[J-42-2022] 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
EASTERN DISTRICT 
 
BAER, C.J., TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ. 
 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,   

No. 2 EAP 2022 

ppeal from the Judgment of 

Superior Court entered on 
6/04/2021 at No. 1642 EDA 2020 
(reargument denied 08/17/2021) 
affirming the Order entered on 
08/18/2020 in the Court of Common 
Pleas, Philadelphia County, Criminal 
Division at No. CP-51-CR-0003284-
2008. 

RGUED:  September 13, 2022 

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OPINION 

Appellee 

 

 

 

v. 

 

 

ONTEZ PERRIN,   

Appellant 

   

     

   

    D

 

   

    J

USTICE MUNDY    

 

 

 

 

DECIDED:  March 21, 2023 

In this appeal by allowance, we are tasked with determining whether the trial court 

erred in refusing to accept a proposed stipulation as to witness credibility in the context 

of a post-sentence motion for a new trial.  As we determine that the trial court was well 

within its right to reject the proposed stipulation, we affirm its denial of Appellant’s motion. 

In 2010 Appellant Dontez Perrin was convicted after a non-jury trial of conspiracy, 

aggravated assault, robbery, possessing instruments of crime, simple assault, recklessly 

endangering another person, receiving stolen property, firearms not to be carried without 

a license, and possession of firearm by minor1 for his role in the robbery and assault of 

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 907(a), 2701(a), 2705, 3925(a), 6106(a)(1), 6110.1.  

 

the victim Rodney Thompson when Thompson arrived at an apartment to deliver a pizza.   

The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of five to ten years’ imprisonment. 

At Appellant’s trial, the Commonwealth presented two witnesses: Thompson and 

Lynwood  Perry,  who  admitted  he  participated  in  the  robbery.    Relevant  to  the  issue 

currently before the Court, at Appellant’s trial, Perry testified that Appellant participated in 

the Thompson robbery with him and Amir Jackson.  According to Perry, Jackson called 

to  order  the  pizza,  and  Jackson  and  Perry  went  to  wait  in  the  vacant  apartment  they 

identified over the phone.  When Thompson arrived with the pizza, Appellant came up 

behind  him  and  pushed  him  through  the  apartment  door,  where  he  was  beaten  and 

robbed  by  the  other  two  co-conspirators.  Perry  further  acknowledged  that  he  was 

testifying for the Commonwealth pursuant to a deal with the federal government in hopes 

of receiving a lighter sentence for federal charges stemming from his participation in the 

robbery of Thompson along with other robberies.2          

After Appellant’s direct appellate rights were reinstated nunc pro tunc, Appellant 

appealed his judgment of sentence to the Superior Court.  While that appeal was pending, 

the  Philadelphia  District  Attorney’s  Office  (DAO)  forwarded  to  Appellant’s  counsel 

communication it had received from the FBI.  The document contained a summary of an 

interview  FBI  Agent  Joseph  Majarowitz  conducted  with  Curtis  Brown,  who  had  been 

incarcerated  with  Perry  at  the  federal  detention  center.    During  that  interview,  Brown 

stated Perry spoke of testifying against Appellant, and Perry “indicated that he testified 

that Appellant was involved in the robbery because ‘someone had to “go down” for it,’ but 

that Appellant was not actually involved in the crime.”  Perrin I, 59 A.3d at 665.   

 

2  For  a  complete  description  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  underlying  Appellant’s 
conviction  see  Commonwealth  v.  Perrin,  59  A.3d  663  (Pa.  Super.  2013)  (Perrin  I), 
vacated & remanded, 103 A.3d 1224 (Pa. 2014) (per curiam). 

 
[J-42-2022] - 2 

In  light  of  the  Commonwealth’s  disclosure,  Appellant  filed  a  petition  with  the 

Superior  Court  to  remand  the  case  for  a  new  trial  or  to  pursue  an  after  discovered 

evidence petition with the trial court.  The intermediate court denied the petition without 

prejudice  to  Appellant’s  ability  to  raise  the  issue  in  his  appellate  brief.    Thereafter,  a 

divided Superior Court panel vacated Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remanded 

for Appellant to “flesh-out his claim” before the trial court with additional evidence.  See 

Complying with the Superior Court’s directive, the trial court ultimately conducted 

an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s after discovered evidence claim.3  At the evidentiary 

hearing4,  Appellant  presented  the  testimony  of  Agent  Majarowitz  and  Brown,  but  not 

hat he did not know [Appellant] but was cellmates with Perry for about two 
months at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia.  He testified that 
Perry  told  him  that  he  lied  on  the  stand  about  [Appellant’s]  involvement 
because he was hoping to get a more lenient sentence.  Brown testified that 
he only told Special Agent Majarowitz about Perry because he felt it was 
the right thing to do, not because he believed that he had to do so to get 
sentencing consideration in his case. 

  t

Perry.  As the Superior Court later summarized, Brown testified as follows: 

Commonwealth v. Perrin, 11 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 1777409 (Pa. Super.  Apr. 23, 2019) 

(“Perrin II”I) (unpublished).  The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a new trial, finding 

that  since  Appellant  did  not  call  Perry  to  testify,  the  testimony  of  Brown  and  Agent 

id. at 667.   

 

3  In  order  to  be  granted  a  new  trial  based  on  an  after  discovered  evidence  claim  a 
Defendant must show the evidence “1) has been discovered after trial and could not have 
been obtained at or prior to the conclusion of trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
2)  is  not  merely  corroborative  or  cumulative;  3)  will  not  be  used  solely  to  impeach  a 
witness’s credibility and 4) is of such a nature and character that a different verdict will 
likely result if a new trial is granted.”  Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 311 (Pa. 
2017), citing Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 1284 (Pa. 2005).    

4 For a full discussion of the procedural process that led to the evidentiary hearing see 
Commonwealth v. Perrin, 108 A.3d 50 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Perrin II”) 

 
[J-42-2022] - 3 

Majarowitz “was hearsay that [Appellant] could only use to impeach Perry’s credibility, a 

purpose prohibited by Pennsylvania precedent.”  Id. at *5.  Appellant again appealed. 

 

The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s ruling, determining that “Perry was 

‘unavailable’ within the meaning of Pa.R.E. 804[,]”5 and thus the testimony of Brown and 

Majarowitz was not excludable hearsay.  Id. at 7-9.  The court granted Appellant relief as 

W]e  vacate  the  court’s  order  denying  [Appellant’s]  motion  for  a  new  trial 
and  remand  for  the  determination  of  whether  Brown’s  testimony  was 
credible so as to justify a new trial.  We note that the original trial court judge 
who decided [Appellant’s] claim is no longer sitting.  Hence, on remand we 
direct the jurist appointed to handle this matter to hold a hearing at which 
[Appellant] shall present his witnesses again so that the trial court need not 
rely on a cold record to make its credibility determinations. 

Id. at *9 (citation omitted). 

On  remand,  the  case  was  scheduled  for  a  hearing  on  July  30,  2019,  but  was 

continued several times at the request of the parties.  On February 24, 2020, Appellant 

and the DAO’s Conviction Integrity Unit filed a Joint Memorandum of Law and Stipulations 

of Fact (Joint Stipulations).  The stipulations included:  

44. Brown testified at the [2017 evidentiary] hearing that: 
 

He did not know Perrin but was cellmates with Perry for about 
two months at the Federal Detention Center In Philadelphia.  
He testified that Perry told him that he lied on the stand about 
Perrin’s  involvement  because  he  was  hoping  to  get  a  more 

 

5 “A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant is absent from 
the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not been able, by process or other 
reasonable means, to procure the declarant’s attendance or testimony, in the case of a 
hearsay exception under Rule 804(B)(2), (3), or (4).”  Pa.R.E. 804(a)(5)(B).  The Superior 
Court  found  Perry’s  statement  was  admissible  pursuant  to  Pa.R.E.  804(b)(3)(B)  (“The 
following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness: … A statement that … is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly 
indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose 
the declarant to criminal liability.”  Perrin III, 11 EDA 2018 at *7-9.      

  [

follows: 

 

 

 
[J-42-2022] - 4 

lenient  sentence.    Brown  testified  that  he  only  told  Special 
Agent Majarowitz about Perry because he felt it was the right 
thing to do, not because he believed that he had to do so to 
get sentencing consideration in his case. 
 

47.  The  Parties  therefore  stipulate  that,  if  Brown  were  called  to  testify  at 
another  evidentiary  hearing,  his  testimony  will  be  consistent  with  the 
account he provided at the 2017 evidentiary hearing.   

4. If called to testify a second time, the Parties stipulate that Brown would 

do so credibly.   

  5

Joint  Stipulations,  2/24/2020  at  10-11  (emphasis  added).    The  Joint  Stipulations 

concluded  the  parties  have  “resolve[d]  the  only  remaining  factual  dispute”  –  Brown’s 

credibility – and since they stipulate “that Perry’s testimony can no longer be credited … 

there is no need” for an evidentiary hearing “to present Brown’s or Majarowitz’s testimony 

… a second time.” Id. at 13-14.  The DAO thus conceded that Appellant was entitled to a 

new trial based on his after discovered evidence claim. 

 

The trial court heard argument on the Joint Stipulations on March 12, 2020.  The 

court did not accept the stipulations and the case was continued for an evidentiary hearing 

on March 26, 2020, which was canceled due to the Covid-19 emergency.  A video status 

conference was held on July 9, 2020, at which time Appellant objected to the trial court’s 

decision  against  proceeding  by  stipulation,  which  the  trial  court  overruled  and 

rescheduled the evidentiary hearing to take place via video on August 6, 2020.  On that 

date,  the  trial  court  convened  the  evidentiary  hearing,  at  which  time  the  parties  again 

sought to proceed via stipulation, which the trial court again denied.  When the trial court 

called  for  presentation  of  evidence  by  Appellant,  his  counsel  declined,  stating  that 

presenting  Mr.  Brown’s  testimony  would  be  against  her  client’s  best  interest,  without 

further elaboration. 

 

The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a new trial, explaining that where the 

Superior  Court’s  remand  carried  “specific  instructions  to  hold  a  hearing  at  which  the 

 
[J-42-2022] - 5 

defense  ‘shall’  present  its  witnesses  in  order  for  [the  trial]  [c]ourt  to  make  credibility 

determinations[,]” Appellant’s refusal to present any witnesses prevented the court “from 

making the requisite determination as to … Brown’s credibility.”  Commonwealth v. Perrin, 

No.  CP-51-CR-0003284-2008,  Order,  at 2  n.1  (C.P.  Phila.  8/18/20).    The  court  further 

“concluded  that  the  determination  of  credibility  was  not  amendable  to  stipulation.”    Id.  

Appellant  appealed  to  the  Superior  Court,  arguing  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his 

motion for a new trial without considering the parties’ factual stipulations. 

 

On  appeal,  Appellant  argued  the  trial  court  was  required  to  accept  the  parties’ 

stipulation  that  Brown  was  credible.    He  acknowledged  that  the  Superior  Court’s  prior 

directive that the trial court hold a hearing to determine Brown’s credibility was reasonable 

at the time, but circumstances changed as the DAO agreed Brown was credible.  Thus, 

according to Appellant, the parties resolved the sole factual question at issue and there 

was no need to present Brown’s (or Agent Majarowitz’s) testimony a second time.  The 

DAO concurred in Appellant’s argument.  A panel of the Superior Court, however, found 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the parties’ stipulation and denying 

Appellant’s request for a new trial absent the presentation of testimony.  The panel agreed 

that  “usually,  parties  may  stipulate  as  to  what  a  witness  will  testify  to,  and  such  a 

stipulation promotes efficiency in litigation.” Commonwealth v. Perrin, 1642 EDA 2020, 

2021 WL 2288081 at *6 (Pa. Super., Aug. 28, 2020) (unpublished).  It found, however, 

that the parties ignored the court’s prior directive that on remand Appellant “shall present 

his witnesses again so that the trial court” could make its own credibility findings.  Id. at 

13 (quoting Perrin III, 11 EDA 2018 at *9) (emphasis provided by Superior Court).  The 

panel further found the Joint Stipulations failed to explain why Appellant could not present 

Brown or Agent Majarowitz at a new evidentiary hearing or how the DAO arrived at its 

 
[J-42-2022] - 6 

present position that Perry was not credible, after defending his credibility throughout the 

case.  Id. at *13-14.  

 

We granted Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal to address whether “the 

trial court abuse[d] its discretion in refusing to accept the parties’ stipulations regarding 

the credibility of witnesses[.]”  Commonwealth v. Perrin, 271 A.3d 1283 (Pa. 2022) (per 

curiam).  As the DAO’s position is aligned with that of Appellant, we invited the Attorney 

General  to  participate  in  the  case  as  amicus  curiae  and  to  file  a  brief  and  attend  oral 

argument.    The  Attorney  General  accepted  the  Court’s  invitation  and  filed  a  brief  and 

participated in oral argument.   

 

Initially, as this Court has previously explained, the “term ‘discretion’ imports the 

exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within 

the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will 

of the trial judge.”  Commonwealth v. Gill, 206 A.3d 459, 466 (Pa. 2019) (internal brackets, 

quotation marks and citation omitted).  An appellate court should not disturb a trial court’s 

discretionary ruling absent an abuse of discretion.  See id.  An abuse of discretion is more 

than merely an error of judgment but is rather the result of an error of law or is manifestly 

unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.  See Commonwealth v. 

DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290, 297 (Pa. 2021) (citing Gill, 206 A.3d at 466-67).   

 

The parties and the Attorney General all agree stipulations are a well-established 

and  critical  tool  for  resolving  undisputed  factual  issues.    Stipulations  help  litigants  and 

courts  narrow  the  issues  needing  to  be  decided,  encouraging  judicial  economy  and 

conserving  the  limited  resources  of  courts  and  litigants  alike.    There  is  disagreement, 

however, on what role, if any, courts should play in determining whether or not to accept 

factual stipulations proposed by the parties.  Appellant and the DAO argue that trial courts 

are required to accept all factual stipulations proposed by the parties and the courts do 

 
[J-42-2022] - 7 

not have any discretion to refuse to accept the proposed stipulations.  In their view, factual 

stipulations  are  binding  and  conclusive  on  a  trial  court.    Appellant’s  Brief  at  13  (citing 

Mader  v.  Duquesne  Light  Co., 214  A.3d 600,  615  (Pa.  2020));  DAO  Brief at 28  (citing 

Commonwealth v. Mathis, 163 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. Super. 1979); Falcione v. Cornell 

Sch.  Dist.,  557  A.2d  425,  428  (Pa.  Super.  1989)).    Thus,  in  their  view,  once  parties 

stipulate  to  certain  facts,  the  trial  court  is  obligated  to  accept  them  as  true  since,  in 

Appellant’s words, “courts resolve factual disputes between parties, they do not create 

them where none exist.”  Appellant’s Brief at 14.  The DAO goes further, arguing that if 

trial courts were permitted to reject factual stipulations proposed by the parties, the courts 

would be invading a prosecutor’s decision in what manner to prove their case, violating 

the principle of prosecutorial discretion.  DAO Brief at 34.   

 

In Appellant’s and the DAO’s view, this precept extends to stipulations pertaining 

to  witness  credibility.    Appellant  posits  that  there  is  no  distinction  between  factual 

stipulations and stipulations as to credibility because when parties stipulate that a witness 

will testify a certain way, they do so with the understanding that the witness will also testify 

credibly.  Appellant’s Brief at 15.  The DAO recognizes that when credibility is disputed, 

credibility determinations fall in the purview of the trial court, but that is not the case when 

the  parties  are  in  agreement.    DAO  Brief  at 34,  36.   Stipulations  hold  little  value  if  the 

credibility of the evidence remains in question and permitting trial courts to disregard such 

stipulations would burden both the parties and the courts.  Id. at 40.   

  

Appellant  and  the  DAO  both  rely  on  the  Superior  Court’s  prior  decision  in 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 215 A.3d 1019 (Pa.Super. 2019).  In Williams, the defendant 

had been convicted of various drug and firearms offenses in a non-jury trial.  Williams, 

215 A.3d at 1022.  The sole witness at Williams’s trial was the arresting officer.  Id.      After 

his sentence became final, he was informed by the Commonwealth of serious allegations 

 
[J-42-2022] - 8 

of misconduct by the arresting officer.  Id.  Williams in turn filed a PCRA petition and the 

Commonwealth agreed he was entitled to PCRA relief.  Id. Prior to an evidentiary hearing 

on  Williams’s  PCRA  petition,  he  and  the  Commonwealth  entered  into  stipulations 

regarding the arresting officer’s misconduct, indicating that similarly situated individuals 

had been granted relief, and reflecting that the Commonwealth no longer stood by the 

arresting officer’s credibility.  Id. at 1025. 

 

The  PCRA  court,  however,  denied relief.   Id.  at  1022.    On appeal,  the  Superior 

Court  reviewed  the  evidence,  including  the  stipulations  and  witness  affidavits  Williams 

submitted at his evidentiary hearing, and determined the PCRA court erred by denying 

Williams’  petition.    Unlike  the  proposed  stipulations  at  issue  herein,  the  stipulations  in 

Williams did not assert a potential witness at an evidentiary hearing would testify credibly.  

See  id.    Further,  again  unlike Appellant, the  defendant  in  Williams  submitted  evidence 

beyond the stipulations at his evidentiary hearing, specifically two witness affidavits and 

testimony  detailing  how  he  was  being  treated  differently  than  other  similarly  situated 

individuals.  See id.  The issue before the Superior Court in Williams was whether the 

PCRA  court erred  in denying Williams’s after  discovered  evidence claim  based  on the 

entire  record  before  it  and  not  whether  the  PCRA  court  erred  in  rejecting  a  proposed 

stipulation as to a potential witness’s credibility. As there was no proposed stipulation to 

witness credibility in Williams, it does not speak to the issue currently before the Court 

and the parties’ reliance on it is unpersuasive.      

  

The Attorney General, on the other hand, argues that while stipulations, even those 

related  to  credibility, play  a  vital  role  in  the  criminal  justice  process,  trial  courts  should 

retain the discretion to decline to accept factual stipulations regarding ultimate, dispositive 

issues of fact.  Attorney General Brief at 17.  This is especially true in criminal matters 

where the prosecution and the defense, the stipulating parties, are not the only parties 

 
[J-42-2022] - 9 

with an interest in the outcome of the case.  Id. at 20-21.  In the Attorney General’s view, 

the  issue  currently  before  the  Court  is  analogous  to  the  one  we  addressed  in 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130 (Pa. 2018).  Brown involved the trial court’s denial 

of PCRA relief in a capital case.  On appeal to this Court, the parties attempted to stipulate 

that the petitioner was entitled to sentencing relief due to ineffective assistance of his trial 

counsel.    According  to  the  Attorney  General,  this  Court  rejected  the  parties’  proposed 

stipulation, holding  that,  after  a  criminal  conviction,  “neither  the  parties,  by  agreement, 

nor  this  Court  absent  a  finding  of  legal  error,  have  the  power  or  ability”  to  disturb  the 

verdict.  Attorney General Brief at 17 (quoting Brown, 196 A.3d at 144).  The Attorney 

General  continues  that  we  rejected  the  Commonwealth’s  prosecutorial  discretion 

argument by holding that “[p]rosecutorial discretion provides no power to instruct a court 

to undo  the  verdict  without  all necessary and  appropriate  judicial  review.”   Id.  (quoting 

Brown, 196 A.3d at 146).  The Attorney General contends that our reasoning in Brown 

applies equally to the case sub judice, where the parties attempted to bind the trial court 

to a factual stipulation that dictated a specific legal conclusion, that Appellant was entitled 

to a new trial.  In the Attorney General’s view, any attempt to distinguish the scenarios 

based on a factual rather than legal stipulation is a distinction without a difference.   

 

In order to prevent the parties from circumventing the courts’ reviewing authority, 

the  Attorney  General  favors  recognizing  that  trial  courts  retain  discretion  to  accept  or 

reject  factual  dispositive  stipulations.    This  would  permit  trial  courts  to  determine  if  a 

hearing is required, despite the parties’ protestations.  Attorney General Brief at 25.  In 

such a scenario, the trial court would be the arbiter of whether or not the verdict should 

be overturned, exercising judicial review. 

 

We agree with the parties that factual stipulations are an integral and valuable part 

of our judicial system.  When parties can agree to narrow the factual disagreements at 

 
[J-42-2022] - 10 

issue, courts should encourage their effort.  Factual stipulations help conserve the limited 

resources of both the courts and the parties and can ease strain on a burdened judicial 

system.  As such, courts should generally willingly consider factual stipulations proposed 

by the parties.  Courts, however, retain an important role in overseeing the administration 

of the judicial process and cannot be relegated to a mere rubber stamp for the parties.  

 

“A stipulation is a declaration that the fact agreed upon is proven [, and a] valid 

stipulation must be enforced according to its terms.”  Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 

430, 460 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069, 1088 (Pa. 2001)).  

Therefore, for a stipulation to be enforceable it must be valid.  While parties have wide 

latitude to enter into valid and enforceable stipulations, that ability is not unfettered.  For 

example,  parties  cannot  stipulate  to  matters  affecting  the  jurisdiction,  business,  or 

convenience of the courts.  Mader v. Duquesne Light Co., 241 A.3d 600 (citing Northbrook 

Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  949  A.2d  333,  337  (Pa.  2008)).    These  areas  are  not 

subject to stipulation by the parties as they are inherently and traditionally the prerogative 

of the judiciary.  Determinations of witness credibility affecting a post-sentence motion for 

a new trial, like the situation at bar, similarly belong to the court as the finder of fact.  See 

Commonwealth  v.  Mitchell,  141  A.3d  1277,  1282  (Pa.  2016)  (emphasizing  the  PCRA 

court’s 

“exclusive  prerogative 

to  make  credibility  determinations”);  see  also 

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 26-27 (Pa. 2011) (“The finder of fact – here, the 

jury – exclusively weighs the evidence, assesses the credibility of witnesses, and may 

choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.”) (citing Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 

860 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. 2004)).   A trial court considering a defendant’s post-sentence 

motion for a new trial sits as the finder of fact and judges whether the evidence supports 

the defendant’s request.   As such, the question of witness credibility in such a scenario 

is  in  the  sole  prerogative  of  the  trial  court.    The  parties  accordingly  do  not  have  the 

 
[J-42-2022] - 11 

authority in post-verdict litigation to enter into a valid and enforceable stipulation as to any 

potential witnesses’ credibility and bind the court thereto, as that would interfere with the 

role of the post-verdict court.  

 

  This Court has previously held that “the parties may stipulate, and be bound by 

their  acts  as  the  law  of  the  case,  in  all  matters  affecting  them  without  affecting  the 

jurisdiction  and  prerogatives  of  the  court.”    Foley  Bros.  v.  Commonwealth  Dep’t  of 

Highways,  163 A.2d  80,  83-84  (Pa. 1960).   Once a  guilty  verdict  is  handed  down  in a 

criminal case, however, the matter no longer solely affects the parties. At that point the 

community has an interest in the verdict.  See Brown, 196 A.3d at 146 (“A representative 

cross section of the community has issued its decision, and the prosecutor, having sought 

and obtained the death sentence, may not thereafter unilaterally alter that decision.  The 

community now has an interest in the verdict, which may thereafter be disrupted only if a 

court finds legal error.”);6 accord State v. Tangalin, 657 P.2d 1025 (Haw. 1983) (“[I]t is 

well established that matters affecting the public interest cannot be made the subject of 

stipulations so as to control the court’s action with respect thereto.  Criminal cases are 

per  se  matters  affecting  public  interest  and  so  the  court’s  determination  of  credibility 

cannot be controlled by the parties’ stipulations.”).  As the community in the post-sentence 

timeframe  has  an  interest  in  the  case,  a  stipulation  purporting  to  establish  witness 

credibility in a post-sentence motion for a new trial is not one that solely affects the parties.  

Where, as here, a defendant files a post-sentence motion for a new trial based on an after 

discovered  evidence  claim,  the  defendant  must  meet  four  specific  requirements.    See 

supra  at  3,  n.3  (setting  forth  requirements  for  an  after  discovered  evidence  claim).    In 

 

6 Brown addressed a situation where a defendant was challenging a jury’s imposition of 
the death penalty, while the verdict in the case sub judice was issued by the trial court 
after a non-jury trial.  The community’s interest in the verdict is the same in either case, 
as it stems from the entry of the verdict rather than how that verdict was reached. 

 
[J-42-2022] - 12 

such circumstances, the trial court sits as the finder of fact and the sole arbiter of issues 

of witness credibility.  See Mitchell, 141 A.3d at 1282.   That being the case, any attempt 

by  the  parties  to  force  the  trial  court  to  accept  a  proposed  stipulation  as  to  witness 

credibility does not solely affect the parties and intrudes on the jurisdiction and prerogative 

of the court.   Parties cannot require the court to accept any such stipulation as binding 

during post-verdict fact-finding.7   

 

Appellant was convicted by the trial court after a non-jury trial.  He then ultimately 

filed a post-sentence motion for a new trial.  The determination of whether he was entitled 

to relief laid in the discretion of the trial court.  As the factfinder, the trial court had sole 

authority to make determinations as to witness credibility.     As such, the parties’ attempt 

to  stipulate  as  to  Brown’s  credibility  intruded  into  the  trial  court’s  jurisdiction  and 

prerogative.  Thus, the Joint Stipulations purporting to stipulate that Brown would testify 

credibly was neither valid nor enforceable.  The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its 

discretion in refusing to accept the parties’ proposed stipulation.  The order of the Superior 

Court is affirmed.8 

 

7 We do not address the question of whether the trial court, in its discretion, may accept 
a proposed stipulation as to witness credibility as that is not the circumstance currently 
before the Court.  The Court’s “adjudicatory process is structured to cast a narrow focus 
on matters framed by the litigants before the Court in a highly directed fashion, and, as 
such,  we  sit  to  decide  concrete  cases.”  D.P.  v.  G.J.P.,  146  A.3d  204,  217  (Pa.  2016) 
(internal  quotation  marks  and  citations  omitted)  (stating  that  consideration  of  the 
constitutionality  of  a  portion  of  the  custody  statute  granting  grandparents  standing  in 
certain circumstances that were not at issue in the case should be left for a case where 
the issue was squarely before the Court).   

8 We note that in addition to the question of whether the parties can force the trial court 
to  accept  a  stipulation  as  to  witness  credibility,  this  case  also  includes  the  additional 
circumstance of the directive by the Superior Court to the trial court to hold a hearing to 
assess the witnesses’ credibility.  Appellant argues that the trial court was not bound by 
this directive due to a change in circumstances, i.e., the parties’ agreement that Brown’s 
testimony was credible.  The DAO’s advocacy, on the other hand, does not address the 
Superior Court’s directive.  Neither party offers any support for the premise that the trial 
court was free to ignore the Superior Court’s directive let alone that the parties had the 
(continued…) 

 
[J-42-2022] - 13 

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht and Brobson join the 
opinion. 

ustice Dougherty files a concurring opinion in which Justice Wecht joins. 

he Late Chief Justice Baer did not participate in the decision of this matter. 

                     

  J

  T

 

  

authority to mandate that the trial court do so.  We need not reach this issue as we have 
resolved the issue raised herein on a different basis.    

 

 
[J-42-2022] - 14