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J-S43046-22  

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 
 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.S., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2134 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001217-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.S., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2135 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000580-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.D., A MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2136 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001218-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.D., A MINOR 
 

: 
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  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

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 No. 2137 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000581-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2138 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001219-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B.A.-M.D., 
A MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2139 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000585-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

- 2 - 

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J-S43046-22 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

     

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 No. 2140 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001221-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.I.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2141 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000582-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2142 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001222-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.I.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    A

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 No. 2143 EDA 2022 

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J-S43046-22 

             

             

             

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Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000583-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2144 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001220-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.B.A.I.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2145 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000586-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

    A

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Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 

 No. 2146 EDA 2022 

J-S43046-22 

             

             

             

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- 5 - 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001223-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.I.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2147 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000584-2021 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

 No. 2148 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-DP-0001432-2019 

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.B.A.I.D., A 
MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

PPEAL OF: D.S., MOTHER 

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 
No(s):  CP-51-AP-0000587-2021 

 No. 2149 EDA 2022 

    A

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J-S43046-22 

EFORE:  DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:  

 

      FILED MARCH 17, 2023 

In  this  consolidated  matter,  D.S.  (Mother)  appeals  the  decrees 

terminating her parental rights to her eight Children, pursuant to the Adoption 

Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b).1   Mother also challenges 

the  orders  changing  the  goals  of  the  dependency  proceedings  from 

reunification  to  adoption.    Additionally,  Mother’s  counsel  has  filed  an 

application to withdraw and a brief, pursuant to  Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967).  After review, we affirm the termination decrees, dismiss the 

goal change appeals as moot, and grant counsel leave to withdraw.2 

The record discloses the following factual and procedural history.  The 

relevant procedural and factual history is as follows.  The family came to the 

attention of DHS in Summer 2019, when Mother’s 14-year-old daughter, T.R. 

alleged abuse by both Mother and Father.  Father  is the stepfather of T.R.; 

J-S43046-22 

  B

 The trial court also terminated the rights of K.D. (Father).  His consolidated 
appeals are separately listed before this panel. 
   

- 6 - 

____________________________________________ 

1 The subject Children are: 
 

•  S.T.S, daughter, age 14 
•  I.D, son, age 10  
•  Ab. D., son, age 8 
•  A.-R.D. 1 son, age 7 
•  A.-R.D. 2., son, age 6 
•  Aa.D., daughter, age 5  
•  M.D., son, age 3 
•  S.D., daughter, age 2 

  2

T.R. is not the subject of these appeals.3  T.R. alleged that Mother beat her 

and forced her to sleep outside.  She also alleged that Father inappropriately 

touched her on her buttocks and breasts, made her stay in the bathroom while 

he showered, exposed himself to her, and on one occasion, licked the back of 

her ear.4 

 

These disclosures caused DHS to investigate the wellbeing of Father’s 

seven  other  Children,  who  are  the  subject  of  this  case.5    The  Agency 

interviewed  the  Children  in  the  home.    At  that  time,  none  of  the  Children 

disclosed abuse, but the caseworker believed that the Children were afraid to 

speak up and had tried to convey to the caseworker that Father could overhear 

to  their  conversation.    Father  had  chosen  the  room  for  the  caseworker’s 

interview, and he could be seen visible pacing outside on the porch. 

 

On July  25, 2019, DHS obtained orders for protective custody for  the 

Children.    After  the  shelter  care  hearing,  the  Children  were  temporarily 

committed to DHS custody.  A subsequent disclosure revealed that one of the 

Children was beaten by Mother at Father’s direction, and that the Child was 

made to sleep outside as punishment.   The Child also alleged that she was 

____________________________________________ 

3 The trial court previously changed the goal of T.R.’s dependency proceedings 
from reunification to another planned permanent living arrangement (APPLA), 
i.e., permanent long-term foster care until the age of majority.  See Interest 
of  T.R.,  283  A.3d  377  (Table),  2022  WL  2813796  (Pa.  Super.  2022)  (non-
precedential decision). 

 Father is the stepfather of T.R.  Her biological father was unknown. 

  4

  5

 The youngest subject Child, S.D., was not yet born. 

- 7 - 

J-S43046-22 

J-S43046-22 

on her person. 

forced to do chores in her underwear to ensure that she did not have any food 

 

In  September  2019,  the  Children  were  adjudicated  dependent.    The 

court  learned  that  Mother  had  given  birth  to  S.D.,  and  that  the  birth  was 

hidden from the agency.  The facts that gave rise to the adjudications of the 

older Children were a predicate for the removal and eventual adjudication of 

S.D.    The  juvenile  court  instituted  a  single  case  plan,  comprising  of  certain 

goals  to  aid  Mother  with  reunification.    The  goals  included:  to  attend 

supervised visitation with the Children; to complete a program for parents of 

children  who  have  been  sexually  abused;  and  to  complete  a  parenting 

program. 

 

The  visits  between  the  parents  and  the  Children  were  tense.    Mother 

and Father would reprimand the Children if they did not say they were poorly 

treated in the foster home.  The parents tried to coerce the Children into taking 

pictures  of  their  foster  home.    The  parents  would  also  try  to  influence  the 

Children as to what they should say to the caseworkers and the court.  During 

one visit, Mother shoved a staff member.  The parents would be late to the 

visits, and they showed the Children pictures of guns.   As a result, the court 

order that the Children receive therapeutic visits, but such visits did not occur 

because Mother did not sign up for them.  Although Mother attended some of 

the court-ordered programing, she did not put any of the lessons into practice. 

 

Meanwhile,  investigations  into  the  parents’  alleged  abuse  continued.  

The  Children  subsequently  participated  in  a  forensic  interview  with 

- 8 - 

J-S43046-22 

Philadelphia Children’s Alliance, where they were then referred for evaluations 

by  Dr.  Michelle  Dominguez,  M.D.,  a  child  abuse  pediatrician  at  St. 

Christopher’s  Hospital  for  Children.    During  their  evaluations,  the  Children 

made  additional  disclosures.    They  claimed,  among  other  allegations,  that 

Father  would  punch  them  and  whip  them  with  extension  cords;  that  their 

refrigerator was chained shut so they could not get food; that Father forced 

them to eat the ants that were in their cereal; and that they were sometimes 

forced  to  stay  in  the  basement,  which  was  often  dark  and  flooded.    Dr. 

Dominguez  physically  examined  the  Children  and  noted  the  presence  of 

bruising consistent with inflicted trauma.  Father defended some of his actions, 

maintaining  that  he  merely  disciplined  the  Children  in  accordance  with  his 

Islamic faith.  He denied other allegations, which he said were fabricated by 

the Children because they were rebelling against his religion. 

In August 2021, the parents were arrested.  Their arrests resulted in a 

no-contact order, which suspended visits with the Children.  DHS eventually 

petitioned  to  change  the  goal  of  the  dependency  proceedings  from 

reunification to adoption and to terminate Father’s rights.  The court held the 

termination hearing over the course of several days on March 14, March 28, 

and June 2, 2022.  On August 11, 2022, the court articulated its findings on 

the record and entered decrees terminating Mother’s rights to each respective 

Child. 

Before we address her appeal, we note that Mother’s counsel has filed 

a petition to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

- 9 - 

J-S43046-22 

738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).6  To 

withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must: 

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel 
has  determined  that  the  appeal  would  be  frivolous;  2) 
furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 
3)  advise  the  [appellant]  that  he  or  she  has  the  right  to 
retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the 
[appellant] deems worthy of the court's attention. 

With  respect  to  the  third  requirement  of Anders,  that 
counsel inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of 
counsel's withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must 
“attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent 
to their client advising him or her of their rights.” 

In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 903, 907 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).  

Additionally,  counsel  must  file  a  brief  that  meets  the  following 

requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago: 

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, 
with citations to the record; 

(2)  refer  to  anything  in  the  record  that  counsel  believes 
arguably supports the appeal; 

(3)  set  forth  counsel's  conclusion  that  the  appeal  is 
frivolous; and 

(4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is 
frivolous.  Counsel  should  articulate  the  relevant  facts  of 
record,  controlling  case  law,  and/or  statutes  on  point  that 
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. 

____________________________________________ 

6  This  Court  extended  the  Anders  principles  to  appeals  involving  the 
termination of parental rights.  In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014) 
(citation omitted). 
 

- 10 - 

J-S43046-22 

In re Adoption of M.C.F., 230 A.3d 1217, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation 

omitted).  Preliminarily, we find that Counsel has complied with the technical 

requirements to withdraw.   

In addition to verifying that Counsel substantially complied with Anders 

and Santiago,  this Court also must “conduct an  independent review of the 

record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked 

by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (footnote omitted). Flowers does not require us “to act as counsel or 

otherwise advocate on behalf of a party.” Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 

A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).  “Rather, it requires us only to 

conduct a simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear on its face 

to be arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or 

misstated.”  Id.  Traditionally,  we  would  start  our  review  by  giving  “a  most 

generous reading and review of ‘the case’ as presented in the entire record 

with consideration first of issues raised by counsel.” See id. (citing Anders, 

Before we conduct our independent review, however, we first address 

the  issues  counsel  presented  in  the  Anders  brief  that  arguably  support 

Mother’s appeal. See M.C.F., 230 A.3d at 1219.  The three issues presented 

386 U.S. at 744). 

are as follows: 

1.  Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion 
where it determined that the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 
2511(a) were met? 

- 11 - 

J-S43046-22 

2.  Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion 
where  it  determined  the  requirements  of  23  Pa.C.S.A.  § 
2511(b) were met? 

3.  Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion 
where it determined that the permanency goal for the Children 
should be changed to adoption?  

Anders Brief at 3 (cleaned up). 

We review these issues mindful of our well-settled standard of review. 

The  standard  of  review  in  termination  of  parental  rights 
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 
and  credibility  determinations  of  the  trial  court  if  they  are 
supported  by  the  record.  If  the  factual  findings  are 
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 
court  made  an  error  of  law  or  abused  its  discretion.  A 
decision  may  be  reversed  for  an  abuse  of  discretion  only 
upon  demonstration  of  manifest  unreasonableness, 
partiality,  prejudice,  bias,  or  ill-will.  The  trial  court's 
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 
the  record  would  support  a  different  result.  We  have 
previously  emphasized  our  deference  to  trial  courts  that 
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 
multiple hearings. 

In  re  T.S.M.,  71  A.3d  251,  267  (Pa.  2013) (citations  and  quotation  marks 

omitted). 

Termination  of  parental  rights  is  governed  by  Section  2511  of  the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 
seeking  termination  must  prove  by  clear  and  convincing 
evidence  that  the  parent's  conduct  satisfies  the  statutory 
grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only 
if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 
termination  of  his  or  her  parental  rights  does  the  court 
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section 
2511(b):  determination  of  the  needs  and  welfare  of  the 
child[.] 

- 12 - 

J-S43046-22 

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). 

Here,  the  trial  court  terminated  Mother’s  parental  rights  pursuant 

to Section  2511(a)(2),  (5),  (8),  and  (b).    We  need  only  agree  with  the 

orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 

2511(b),  in  order  to  affirm.   In  re  B.L.W.,  843  A.2d  380,  384  (Pa.  Super. 

2004) (en  banc).  Moreover,  we  may  uphold  a  termination  decision  if  any 

proper basis exists for the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201(Pa. 

Super. 2000) (en banc). 

Mother’s  first  issue  of  arguable  merit  involves  the  initial  prong  of  the 

termination analysis under Section 2511(a). As we need only agree with the 

orphans’ court as to one subsection of Section 2511(a), we analyze whether 

the  Agency  properly  established  grounds  for  termination  under  Section 

2511(a)(2).  That section provides in relevant part: 

(a)  General  rule.--The  rights  of  a  parent  in  regard  to  a 
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 
following grounds: 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 
his  physical  or  mental  well-being  and  the  conditions  and 
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 
will not be remedied by the parent. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). 

To  satisfy  the  requirements  of Section  2511(a)(2),  the  moving  party 

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

*** 

- 13 - 

J-S43046-22 

(2)  that  such  incapacity,  abuse,  neglect  or  refusal  caused  the  child  to  be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Parents 

are  required  to  make  diligent  efforts  toward  the  reasonably  prompt 

assumption  of  full  parental  duties.  In  re  Z.P.,  994  A.2d  1108,  1117  (Pa. 

Super. 2010). 

We note that the grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct  like  abuse  but  concern  parental  incapacity  that  cannot  be 

remedied.  See id.  This case, however, explicitly concerns abuse.  The trial 

court set forth its Section 2511(a)(2) findings on the record: 

[T]he testimony of Dr. Dominguez, which I found credible, 
was  that  these  children,  not  only  were  they  subject  to 
continued and repeated abuse, whether by denying food or 
being hit in the head with 2-by-4s, being hit with extension 
cords, being made to get into showers that were hot, and 
then  with  cords  that  were  run  under  cold  water,  being  hit 
with those cords, Dr. Dominguez went a step further from 
saying  that  that’s  abuse.    In  fact,  she  indicated  that  that 
meets the definition of child torture.  And while she testified, 
and, again, credibly, that neither [Ab.D, A-R.D. 1 or A.-R.D. 
2.]  disclosed  any  abuse,  the  physical  findings  on  those 
children’s bodies were consistent with the physical findings 
on the bodies of [T.R., S.T.S., and I.D.], all of whom disclose 
physical  abuse  in  the  manner  in  which  they  were  abused.  
And  so  the  fact  she  also  determine  that  based  on  photos 
review from [Ab.D.] and well as her physical examination of 
[I.D., T.S., and A.-R. D. 1, and A.-R.D. 2,] that the markings 
on [A.-R.D.1, A.-R.D. 2, and Ab.-D.’s] body were consistent 
with he physical abuse that was disclosed as to [T.R., S.T.S., 
and I.D.] in their PCA interviews. […] 

- 14 - 

J-S43046-22 

In  addition  to  what  the  children  disclosed  in  their  PCA 
interview  and  to  their  CUA  case  manager,  because  Ms. 
McNeill also testified that [I.D., T.R., and S.T.S.] disclosed 
abuse,  found  in  the  transcripts  that  were  entered  into 
evidence  that  were  part  of  this  court’s  prior  hearings, 
[S.T.S., I.D., and T.R.] testified in camera as to the abuse 
that they suffered.  And this court found them credible when 
they testified in camera.  All counsel was present for those 
hearings, except for TPR counsel, as she was appointed after 
those hearings. 

And so the testimony has been consistent each time these 
Children have disclosed as to what they were subjected to 
in  [Father’s]  and  [Mother’s]  home.    And  I  have  to  say,  I 
started out as a social worker working with families in the 
system.  I worked for nine years as a solicitor for DHS.  And 
I’ve been on the bench.  This is my fifth year.  I have never 
ever heard a doctor testify that what children suffered was 
torture.  I’m speechless. 

And  so  this  court  is  going  to  find  that  while  there  was  no 
testimony as to the younger children, the testimony of Dr. 
Dominguez as an expert that the fact that sexual abuse was 
found  as  to  [T.R],  and  physical  abuse  as  to  the  other 
Children,  all  of  the  Children  in  Mother  and  Father’s  care 
would be at risk.  And so I am terminating for all the Children 
under [Section] 2511(a)(2).  Specifically, [T.R., I.D., S.T.S., 
A.-R.D.  1,  A.-R.D.  2,  and  Ab.D.]  suffered  actual  abuse  at 
the hands of their parents consistent with the markings on 
their bodies. 

N.T. 91-94. 

 

Upon  our  review,  the  trial  court  properly  determined  that  the  Agency 

established  grounds  under  Section  2511(a)(2)  by  clear  and  convincing 

evidence.  The abuse caused the Children to go without parental care.  The 

Agency provided services to no avail.  Mother cannot or will not remedy the 

conditions which caused the Children to be removed from her care.  Mother’s 

first issue is without merit. 

- 15 - 

J-S43046-22 

 

In  her  second  issue  of  arguable  merit,  Mother  argues  the  trial  court 

abused its discretion when it found that termination best served  the Child's 

needs and welfare. Section 2511(b) provides: 

(b)  Other  considerations.--The  court  in  terminating  the 
rights  of  a  parent  shall  give  primary  consideration  to  the 
developmental,  physical  and  emotional  needs  and  welfare 
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 
solely  on  the  basis  of  environmental  factors  such  as 
inadequate  housing,  furnishings,  income,  clothing  and 
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 
With  respect  to  any  petition  filed  pursuant  to  subsection 
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 
filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 

This Court has explained that: 

[S]ection  2511(b)  focuses  on  whether  termination  of 
parental  rights  would  best  serve  the  developmental, 
physical,  and  emotional  needs  and  welfare  of  the  child. 
In In re  C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), 
this  Court  stated,  “Intangibles  such  as  love,  comfort, 
security,  and  stability  are  involved  in  the  inquiry  into  the 
needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed 
that the trial court must also discern the nature and status 
of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 
on  the  child  of  permanently  severing  that  bond. Id. 
However,  in  cases  where  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  bond 
between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 
bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 
2008).  Accordingly,  the  extent  of  the  bond-effect  analysis 
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 
case. Id. at 763. 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

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Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists, 

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child 

had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting 

bond to be too attenuated).  Moreover, the court is not required to use expert 

testimony  to  resolve  the  bond  analysis.    In  re  Z.P.,  994  A.2d  1108,  1121 

(citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)).    

“Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also 

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they 

have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.   Finally, we 

emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child 

is  a  major  aspect  of  the  Section  2511(b)  best-interest  analysis,  it  is 

nonetheless  only  one  of  many  factors  to  be  considered  by  the  court  when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.”  In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

Instantly, the trial court heard testimony about the needs and welfare 

of  the  Children.    The  trial  court  thoroughly  addressed  its  findings  on  the 

record.  See N.T., 8/11/22, at 100-115.  We note that only two of the Children, 

A.-R.D. 1 and A.-R.D.-2, had articulated a desire to see Mother, but they did 

not articulate a request to be returned to her care.  The court concluded that 

none of Children had a beneficial bond worth preserving.  For instance, once 

the  visits  between  the  Children  and  Mother  were  suspended,  the  Children 

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issue also lacks merit. 

began doing much better in foster care.  We conclude that Mother’s second 

Having concluded that the trial court properly terminated Mother’s rights 

as to each Child, we turn our focus to Mother’s third issue of arguable merit. 

Mother  claims  the  trial  court  erred  when  it  changed  the  goals  of  the 

dependency cases from reunification to adoption.  Because we have already 

concluded  that  termination  was  warranted,  we  dismiss  these  challenges  as 

moot.  See Interest of D.R.W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An 

issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter 

an order that has any legal force or effect.”). 

 

Finally,  we  must  conduct  our  independent  review  to  discern  whether 

there are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel, pursuant 

to Flowers, 113 A.2d at 1250.  Upon a “generous” review of the record, we 

discover no other issues of arguable merit.  See Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272.   

 

In sum, after review, we agree with counsel’s assessment that Mother’s 

issues  on  appeal  are  frivolous  and  that  the  Agency  presented  clear  and 

convincing  evidence  to  support  the  termination  of  Mother’s  parental  rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2) and (b).  We therefore grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and affirm the orphans’ court order terminating Mother’s 

Petition  to  withdraw  granted.    Termination  decrees  affirmed.    Goal 

parental rights.  

 

 

change orders affirmed.   

Judge Nichols joins the memorandum. 

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Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 

J-S43046-22 

case. 

 

        J

    J

  D

 

udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/17/2023 

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