[J-61-2022] 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
WESTERN DISTRICT 
 
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ. 
 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

No. 16 WAP 2022 

ppeal from the Order of the 

Superior Court entered October 25, 
2021, at No. 355 WDA 2021, 
quashing the appeal from the Order 
of the Court of Common Pleas of 
Blair County entered March 10, 
2021, at No. CP-07-CR-0000638-
2020 

RGUED:  October 25, 2022 

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Appellee 

AMIEN A. GREEN, 

Appellant 

v. 

 

 

 

 

 

   

   

   

    D

OPINION 

 

 

JUSTICE BROBSON  

 

 

  DECIDED: OCTOBER 28, 2022 
       OPINION FILED: MARCH 21, 2023 

In this discretionary matter, Damien A. Green (Appellant) appeals from an order of 

the  Superior  Court,  which  quashed  his  appeal from  an  order  of  the  Court  of  Common 

Pleas of Blair County (trial court).  In doing so, the Superior Court concluded that the trial 

court’s  order,  granting  decertification  to  a  juvenile  who  was  to  be  tried  as  an  adult  for 

murder,1 constituted a legal nullity because the decertification order was not filed within 

                                            
1  Pursuant  to  Section  6355  of  the  Juvenile  Act,  42  Pa.  C.S.  §  6355,  pertaining  to  the 
transfer of a juvenile to criminal proceedings,  

[w]here the petition [to transfer a juvenile’s case] alleges conduct which if 
proven would constitute murder . . . , the court shall require the offense to 
be  prosecuted  under  the  criminal  law  and  procedures,  except  where  the 
case has been transferred pursuant to [S]ection 6322 (relating to transfer 
from criminal proceedings) from the division or a judge of the court assigned 
to conduct criminal proceedings. 

 

 

   

 

the time constraints set forth in Section 6322(b) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 6322(b), 

and  Pennsylvania  Rule  of  Criminal Procedure  597  (Rule  597).   Section  6322(b)  of  the 

Juvenile Act provides, in part, that “[i]f the court does not make its finding within 20 days 

of the hearing on the petition to transfer the case, the defendant’s petition to transfer the 

case  shall  be  denied  by  operation  of  law.”    Rule  597,  which  pertains  to  procedures 

following the filing of a motion2 requesting transfer from criminal proceedings to juvenile 

proceedings, similarly provides, in part: 

(C)  At the conclusion of the hearing, but in no case longer than 20 days 
after the conclusion of the hearing, the judge shall announce the decision 
in open court.  The judge shall enter an order granting or denying the motion 

                                            

ection  6322  of  the  Juvenile  Act,  42  Pa.  C.S.  §  6322,  sets  forth  a  process—
decertification—by which a juvenile charged with murder may seek to be transferred from 
criminal proceedings to the juvenile court system.  Section 6322 provides, in part:  

 

  S

(a)  General rule.--. . . . If it appears to the court in a criminal proceeding 
charging  murder  .  .  .  that  the  defendant  is  a  child,  the  case  may  .  .  .  be 
transferred  [to  the  division  or  a  judge  of  the  court  assigned  to  conduct 
juvenile hearings] and the provisions of this chapter applied.  In determining 
whether to transfer a case charging murder . . . , the child shall be required 
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer will serve 
the public interest.  In determining whether the child has so established that 
the transfer will serve the public interest, the court shall consider the factors 
contained  in  [S]ection  6355(a)(4)(iii)  (relating  to  transfer  to  criminal 
proceedings). 

(b)    Order.--If  the  court  finds  that  the  child  has  met  the  burden  under 
subsection  (a),  the  court  shall  make  findings  of  fact,  including  specific 
references to the evidence, and conclusions of law in support of the transfer 
order.  If the court does not make its finding within 20 days of the hearing 
on the petition to transfer the case, the defendant's petition to transfer the 
case shall be denied by operation of law. 

42 Pa. C.S. § 6322 (emphasis added).    

2  Section  6322  of  the  Juvenile  Act  refers  to  a  “petition  to  transfer,”  whereas  Rule  597 
refers to a “motion for transfer.”  See 42 Pa. C.S. § 6322; Pa.R.Crim.P. 597.  We perceive 
no difference in the terms, which are used interchangeably in this opinion.   

 
[J-61-2022] - 2 

for transfer[] and set forth in writing or orally on the record the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. 

D)  If the judge does not render a decision within 20 days of the conclusion 
of the hearing, the motion for transfer shall be denied by operation of law.  
The clerk of courts immediately shall enter an order on behalf of the judge. 

  (

We  accepted  review  to  consider  “[w]hether,  as  a  matter  of  first  impression  and  in  the 

interests of justice, a transfer order filed after the [20-]day limitation in [Section 6322 of 

the  Juvenile  Act]  and  [Rule]  597  is  a  legal  nullity  or  should  exceptions  created  by 

Pennsylvania 

jurisprudence 

[under]  similar  rules  and  statutes  be  applicable?”  

Commonwealth  v.  Green,  276  A.3d  202  (Pa.  2022)  (per  curiam)  (some  alteration  in 

original). 

  Following  oral  argument,  we  entered  a  per  curiam  order,  dated 

October 28, 2022, affirming the Superior Court’s order quashing the appeal.  Our order 

also remanded the matter to the trial court for immediate entry of an order by the clerk of 

courts pursuant to Rule 597(D).3  This opinion now follows. 

                                           
3 Our order provided:  

AND NOW, this 28th day of October, 2022, the order of the Superior 
Court,  dated  October  25,  2021,  is  AFFIRMED,  and  the  matter  is 
REMANDED directly to the [trial court] for immediate entry of an order by 
the clerk of courts pursuant to . . . Rule . . . 597(D), from which the defendant 
may wish to seek an interlocutory appeal by permission to the Pennsylvania 
Superior  Court  pursuant  to  Chapter  13  of  the  Pennsylvania  Rules  of 
Appellate  Procedure.    See  Pa.R.Crim.P.  597(D)  (“If  the  judge  does  not 
render  a  decision  within  20  days  of  the  conclusion  of  the  hearing  [on  a 
motion 
juvenile 
proceedings], the motion for transfer shall be denied by operation of law.  
The clerk of courts immediately shall enter an order on behalf of the judge.”)  
The Office of the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court shall promptly REMIT 
the  record  directly  to  the  trial  court.    Opinion(s)  of  the  Supreme  Court  to 
follow. 
 

from  criminal  proceedings 

requesting 

transfer 

to 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Supreme Court Order, 10/28/2022 (alterations in original).)   

 
[J-61-2022] - 3 

 

   

  (

 

 

 

I. 

As background, Appellant and three other individuals, all juveniles, were charged 

in criminal court—i.e., thus as adults—with several crimes in connection with a murder 

and robbery that occurred on February 27, 2020.  Appellant was charged as an adult with 

robbery,  conspiracy  to  commit  robbery,  and  murder  of  the  second  degree.    The 

Commonwealth filed a written joinder to join all cases and proceedings involving Appellant 

and  the  three  other  juveniles  (co-defendants).    Appellant  and  his  co-defendants 

separately filed petitions to decertify their cases, seeking the appointment of an expert 

and the transfer of their cases to juvenile court.  The trial court appointed an expert and 

scheduled  separate  decertification  hearings  for  each  juvenile.    Relevant  here,  the  trial 

court  held  a  two-day  remote  hearing  on  Appellant’s  decertification  petition.    At  the 

conclusion of the hearing on January 19, 2021, the trial court observed that it had 20 days 

to  issue  an  order  and  opinion  on  the  matter,  i.e.,  until  February  8,  2021.4    (Notes  of 

Testimony (N.T.), 1/19/2021, at 256.)   

 

On  March  9,  2021—49  days  after  the  hearing—the  trial  court  issued  an  order 

wherein  it  first  stated  that  it  made  its  “decision  and  finding  in  this  matter  on 

                                            
4 In making this observation, the trial court explained: 

I think[,] based on the totality of the testimony over the two days that the 
[c]ourt understands the viewpoints of both [of] the parties sufficiently that [it] 
can do an [o]rder and [o]pinion on this.  I can do it within the 20 days that I 
have to do it in. 

(N.T., 1/19/2021, at 256.)  Shortly thereafter, the trial court stressed that, by the time it 
received the transcript for Appellant’s two-day hearing, it would likely only have about ten 
days to draft and issue the order and opinion.  (Id.)  

 
[J-61-2022] - 4 

 

further stated  

February 2, 2021.”5  (Trial Ct. Order, dated 3/9/2021, at 1.)  In this regard, the trial court 

that its recent request to the parties for waiver[6] was in regard to the time 
frame  to  publicly  issue  a  written  [o]pinion  with  its  [o]rder,  because  the 
issuance of said [o]pinion could influence ongoing testimony in the joined 
co-defendant’s  [p]etition  for  [d]ecertification.    The  Commonwealth  having 
indicated to the [trial court its] opposition to waiver, and [Appellant] having 
consented to waiver, the [trial court] memorializes its previous decision and 
findings in [o]rder form here, and will issue an [o]pinion under seal, which 
will be released at the conclusion of [the] hearing for the co-defendant.   

(Id.)  In the same order, the trial court concluded that Appellant had “met his burden of 

proof  .  .  .  as  to  his  timely  amenability  to  treatment”  and  “that  the  interest  of  society  is 

served by decertification.”  (Id.)  The trial court thereafter sealed its opinion in support of 

that order pending the final decertification hearing for one of Appellant’s co-defendants.7 

 

The  Commonwealth  thereafter  filed  an  interlocutory  appeal  of  the  trial  court’s 

March 9, 2021 order to the Superior Court.  In its statement of matters complained of on 

appeal, the Commonwealth argued, inter alia, that Appellant’s decertification petition was 

automatically denied by operation of law when the trial court failed to issue its decision 

                                            
5 On appeal, the Superior Court observed—and the parties did not disagree—that, in the 
case sub judice, the docket was “devoid of any indication that the [trial] court issued a 
‘decision and finding’ on February 2, 2021, or otherwise communicated with the parties 
after the January 19, 2021 hearing.”   Commonwealth v. Green, 265 A.3d 798, 799 n.2 
(Pa. Super. 2021).  Neither party on appeal to this Court nor the record suggests that the 
trial court announced any decision on February 2, 2021, and, therefore, we do not further 
consider this statement by the trial court in our analysis.   

6  Before  this  Court,  the  Commonwealth  asserts  that  on  March  8,  2021,  the  trial  court 
asked both parties—via telephone—to “verbally waive the [20-]day deadline imposed by 
[Section of 6322(b) of the Juvenile Act] and [Rule] 597([D]).”  (Commonwealth’s Br. at 6.)  
Appellant’s brief before this Court is silent in this regard.  We do not consider the concept 
of waiver in this appeal.   

7 In its opinion, which the trial court did not unseal until March 19, 2021—59 days after 
Appellant’s decertification hearing—the trial court did not address its delay in issuing its 
order and supporting opinion.  

 
[J-61-2022] - 5 

 

within the statutorily mandated 20-day time frame provided for by Section 6322(b) of the 

Juvenile Act and Rule 597.  In rejecting the Commonwealth’s argument, the trial court 

explained  in  a  subsequent  opinion8  that  it  held  separate  hearings  for  each  of  the  four 

co-defendants  because  “the  burden  of  proof  in  decertification  is  individual  to  each 

defendant”  and  the  “interests  of  justice  dictate  that  each  juvenile  [receive]  separate 

consideration.”  (Trial Ct. 1925(a) Op., 4/14/2021, at 5.)  The trial court then observed 

that, given the various logistical challenges attendant to the four co-defendants’ hearings 

and related volume of material that it would have to review prior to rendering four separate 

decisions,  it  suggested  at  the  conclusion  of  Appellant’s  decertification  hearing  that  “it 

would  be  difficult  to  release  a  written  opinion  within  the  20-day  period  set  out  in  the 

statute.”  (Id. at 6.)  The trial court then stated that, given the Commonwealth’s use of a 

sole expert witness to collectively evaluate the four co-defendants, “it became obvious” 

to the trial court as it wrote its opinion in Appellant’s case “that[,] if the [trial court’s] opinion 

in [Appellant’s] case, which dealt heavily with the Commonwealth’s expert opinion, was 

published before the decertification hearing in [one of Appellant’s co-defendant’s] case, 

the  [trial  court’s]  writing  could  prejudice  either  the  Commonwealth  or  [Appellant],  or 

otherwise shape the testimony in that matter.”  (Id. at 6-7.)   

 

The  trial  court  then  extensively  set  forth  additional  details  regarding  the 

above-mentioned  logistical  challenges  before  indicating  that  it  “had  a  true  dilemma” 

because, while the trial court fully acknowledged “its duty to follow” the 20-day time frame 

provided by Section 6322(b) of the Juvenile Act, it was “further . . . guided by its duty to 

operate in the interests of justice.”  (Id. at 8.)  Thus, the trial court remarked, it was “caught 

between competing duties” and “could find no authority to guide it.”  (Id.)  In this context, 

                                            
8  The  trial  court  issued  the  subsequent  opinion  pursuant  to  Pennsylvania  Rule  of 
Appellate Procedure 1925(a).   

 
[J-61-2022] - 6 

 

the  trial  court  requested—albeit  unsuccessfully—that  the  parties  waive  the  statutory 

20-day time frame.  (Id.)  The trial court then reasoned that, although it initially sealed its 

opinion  in  support  of  its  order  granting  Appellant’s  decertification  petition,  it  made  “its 

decision and findings public” when it issued its March 9, 2021 order.  (Id.)  The trial court 

also noted that the March 9, 2021 order allowed the Commonwealth to appeal its ruling. 

 

Before the Superior Court, the Commonwealth relied upon Section 6322(b) of the 

Juvenile Act and Rule 597(D) to argue that, because the trial court “‘did not take action 

until  March  9,  2021  (approximately  [50]  days  after  the  hearing),’  the  [trial]  court  ‘lost 

jurisdiction to take action’” on Appellant’s decertification petition.  Green, 265 A.3d at 798 

(quoting Commonwealth’s Superior Ct. Br. at 23).  The Commonwealth, therefore, asked 

the  Superior  Court  to  “deem  the  [trial  court’s]  untimely  order  granting  decertification  a 

legal  nullity.”    (Id.  (quoting  Commonwealth’s  Superior  Ct.  Br.  at  24).)    In  its  published 

decision,  the  Superior  Court first  addressed  the  Commonwealth’s argument  relative  to 

the legal nullity.  In so doing, the Superior Court relied on Section 6322 of the Juvenile 

Act  to  outline  the  procedure  a  trial  court  must  follow  where  a  juvenile,  who  has  been 

charged with murder, requests decertification to transfer the case to juvenile court.  The 

Superior Court then emphasized:  “If the court does not make its finding within 20 days of 

the hearing on the petition to transfer the case, the defendant’s petition to transfer the 

case  shall  be  denied  by  operation  of  law.”    Id.  (emphasis  omitted)  (quoting 

Section 6322(b) of the Juvenile Act).  Thereafter, the Superior Court explained that if “a 

court issues an order after statutory time limits have passed, that order is a legal nullity.”  

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Martinez, 141 A.3d 485, 490-91 (Pa. Super. 2016)).  Based 

on  the  foregoing,  the  Superior  Court  concluded  that  because  the  trial  court  only 

had 20 days after the conclusion of Appellant’s hearing—i.e., until February 8, 2021—to 

act on Appellant’s petition to transfer, the trial court’s order, dated March 9, 2021, granting 

 
[J-61-2022] - 7 

 

 

 

decertification  was  a  legal  nullity.9    The  Superior  Court  further  concluded  that  the 

Commonwealth’s appeal was, therefore, also a legal nullity, and it quashed the appeal.10 

II. 

Before this Court, Appellant11 acknowledges that Section 6322 of the Juvenile Act 

and  Rule  597  do  not  provide  an  exception  to  the  20-day  time  frame  at  issue.  

Nevertheless,  Appellant  argues  that  the  outcome  of  this  matter  offends  the  absurdity 

doctrine  and  Section  1922  of  the  Statutory  Construction  Act  of  1972  (Statutory 

Construction Act), 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922.12   

As to the absurdity doctrine, Appellant submits that the “interests of justice” do not 

support rigid application of this time frame, which, he contends, “creates an unreasonable 

and absurd outcome.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 5, 8.)  Appellant relies on concepts interspersed 

into early decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 

                                            
9 The Superior Court also observed that, pursuant to Rule 597, where the trial court fails 
to  “announce  its  decision  regarding  the  transfer  of  the  case  in  open  court  no  later 
than 20 days after the hearing,” the motion for transfer “shall be denied by operation of 
law” and “[t]he clerk of courts immediately shall enter an order on behalf of the judge.”  
Green, 265 A.3d at 800 n.5 (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 597).  The Superior Court additionally 
observed that “[t]he court in this case did not follow this rule.”  Id.  

10 Although Appellant appeals from this order, he does not argue that the Superior Court 
erred in concluding that the trial court’s order granting decertification was a legal nullity, 
such  that  the  appeal  should  be  quashed.    As  Appellant  does  not  challenge  this 
conclusion, we do not address it in our opinion.   

11  The  Juvenile  Law  Center  (JLC)  filed  an  amicus  brief  in  support  of  Appellant.    The 
gravamen  of  JLC’s  position  is  that  strict  application  of  the  20-day  time  frame  that  the 
statute and Rule 597 provide would be unjust and run counter to the public interest.  In 
support, JLC advances arguments similar to those Appellant raises, which are set forth 
in detail below.  JLC also submits that the public interest is not served by prosecuting 
children  in  criminal court where abundant  research  shows  that  children  are  capable  of 
change,  where  juvenile  court was  designed  to  effectuate  such  change,  where  criminal 
court  does  not  reduce  recidivism,  and  where  children  suffer  devastating  and  lasting 
consequences and trauma when incarcerated in prisons. 

12 The Statutory Construction Act is codified at 1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501-1991.   

 
[J-61-2022] - 8 

 

17 U.S. 122, 202-03 (1819) (“But if, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not 

contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because 

we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one 

in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so 

monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.”); 

Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (“If a literal construction 

of  the  words  of  a  statute  be  absurd,  the  act  must  be  so  construed  as  to  avoid  the 

absurdity.”);  and  United  States  v.  Kirby,  74  U.S.  482,  486-87  (1868)  (“All  laws  should 

receive a sensible construction.  General terms should be so limited in their application 

as  not  to  lead  to  injustice,  oppression,  or  an  absurd  consequence.    It  will  always, 

therefore, be presumed  that  the  legislature  intended  exceptions  to  its  language,  which 

would avoid results of this character.”)  Appellant also notes a more modern reference to 

the  absurdity  doctrine  by  Justice  Wecht  in  Commonwealth  v.  Peck,  242  A.3d  1274 

(Pa. 2020) (Wecht, J., concurring),13 wherein Justice Wecht discouraged invocation of the 

absurdity doctrine in criminal cases unless, as suggested by late Justice Antonin Scalia 

and  scholar  Bryan  Garner,  two  conditions  exist:    (1)  the  absurdity  “must  consist  of  a 

disposition  that  no  reasonable  person  could  intend”  and  (2)  the  absurdity  “must  be 

reparable  by  changing  or  supplying  a  particular  word  or  phrase  whose  inclusion  or 

omission was obviously a technical or ministerial error.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 10-11 (quoting 

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 237 

(2012), and (citing Peck, 242 A.3d at 1286-87 (Wecht, J., concurring))).)  In applying the 

first condition to the case sub judice, rather than explicitly arguing that the outcome is one 

that “no reasonable person could intend,” Appellant instead contends that it is  “absurd 

                                            
13 In Peck, the trial court relied upon the absurdity doctrine to reject the appellant’s claims 
relative to his drug delivery resulting in death conviction.  On appeal, the Superior Court 
resolved the case without resorting to the absurdity doctrine.   

 
[J-61-2022] - 9 

 

 

and  unreasonable”  to  “subject  a  child  found  to  be  amenable  to  treatment  to  decades 

behind bars” when the child did not cause the trial court’s late filing or the Superior Court’s 

determination that the trial court’s late filing was a legal nullity.  (Id. at 10.)  In applying the 

second  condition  to  the  case  sub  judice,  Appellant  suggests  that  the  inclusion  of  the 

phrase  “without  cause  shown”  would  cure  the  absurdity  that  he  contends  exists  in 

Section 6322 of the Juvenile Act and Rule 597.  (Id. at 11.) 

 

Turning to the Statutory Construction Act, Appellant contends that the principles of 

statutory  construction  demand  flexibility  where  cause  is  shown  for  a  delay.    Appellant 

applies  the  five  presumptions  for  ascertaining  legislative  intent,  as  set  forth  in 

Section 1922 of the Statutory Construction Act.14  Regarding the first presumption, that 

the “General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or 

unreasonable,” Appellant reiterates his previous argument that the outcome in his case 

is absurd and unreasonable.  (Id. at 12 (quoting 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1)).)  Regarding the 

                                            
14 Section 1922 of the Statutory Construction Act provides:   

In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a 
statute the following presumptions, among others, may be used: 

(1) That the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, 
impossible of execution or unreasonable. 

(2) That the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective 
and certain. 

(3) That the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution 
of the United States or of this Commonwealth. 

(4) That when a court of last resort has construed the language used in 
a  statute,  the  General  Assembly  in  subsequent  statutes  on  the  same 
subject  matter  intends  the  same  construction  to  be  placed  upon  such 
language. 

(5)  That  the  General  Assembly  intends  to  favor  the  public  interest  as 
against any private interest. 

 
[J-61-2022] - 10 

 

second presumption, that the “General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective 

and certain,” Appellant contends that this “factor is essentially a non-factor” in this case 

but also notes that,  while the inclusion of the phrase “without cause shown” would not 

“affect the utility and efficacy” of Section 6322 of the Juvenile Act and Rule 597, it might 

make  them  “more  certain.”    (Id.  at  12-13  (emphasis  in  original)  (quoting  1  Pa.  C.S. 

§ 1922(2)).)    Regarding  the  third  presumption,  that  the  “General  Assembly  does  not 

intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth,” Appellant 

argues  that  strict  application of  Section  6322  and  Rule  597  would violate  due process 

protections  and  fundamental  fairness  precepts  that  both  constitutions  provide.    (Id. 

at 12 (quoting 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(3)).)  Regarding the fourth presumption, that “when a 

court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly 

in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be 

placed upon such language,” Appellant maintains that the related jurisprudence and text 

of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720 (Rule 720)15 and Section 6355 of the 

                                            
15 Rule 720 pertains to post-sentence procedures and appeals.  Subsection (B)(3) of the 
rule, which imposes time limits on the trial judge for deciding post-sentence motions and 
allows for an extension of that time upon “good cause shown” provides, in part:   

(3) Time Limits for Decision on Motion. The judge shall not vacate sentence 
pending decision on the post-sentence motion, but shall decide the motion 
as provided in this paragraph. 
 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (B)(3)(b), the judge shall decide the 
post-sentence  motion,  including  any  supplemental  motion,  within 
120 days of the filing of the motion.  If the judge fails to decide the motion 
within  120  days,  or 
in 
paragraph (B)(3)(b), the motion shall be deemed denied by operation of 
law. 

to  grant  an  extension  as  provided 

b) Upon motion of the defendant within the 120-day disposition period, 
for  good  cause  shown,  the  judge  may  grant  one  30-day  extension  for 
decision  on  the  motion.    If  the  judge  fails  to  decide  the  motion  within 

  (

 
[J-61-2022] - 11 

 

 

Juvenile  Act—which  govern  post-trial  procedures  and  a  juvenile’s  transfer  to  criminal 

proceedings, respectively—further support his argument that Section 6322 and Rule 597 

should be flexibly applied.  (Id. at 12, 14 (quoting 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(4)).)   

Appellant characterizes both Rule 720 and Rule 597 as providing “very strict and 

rigid filing deadlines,” but he argues that the jurisprudence on Rule 720’s predecessor—

former Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1410 (Rule 1410)—supports a “flexible[,] 

non-rigid application.”  (Id. at 14, 16.)  In this regard, Appellant cites to several cases:  

Commonwealth  v.  Wright,  142  A.2d  336,  337  (Pa.  Super.  1958)  (“When  an  Act  of 

Assembly fixes the time within which an appeal may be taken, courts have no power to 

extend it or to allow an appeal nunc pro tunc, except where there is a showing of fraud or 

its equivalent.”); Commonwealth v. Laskaris, 561 A.2d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 1989), appeal 

denied,  577  A.2d  889  (Pa.  1990)  (“Procedural  rules  are  not  ends  in  themselves,  but 

means whereby justice, as expressed in legal principles, is administered.  They are not 

to be exalted to the status of substantive objectives.” (quoting Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. 

Auth.,  517  A.2d  1270,  1272  (Pa.  1986));  and  Commonwealth  v.  Braykovich,  664  A.2d 

133, 138 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 675 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1996) (concluding that 

appellant’s notice of appeal was timely filed even though there was “a breakdown in the 

court  system”  where  trial  court  failed  to  decide  defendant’s  post-sentence  motion 

the 30-day  extension  period,  the  motion  shall  be  deemed  denied  by 
operation of law. 

c) When a post-sentence motion is denied by operation of law, the clerk 
of  courts shall  forthwith  enter an  order on  behalf  of the  court,  and,  as 
provided  in  Rule  114,  forthwith  shall  serve  a  copy  of  the  order  on  the 
attorney  for  the  Commonwealth,  the  defendant's  attorney,  or  the 
defendant  if  unrepresented,  that  the  post-sentence  motion  is  deemed 
denied.  This order is not subject to reconsideration. 

  (

                                            

 
[J-61-2022] - 12 

a.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3) (emphasis added). 

  P

 

 

of law).   

within 120-day period and clerk of courts failed to enter order denying motion by operation 

Furthermore, Appellant argues that the facts here are analogous to those found in 

the Superior Court’s decision in Braykovich, because both cases involved litigants who 

were  not  at  fault  for  the  trial  courts’  and  clerk  of  courts’  failures  to  comply  with  filing 

deadlines.  In Braykovich, the Superior Court wrote: 

In the instant case, the failure to file a timely appeal involved a breakdown 
in the court system, that is, lack of compliance with [Rule] 1410.  The text 
of Rule 1410 and the comments thereto leave no doubt that a timely written 
order, either by the trial court or by the clerk of courts, is intended to protect 
the defendant’s right to a timely appeal.   The judgment becomes final for 
appeal purposes either on the date when the court disposes of the motion 
or  when  the  motion  is  denied  by  operation  of  law.    Appellant’s  failure  to 
comply with Rule 1410 was caused by a breakdown in the processes of the 
court,  that  is,  the  clerk  of  courts’  failure  to  notify  him  that  his motion  had 
been  denied  by  operation  of  law.    Appellant  filed  his  appeal  on 
October 11, 1994,  within  30  days  of  the  filing  of  the  trial  court’s  order 
denying his post-sentence motion.  We hold that under the circumstances 
of the present case, the appeal is timely filed and may be considered by us.   

Braykovich, 664 A.2d at 138.  Appellant suggests that the Superior Court’s reasoning in 

Braykovich could be applied here to render the appeal timely.   

 

Appellant,  addressing Section  6355  of  the  Juvenile  Act, argues  that, although  it 

contains language similar to that which Section 6322 of the Juvenile Act provides, albeit 

in the context of transferring a case to criminal proceedings, Section 6355 nevertheless 

does not require a trial court to determine whether a child is delinquent within a strict time 

frame.  Finally, Appellant returns to Section 1922 of the Statutory Construction Act and 

argues, relative to the fifth presumption that the “General Assembly intends to favor the 

public interest as against any private interest,” that  Section 6322 and Rule 597 do “not 

favor  the  public  good  as  written.”    (Appellant’s  Br.  at  12,  20  (quoting  1  Pa.  C.S. 

§ 1922(5)).)  Here, Appellant “suggests that the public good is best served by treatment 

of juveniles through the juvenile system” and that a trial court’s decision to decertify and 

 
[J-61-2022] - 13 

 

transfer  a  case  to  juvenile  court  should  be  honored  even  if  it  is  not  timely  made.    (Id. 

at 20.)    Appellant  also  suggests  that  the  statute  and  Rule  597  constitute  “[r]emedial 

legislation”  and  that  their  clear  humanitarian  objectives—i.e.,  rehabilitating  juveniles—

should be prioritized over rigid application of the 20-day time frame.  (Id.)  Based on the 

foregoing, Appellant asks this Court to reverse the Superior Court’s order. 

 

The Commonwealth counters that the language in Section 6322 of the Juvenile 

Act and Rule 597 clearly and unambiguously dictate a mandatory rule:  the lower court 

must  “take  action  no  later  than  [20]  days  after  the  conclusion  of  the  [decertification] 

hearing.”  (Commonwealth’s Br. at 11.)  The “plain language and meaning of this legal 

rubric,”  the  Commonwealth  contends,  “are  so  categorically  free  from  ambiguity  that  to 

judicially  insert  an  exception  would  disregard  the  letter  of  the  law.”    (Id.)    The 

Commonwealth criticizes Appellant’s invitation to “re-imagine and re-write” the statute and 

rule  “under  the  pretext  of  invoking  his  interpretation  of  the  spirit  of  the  law,”  as  an 

undertaking that appellate courts have soundly rejected.  (Id.)  The Commonwealth takes 

the position that the clear language of Rule 597(C) demonstrates that its drafters “already 

contemplated and rejected any application of a good cause exception.”  (Id.)  In support, 

the Commonwealth emphasizes the portion of Rule 597(C) which provides that a judge 

must  openly  issue  its  decision  “in  no  case  longer”  than  20  days  after  the  hearing  and 

submits  that  the  foregoing  phrase  is  “arguably  tantamount  to  ‘under  no  circumstances 

longer’ or ‘for no reason longer.’”  (Id. (emphasis in original).)  Rule 597(C), argues the 

Commonwealth, clearly favors a trial court’s immediate decision at the conclusion of the 

hearing.    The  Commonwealth  then  contends  that  Appellant’s  attempt  to  analogize  to 

Rule 720 is of no avail, because, unlike the at-issue statute and rule, Rule 720 explicitly 

provides for an extension of the relevant time frames in the post-sentence context.  In 

fact,  argues  the  Commonwealth,  “the  law  is  clear  that  the  court  is  to  take  action 

 
[J-61-2022] - 14 

 

 

within 20 days, and goes so far as to command certain action to be taken by a separate 

office (the Prothonotary) in the event the [trial] court fails to comply.”  (Id. at 13.) 

The  Commonwealth  then  posits  that  the  20-day  time  frame  evidences  the 

legislature’s 

intent 

to  expedite  decertification  proceedings. 

 

In  support, 

the 

Commonwealth argues that this time frame and related transfer from prison to a juvenile 

detention  center  not  only  preserves  hope  for  the  juvenile’s  rehabilitation,  but  it  also 

provides society with certain rights related to safety.  In this regard, the Commonwealth 

submits that the trial court’s statement that it had made its decision on February 2, 2021, 

does not comport with the record or the law.  Further, the Commonwealth faults the trial 

court for failing to announce or issue its decision within the 20-day time frame, failing to 

transfer Appellant  to  a  juvenile  facility  during  the  same  time  period,  and for sealing  its 

order  and,  thereby,  preventing  the  parties  from  receiving  notice  of  the  trial  court’s 

decision.   

 

Further,  in  the  event  this  Court  creates  a  “good  cause  shown”  exception  to 

the 20-day  time  frame,  the  Commonwealth  submits  that  such  an  exception  would  be 

unwarranted here.  In support, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court failed to 

openly communicate that good cause existed to seal or delay its issuance of an opinion.  

The  Commonwealth  further  submits  that  the  record  demonstrates  that,  at  the  time  of 

Appellant’s hearing, the trial court believed that it was subject to the 20-day time frame 

and, moreover, did not articulate any concern that the procedural posture of Appellant’s 

co-defendants’ cases would prevent it from complying with the 20-day time frame.  The 

Commonwealth  then  contends  that  the  trial  court  lacked  jurisdiction  both  when  it 

requested that the parties waive the 20-day time frame and when it ultimately issued its 

order  and  opinion.    The  Commonwealth  also  asserts  that  the  trial  court  lacked  the 

 
[J-61-2022] - 15 

 

 

authority to seal its opinion given that Rule 597(C) clearly provides that a trial court shall 

announce its decision in open court.   

Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court’s explanation for why it 

exceeded the 20-day time frame is of no avail.  It submits that, while the trial court claimed 

that it could cause prejudice to Appellant’s co-defendants’ pending cases by issuing an 

opinion  in  Appellant’s  case,  the  trial  court  failed  to  “explain  how  such  prejudice  would 

manifest.”  (Id. at 22.)  In this regard, the Commonwealth posits that the trial court’s fear 

of prejudice “is an implicit accusation that the prosecutors and/or defense attorney are 

risks for improper dissemination.”  (Id.)  Finally, the Commonwealth submits that, relative 

to the trial court’s complaint that it was caught between competing duties to comply with 

the 20-day time frame in Appellant’s case or cause prejudice in his co-defendants’ cases, 

“[o]ur law cannot legitimately be understood to trade the best interests of one juvenile at 

the expense of another.”  (Id. at 25.)  Based on the foregoing, the Commonwealth asks 

this Court to deny the relief Appellant requests and remand his case to criminal court. 

III. 

 

Although Appellant leads with his argument based on the absurdity doctrine, we 

begin our analysis by addressing Appellant’s argument that Section 1922 of the Statutory 

Construction Act requires us to interpret Section 6322 of the Juvenile Act and Rule 597 to 

provide for exceptions to the 20-day time limit set forth in each.  At the outset, we confirm 

that, in addition to applying to statutes, “we apply the Statutory Construction Act . . . when 

interpreting the Rules of Criminal Procedure.”  Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 

717, 733 (Pa. 2020) (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 101(C) (“To the extent practicable, these rules 

shall be construed in consonance with the rules of statutory construction.”)). 

 

The  Statutory  Construction  Act  provides  that  the  object  of  all  statutory 

interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”  1 Pa. 

 
[J-61-2022] - 16 

 

C.S. § 1921(a).  Generally, the plain language of the statute “provides the best indication 

of legislative intent.”  Miller v. Cnty. of Centre, 173 A.3d 1162, 1168 (Pa. 2017).  If the 

statutory  language  is  clear  and  unambiguous  in  setting  forth  the  intent  of  the  General 

Assembly, then “we cannot disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing 

its spirit.”  Fletcher v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 985 A.2d 678, 684 (Pa. 2009) 

(citing 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b)).  In this vein, “we should not insert words into [a statute] that 

are  plainly  not  there.”    Frazier  v.  Workers’  Comp.  Appeal  Bd.  (Bayada  Nurses,  Inc.), 

52 A.3d 241, 245 (Pa. 2012).  When the statutory language is ambiguous, however, we 

may  ascertain  the  General  Assembly’s  intent  by  considering  the  factors  set  forth  in 

Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c), and other rules 

of  statutory  construction.    See  Pa.  Sch.  Bds.  Ass’n,  Inc.  v.  Pub.  Sch.  Emps.  Ret.  Bd., 

863 A.2d  432,  436  (Pa.  2004)  (observing  that  “other  interpretative  rules  of  statutory 

construction are to be utilized only where the statute at issue is ambiguous”).  “We also 

presume that ‘the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible 

of execution or unreasonable,’ and that ‘the General Assembly intends the entire statute 

to be effective and certain.’”  Berner v. Montour Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 217 A.3d 238, 

245 (Pa. 2019) (quoting 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1)-(2)). 

 

Section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction Act, which provides that “when the 

words  of  a  statute  are  clear  and  free  from  all  ambiguity,  the  letter  of  it  is  not  to  be 

disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit,” is crucial to our analysis here.  If the 

statute or rule in this case—i.e., Section 6322(b) of the Juvenile Act or Rule 597—are not 

ambiguous,  then  we  cannot  apply  the  presumptions  set  forth  in  Section  1922  of  the 

Statutory  Construction  Act.    “A  statute  is  ambiguous  when  there  are  at  least  two 

reasonable  interpretations  of  the  text  under  review.”    Warrantech  Consumer  Prods. 

Servs., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co. in Liquidation, 96 A.3d 346, 354-55 (Pa. 2014).  “This 

 
[J-61-2022] - 17 

 

Court has consistently held that . . . interpretive rules of statutory construction are to be 

utilized  only  where  the  statute  [or  rule]  at  issue  is  ambiguous.”    Pa.  Sch.  Bd.  Ass’n, 

863 A.2d  at  436.    With  this  in  mind,  we  consider  whether  Section  6322(b)  and 

Rule 597 are ambiguous as to the strict 20-day time frame for the announcement of the 

trial court’s decertification decision. 

as follows: 

 

The Superior Court summarized the provisions of Section 6322 of the Juvenile Act, 

When  the  Commonwealth  charges  a  juvenile  with  murder,  jurisdiction  is 
vested with the criminal division of the court of common pleas.  See 42 Pa. 
C.S. §§ 6302, 6322(a) (excluding murder from the definition of “delinquent 
acts”  that  are  reviewable  under  the  court  of  common  pleas’  juvenile 
division’s  original  jurisdiction).    However,  a  juvenile  charged  with  murder 
may request that the matter be decertified and transferred to the juvenile 
division for adjudication.  Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 10 A.3d 336, 338 (Pa. 
Super. 2010).  The court must then hold a hearing at which the juvenile must 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer will serve the 
public interest.  42 Pa. C.S. § 6322(a).  If the court finds that the juvenile 
has met his burden under subsection (a), “the court shall make findings of 
fact, including specific references to the evidence, and conclusions of law 
in support of the transfer order.”  42 Pa. C.S. § 6322(b).  “If the court does 
not make its finding within 20 days of the hearing on the petition to transfer 
the  case,  the  defendant’s  petition  to transfer the  case  shall  be denied by 
operation of law.”  Id. (emphasis added). 

Green, 265 A.3d at 800.   

 

As to Rule 597, the Superior Court summarized it as  

requir[ing] the court to announce its decision regarding the transfer of the 
case in open court no later than 20 days after the hearing.   Pa.R.Crim.P. 
597(C).  If no decision is rendered within 20 days of the conclusion of the 
hearing, the motion for transfer “shall be denied by operation of law.  The 
clerk  of  courts  immediately  shall  enter  an  order  on  behalf  of  the  judge.”  
Pa.R.Crim.P. 597(D).   

Id. at 800 n.5.   

 

Thus,  the  Superior  Court  interpreted  Section  6322(b)  of  the  Juvenile  Act  and 

Rule 597  to  provide  for  a  strict  20-day  time  frame  within  which  the  trial  court  must 

announce  its  decision.   We perceive  no  other possible  interpretation  of  that  language.  

 
[J-61-2022] - 18 

 

Moreover, the parties, even Appellant, do not dispute the Superior Court’s interpretation 

of the statute and  rule as providing for a strict 20-day time frame within  which the trial 

court must announce its decision.  Thus, a careful review of the statutory language and 

Rule 597  reveals  that  there  is  no  ambiguity  in  the  statute  or  rule  as  to  the  20-day 

requirement.    In  the  absence  of  ambiguity,  we  cannot  apply  the  presumptions  of 

Section 1922 of the Statutory Construction Act to allow for exceptions to that time limit.  

Accordingly, we must reject Appellant’s argument to the contrary.   

 

Turning now to Appellant’s  argument that the absurdity doctrine must apply,  we 

reject that argument outright.  Appellant’s argument is premised on the notion that the 

rigid application of the time frame in Section 6322(b) of the Juvenile Act and Rule 597 

“creates an unreasonable and absurd outcome.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 5.)  We disagree with 

such a characterization, as it reads the statute in isolation without consideration of the 

avenues of relief available to a juvenile whose petition to transfer is denied by operation 

of law.   

 

First, and foremost, Rule 597(D) provides that, when a “judge does not render a 

decision within 20 days,” thereby rendering a petition for transfer “denied by operation of 

law,”  “[t]he  clerk  of  courts  immediately  shall  enter  an  order  on  behalf  of  the  judge.”  

Pa.R.Crim.P. 597(D) (emphasis added).  In the case now before this Court, the trial judge 

failed  to  meet  the 20-day  time frame  set forth  in  Section 6322  of  the  Juvenile  Act and 

Rule 597, resulting in the petition being denied by operation of law.  Equally important, 

however, the clerk of courts failed to comply with the critical aspect of Rule 597(D) that 

provides for the entry of an order.  Without action on the part of the clerk of courts, there 

was no notice to Appellant of the deemed denial and no order from which Appellant could 

 
[J-61-2022] - 19 

 

seek an appeal.16  Had the procedural mechanism in Rule 597 for entry of an order been 

utilized, there would have been no question as to the effect of the trial court’s failure to 

announce its decision and the time period for filing an appeal under Chapter 13 of the 

Pennsylvania  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure,  pertaining  to  interlocutory  appeals  by 

permission.  It is for this reason that our Court remanded the matter back to the trial court 

for entry of the order pursuant to Rule 597(D).   

                                            
16 As to the appealability of Appellant’s order, an  

order  denying  [a  juvenile’s]  request  to  transfer  [a]  case  from  the  criminal 
division to the juvenile division under [Section 6322 of the Juvenile Ac]t is 
an interlocutory order.  See In the Interest of McCord, . . . 664 A.2d 1046, 
1048  ([Pa.  Super.]  1995)  (“Where  a  juvenile  appeals  the  .  .  .  denial  of 
transfer  from  the  criminal  division,  double  jeopardy  protections  are  not 
implicated.  Such orders are . . . interlocutory, and are not appealable until 
judgment of sentence has been entered.  The defendant’s rights to contest 
the  trial  court’s  transfer  decision  are  fully  preserved  .  .  .  [and]  may  be 
vindicated  on  appeal.”);  see  generally  Commonwealth  v.  Rosario,  .  .  . 
648 A.2d 1172 ([Pa.] 1994) (plurality) (where a trial court denies a defense 
pretrial order and the order neither terminates the litigation nor disposes of 
the  matter,  the  order,  by  definition,  is  an  interlocutory,  non-appealable 
order); Commonwealth v. Scott, . . . 578 A.2d 933, 941 ([Pa. Super.]) (“[T]he 
general rule in criminal cases is that a defendant may appeal only from a 
final judgment of sentence, and an appeal from any prior order or judgment 
will be quashed.”)[, appeal denied, 598 A.2d 283 (Pa. 1990)].  The order is 
neither appealable as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 311 nor as a collateral order 
under Pa.R.A.P. 313.   
 

Commonwealth v. McMurren, 945 A.2d 194, 195 (Pa. Super. 2008) (per curiam) (some 
alterations in original).  An appeal by a juvenile from an order denying a transfer to juvenile 
court is treated differently than an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order granting 
a juvenile’s transfer to juvenile court.  “[A]n appeal of an order transferring a case from 
the criminal division to the juvenile division is more appropriately aligned with cases falling 
under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d) [(Rule 311(d)].  Therefore, . . . 
these orders are immediately appealable as of right.”  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
669 A.2d 315, 323 (Pa. 1995) (footnote omitted).  Rule 311(d) provides, in part:  “In a 
criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an 
appeal  as  of  right  from  an  order  that  does  not  end  the  entire  case  where  the 
Commonwealth  certifies  in  the  notice  of  appeal  that  the  order  will  terminate  or 
substantially handicap the prosecution.”   

 
[J-61-2022] - 20 

 

 

Secondly, as alluded to above, a juvenile denied a transfer to juvenile court is not 

without  appellate  rights.    Appellate  rights  may  be  obtained  through  a  petition  for 

permission  to  file  interlocutory  appeal  under  Chapter  13  of  the  Pennsylvania  Rules  of 

Appellate  Procedure.    See  Commonwealth  v.  Brown,  26  A.3d  485,  491  n.2  (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (observing that Superior Court considered juvenile’s interlocutory appeal by 

permission  filed  pursuant  to  Pa.R.A.P.  1313).    Appellate  rights  also  may  be  exercised 

upon entry of a judgment of sentence, should the juvenile ultimately be convicted as an 

adult in a criminal proceeding.  See In the Interest of McCord, 664 A.2d at 1048.  In cases 

such as this, where a juvenile has been denied his request for a transfer by operation of 

law under Section 6322(b) of the Juvenile Act and Rule 597(D), a petition for permission 

to file interlocutory appeal is an appropriate vehicle for purposes of requesting appellate 

review.   

 

Justice Wecht, in his concurring opinion in Peck, wrote of the absurdity doctrine, 

directing  our  attention  to  the  United  States  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Holy  Trinity 

Church,  wherein  the  Supreme  Court  considered  the  potential  absurdity  of  statutory 

language.    In  so  doing,  the  Supreme  Court  noted,  by  way  of  example,  that  a  statute 

providing “that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of a felony, does not extend 

to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire, for he is not to be hanged because 

he would not stay to be burnt.”  Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 461.  The Supreme Court, 

in considering what we refer to as the absurdity doctrine, provided additional examples of 

laws that had the potential to be absurd if not applied in connection with “common sense,” 

observing that a “law which enacted ‘that whoever drew blood in the streets should be 

punished with the utmost severity,’ did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of 

a  person  that  fell  down  in  the  street  in  a  fit”  and  further  observing  that  “the  act  of 

[C]ongress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of 

 
[J-61-2022] - 21 

 

 

 

 

its  carrier,  does  not  apply  to  a  case  of  temporary  detention  of  the  mail  caused  by  the 

arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for murder.”  Id. 

Considering those examples of instances where the absurdity doctrine may well 

apply,  we  cannot  conclude  that  they  equate  to  the  circumstances  at  hand.    Here,  the 

result is not absurd—the application of the clear language of the statute does not cause 

results  that  were  not  contemplated.    Nor  does  the  application  offend  common  sense, 

although some might find the policy behind the statutory provision and rule offensive or 

overly harsh.  Moreover, a juvenile whose decertification petition was denied by operation 

of law may request immediate appellate review.   

IV. 

It  is  based  on  the  reasoning  above  that  this  Court  entered  its  order  dated 

October 28, 2022.  

opinion.  

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht and Mundy join the 

 
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