

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

It is well settled there is no  absolute right to appeal the discretionary 

aspects of a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805 

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2007). 

Super. 2010): 

(Pa.  Super.  2006).  Rather,  where  an  appellant  challenges  the  discretionary 

aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a petition for allowance 

of appeal. See Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super. 

As  we  observed  in  Commonwealth  v.  Moury,  992  A.2d  162  (Pa. 

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 
must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test: 

We  conduct  a  four-part  analysis  to  determine:    (1) 
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, 
see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was 
properly  preserved  at  sentencing  or  in  a  motion  to 
reconsider  and  modify  sentence,  see  Pa.R.Crim.P. 
720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, 
Pa.R.A.P.  2119(f);  and  (4)  whether  there  is  a 
substantial question that the sentence appealed from 
is  not  appropriate  under  the  Sentencing  Code,  42 
Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation and brackets omitted). 

 

Here, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met. Suchite 

brought an appropriate appeal, filed a post-sentence motion, and included in 

his appellate brief the necessary concise statement of the reasons relied upon 

for  allowance  of  appeal  pursuant  to  Pa.R.A.P.  2119(f).  We  next  determine 

whether  he  has  raised  a  substantial  question  requiring  us  to  review  the 

discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed. 

 

Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about the 

appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-by-case 

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basis.  See  Commonwealth  v.  Kenner,  784  A.2d  808,  811  (Pa.  Super. 

2001).  As  to  what  constitutes  a  substantial  question,  this  Court  does  not 

accept  bald  assertions  of  sentencing  errors.  See  Commonwealth  v. 

Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, an appellant must 

show  actions  by  the  trial  court  inconsistent  with  the  Sentencing  Code  or 

contrary  to  the  fundamental  norms  underlying  the  sentencing  process.  See 

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735, 737 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

 

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Suchite argues the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to consider certain mitigating factors, including Suchite’s 

family  history,  age  and  rehabilitative  needs,  when  it  imposed  an  unduly 

excessive aggregate sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 23-24. This Court has 

held that an assertion that a sentence was excessive and that the trial court 

failed  to  properly  consider  the  factors  set  forth  in  42  Pa.C.S.A.  §  9721(b)2 

raises  a  substantial  question.  See  Commonwealth  v.  Caldwell,  117  A.3d 

763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). See also Commonwealth v. Raven, 

97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “an excessive sentence 

claim—in  conjunction  with  an  assertion  that  the  court  failed  to  consider 

mitigating factors—raises a substantial question”) (internal citation omitted). 

____________________________________________ 

2  The  factors  to  be  considered  under  42  Pa.C.S.A.  §  9721(b)  include:  the 
protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and 
community, and rehabilitative needs of the  defendant.    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 
9721(b). 

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We therefore grant permission to appeal and proceed to review the merits of 

this issue of Suchite’s sentencing claim. 

 

In  his  brief,  Suchite  argues  that  the  trial  court  “did  not  give  any 

consideration  to  the  [Suchite’s]  character,  history  or  condition  but  focused 

solely  on  the  nature  of  the  crimes.”  Appellant’s  Brief  at  27.  Specifically, 

Suchite offers the following concerning his troubled history and upbringing: 

[Suchite] grew up in Guatemala where he had no formal education 
and  was  forced  to  work  as  a  child.  N.T.  4/6/22,  p.  74-75. 
Throughout  his  testimony,  [Suchite]  repeatedly  expressed 
remorse  for  his  actions.  [Suchite]  is  a  young  man  with  no  prior 
criminal  record.  Id.  at  77.  Furthermore,  [Suchite]  presented 
testimony regarding his traumatic upbringing. He described a long 
history  of  childhood  abuse  and  indicated  that  his  stepfather 
abused both [Suchite] and his mother and ultimately tried to kill 
[Suchite]. (N.T. 4/6/22, p. 74). 

d. at 26. To further elaborate on his traumatic past, Suchite refers to his own 

  I

testimony at the sentencing hearing pertaining to witnessing his stepfather’s 

killing at the hands of a gang. See id. at 27. 

 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing 

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse 

of  discretion.  See  Fullin,  892  A.2d  at  847.  In  this  context,  an  abuse  of 

discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.  See id. Rather, an 

appellant must establish by reference to the record that the sentencing court 

ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, 

prejudice,  bias,  or  ill  will,  or  arrived  at  a  manifestly  unreasonable  decision. 

See id. 

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J-S40006-22 

 

The  sentencing  judge  has  broad  discretion  in  determining  the  proper 

penalty, and this Court accords the sentencing court great deference, as it is 

the  sentencing  court  that  is  in  the  best  position  to  view  a  defendant’s 

character, displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference and the overall effect 

and nature of the crime.  See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 

(Pa. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). As we have stated, “a court is 

required  to  consider  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  offense  and  the 

character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “In particular, the court should refer to the 

defendant’s  prior  criminal  record,  his  age,  personal  characteristics  and  his 

potential for rehabilitation.” Id. (citation omitted). 

 

In addition, “[o]ur Supreme Court has determined that where the trial 

court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is  presumed that the court is 

aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where 

the  court  has  been  so  informed,  its  discretion  should  not  be  disturbed.”  

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1988)). 

 

Our  review  of  the  record  reflects  that,  and  it  is  undisputed  that,  at 

Suchite’s  sentencing,  the  trial  court  received  and  reviewed  a  presentence 

report, considered argument from defense counsel, heard Suchite’s allocution, 

and  received  argument  from  the  Commonwealth.  Prior  to  announcing  the 

judgment of sentence, the trial court detailed its reasoning for imposing the 

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sentence,  which  included  a  thorough  discussion  of  the  relevant  sentencing 

factors and evinced an understanding of Suchite’s history and a full grasp of 

the  crimes  related  to  these  convictions.  See  N.T.,  4/6/22,  at  81-88.  In 

addition,  the  trial  court  stated  the  following  at  the  hearing  addressing 

Suchite’s post-sentence motion: “I certainly gave great consideration to the 

sentence before I imposed it, believe me, great consideration to it. And as I 

stated on April 6th, I read the PSI report a number of times, I reviewed the 

facts, and I gave great thought to all the factors [that] we, as a [c]ourt, are 

required to balance when imposing sentence. It’s very rare that I’ve imposed 

anything close to a maximum sentence, truthfully, but it was appropriate in 

this case, unfortunately.” N.T., 5/19/22, at 12. 

 

In its written opinion, the trial court offered the following summation to 

support the sentence imposed: 

relevant 

The notes of testimony from [Suchite’s] Sentencing Hearing 
and  Reconsideration  Hearing  demonstrate  that  this  [c]ourt 
considered  all 
factors  during  sentencing,  and 
appropriately  fashioned  a  balanced  sentence  based  on  those 
factors.14  While  we  recognize  that  [Suchite]  arguably  exhibited 
some degree of remorse for his actions and acknowledged that his 
actions  affected  his  children,  this  alone  failed  to  substantially 
ameliorate  many  of  the  other,  more  pertinent  factors  presented 
for  this  Court’s  consideration.  Simply  stated,  [Suchite]  took 
advantage  of  his  own  young  vulnerable  children  and  violently 
sexually  abused  them  for  his  own  gratification  while  knowing  it 
was wrong to do so. 

 

14 As described in the recent Superior Court decision 
in  Commonwealth.  v.  Velez,  273  A.3d  6  (Pa.  Super. 
2022), we did not solely consider the severity of the 
crimes. We evaluated a variety of mitigating and other 

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sentencing 
rehabilitative needs. 

factors, 

including 

[Suchites’s] 

rial Court Opinion, 8/5/22, at 14-15. 

We conclude the reasons the trial court offered for the sentence imposed 

were more than sufficient to conclude that the court properly considered all 

relevant factors in fashioning Suchite’s sentence. Also, because the trial court 

had been fully informed and relied upon the presentence report, we conclude 

the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  creating  the  instant  sentence. 

Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1133. Accordingly, Suchite’s claim that the trial court 

failed to consider the appropriate factors in imposing the sentence lacks merit. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/16/2023 

  T

 

  J

    J

  D

   

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