NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

             

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v. 

 

 

RIK BURNELL WILLIAMS       

 

Appellant 

 No. 1533 MDA 2021 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2021 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at 
No(s):  CP-01-CR-0000851-2020 

EFORE:   BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* 

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:               FILED: MARCH 21, 2023 

 

Erik  Burnell  Williams  appeals  from  the  judgment  of  sentence  of  two 

years of probation, which was imposed after the trial court convicted him of 

driving under the influence (“DUI”) of a schedule I controlled substance and 

DUI of a metabolite of a schedule I controlled substance.  We affirm. 

 

At  approximately  two  a.m.  on  February  3,  2020,  Pennsylvania  State 

Police  (“PSP”)  Troopers  Matthew  Kile  and  Justin  Horan  were  patrolling  in  a 

marked SUV in Adams County, Pennsylvania, when they observed a Chevrolet 

Avalanche vehicle traveling approximately one-half mile ahead of them.  See 

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 3/18/21, at 7.  The troopers increased their speed 

to  ten  miles  per  hour  above  the  posted  speed  limit  until  they  reduced  the 

distance  between  their  vehicle  and  the  Avalanche  to  approximately  two  or 

____________________________________________ 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

     

    E

   

 

 

  B

  

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three car lengths, allowing them to read the other automobile’s license plate.  

The officers continued to follow the Avalanche while they submitted the tag to 

their database to ensure the vehicle was properly registered and  that there 

were  no  outstanding  warrants  or  other  issues  with  the  owner.    Once  the 

Avalanche came into view, what happened subsequent was captured by the 

mobile  vehicle  recorder  (“MVR”)  on  the  PSP  vehicle.    See  Commonwealth 

Exhibit  1  (capturing  the  initial  driving  portion  of  the  interaction);  see  also 

Commonwealth  Exhibit  2  (audio  and  video  recording  containing  sound  and 

video of the remainder of the encounter between the troopers and Appellant).   

Approximately  one-tenth  of  a  mile  later,  the  Avalanche  signaled  and 

pulled over to the side of the road.   The troopers continued driving a short 

distance before stopping their vehicle  to await completion of their database 

search.    Seconds  later,  the  troopers  observed  the  Avalanche  proceed  past 

them.    Since  their  inquiry  was  still  in  progress,  the  troopers  reentered  the 

highway and continued to follow the Avalanche, though this time at a greater 

distance.  Almost immediately, the vehicle signaled and pulled into the parking 

lot of the Oxford Township municipal building.  Finding it “highly unusual” that 

a vehicle would pull over twice in such a short period of time without being 

directed to do so, the officers also entered the parking lot.  N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 3/18/21, at 11.  The troopers parked their SUV to the left rear of the 

Avalanche without  activating their lights  or sirens.  This positioning allowed 

the Avalanche multiple points of egress from the parking lot.   

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The  troopers  approached  the  vehicle  in  a  marked  uniform  with  a 

flashlight.  Id. at 13.  Upon reaching the driver’s side window, the troopers 

observed Appellant yelling into his cellular telephone that he had pulled into 

the  municipal  parking  lot  of  his  own  volition  because  the  police  were 

“harassing” him.  See Commonwealth Exhibit 2 (“So I pulled over and then 

they pulled over and then I pulled into the municipal building . . . well they 

didn’t pull me over.  They don’t have their lights on.  They are just fucking 

here  harassing  me  pretty  much.”).    Noticing  that  Appellant’s  speech  was 

slurred,  Trooper  Kile  asked  Appellant  if  he  had  his  license  on  him  and  if 

“everything was alright.”  Id.  Appellant confirmed that he had his license and 

explained  that  he  had  pulled  over  because  the  officers  were  “flying  up  on 

[him.]”    Id.    Recognizing  Appellant’s  constricted  pupils,  Trooper  Kile  asked 

whether  Appellant  had  recently  imbibed  any  drugs  or  alcohol.    Appellant 

denied  ingesting  any  such  substances  and,  again,  accused  the  troopers  of 

harassing him.  The troopers briefly returned to their vehicle with Appellant’s 

license.   

 

When Trooper Kile reapproached the Avalanche, he observed Appellant 

still on his cellular phone reiterating that the police had not pulled him over.  

Id.  Realizing that Trooper Kile was standing next to him, Appellant  stated, 

for the first time, that he would like to go home.  Trooper Kile responded that 

he would need to check Appellant’s pupils before he could allow him to leave, 

since  his  speech  was  slurred.    After  unsuccessfully  attempting  to  complete 

field  sobriety  testing  with  Appellant  still  seated  in  the  vehicle,  Trooper  Kile 

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asked Appellant to exit the vehicle.  Appellant asked the person on the other 

end of the phone to come to the municipal building immediately because he 

was being harassed.  Appellant then exited the vehicle and engaged in a brief 

scuffle  with  the  troopers.    Afterwards,  Appellant  remained  agitated  but 

complied  with  their  requests  to  complete  multiple  field  sobriety  tests.    The 

scene further devolved when Appellant’s brother appeared.  Once additional 

troopers arrived on scene, Appellant was placed under arrest and transported 

to Hanover Hospital where he consented to a blood draw.  The results revealed 

that Appellant’s blood contained the active component and the metabolites of 

marijuana, a schedule I substance.  Appellant produced a valid Pennsylvania 

medical marijuana card.  Based on the foregoing, Appellant was charged with 

DUI  of  a  schedule  I  controlled  substance  and  DUI  of  the  metabolites  of  a 

controlled substance.   

 

On October 16, 2020, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion seeking 

suppression  of  the  evidence.    Appellant  argued  that  the  initial  parking  lot 

interaction was not a mere encounter because the troopers initiated the stop 

by following Appellant’s vehicle at a high rate of speed.  See Omnibus Pretrial 

Motion,  10/16/20,  at  ¶  37.    Since  the  police  had  forced  him  off  the  road, 

Appellant contended that he did not feel free to leave the parking lot or decline 

their requests for his identification.  Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.  Accordingly, Appellant 

averred  that  he  was  subjected  to  an  investigatory  detention  without  the 

requisite reasonable suspicion and all evidence derived from the stop should 

be suppressed.  Id. 

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J-A23008-22 

 

On  March  18,  2021,  the  suppression  court  held  a  hearing  on  the 

suppression motion.  After confirming that Appellant only wished to challenge 

the legality of the initial encounter in the municipal building parking lot, the 

court  allowed  the  Commonwealth  to  present  the  testimony  of  the  troopers, 

who  detailed  their  interaction  with  Appellant  as  described  above.    See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 3/18/21, at 4.  The Commonwealth also submitted the 

MVR  recordings  which  captured  the  entire  event.    Appellant  testified  in 

contrast to the troopers, claiming that he was forced to pull over the first time 

because  the  officers  were  travelling  at  a  high  rate  of  speed  and  had  nearly 

collided with his rear bumper.  Id. at 34-35.  While Appellant conceded that 

the police never employed their lights or sirens to initiate a stop, he contended 

that his second roadway exit was, again, due to the police “forc[ing] me off 

the road because they were driving too fast.”  Id. at 41.  At the conclusion of 

the hearing, the suppression court took the matter under advisement so that 

it could review the MVR recordings and the parties could provide memoranda 

of law supporting their positions. 

 

After 

receiving  post-hearing  briefs 

from  Appellant  and 

the 

Commonwealth,  the  suppression  court  issued  an  order  denying  the  motion 

and authored  an opinion in which it rendered  the necessary  findings of fact 

and  conclusions  of  law.    Specifically,  the  suppression  court  credited  the 

troopers’  testimony,  while  rejecting  Appellant’s  claims  that  the  officers 

initiated a de facto traffic stop by forcing him off the road.  The suppression 

court reasoned that Appellant’s testimony was not corroborated by the MVR 

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recordings, which demonstrated that the officers never came within two car 

lengths of Appellant’s vehicle and had not attempted to initiate a traffic stop 

of  Appellant.    See  Suppression  Court  Opinion,  3/30/21,  at  4.    Since  the 

troopers did not activate emergency lights to stop the vehicle, position their 

vehicle in a manner that blocked Appellant’s exit, brandish weapons, display 

a show of force, or make any threats or commands, the court concluded that 

the troopers’ initial interaction with Appellant was a mere encounter which did 

not implicate any federal or state constitutional consequences.  Id. at 5-6.   

 

Relying  on  the  testimony  from  the  suppression  hearing,  Appellant 

proceeded  to  a  stipulated  non-jury  trial  before  a  different judge.    Appellant 

sought  dismissal  of  both  DUI  charges  due  to  his  possession  of  a  valid 

prescription for a medical marijuana card.  See N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 4/26/21, 

at 2.  The court denied the motion, explaining that having a medical marijuana 

card is not a valid defense to metabolite DUI since the subsections charged 

prohibited  operating  a  vehicle  with  any  amount  of  a  schedule  I  controlled 

substance  in  the  driver’s  blood  and  marijuana  was  listed  as  a  schedule  I 

controlled substance.  Id. at 3.  Afterwards, the court found Appellant guilty 

of both DUI charges.   

 

On  February  26,  2021,  Appellant  proceeded  to  sentencing.    The  trial 

court  sentenced  Appellant  for  DUI  of  a  schedule  I  controlled  substance  to 

twenty-four  months  of  probation  with  one  hundred  eight  days  of  restrictive 

DUI conditions.  The court also ordered Appellant to pay a $1,500 mandatory 

fine  and  court  costs.    Finally,  Appellant  received  a  mandatory  license 

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suspension  of  sixty  days.    The  DUI  charge  pertaining  to  the  marijuana 

metabolites merged for sentencing purposes.  Appellant did not pursue post-

sentence motions.  Instead, this timely appeal followed.  Both Appellant and 

the trial court complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.   

 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

.  Whether the [suppression] court erred in its order of March 
30,  2021  denying  Appellant’s  pretrial  motion  to  suppress 
evidence due to lack of reasonable suspicion to effectuate a 
stop of Appellant’s vehicle? 

.  Whether  the  evidence  was  insufficient  to  support  a 
conviction under 75 [Pa.C.S.] § 3802 §§ D1 DUI: Controlled 
Substance – Schedule I when Appellant is a lawful user of 
medical marijuana, no marijuana was found on Appellant’s 
person or vehicle and there was no evidence presented at 
trial that Appellant was impaired? 

  1

  2

 

Appellant’s brief at 4 (cleaned up). 

 

In his first claim, Appellant argues that the court erred when it denied 

his suppression motion due to a lack of reasonable suspicion to effectuate a 

stop of his vehicle.  See Appellant’s brief at 7.  Preliminarily, we note that, 

[a]n appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge 
to  the  denial  of  a  suppression  motion  is  limited  to  determining 
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 
the  record  and  whether  the  legal  conclusions  drawn  from  those 
facts  are  correct.    Because  the  Commonwealth  prevailed  before 
the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 
a  whole.    Where  the  suppression  court’s  factual  findings  are 
supported  by  the  record,  the  appellate  court  is  bound  by  those 
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are 
erroneous.    Where  the  appeal  of  the  determination  of  the 
suppression  court  turns  on  allegations  of  legal  error,  the 

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up). 

suppression  court’s  legal  conclusions  are  not  binding  on  an 
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 
court properly applied the law to the facts.  Thus, the conclusions 
of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review. 
 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned 

Both  the  United  States  and  Pennsylvania  Constitutions  provide 

coterminous protections against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”  See 

Interest of T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 418 (Pa. 2021).  The law recognizes three 

distinct levels of interaction between police officers and citizens:  (1) a mere 

encounter, (2) an investigative detention, and (3) a custodial detention.  See 

Commonwealth  v.  Mackey,  177  A.3d  221,  227  (Pa.Super.  2017).    Our 

Supreme  Court  has  reiterated  the  requirements  that  distinguish  the 

classifications of contacts between the police and the citizenry as follows: 

The  first  is  a  mere  encounter,  sometimes  referred  to  as  a 
consensual encounter, which does not require the officer to have 
any suspicion that the citizen is or has been engaged in criminal 
activity.  This interaction also does not compel the citizen to stop 
or respond to the officer.  A mere encounter does not constitute a 
seizure, as the citizen is free to choose whether to engage with 
the officer and comply with any requests made or, conversely, to 
ignore  the  officer  and  continue  on  his  or  her  way.    The  second 
type  of  interaction,  an  investigative  detention,  is  a  temporary 
detention of a citizen.  This interaction constitutes a seizure of a 
person,  and  to  be  constitutionally  valid  police  must  have  a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.   The third, a 
custodial detention, is the functional equivalent of an arrest and 
must be supported by probable cause.  A custodial detention also 
constitutes a seizure. 

o  bright  lines  separate  these  types  of  [interactions],  but  the 
United States Supreme Court has established an objective test by 
which  courts  may  ascertain  whether  a  seizure  has  occurred  to 

  N

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elevate the interaction beyond a mere encounter.  The test, often 
referred  to  as  the  “free  to  leave  test,”  requires  the  court  to 
determine whether, taking  into account all of  the circumstances 
surrounding  the  encounter,  the  police  conduct  would  have 
communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty 
to  ignore  the  police  presence  and  go  about  his  business.  
[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his 
freedom to walk away, [the officer] has “seized” that person. 
 

Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa. 2019).  Whether 

a seizure has occurred is a question of law involving a plenary scope of review.  

See Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1006 (Pa. 2012).  

 

When  initially  evaluating  the  level  of  interaction  between  law 

enforcement and a citizen to determine whether, and at what point, a seizure 

may have occurred, “courts conduct an objective examination of the totality 

of the surrounding circumstances.”  Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 

302 (Pa. 2014).  Relevant factors of that analysis include, but are not limited 

to:  “the number of officers present during the interaction; whether the officer 

informs  the  citizen  they  are  suspected  of  criminal  activity;  the  officer’s 

demeanor and tone of voice; the location and timing of the interaction; the 

visible  presence  of  weapons  on  the  officer;  and  the  questions  asked.”  

Commonwealth  v.  Luczki,  212  A.3d  530,  543  (Pa.Super.  2019)  (internal 

quotation marks omitted).  Importantly, a seizure does not occur when officers 

“merely approach a person in public and question the individual or request to 

see  identification”  so  long  as  the  officer  does  not  imply  that  the  citizen  is 

required to comply with their request.  See Lyles, supra at 303.   

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Appellant contends that the troopers had no legal authority to approach 

his parked vehicle and ask for identification because there was no evidence 

that he needed assistance or had violated any traffic laws.   See Appellant’s 

brief  at  9.    In  his  view,  the  troopers  forced  a  traffic  stop  when  they  twice 

approached his vehicle at a high rate  of speed.   Thus, the troopers needed 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot before approaching the 

vehicle and requesting his identification.  Id. at 9-10.  We disagree.  

We find our Supreme Court’s decision in Au, supra instructive.  In Au, 

a  police  officer  was  conducting  a  routine  patrol  in  the  early  morning  hours 

when he observed a vehicle parked at a closed business establishment.  Id. 

at 1003.  Finding this occurrence unusual, the officer pulled into the parking 

lot  and  positioned  his  vehicle  at  an  angle  relative  to  the  parked  vehicle  to 

illuminate the passenger side without blocking the vehicle’s ability to exit or 

activating his emergency lights.  Id.  The officer approached on foot with a 

flashlight, observed six occupants, and watched the defendant roll down his 

window.    The  officer  asked  the  defendant  “what’s  going  on[?]”  and  the 

defendant responded we are just “hanging out.”   Id.   After  asking whether 

the occupants were eighteen years of age and receiving a negative response, 

the officer asked the defendant for his identification.  The defendant opened 

the glove compartment, revealing two baggies of marijuana.   There was no 

evidence of any criminal activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code prior 

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to the defendant opening the glove compartment.  A subsequent search of the 

vehicle uncovered additional illegal drugs.   

Following  the  defendant’s  arrest,  he  sought  to  suppress  the  drug 

evidence, alleging that the interaction amounted to an investigative detention 

unsupported by reasonable suspicion.  The trial court suppressed the evidence 

and an en banc panel of this Court affirmed that ruling.  See Commonwealth 

v.  Au,  986  A.2d  864  (Pa.Super.  2009)  (en  banc).    However,  our  Supreme 

Court reversed, holding that the police officer’s interaction with the defendant 

amounted to a mere encounter, explaining as follows:   

In the present case, the arresting officer’s unrebutted testimony 
indicates  that  he  did  not:    activate  the  emergency  lights  on  his 
vehicle[;]  position  his  vehicle  so  as  to  block  the  car  that  [the 
defendant] was seated in from exiting the parking lot[;] brandish 
his weapon; make intimidating movement or overwhelming show 
of  force;  make  a  threat  or  a  command;  or  speak  in  an 
authoritative tone. . . . In terms of the use of the arresting officer’s 
headlights  and  flashlight  this  was  in  furtherance  of  the  officer’s 
safety,  and  we  conclude  it  was  within  the  ambit  of  acceptable, 
non-escalatory factors. . . .  

ursuant to governing Fourth Amendment law, we hold that the 
arresting officer’s request for identification did not transform his 
into  an  unconstitutional 
encounter  with  [the  defendant] 
investigatory detention. 
 

  P

Id. at 1008-09. 

Our own review of the MVR recordings reveals the similarities between 

Au  and  this  case.    Herein,  the  troopers  did  not  travel  at  an  extraordinary 

speed, tailgate Appellant, activate their emergency lights and sirens, or make 

any  other  show  of  force  that  would  convey  to  a  reasonable  person  in 

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Appellant’s position that he needed to exit the roadway.  Instead, the troopers 

maintained  a  safe  distance  during  the  short  time  that  they  were  behind 

Appellant’s vehicle on a public roadway.  See also Suppression Court Opinion, 

3/30/21, at 2-4.  Since Appellant exited and parked in the municipal building 

lot of his own volition, his decision to do so did not create a traffic stop that 

required reasonable suspicion.  Critically, as in Au, the troopers parked their 

vehicle perpendicular to Appellant’s vehicle without blocking his ability to exit 

the lot and approached to ask questions targeting Appellant’s well-being and 

identification.    Although  Appellant  repeatedly  accused  the  troopers  of 

harassing  him,  he  acknowledged  that  he  pulled  over  without  being  stopped 

and provided his license without evincing a desire to terminate the interaction.   

Given  the  totality  of  the  circumstances  in  this  case,  Appellant’s  initial 

interaction  with  the  troopers  constituted  a  mere  encounter.    We  cannot 

conclude  that  a  reasonable  person  would  have  thought  they  were  being 

restrained  when  a  police  vehicle  drove  behind  them  on  a  roadway  or  when 

two  officers  approached  that  vehicle,  which  was  parked  at  a  closed 

establishment,  to  inquire  about  the  operator’s  well-being.    Thus,  consistent 

with  Au,  Appellant  was  not  seized  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourth 

Amendment  to  the  United  States  Constitution  or  Article  1,  Section  8  of  the 

Pennsylvania  Constitution  when  he  pulled  into  the  municipal  parking  lot  or 

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during the initial interaction that occurred there.  Therefore, Appellant is not 

entitled to any relief on his first issue.1 

In  his  second  claim,  Appellant  contends  that  the  Commonwealth 

presented insufficient evidence to establish that he had a Schedule I substance 

or  the  metabolite  of  Schedule  I  substance  in  his  blood,  because  “medical 

marijuana”  is  not  a  Schedule  I  controlled  substance  in  Pennsylvania.    See 

Appellant’s brief at 10-14.   

Our scope and standard of review when considering challenges to the 

sufficiency of the evidence are well settled: 

____________________________________________ 

1 To the extent Appellant’s argument that he “did not engage in any conduct 
that would suggest to the police that he needed assistance” can be construed 
as  an  assertion  that  the  community  caretaking  exception  to  the  warrant 
requirement  does  not  apply,  we  note  that  this  claim  is  waived  due  to 
Appellant’s failure to raise  it before the suppression  court.   See  Appellant’s 
brief at 9; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are 
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).  However, even if 
properly preserved, Appellant would not be entitled to relief.  The community 
caretaking  exception  applies  only  where  a  seizure  has  occurred,  providing 
police  with  the  necessary  reasonable  suspicion  to  justify  an  investigative 
detention.  See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Schneider, 239 A.3d 161, 170-71 
(Pa.Super. 2020) (finding the community caretaking exception did not allow 
the police to enter a home without a warrant to further investigate whether 
assistance  was  required  where  nothing  in  the  defendant’s  demeanor, 
statements, outward appearance, or condition indicated that he needed police 
assistance); see also, e.g. Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 
637 (Pa. 2017) (finding that the trooper’s warrantless seizure of the defendant 
to  ascertain  if  she  needed  help  was  not  permitted  under  the  community 
caretaking  doctrine  because  the  facts  did  not  establish  that  the  defendant 
actually needed assistance). Herein, the only  portion of the interaction that 
Appellant challenged amounted to a mere encounter.  Thus, the troopers did 
not  need  to  possess  reasonable  suspicion  and  the  community  caretaking 
exception is inapplicable.   

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Because  a  determination  of  evidentiary  sufficiency  presents  a 
question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope 
of review is plenary.  In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 
we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient 
to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  
[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 
need not preclude every possibility of innocence.  It is within the 
province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded 
to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the 
evidence.  The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 
every  element  of  the  crime  by  means  of  wholly  circumstantial 
evidence.  Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh 
the  evidence  and  substitute  our  judgment  for  that  of  the  fact-
finder. 
 

Commonwealth  v.  Williams,  176  A.3d  298,  305–06  (Pa.Super.  2017) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The  Medical  Marijuana  Act  (“MMA”)  permits  qualifying  individuals  to 

lawfully  consume  marijuana.    See  35  P.S.  §§  10231.101–10231.2110.  

Notwithstanding this, the list of Schedule I controlled substances set forth in 

the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) currently includes marijuana.  See 35 

P.S.  §  780-104(1)(iv).    Critically,  the  applicable  portion  of  the  DUI  statute 

states: 

(d)  Controlled  Substances.  –  An  individual  may  not  drive, 
operate  or  be  in  actual  physical  control  of  the  movement  of  a 
vehicle under any of the following circumstances: 
 

(1) there is in the individual’s blood any amount of a: 

(i) Schedule I controlled substance, as defined in the 
act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as the 
[CSA]. 

 . . 

  .

 

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iii) metabolite of a substance under subparagraph (i) 
or (ii). 
 

  (

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i), (iii).  Thus, § 3802(d)(1) does not require that a 

driver be impaired; rather, it prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle by any 

driver who has any amount of a Schedule I controlled substance in his blood.  

See Commonwealth v. Etchison, 916 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Pa.Super. 2007); 

see also 75 Pa.C.S. § 3810 (stating  that “[t]he fact that a person charged 

with  violating  this  chapter  is  or  has  been  legally  entitled  to  use  alcohol  or 

controlled substances is not a defense to a charge of violating his chapter.”).  

With regard to the significance of Appellant’s medical marijuana card, during 

the pendency of this appeal, this Court found that the Schedule I designation 

for  marijuana  pertinent  to  §  3802(d)(1)  includes  medical  marijuana.    See 

Commonwealth v. Stone, 273 A.3d 1163, 1174 (Pa.Super. 2022) (en banc); 

see  also  Commonwealth  v.  Dabney,  274  A.3d  1283,  1291  (Pa.Super. 

2022)  (“[M]edical  marijuana  remains  a  Schedule  I  controlled  substance  for 

purposes of Section 3802(d)(1).”)  In so holding, we noted that while “[t]he 

[MMA] anticipates the removal of marijuana from Schedule I. . ., the General 

Assembly  has  not  enacted  legislation  amending  the  MMA,  CSA,  or  the  DUI 

statutes  to  remove  marijuana  from  its  Schedule  I  designation  under  state 

law.”  Stone, supra at 1172.  Since the issuance of Stone, neither 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3802(d)(1) nor 35 P.S. § 780-104(1)(iv) have been amended to distinguish 

between  medical  and  non-medical  marijuana.    Accordingly,  pursuant  to  our 

J-A23008-22 

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J-A23008-22 

holding  in  Stone,  §  3802(d)(1)(i)  specifically  prohibits  driving  with  any 

amount of medical or non-medical marijuana in the driver’s blood. 

Herein, it is undisputed that Appellant was driving a motor vehicle at a 

time  when  detectable  amounts  of  marijuana  and  its  metabolites  were 

discovered in his blood stream.   Accordingly, the Commonwealth  presented 

sufficient  evidence  to  support  Appellant’s  DUI  conviction  for  imbibing  a 

Schedule  I  controlled  substance  and  its  metabolites  pursuant  to  75  Pa.C.S. 

§ 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii).   

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/21/2023 

  J

    J

  D

 

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