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J-S01020-23  

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S.K.G. 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: M.L.G., FATHER 

 No. 1132 WDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2022, 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County, 
Orphans' Court at No(s):  No. AD-11 2022. 

EFORE:   BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:  

 

FILED:  March 17, 2023 

 

M.L.G. (“Father”) appeals the orphans’ court decision to terminate his 

parental  rights  to  his  daughter,  K.S.K.G.,  (“the  Child”),  born  March  2021, 

pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).1  After 

careful review, we affirm. 

The facts and procedural history are as follows:  Shortly after the Child 

was born, Bedford County Children and Youth Services (“the Agency”), filed 

an application for emergency protective custody after receiving a report that 

the Child tested positive for various drugs in her system.  Thereafter, a shelter 

care  hearing  was  conducted.    The  court  granted  the  Agency’s  request  for 

____________________________________________ 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

 On August 25, 2022, K.L.B. (“Mother”) filed her consent to adoption. 

    A

   

 

  B

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shelter  care  and  the  court  directed  the  Child  to  be  placed  in  the  physical 

custody of her maternal grandmother upon release from the hospital. 

The Child was adjudicated dependent on March 25, 2021.  Pursuant to 

a  subsequent  emergency  protective  custody  order,  however,  the  court 

directed that upon the Child’s release from the hospital she would be placed 

in  foster  care.    This  change  was  necessitated  by  the  fact  that  the  maternal 

grandmother tested positive for illegal drugs.   

A  permanency  plan  was  instituted  for  Father.    From  the  date  of  the 

Child’s dependency adjudication to the time of the first permanency review on 

August  17,  2021,  Father’s  compliance  and  progress  were  moderate  toward 

alleviating the circumstances which led to Child’s  original  placement.   As  of 

that  date,  Father  was  consistent  with  his  visitation,  cooperated  with  the 

Agency  and  service  providers,  and  was  addressing  his  mental  health.  

However, he was still experiencing difficulty managing basic life skills and was 

still not ready for an unsupervised visitation with the Child.  Father was still 

not  passing  his  drug  tests  but  was  in  the  process  of  applying  for  a  medical 

marijuana card.   

By the time of the next permanency review on February 1, 2022, Father 

was  found  to  have  had  only  minimal  compliance  and  progress  toward 

alleviating the circumstances which led to the Child’s original placement.  By 

this time, Father’s visits were inconsistent, he continued to fail drug screens, 

was  not  receiving  treatment  for  his  mental  health  issues,  and  lacked 

appropriate housing. 

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By the  time of  the  third permanency review on July 19, 2022,  Father 

was incarcerated after his May 2022 arrest for criminal mischief and related 

charges.  He was found to have made minimal compliance and progress with 

his permanency plan because he failed all his drug screens, lacked appropriate 

housing, and was not receiving treatment for his mental health issues.    

On  July  20,  2022,  the  Agency  filed  a  petition  to  terminate  Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b).  

The orphans’ court conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 29, 2022.  The 

Agency presented the testimony of Valerie Kinsey, the Agency’s caseworker 

assigned to the case from its beginning, and Amanda Kendall, the Agency’s 

caseworker  who  provided  family  preservation  services  to  Father.    Father 

testified  on  his  own  behalf.    After  hearing  argument  from  the  parties,  the 

orphans’ court provided its reasons for terminating Father’s parental rights on 

the record.  By order entered that same day, the court terminated Father’s 

parental  rights  pursuant  to  Section  2511(a)(8)  and  (b).    Father  appealed.  

Both Father and the orphans’ court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

 

Father raises the following issue: 

Did  the  [orphans’]  court commit an abuse of discretion or 
an error of law in determining that [the Agency] presented 
sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of proof (clear and 
convincing  evidence)  in  the  bifurcated  analysis  to  warrant 
the involuntary termination of [Father’s] parental rights? 

Father’s Brief at 6. 

 

We begin our well-settled standard of review: 

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The  standard  of  review  in  termination  of  parental  rights 
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 
and  credibility  determinations  of  the  trial  court  if  they  are 
supported  by  the  record.  If  the  factual  findings  are 
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 
court  made  an  error  of  law  or  abused  its  discretion.  A 
decision  may  be  reversed  for  an  abuse  of  discretion  only 
upon  demonstration  of  manifest  unreasonableness, 
partiality,  prejudice,  bias,  or  ill-will.  The  trial  court's 
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 
the  record  would  support  a  different  result.  We  have 
previously  emphasized  our  deference  to  trial  courts  that 
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 
multiple hearings. 

In  re  T.S.M.,  71  A.3d  251,  267  (Pa.  2013) (citations  and  quotation  marks 

omitted). 

Termination  of  parental  rights  is  governed  by  Section  2511  of  the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 
seeking  termination  must  prove  by  clear  and  convincing 
evidence  that  the  parent's  conduct  satisfies  the  statutory 
grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only 
if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 
termination  of  his  or  her  parental  rights  does  the  court 
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section 
2511(b):  determination  of  the  needs  and  welfare  of  the 
child[.] 

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). 

Clear  and  convincing  evidence  is  evidence  that  is  so  “clear,  direct, 

weighty  and  convincing  as  to  enable  the  trier  of  fact  to  come  to  a  clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).  We add that we 

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may  uphold  a  termination  decision  if  any  proper  basis  exists  for  the  result 

reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201.  Importantly, we need only agree with 

the  orphans’  court  as  to  any  one  subsection  of  Section  2511(a),  as  well  as 

Section  2511(b),  in  order  to  affirm.  In  re  B.L.W.,  843  A.2d  380,  384  (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc). 

We first address Father’s claim that the Agency failed to present clear 

and  convincing  evidence  to  support  the  termination  of  his  parental  rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8), which provides: 

(a)  General  rule.--The  rights  of  a  parent  in  regard  to  a 
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 
following grounds: 

[…] 

(8)  The  child  has  been  removed  from  the  care  of  the 
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 
an  agency,  12  months  or  more  have  elapsed  from  the 
date of removal or  placement, the conditions which led 
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist 
and termination of parental rights would best serve the 
needs and welfare of the child. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). 

To  terminate  parental  rights  under  Section  2511(a)(8),  the  petitioner 

must prove: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months 

or  more  from  the  date  of  the  removal;  (2)  the  conditions  which  led  to  the 

removal  or  placement  of  the  child  continue  to  exist;  and  (3)  termination  of 

parental  rights  would  best  serve  the  needs  and  welfare  of  the  child.  In  re 

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).  Termination 

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under  Section  2511(a)(8)  does  not  require  the  court  to  evaluate  a  parent’s 

current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused the 

placement, or the availability or efficacy of the services provided by the local 

children and youth agency. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 759 (citation omitted). 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  evidentiary  hearing,  the  orphans’  court  first 

noted  the  three  elements  that  the  Agency  had  the  burden  to  prove  under 

Section 2511(a)(8).  See N.T., 8/29/22, at 98; K.Z.S., supra.  The court then 

provide its rationale as to each element.  As to the first element, the orphans’ 

court reasoned: 

 
So, [the first element] subsection 8 [is] essentially that the 
child has been removed from parental care for twelve months or 
more  from  the  date  of  the  removal.    [The  Child]  was  born,  I 
believe, [in March 2021].  Upon discharge - -[the Child] was never 
discharged  home  to  the  parents.    I  believe  we,  there  was  an  [] 
shelter  care  order  prior  to  discharge,  but  essentially  upon 
discharge from the hospital [the Child] has always been placed in 
the foster home of [the Foster Parents].  I would note that today’s 
date  is  August  29,  2022.    So,  certainly  that  twelve  months  has 
passed. 

N.T., 8/29/2, at 98-99. 

 

The  court  then  noted  that  the  second  element  is  that  the  conditions 

which led to the placement of the Child continue to exist.  The orphans’ court 

found  that  the  Agency  met  its  burden  as  to  this  element,  and  explained  as 

follows: 

 
So, my analysis will initially focus on whether the condition 
that  led  to  [the  Child’s]  placement  continue  to  exist  despite 
reasonable  good  faith  efforts  of  the  Agency  supplied  over  a 
realistic period of time.  And as I’ve stated, this case - - [the Child] 
has been in placement now for, well, close to a year and a half.   

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In the case at hand, I heard testimony from the caseworker, 
 
Ms.  Kinsey,  as  well  as  the  testimony  of  the  Family  Preservation 
caseworker, [Ms.] Kendall.  It seems clear to  me that the initial 
reasons as it relates to [Father], the reasons for placement, there 
were concerns as it relates to instability in the areas of drug use, 
mental health and unstable housing.  So, three were essentially 
as it relates to [Father], the three big issues where his goals were 
focused around. 

 
[The  orphans’  court]  has  noted  that  out  of  all  of  the  drug 
tests,  I  believe  it  was  approximately  ten  that  were  given  to 
[Father],  he  unfortunately  failed  them  all.    What  is  of  greater 
concern to the [court] is the trend beginning in December of 2021 
until, well, the most recent attempt at a test in May . . . he tested 
positive, among other things, to methamphetamine,  I would note 
that initially when the case was open and he began being tested, 
he  was  testing  positive  for  things  like  marijuana  and  suboxone, 
which while concerning - - I will be very frank - - the trend toward 
the heavier drugs concerns the [court] much, much more.  So, it 
would seem to [the orphans’ court] as though that issue has not 
been resolved. 

 
The next issue raised or concern that was raised had to do 
with mental health.  Well, it would seem to me that unless or until 
[Father] is able to get his drug use under control, it will be difficult 
to  address  the  mental  health  issues,  which  I  think  has  been 
indicated by the various caseworkers over the last months.  That 
has been indicated and explained to [Father].  Various options, I 
believe, were discussed with him, and at least until his most recent 
incarceration about three months ago, that he has not effectively 
been able to get a handle on his drug use.   

Another one of the concerns was, as I said, the instability 
 
as  it  relates  to  housing.    It  seems  to  me  at  times  [Father]  has 
attempted to rely on his father to assist him with a residence but 
it seems to me that relationship at times has been quite volatile.  
So, the court is very concerned about that, and I don’t know, nor 
did I hear evidence today that if [Father] would be released from 
incarceration  sometime  in  the  future,  that  he  would  have  the 
ability to go back to his father’s residence.  I don’t know that’s the 
case.    But,  over  the  course  of  this  case  it  seems  as  though  the 
housing situation certainly has not improved. 

 
Additionally,  again,  I  do  want  to  touch  upon  a  little  bit 
further [on Father’s] mental health issues.  [A]s I said, it would 

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seem  to  me  that  drug  use  must  be  resolved  but  the  court  is 
concerned he had in 2021, just after this case was opened, he had 
a  mental  health  placement  and  I  found  his  testimony  credible 
when he said when he got out of the hospital from Pittsburgh back 
in June or July of 2021, that was probably the best he was doing.  
And  I  find  that  credible  because  our  Permanency  Review  order 
reflected that.  He wasn’t fully making, fully in compliance, but he 
was making progress at least.  And so, I take him at his word that 
throughout the history of this case, that’s the best he had been.  
But,  unfortunately,  as  I  said  over  time  instead  of  continuing  to 
progress  in  the  right  direction  [in]  terms  of  both  drug  use  and 
mental  health  treatment  it  just  has  not  happened.    And  in  the 
court’s estimation, it has, has in fact gotten worse. 

The  court  further  notes  that  most  recently  here  in  May  of 
 
2022, there was testimony that [Father] had a 302 commitment 
at the Somerset Hospital.  [Father] was well aware that upon his 
discharge they recommended additional follow-up, mental health 
treatment, but he did not do that.  He did not ask for assistance 
to do that and in fact, refused, and said he didn’t need treatment. 

So, in those regards, it would seem to me that as it relates 
 
to [Father] and the concerns of the Agency and the goals that he 
had, despite reasonable good faith efforts of the Agency, he has 
not improved upon those.  He has not made progress. 

N.T., 8/29/22, at 99-103 (excess capitalization omitted). 

 

Finally, the orphans’ court stated why it found that the Agency met the 

element  for  termination  under  Section  2511(a)(8),  that  termination  would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the Child: 

 
It appears to me that the evidence has shown that through 
testimony of the case worker, as well as the report of the guardian 
ad  litem,  [the  Child]  currently  is  doing  well  in  her  current 
placement.  She’s happy.  She’s formed bonds within that family.  
And when I look at the bond that she has with [Father], I agree 
with the attorney for the Agency.  I think there is a bond, but I 
just don’t think it’s outweighed by the stability that the child has 
currently. 

N.T., 8/29/22, at 104.   

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J-S01020-23 

 

Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusions.  In 

arguing to the contrary, Father first acknowledges that he “conceded during 

the [termination] hearing that he was not in a position to provide the care and 

nurturing environment that [the Child] would require.”  Father’s Brief at 10-

11.  He contends, however, that his three months of incarceration, “served to 

afford  [him]  the  space  to  clear  his  head  and  to  commit  to  services  he 

requires/needs in order to provide [the Child] with a safe, stable and nurturing 

environment.”  Id. at 11.  Thus, Father asserts that “[all] he requested of the 

court  was  to  be  afforded  an  additional  3-6  months  following  his  release  to 

meet his goals for him and [the Child] to be reunited.”  Id.   

 

The  orphan’s  court  was  aware  of  Father’s  testimony  regarding  his 

incarceration  status  and  his  hope  to  meet  his  reunification  goals  upon  his 

release.  As the court explained: 

 
The court will also look at what’s the likelihood that [Father] 
would make progress if we just simply give him more time.  Well, 
unfortunately, things for [Father] seem to this court to continue 
to  be  a  little  up  in  the  air.    He’s  currently  incarcerated  on  new 
charges.  There is no indication of what the resolution might [be], 
or what the plan might be when he may be released.  I know he 
testified that he was hoping maybe to touch base with his father.  
Move  back  in  with  his  father,  but  this  court  is  not  satisfied  that 
that even is an option at this point. 

N.T.,  8/29/22,  at  103  (excess  capitalization  omitted).    In  essence,  the 

orphans’  court  determined  that  the  uncertainty  regarding  Father’s  release 

date,  and  ability  to  meet  his  reunification  goals  thereafter,  supported  the 

termination of his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).   

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J-S01020-23 

 

The orphans’ court’s conclusion is consistent with pertinent case law.  As 

noted by the guardian ad litem’s brief supporting termination, Father asked 

the  orphans’  court  to  place  the  Child  in  a  “holding  pattern”  until  he  gets 

released from jail and can work on his reunification goals.  Brief for Guardian 

Ad Litem, at 16.  As our Supreme Court has previously stated, “[i]n weighing 

the  difficult  factors  [relevant  in  a  parental  rights  termination  proceeding,] 

courts  must  keep  the  ticking  clock  of  childhood  ever  in  mind.    Children  are 

young for a scant number of years, and courts have an obligation to see to 

their healthy development quickly.”  T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269.  Moreover, it is 

now well settled that “[a] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent 

attempts 

to  attain 

the  maturity  necessary 

to  assume  parenting 

responsibilities.  The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s 

need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope 

for the future.”  Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 914 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(citation omitted). 

 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude: the orphans’ court did not commit 

an error of law or abuse its discretion when it terminated Father’s rights under 

Section 2511(a)(8).  Thus, we next consider whether the record supports the 

orphans’  court’s  conclusion  that  the  Agency  presented  clear  and  convincing 

evidence pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

Section 2511(b) provides: 

(b) Other  considerations.--The court in  terminating the 
rights  of  a  parent  shall  give  primary  consideration  to  the 
developmental,  physical  and  emotional  needs  and  welfare 

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of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 
solely  on  the  basis  of  environmental  factors  such  as 
inadequate  housing,  furnishings,  income,  clothing  and 
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 
With  respect  to  any  petition  filed  pursuant  to  subsection 
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 
filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 

This Court has explained that: 

[S]ection  2511(b)  focuses  on  whether  termination  of 
parental  rights  would  best  serve  the  developmental, 
physical,  and  emotional  needs  and  welfare  of  the  child. 
In In re  C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), 
this  Court  stated,  “Intangibles  such  as  love,  comfort, 
security,  and  stability  are  involved  in  the  inquiry  into  the 
needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed 
that the trial court must also discern the nature and status 
of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 
on  the  child  of  permanently  severing  that  bond. Id. 
However,  in  cases  where  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  bond 
between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 
bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 
2008).  Accordingly,  the  extent  of  the  bond-effect  analysis 
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 
case. Id. at 763. 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists, 

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. See  C.M.K.,  203  A.2d  at  264  (citation  omitted); see 

also K.Z.S.,  946  A.2d  at  764 (holding  there  was  no  bond  worth  preserving 

where  the  child  had  been  in  foster  care  for  most  of  the  child's  life,  which 

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caused  the  resulting  bond  to  be  too  attenuated).    We  add,  the  court  is  not 

required to use expert testimony to resolve the bond analysis but may rely on 

the  testimony  of  social  workers  and  caseworkers.    Z.P.,  994  A.2d  at  1121. 

Finally, we emphasize that “[w]hile a parent's emotional bond with her and/or 

her  child  is  a  major  aspect  of  the §  2511(b) best-interest  analysis,  it  is 

nonetheless  only  one  of  many  factors  to  be  considered  by  the  court  when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.”  In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

Here, at the close of testimony the orphans’ court explained its rationale 

for concluding that the Agency met its burden of establishing termination was 

warranted pursuant to Section 2511(b).  The court stated: 

And,  as  I’ve  mentioned,  it  seems  to  me  [the  Child]  has  a 
particularly strong parental bond, not just a bond, but a parental 
bond  with  the  foster  parents.    The  court  notes,  I  also  heard 
testimony that [the Child] has what I would refer to as a sibling 
bond with the other children in that household. 

The  testimony  that  the  court  particularly  relies  on  as  it 
 
relates  to  this  subsection  is  the  testimony  of  the  Family 
Preservation  caseworker,  [Ms.]  Kendall.    She  forthrightly  and 
credibly testified as to the things that [Father] was able to do.  He 
clearly loves [the Child].  During visits he was able to take proper 
care of [the Child] in terms of feeding and holding, changing [her] 
diaper.  So, the court did recognize that, and I did consider that, 
but I also considered the nature of the bond that was displayed 
between [the Child] and [Father]. 

So, certainly I think there is a bond but I don’t know that I 
 
would characterize it, unfortunately as a parental bond.  I think 
[the Child] has that bond with the foster parents.  And I think the 
evidence  has  supported  that.    And  I  would  note  that  parental 
rights  are  not  preserved  by  waiting  for  a  more  suitable  or 
convenient  time  to  perform  one’s  parental  responsibilities  while 
others provide [the Child] with her physical, emotional needs. 

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So, what it really comes down to, [Father], unfortunately, is 
 
I have no doubt that you love [the Child].  You want what’s best 
for  [the  Child,]  but  I  can’t  put  her  life  on  hold  while  you  [] 
continually  try  to  resolve  the  issues  that  you  have  and  I  don’t 
mean  any  disrespect  in  saying  that,  but  I  have  to  look  at  the 
fact[s], sir as they are today. 

So,  based  on  that,  I  do  find  that  the  Agency  has  met  its 
 
burden of proof and the court will grant the Agency’s petition as 
far as termination of parental rights. 

N.T. 8/29/22, at 105-06 (excess capitalization omitted). 

 

Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusions.  As 

noted  above,  we  may  not  disturb  the  orphans’  courts  credibility 

determinations when they are supported by the record.  T.S.M., supra.  The 

court  found  Ms.  Kendall’s  testimony  comparing  the  nature  of  the  bond  the 

Child had with Father vis-à-vis her bond with the foster parents. Ms. Kendall 

testified  that,  although  she  saw  a  bond  between  the  Child  and  Father,  the 

Child  displayed  the  same  bond  toward  her.    See  N.T.,  8/29/22,  at  38.  

Contrarily, Ms. Kendall testified that the Child displayed a true parental bond 

with both foster parents.  Id. at 37.  

 

Thus,  Ms.  Kendall’s  testimony  establishes  that  the  Agency  met  its 

burden  of  presenting  clear  and  convincing  evidence  that  termination  of 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b) was in the Child’s best 

interests.  See In re T.M.T., 64 A.3d 1119 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that a 

parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, does not prevent 

termination of parental rights); In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(explaining  that  whether  a  child’s  primary  emotional  attachment  is  with  a 

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foster parent rather than a birth parent is a significant factor in evaluating the 

child’s  developmental  and  emotional  needs  and  welfare  in  a  termination  of 

parental rights proceeding).  

 

In  sum,  because  the  record  supports  the  orphans’  court’s  conclusion 

that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(8) and (b), we affirm the order terminating Father’s parental rights. 

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Order affirmed. 

udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate:  3/17/2023 

 

  J

    J

  D

   

 

 

 

         

 

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