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J-A26009-22  
J-A26010-22  
 
 

 

v. 

2023 PA SUPER 47 

JENNIFER SANTIAGO AND SAMUEL 
SANTIAGO 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

HILLY TRAMPOLINE PARK, LLC I/P/A 

SKY ZONE, D/B/A SKY ZONE 
TRAMPOLINE PARK D/B/A SKY ZONE 
PHILADELPHIA, SKY ZONE 
PHILADELPHIA, INC., SKY ZONE 
TRAMPOLINE PARK A/K/A SKY ZONE 
PHILADELPHIA       

 

 

Appellants 

 No. 2615 EDA 2021 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2021 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 
No(s):  February Term, 2021, No. 021 
 

ALESSANDRA SHULTZ, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS P.N.G. FOR 
ROCCO SHULTZ, A MINOR 

  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
           PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

KY ZONE, LLC       

 

 

 

Appellant 

 No. 664 EDA 2022 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 25, 2022 
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 
No(s):  200701660 

EFORE:   BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.* 

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: 

 

 

 

     FILED MARCH 21, 2023 

____________________________________________ 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

   

  P

   

   

  S

   

 

 

 

   

  B

  

J-A26009-22  
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In these separate appeals, we are tasked with deciding an issue of first 

impression  in  Pennsylvania:    whether  a  parent’s  role  as  natural  guardian 

entitles the parent to bind a minor child to an arbitration agreement and waive 

that child’s right to seek redress for injuries in a court of law.  Answering that 

question  in  the  negative  and  concluding  that  the  respective  trial  courts 

likewise  properly  resolved  whether  the  parents’  claims  were  subject  to 

arbitration,  we  affirm  both  of  the  appealed-from  orders  that  ruled  upon 

motions to compel arbitration filed by Appellant, Sky Zone.1 

I. 

Facts and Procedural History2 

A. 

The Shultz Plaintiffs 

 

 

In August 2018, Ryan Shultz took two minors, including his son Rocco, 

to Sky Zone, a Philadelphia trampoline park.  In order for the children to use 

the facilities, Mr. Shultz was required to execute a six-page document entitled 

“Participant  Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk (The Agreement).”  

Petition to Compel Arbitration, 1/21/21, Exhibit B at 1.  In addition to, among 

other things, recognizing a voluntary assumption of risk, allowing Sky Zone to 

____________________________________________ 

1    In  one  case,  the  plaintiffs  brought  their  claims  against  Philly  Trampoline 
Park, LLC I/P/A Sky Zone, D/B/A Sky Zone Trampoline Park D/B/A Sky Zone 
Philadelphia,  Sky  Zone  Philadelphia,  Inc.,  and  Sky  Zone  Trampoline  Park 
A/K/A Sky Zone Philadelphia, while in the other, Sky Zone, LLC is the named 
defendant.  For ease of discussion, we refer to the appellants in both cases, 
who are all represented by the same counsel, as “Sky Zone.”   

2  We derive the underlying facts by accepting as true the allegations of the 
plaintiffs’  complaints  and  from  the  record  created  for  adjudication  of  the 
motions to compel arbitration. 

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use  the  children’s’  images  on  social  media,  agreeing  to  receive  e-mail 

promotions, and  broadly acknowledging “that if I or any  of my children are 

injured in any way, this waiver prevents and prohibits any recovery of money 

from  any  Sky  Zone  related  entity,”  id.  at  6  (emphasis  omitted),  the 

Agreement contained the following arbitration provision: 

ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES; TIME LIMIT TO BRING CLAIM 

  I understand that by agreeing to arbitrate any dispute as set 
forth in this section, I am waiving my right, and the right(s) of 
the  minor  child(ren)  above,  to  maintain  a  lawsuit  against  SZ 
and the other Releasees for any and all claims covered by this 
Agreement.  By agreeing to arbitrate, I understand that I will 
NOT  have  the  right  to  have  my  claim  determined  by  a  jury, 
and the minor child(ren) above will NOT have the right to have 
claim(s) determined by a jury.  Reciprocally, SZ and the other 
Releasees  waive  their  right  to  maintain  a  lawsuit  against  me 
and the minor child(ren) above for any and all claims covered 
by  this  Agreement,  and  they  will  not  have  the  right  to  have 
their claim(s) determined by a jury.  ANY DISPUTE, CLAIM 
OR  CONTROVERSY  ARISING  OUT  OF  OR  RELATING  TO 
MY OR THE CHILD’S ACCESS TO AND/OR USE OF THE SKY 
ZONE PREMISES AND/OR ITS EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING 
THE DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE OR APPLICABILITY 
OF  THIS  AGREEMENT  TO  ARBITRATE,  SHALL  BE 
BROUGHT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF ITS ACCRUAL (i.e., the 
date  of  the  alleged  injury)  AND  BE  DETERMINED  BY 
ARBITRATION  IN  THE  COUNTY  OF  THE  SKY  ZONE 
FACILITY,  PENNSYLVANIA,  BEFORE  ONE  ARBITRATOR. 
THE  ARBITRATION  SHALL  BE  ADMINISTERED  BY  JAMS 
PURSUANT TO ITS RULE 16.1 EXPEDITED ARBITRATION 
RULES  AND  PROCEDURES.  JUDGMENT  ON  THE  AWARD 
MAY  BE  ENTERED 
IN  ANY  COURT  HAVING 
JURISDICTION.  THIS  CLAUSE  SHALL  NOT  PRECLUDE 
PARTIES  FROM  SEEKING  PROVISIONAL  REMEDIES  IN 
AID OF ARBITRATION FROM A COURT OF APPROPRIATE 
JURISDICTION.    This  Agreement  shall  be  governed  by, 
construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the 
Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania,  without  regard  to  choice  of 
law principles.  Notwithstanding the provision with respect to 

  

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the  applicable  substantive  law,  any  arbitration  conducted 
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement shall be governed by 
the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C., Sec. 1-16).  I understand 
and  acknowledge  that  the  JAMS  Arbitration  Rules  to  which  I 
agree are available online for my review at jamsadr.com, and 
include JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures; 
Rule  16.1  Expedited  Procedures;  and,  Policy  On  Consumer 
Minimum Standards Of Procedural Fairness. 

 

Id. at 3-4 (emphases in original).  Mr. Shultz identified Rocco as one of the 

minor participants in the Sky Zone activities, and electronically executed the 

Agreement below the following provision: 

By signing below, I represent and warrant that I am the parent, 
legal guardian, or power-of-attorney of the above listed Child(ren) 
and have the authority to execute this Agreement on his/her or 
their behalf and to act on his/her or their behalf.  I have read each 
paragraph in this document and I and they agree to be bound by 
the  terms  stated  therein,  including  the  release  of  liability 
contained therein.  I further agree to indemnify and hold harmless 
the Releasees from any and all claims which are brought by or on 
behalf  of  this  or  these  minor  Child  or  Children,  or  any  of  them, 
which are in any way connected with, arise out of, or result from 
their use of the Sky Zone Facility.  I am 18 years of age or older. 
I am entering this agreement on behalf of myself, my spouse or 
domestic partner, the Child, and our respective and/or collective 
issue, parents, siblings, heirs, assigns, personal representatives, 
estate(s),  and  anyone  else  who  can  claim  by  or  through  such 
person or persons (collectively, the "Releasing Parties"). 
 

Id. at 5-6.  While utilizing the facilities, five-year-old Rocco was injured when 

an  older,  larger  child  jumped  on  the  same  trampoline  as  Rocco.    See 

Complaint, 7/24/20, at ¶ 8.   

 

On  July  24,  2020,  Alessandra  Shultz,  who  is  Rocco’s  mother,  filed  a 

complaint  in her  own right and on behalf of Rocco in the Court of Common 

Pleas  of  Philadelphia  County,  seeking  personal  injury  damages  related  to 

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Rocco’s injury and for Ms. Shultz to recover the costs of his medical treatment.  

Sky  Zone  filed  a  petition  to  compel  arbitration  and  stay  the  litigation.  

Following discovery on the matters raised in Sky Zone’s petition, the trial court 

denied it by order of January 25, 2022.   The Honorable Stella M. Tsai ruled 

that  Ms.  Shultz  was  not  bound  by  Mr.  Shultz’s  execution  of  the  agreement 

because he was not acting as her agent when he signed it, and that parents 

lack  the  authority  to  waive  their  children’s  rights  to  file  a  lawsuit  for  their 

injuries.  See Order, 1/25/22, at 2, 5.    

 

On February 24, 2022, Sky Zone filed a notice of appeal, and both Sky 

Zone and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.  Sky Zone states the 

following questions in the Shultz appeal: 

1.   Whether the trial court erred in finding that the arbitration 
provision set forth in the waiver signed by [Mr. Shultz] has 
no binding effect on the claims of [Ms. Shultz] who was his 
wife—and  therefore,  acting  as  her  agent—at  the  time  he 
signed the waiver. 

.   Whether the trial court erred in finding that the claims made 
by [Rocco] are not  subject to  the arbitration provision set 
forth in the waiver signed by [Mr. Shultz], such that minor 
[Rocco] may now disavow this waiver and bring his claims 
—which  fall  squarely  within  the  scope  of  the  arbitration 
provision—before a court of law. 

  2

 

Sky Zone’s brief (Shultz) at 12 (cleaned up).   

B. 

The Santiago Plaintiffs 

 

In February 2019, Jennifer Santiago took her two minor daughters to a 

different  Sky  Zone  location.    Prior  to  their  admittance  to  the  play  area, 

Ms. Santiago executed the same six-page digital Agreement as did Mr. Shultz, 

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disputes.   

acknowledging that she was waiving her rights, as well as those of her spouse 

and  children,  to  seek  redress  in  a  jury  trial  for  any  injuries  sustained  or  to 

recover  any  damages  for  such  an  injury,  and  agreeing  to  arbitrate  any 

 

Isabella  Santiago,  then  three  years  old,  proceeded  to  play  on  a 

trampoline during designated “toddler time” in a “toddler zone.”  Complaint, 

2/23/21, at ¶ 23.  In the absence of any Sky Zone employee monitoring the 

area, an adult male elected to use the same trampoline as the child.  Id. at 

¶¶ 23-24.  The  man’s  jumping  threw  Isabella  toward  another  trampoline, 

causing  her  to  fracture  her  knee  on  the  seam  in  between  and  to  require 

immediate and future medical care.  Id. at ¶¶ 23, 27, 29.   

 

Ms.  Santiago  and  her  husband,  Samuel  Santiago,  individually  and  on 

Isabella’s  behalf,  filed  a  complaint  in  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  of 

Philadelphia County seeking to recover money damages related to Isabella’s 

injury.    Sky  Zone  moved  to  stay  the  court  proceedings  and  to  compel 

arbitration, contending that the Agreement was a valid arbitration agreement 

and  that  all  three  plaintiffs’  claims  were  within  its  scope.    The  Santiagos 

responded,  acknowledging  that  Ms.  Santiago  executed  the  Agreement,  but 

denying  its  validity  to  compel  arbitration  of  the  claims  of  Mr.  Santiago  or 

Isabella.  Specifically, they contended that Ms. Santiago’s unilateral execution 

of the Agreement was ineffective to bind her spouse or her child.   

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The  trial  court  ordered  discovery  limited  to  Sky  Zone’s  petition,  after 

which  the  parties  filed  supplemental  briefs.    On  August  23,  2021,  the 

Honorable  Angelo  J.  Foglietta  denied  Sky  Zone’s  petition.    Sky  Zone  filed  a 

motion  for  the  trial  court  to  amend  its  order  to  certify  it  as  immediately 

appealable  pursuant  to  42  Pa.C.S.  §  702(b)  and  to  stay  the  action  pending 

appeal.  The trial court denied the motion to amend by order of October 12, 

2021.   

On  November  4,  2021,  Sky  Zone  filed  in  this  Court  a  petition  for 

permission to appeal, which we denied as moot because an order denying an 

application  to  compel  arbitration  is  immediately  appealable  as  of  right 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 7320(a)(1).  Instead, we treated Sky Zone’s petition 

as  a  notice  of  appeal  in  accordance  with  Pa.R.A.P.  1316(a)  (“The  appellate 

court  shall  treat  a  request  for  discretionary  review  of  an  order  that  is 

immediately  appealable  as  a  notice  of  appeal  if  a  party  has  filed  a  timely 

petition for permission to appeal[.]”).  Thereafter, both Sky Zone and the trial 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Sky  Zone  presents  this  Court  with  the  following  questions  in  the 

Santiago appeal: 

1.   Whether the trial court erred in denying [Sky Zone’s] motion 
to  amend  order  and  stay  litigation,  where  amending  and 
certifying the order denying [Sky Zone’s] motion to compel 
arbitration  and  stay  litigation  for  immediate  appeal  would 
materially advance the ultimate termination of this matter 
and involves a controlling question of law as to which there 
is substantial ground for difference of opinion?  

 

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2.   Whether the trial court erred in denying [Sky Zone’s] motion 
to  compel  arbitration  and  stay  litigation  thereby  allowing 
Plaintiffs to continue to litigate their respective claims before 
the trial court, where the participant agreement, release and 
assumption  signed  by  [Ms.  Santiago]  included  a  provision 
that  clearly  and  unambiguously  required  that  any  and  all 
disputes, claims, or controversies arising out of or relating 
to [Isabella’s] use of [Sky Zone’s] premises and equipment 
be submitted to and settled by binding arbitration? 

 

Sky Zone’s brief (Santiago) at 7-8 (re-ordered and cleaned up). 

II.  Applicable Legal Principles 

 

We  begin  our  examination  of  Sky  Zone’s  issues  with  a  review  of  the 

governing legal principles.  “An order denying a petition to compel arbitration 

is  an  interlocutory  order  appealable  as  of  right.”3    Fineman,  Krekstein  & 

Harris,  P.C.  v.  Perr,  278  A.3d  385,  389  (Pa.Super.  2022)  (cleaned  up).  

“[W]e employ a two-part test to determine whether the trial court should have 

compelled  arbitration.    First,  we  examine  whether  a  valid  agreement  to 

arbitrate  exists.    Second,  we  must  determine  whether  the  dispute  is  within 

the scope of the agreement.”  Id. (cleaned up).   

 

Our  standard  of  review  “is  limited  to  determining  whether  the  trial 

court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial 

court  abused  its  discretion  in  denying  the  petition.”    Id.  (cleaned  up).  

However, “[w]hether a claim is within the scope of an arbitration provision is 

____________________________________________ 

3  This resolves Sky Zone’s first question in the Santiago appeal:  because Sky 
Zone had a statutory right to immediately appeal from the order denying its 
petition to compel arbitration, there was no need for the trial court to certify 
it for immediate appeal pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b). 

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a matter of contract, and as with all questions of law, our review of the trial 

court’s conclusion is plenary.”  Id. (cleaned up).   

When addressing the issue of whether there is a valid agreement 
to  arbitrate,  courts  generally  should  apply  ordinary  state-law 
principles that govern the formation of contracts, but in doing so, 
must  give  due  regard  to  the  federal  policy  favoring  arbitration.  
However,  the  mere  existence  of  an  arbitration  provision  and  a 
liberal  policy  favoring  arbitration  does  not  require  the  rubber 
stamping of all disputes as subject to arbitration. 
 

Adams v. Mt. Lebanon Operations, LLC, 276 A.3d 1203, 1206 (Pa.Super. 

2022) (cleaned up).   

 

As  a  general  rule  of  contract  law,  only  the  parties  to  an  arbitration 

agreement  may  be  compelled  to  arbitrate.    See,  e.g.,  Humphrey  v. 

GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 263 A.3d 8, 14 (Pa.Super. 2021) (“[A] party cannot 

be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so 

to  submit.”  (cleaned  up)).    “Nevertheless,  a  party  can  be  compelled  to 

arbitrate under an agreement, even if he or she did not sign that agreement, 

if common law principles of agency and contract support such an obligation 

on his or her part.”4   Id. at 15 (cleaned up).   

____________________________________________ 

4  We observe that a third-party beneficiary to a contract may also be bound 
by  an  arbitration  agreement  contained  therein.    See,  e.g.,  Pisano  v. 
Extendicare  Homes,  Inc.,  77  A.3d  651,  661  (Pa.Super.  2013)  (“[A] 
nonparty, such as  a third-party beneficiary, may fall within the scope of an 
arbitration  agreement  if  that  is  the  parties’  intent.”).    Sky  Zone  does  not 
contend  that  the  minors  are  bound  as  third-party  beneficiaries  to  the 
Agreement.  Accordingly, we do not consider third-party-beneficiary status as 
a basis for deciding whether the minors are bound by the arbitration provision 
of the Agreement.    

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The existence of an agency relationship is a factual question for which 

the party asserting an agency relationship has the burden of proof.  See, e.g., 

McIlwain  v.  Saber  Healthcare  Grp.,  Inc.,  LLC,  208  A.3d  478,  485 

(Pa.Super. 2019).  There are four ways to create an agency relationship:  “(1) 

express  authority,  (2)  implied  authority,  (3)  apparent  authority,  and/or  (4) 

authority by estoppel.”  Id. (cleaned up).  As this Court has summarized: 

Express  authority  exists  where  the  principal  deliberately  and 
specifically  grants  authority  to  the  agent  as  to  certain  matters.  
Implied authority exists in situations where the agent’s actions are 
proper,  usual  and  necessary  to  carry  out  express  agency.  
Apparent  authority  exists  where  the  principal,  by  word  or 
conduct,  causes  people  with  whom  the  alleged  agent  deals  to 
believe that the principal has granted the agent authority to act.  
Authority  by  estoppel  occurs  when  the  principal  fails  to  take 
reasonable steps to disavow the third party of their belief that the 
purported agent was authorized to act on behalf of the principal. 
 

Id. (cleaned up, emphases added).  Hence, in determining whether a person 

is the agent of another, the focus is on the conduct of the principal, not on 

that of the purported agent.  See, e.g., id. at 486 (“[A]n agent cannot simply, 

by her own words, invest herself with apparent authority.”).   

Critically, “[a]gency cannot be inferred from mere relationships or family 

ties, and we do not assume agency merely because one person acts on behalf 

of another.”  Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC, 124 A.3d 317, 

323 (Pa.Super. 2015).  See also US Coal Corp. v. Dinning, 222 A.3d 431, 

441  (Pa.Super.  2019)  (“The  relationship  of  agency  cannot  be  inferred  from 

mere  relationship  or  family  ties  unattended  by  conditions,  acts  or  conduct 

clearly implying an agency.” (cleaned up)).  Specifically, “[i]t is well settled 

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that neither a husband nor wife has the power to act as agent for the other 

merely due to the marriage relationship.”  Washburn v. N. Health Facilities, 

Inc.,  121  A.3d  1008,  1014  (Pa.Super.  2015).    “Rather,  we  look  to  facts  to 

determine whether the principal expressly or impliedly intended to create an 

agency relationship.  To that end, family ties may be relevant when considered 

with other factors evincing agency.”  Wisler, supra at 323 (emphasis added).   

III.  Analysis 

 

With  the  above  principles  in  mind,  we  turn  to  Sky  Zone’s  appellate 

issues, beginning with its claims that the trial courts improperly ruled that the 

parent signing each Agreement was not the agent for his or her absent spouse 

for purposes of agreeing to arbitrate any claims arising from the children’s use 

of the facilities.    

A.  Mr. Santiago  

 

 

Sky Zone asserts that the evidence demonstrated that Ms. Santiago had 

apparent and implied authority to sign the Agreement as Mr. Santiago’s agent.  

Sky Zone’s brief (Santiago) at 24.  Sky Zone observes that it is undisputed 

that  the  Santiagos  were  married  at  the  time  Ms.  Santiago  signed  the 

Agreement purporting to bind herself and spouse.  Id. at 22.  Sky Zone argues 

that,  “by  nature  of  their  marital  relationship  and  her  role  as  [Isabella’s] 

mother, [Ms.] Santiago had apparent authority to bind [Mr.] Santiago to the 

terms  of  the  Agreement,”  and  “caused  [Sky  Zone]  to  believe  that  she  had 

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Id. at 23.   

authority to sign the Agreement on both her own and [Mr.] Santiago’s behalf.”  

Sky Zone further posits that it “cannot possibly be expected to ask each 

and every patron, in signing the agreement, if they have actual authority to 

sign on behalf of their spouse.”  Id. at 24.  It maintains that, “[i]nstead, it 

was reasonable for [Sky Zone] to rely upon the representations of the signing 

spouse as to her authority to sign on behalf of her husband.”  Id.   

 

We find Sky Zone’s arguments wholly unavailing.  Sky Zone improperly 

focuses  on  the  actions  of  the  purported  agent,  not  that  of  the  non-signing 

principal, in asserting implied and apparent authority in this case.  As noted 

above, implied authority only pertains where the agent’s actions are necessary 

to  carry  out  express  agency.    See  McIlwain,  supra  at  485.    Here,  the 

certified  record  contains  no  evidence  that  Mr.  Santiago  deliberately  and 

specifically granted his wife authority to sign as his agent, defeating any claim 

of either express or implied agency.   

Similarly, apparent authority is present “where the principal, by word 

or conduct, causes people with whom the alleged agent deals to believe that 

the principal has granted the agent authority to act.”  Id. (emphasis added).   

Sky Zone cites no evidence that Mr. Santiago had any interaction at all with 

Sky Zone, let alone that he caused it by his word or deed to believe that Ms. 

Santiago was his agent.  Rather, it relies solely upon the familial relationship 

and  the  conduct  of  the  purported  agent  to  support  its  assertion  of  agency, 

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which is a meritless argument.  See, e.g., US Coal Corp., supra at 441 (“The 

relationship of agency cannot be inferred from mere relationship or family ties 

unattended  by  conditions,  acts  or  conduct  clearly  implying  an  agency.”  

(cleaned 

up)). 

  Absent 

verbal 

or 

nonverbal 

communication 

from Mr. Santiago  that  caused  Sky  Zone  to  believe  that  he  authorized 

Ms. Santiago  to  agree  on  his  behalf  to  arbitrate  any  claims,  Sky  Zone  has 

failed  to  establish  that  Ms.  Santiago  had  apparent  authority  to  act  as  her 

husband’s agent.   

 

We  further  reject  Sky  Zone’s  lament  that  it  “cannot  possibly  be 

expected” to make sure that a person executing its digital Agreement had the 

authority to agree on her own behalf as well as that of her “spouse or domestic 

partner,  the  Child,  and  our  respective  and/or  collective  issue,  parents, 

siblings, heirs, assigns, personal representatives, estate(s), and anyone else 

who  can  claim  by  or  through  such  person  or  persons.”    Petition  to  Compel 

Arbitration, 1/21/21, Exhibit B at 6.  It is well-settled that a third party must 

exercise reasonable diligence to determine the authority of an apparent agent, 

and “can rely on the apparent authority of an agent when this is a reasonable 

interpretation  of  the  manifestations  of  the  principal.”    Bolus  v.  United 

Penn Bank, 525 A.2d 1215, 1222 (Pa.Super. 1987).  Sky Zone has presented 

no evidence of any diligence in learning whether Mr. Santiago authorized his 

wife to bind him to arbitration and no indication that Mr. Santiago otherwise 

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Agreement.   

manifested  such  an  intent  to  Sky  Zone  prior  to  her  execution  of  the 

It is axiomatic in the law of contracts that only parties to the agreement 

are bound thereby.  See, e.g., Humphrey, supra at 14 (“[A] party cannot 

be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so 

to  submit.”  (cleaned  up)).    If  Sky  Zone  wishes  to  create  enforceable 

agreements to arbitrate from the laundry list of people it  seeks to preclude 

from filing claims against it in a court of law, then obtaining the assent of each 

of those persons, directly or through the recognized principles of agency,  is 

precisely what it must do. 

B.  Ms. Shultz 

 

 

Sky Zone’s arguments as to Ms. Shultz are nearly identical to those it 

proffered  as  to  Mr.  Santiago.    Sky  Zone  maintains  that,  given  their  marital 

relationship  and  his  role  as  Rocco’s  father,  and  Mr.  Shultz’s  representation 

that he had authority to sign for his spouse and anyone else associated with 

Rocco,  Mr.  Shultz  had  the  apparent  authority  to  bind  Ms.  Shultz  to  the 

arbitration agreement.  See Sky Zone’s brief (Shultz) at 29.   

Sky  Zone  offers  two  additional  facts  in  the  Shultz  case  to  support  its 

agency  contentions.    First,  it  asserts  that  Ms.  Shultz  offered  testimony 

indicating that her husband had authority to sign the Agreement on her behalf.  

Id.  at  28.    Specifically,  Sky  Zone  represents  that  Ms.  Shultz  testified  that 

Mr. Shultz “would have been the parent to sign any contracts for the both of 

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them  on  behalf  of  their  children,”  and  that,  while  she  recalled  no  specific 

instances of that happening, “it would not have been surprising to her if he 

had  done  so.”    Id.  at  28-29.    Sky  Zone  suggests  that  this  evinces  that 

Mr. Shultz  “had  implied  and  apparent  authority  to  sign  the  Agreement  on 

[Ms.] Shultz’s behalf and bind her to the terms of this Agreement.”  Id. at 29.  

Indeed, Sky Zone goes so far as to say that Ms. Shultz “affirmatively testified” 

that  Mr.  Shultz  had  her  “approval  to  execute  a  contract  on  her  behalf  as  it 

relates  to  their  children”  and  that  he  “exercised  this  authority  on  a  regular 

basis.”  Id. at 29-30.   

 

These  assertions  are  not  supported  by  the  certified  record.    The  two 

pages of Ms. Shultz’s deposition transcript upon which Sky Zone relies neither 

contains any such testimony nor supports the representations made by Sky 

Zone.5  One begins  mid-question with “to is, would  it  have surprised you  if 

[Mr. Shultz] had signed that?” to which Ms. Shultz answered, “No.  I guess 

not, no.” and contains no other pertinent testimony.   Supplemental Brief in 

Support of Response to Motion to Compel Arbitration, 6/29/21, at Exhibit B 

(Deposition of Ms. Shultz, 5/19/21, at 28).  The other contains the following, 

abruptly-ending excerpt: 

Q   Do you know if [Mr.] Shultz has ever signed any contracts 
or agreements on behalf of you as a couple? 
 

____________________________________________ 

5    Sky  Zone  did  not  include  the  entirety  of  the  transcript  of  Ms.  Shultz’s 
deposition,  but  rather  excerpts  of  a  page  here  and  a  page  there  lacking 
context.   

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I think you mentioned soccer at some point before this. 

He has been unable to since this happened. 

But prior to this, he did play soccer? 

   Did you ever have to sign anything in connection with that? 

I’m sure Ryan did.  I don’t think I did. 

So  Ryan  Shultz  signed  something,  you  think,  on  behalf  of 

Rocco in order to allow him to play soccer? 

Counsel for Ms. Shultz]:  

If you know.  I’m fine with [. . . .] 

Supplemental  Brief  in  Support  of  Motion  to  Compel  Arbitration,  6/29/21,  at 

Exhibit 1 (Deposition of Ms. Shultz, 5/19/21, at 45).   

 

This  evidence  suggests  that  Mr.  Shultz  might  have  signed  some 

undisclosed  paperwork  at  some  indefinite  time  for  Rocco  to  play  soccer.    It 

comes woefully short of indicating that Ms. Shultz gave her husband blanket 

authority  to  bind  her  to  contracts  and  that  he  exercised  that  authority 

frequently.  Moreover, nothing Ms. Shultz stated in her May 2021 deposition 

suggests that she caused Sky Zone to believe that Mr. Shultz was authorized 

to sign the Agreement on her behalf in August 2018.   

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Yeah. 

No. 

Yeah. 

  Q

  A

  Q

  A

  Q

  A

  Q

  A

  Q

  A

  Q

  [

 

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

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A  

No, I don’t believe so. 

   Does Rocco go to school? 

   Does Rocco play any sports? 

J-A26009-22  
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The second fact cited by Sky Zone that distinguishes this case from the 

Santiago case is that Rocco had been to Sky Zone prior to the date he was 

injured there.  See Sky Zone’s brief (Shultz) at 20 (indicating that Rocco “had 

been  to  [Sky  Zone’s]  trampoline  park  prior  to  the  date  of  the  alleged 

accident.”); id. at 30 (stating that Rocco had been to Sky Zone “multiple times 

without  any  objection”  from  Ms.  Shultz).    It  is  unclear  when  these  visits 

occurred or whether Ms. Shultz or someone else accompanied Rocco on the 

prior occasions, as Sky Zone does not cite where this fact is documented in 

the  certified  record.    Presumably,  if  Ms.  Shultz  had  herself  signed  an 

arbitration agreement on a prior visit, Sky Zone would assert that as a basis 

to  compel  her  to  arbitrate  her  claims.    Likewise,  if  a  witness  had  seen 

Ms. Shultz engage in conduct at a prior visit indicating that her husband was 

authorized  to  act  as  her  agent  in  the  future,  we  would  expect  Sky  Zone  to 

have produced testimony from that person.  Instead, we have no information 

whether Ms. Shultz was even aware that Rocco had visited Sky Zone before, 

let alone that she caused Sky Zone to believe, prior to Mr. Shultz’s execution 

of the Agreement on the day in question, that Mr. Shultz was her authorized 

agent for purposes of agreeing to arbitration.   

 

Accordingly, Sky Zone’s arguments in support of compelling Ms. Shultz 

to arbitrate her claims fail for the same reasons we discussed in connection 

with Mr. Santiago:  without any conduct by Ms. Shultz that suggested to Sky 

Zone that she had authorized Mr. Shultz to agree on her behalf to arbitrate 

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any of her potential claims, Sky Zone failed to establish that Mr. Shultz had 

apparent authority to act as her agent.     

C. 

Rocco and Isabella 

 

 

Finally,  we  reach  the  novel  question  of  Pennsylvania  law  common  to 

both of these appeals:  whether a parent, in the role of natural guardian, as 

opposed to a court-appointed guardian, is the equivalent of being the child’s 

agent  for  purposes  of  making  a  minor  child  a  party  to  an  arbitration 

agreement, thereby waiving the child’s right to a jury trial.  In resolving this 

issue, we begin with a discussion of some principles pertinent to a child’s legal 

status.   

We  observe  at  the  outset  that  Rocco  and  Isabella  could  not  have 

themselves agreed to arbitrate any potential claims against Sky Zone.  Minors 

lack the capacity to agree to an arbitration agreement or any other contract 

in their own right.  Rather, it has long been the law that minors lack capacity 

to contract.  See, e.g., In re O’Leary’s Estate, 42 A.2d 624, 625 (Pa. 1945) 

(“An infant is not competent to contract.”).  A contract executed by a minor is 

not  void  ab  initio,  but  is  voidable  such  that  the  minor  may,  upon  reaching 

majority, avoid any contract other than for necessaries.  See, e.g., Wharen 

v.  Funk,  31  A.2d  450,  452  (Pa.Super.  1943)  (“[I]nfants  may  avoid  their 

contracts on reaching majority.”).   

As such, minors lack the capacity to grant express authority to an agent 

to contract on their behalves, rendering any such resulting contracts voidable.  

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guardians.   

See  Rest.  (2d)  Agency  §  20  cmt.  c  (1958)  (“The  contract  of  an  infant  to 

employ an agent is voidable by him, as is any contract made for him by such 

agent, except a contract for necessaries.”).  Rather, minors act through their 

We  have  explained  that  “Pennsylvania  law  defines  a  guardian  as  a 

person lawfully invested with the power, and charged with the duty, of taking 

care of the person and/or managing the property and rights of another person, 

who, for defect of age, understanding or self-control is considered incapable 

of  administering  his  own  affairs.”    Rock  v.  Pyle,  720  A.2d  137,  141  (Pa. 

Super. 1998).  “Two classes of guardians have long been recognized at law:  

(1) guardian of the person being invested with the care of the person of the 

minor, and (2) guardian of the estate being entrusted with the control of the 

property of the minor.”  Id.  “The spheres of authority of a guardian of the 

person and of a guardian of the estate are distinct and mutually exclusive.”  

Id.   

Statutory mechanisms exist for the court appointment and supervision 

of guardians for minors.  See 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101-5167.  However, “parents 

have intrinsic rights and responsibilities as the natural guardians of their minor 

children.”  Rehrer  v.  Youst,  91  A.3d  183,  192  (Pa.Super.  2014).    Natural 

guardianship grants a parent “primary physical responsibility for the care and 

custody of the minor child.”  Rock, supra at 141.  Yet “natural guardianship 

confers no inherent right to intermeddle with the property of the minor child, 

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and  the  natural  guardian  has  no  inherent  authority  to  demand  or  power  to 

receive, hold or manage the minor’s property unless the natural guardian has 

also been appointed as guardian of the minor’s estate.”  Id.  See also Rehrer, 

supra  at  192  (“[N]atural  guardianship  confers  no  right  to  intermeddle  with 

the property of the infant . . .; a natural guardian has no authority whatever 

to exercise any control over the estate of the minor.” (cleaned up)).  Rather, 

by  statute,  “[l]egal  title  to  all  real  and  personal  property  of  a  minor  shall 

remain in him, subject, however, to all the powers granted to his guardian by 

this title and lawfully by a governing instrument and to all orders of the court.”  

20 Pa.C.S. § 303.   

Pennsylvania  courts  have  observed  that  “[a]  cause  of  action  is 

property[.]”  Tri-State Asphalt Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 875 A.2d 1199, 

1202  (Pa.Cmwlth.  2005)  (citing    Fejerdy  v.  Fejerdy,  437  A.2d  1244 

(Pa.Super. 1981)).  In situations when a minor is injured, two distinct causes 

of action arise, “one the parents’ claim for medical expenses and loss of the 

minor’s  services  during  minority,  the  other  the  minor’s  claim  for  pain  and 

suffering  and  for  losses  after  minority.”    Hathi  v.  Krewstown  Park 

Apartments, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (Pa.Super. 1989) (cleaned up).   

A parent obviously may pursue his or her own cause of action in tort in 

connection with the child’s injury, subject to a two-year statute of limitations.  

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2).  However, “children have a distinct legal disability, 

as  they  are  prohibited  from  personally  bringing  a  cause  of  action  before 

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reaching the age of majority.”  Nicole B. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 237 

A.3d 986, 993 (Pa. 2020).  Accordingly, “to safeguard certain minors’ rights 

during their period of legal disability,”  42 Pa.C.S. § 5533  “exempt[s] children 

from  the  operation  of  statutes  of  limitations  during  their  period  of  legal 

disability, and enabl[es] them to bring a civil action on their own behalf upon 

reaching the age of majority.”  Id.   

Alternatively,  a  parent  “has  the  natural  and  primary  right  to  bring  an 

action, as guardian, on behalf of his or her child,”   Dengler by Dengler v. 

Crisman, 516 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Pa.Super. 1986).  Nonetheless, “[a] minor’s 

representation is subject to the trial court’s control and supervision, and it has 

the right in each case to determine whether the litigation is in the minor’s best 

interests.”  Rehrer, supra at 193.  Furthermore, “[n]o action to which a minor 

is a party shall be compromised, settled or discontinued except after approval 

by the court pursuant to a petition presented by the guardian of the minor.”  

Pa.R.C.P. 2039(a). 

With these principles in mind, we turn to the rulings  at issue in these 

cases.  The Santiago trial court, citing the tolling of the statute of limitations 

for Isabella’s personal injury claims, concluded that Ms. Santiago “could not 

legally sign away [Isabella’s] future claim for any injuries sustained while in 

[Sky Zone]’s facility.”  Trial Court Opinion (Santiago), 7/1/22, at 4.  The Shultz 

trial court likewise ruled that Mr. Shultz lacked the authority to bind Rocco to 

arbitration  of  his  claim,  but  relied  upon  federal  district  court  decisions 

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purporting to apply Pennsylvania law.  Specifically, the Shultz trial court cited 

cases premised generally upon a child’s right to avoid contracts entered during 

the child’s minority, and, particular to arbitration agreements, discussed the 

ruling in Troshak v. Terminix Intern. Co., L.P., CIV. A. 98–1727, 1998 WL 

401693 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998) (unpublished decision). 

 

In  Troshak,  the  father  signed  a  “Termite  Service  Plan”  agreement  in 

connection with Terminix’s provision of termite control services at the Troshak 

home in Pennsylvania.  Alleging that Terminix’s service caused personal injury 

and property damage, the family brought a civil action that was removed to 

federal  court.    There,  Terminix  sought  to  enforce  an  arbitration  agreement 

contained in the service plan contract.  The trial court was thus tasked with 

determining which family members were bound by the contract entered into 

by  the  father.    Regarding  the  personal  injury  claims  of  the  minor  child, 

Terminix  argued  that  the  father  had  waived  the  child’s  right  to  proceed  in 

court.    Noting  the  lack  of  Pennsylvania  authority  on  the  issue,  the  court 

examined two other district court decisions, which it summarized as follows: 

In  Apicella  v.  Valley  Forge  Military  Academy  and 
Junior  College,  630  F.Supp.  20,  23  (E.D.Pa.1985),  the  court 
ruled  that  “under  Pennsylvania  law,  Parents  do  not  possess  the 
authority to release the claims or potential claims of a minor child 
merely  because  of  the  parental  relationship.”    In  Apicella,  the 
parents of Jerry Apicella enrolled their minor son as a student at 
Valley  Forge.    At  that  time,  Valerie  and  John  Apicella  informed 
school  officials  that  Jerry  Apicella  suffered  from  hemophilia.    To 
persuade  the  school  to  enroll  their  son,  the  Apicella[s]  signed  a 
document  releasing  Valley  Forge  “from  all  claims  and  damages 
arising from or related to or in any way connected with their son 
Jerry’s hemophilic condition.”  School officials permitted Jerry to 

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attend the school.  Subsequently, Valerie and John Apicella, as the 
parents  of  Jerry  Apicella,  and  Jerry  Apicella  on  his  own  behalf, 
brought suit against Valley Forge claiming that the school and its 
employees were negligent in  their care of Jerry Apicella.   Valley 
Forge asserted that Jerry was estopped from asserting his cause 
of action because his parents signed a document releasing it from 
claims  and  damages  arising  from  Jerry’s  hemophilic  condition.  
The  court  rejected  that  argument.  Based  on  analogous 
Pennsylvania  case  law,  the  court  held  that  “John  and  Valerie 
Apicella released the defendants from potential claims which they 
had  the  right  to  assert  but  did  not  release  the  defendants  from 
claims or potential claims which Jerry Apicella might assert upon 
reaching  the  age  of  majority.”    This  ruling  was  adopted  in 
Simmons  by  Grinnel  v.  Parkette  Nat’l  Gymnastic  Training 
Ctr., 670 F.Supp. 140 (E.D.Pa.1987). 
 

In  Simmons,  a  minor  and  her  parent  sued  a  gymnastic 
organization for personal injuries suffered by the minor while the 
minor  was  participating  as  a  gymnast  at  the  defendant  training 
center.  The defendant training center  asserted the signing of a 
release as an affirmative defense.  The release was signed by the 
minor and by the minor’s mother.  The release was prospective in 
nature  and  was  intended  to  release  the  defendant  from  future 
liability as opposed to an already existing claim for damages.  The 
court  found  that  the  minor’s  parent  was  bound  by  the  release.  
The  defendant  asserted,  inter  alia,  that  the  minor’s  claim  was 
barred  because  the  parent  signed  the  release  for  the  minor.  
Relying on Apicella, the court found that the minor’s parent could 
not  release  the  defendant  from  the  potential  claims  that 
eventually accrued to the minor.  
 

Id. at *4–*5 (some citations omitted).  The Troshak trial court acknowledged 

that Apicella and Simmons were not precisely on point, but concluded that, 

“under the reasoning and holdings interpreting Pennsylvania law contained in” 

those cases, “a parent cannot bind a minor child to an arbitration provision 

that  requires  the  minor  to  waive  his  or  her  right  to  file  potential  claims  for 

personal injury in a court of law.”  Id. at *5.  The court explained that, since 

a parent could not prospectively release a minor’s potential claims, it follows 

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that “a parent does not have authority to bind a minor child to an arbitration 

provision that requires the minor to waive their right to have potential claims 

for personal injury filed in a court of law.”  Id.   

Adopting  this  reasoning,  the  Shultz  trial  court  concluded  that  Mr. 

Shultz’s execution of the Agreement was not effective in waiving Rocco’s right 

to file the instant action in court.  Trial Court Opinion (Shultz), at 5.  The court 

further  ruled  that,  to  the  extent  that  Rocco  was  required  to  disaffirm  the 

voidable contract made on his behalf by Mr. Shultz, Rocco’s action of bringing 

this  suit  constituted  such  disaffirmance.    Id.  (citing  Haines  v.  Fitzgerald, 

165 A. 52, 55 (Pa.Super. 1933) (holding that bringing suit three months after 

reaching majority constituted disaffirmance of contract made during plaintiff’s 

minority).    Accordingly,  the  Shultz  court  denied  Sky  Zone’s  petition  as  to 

Rocco’s claims.  

 

Sky Zone proffers the same basic argument for reversal in both of these 

cases.  It argues that Troshak, which is not binding on this Court, improperly 

conflates  the  release  of  a  minor’s  personal  substantive  claims  with  a  mere 

“agreement to litigate a dispute in a specific forum.”  Sky Zone’s brief (Shultz) 

at 34.  Sky Zone asserts that  the more persuasive non-binding authority  is 

found  in  the  decisions  of  our  sister  states  that  recognized  that  distinction:  

Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park,  901  A.2d  381  (N.J.  2006),  and  Cross v. 

Carnes, 724 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).   

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In  Hojnowski,  a  twelve-year-old  boy  was  injured  at  a  skate  park 

operated  by  defendant  Vans.    Before  using  the  park,  the  boy’s  mother  had 

executed a release and waiver that included an arbitration clause.  When the 

boy sued through his parents as guardians ad litem, Vans moved to compel 

arbitration.    The  trial  court  granted  Vans’s  motion,  declining  to  rule  on  the 

validity of the release because it was an issue for the arbitrators to decide.  

The appellate court unanimously affirmed a parent’s ability to “enter into an 

enforceable contract, binding on the parent’s minor child, that waives the right 

to trial by jury of the minor’s bodily injury claims and requires submission of 

‘any dispute’ to arbitration.”  Hojnowski, supra at 385 (cleaned up).  The 

panel  also  fully  agreed  that  the  court  should  have  considered  whether  the 

substantive waiver  violated public policy, but divided on  the answer to  that 

question.    

 

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the exculpatory provision was 

invalid  given  “the  protections  that  our  State  historically  has  afforded  to  a 

minor’s  claims  and  the  need  to  discourage  negligent  activity  on  the  part  of 

commercial enterprises attracting children,” noting that it was in that regard 

consistent “with the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions.”  Id. at 388-

89 (citing, inter alia, Simmons and Apicella).   

However, the Court found no such public-policy reason to invalidate the 

waiver’s arbitration clause.  The Court explained:  “As opposed to a pre-injury 

release  of  liability,  a  pre-injury  agreement  to  arbitrate  does  not  require  a 

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minor to forego any substantive rights.   Rather, such an agreement specifies 

only the forum in which those rights are vindicated.”  Id. at 392.  Further, the 

Court  held  that  a  parent  is  “permitted  to  bind  a  minor  child  to  arbitration,” 

holding  that,  unless  general  contract  defenses  such  as  “fraud,  duress,  or 

unconscionability  in  the  signing  of  the  contract  or  that  the  agreement  to 

arbitrate was not written in clear and unambiguous terms,” then “a parent’s 

agreement  to  arbitrate  is  valid  and  enforceable  against  any  tort  claims 

asserted on a minor’s behalf.”  Id. at 393-94.   

The Hojnowski Court cited as persuasive the decision of the Ohio Court 

of Appeals in Cross.  In that case, the minor’s mother executed, on her own 

behalf and on behalf of her daughter, a consent and release that permitted 

her daughter to appear on a television talk show.  The document contained 

an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the minor’s appearance 

on  the  show.    Displeased  with  her  portrayal  on  the  program,  the  minor, 

through  her  mother,  sued  the  show  for  defamation.    The  show  moved  to 

enforce  the  arbitration  agreement,  and  the  trial  court  granted  the  motion, 

staying  the  court  proceedings  pending  arbitration.    The  appellate  court 

affirmed.  It first noted that the Ohio Supreme Court had recently ruled that 

“public policy justifies giving parents authority to enter into . . . binding [pre-

injury exculpatory] agreements on behalf of their minor children” that further 

the  public  policy  of  making  non-profit  recreational  sporting  activities 

affordable.  Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ohio 

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1998).  The Cross Court indicated that the Zivich “holding leads us to believe 

that our conclusion, that a parent has the authority to bind his or her child to 

a  resolution  of  the  child’s  claims  through  arbitration,  is  correct  under  Ohio 

law.”  Cross, supra at 836.  The Court continued:  

In so holding, we note that the parent’s consent and release 
to arbitration only specifies the forum for resolution of the child’s 
claim; it does not extinguish the claim.  Logically, if a parent has 
the authority to bring and conduct a lawsuit on behalf of the child, 
he  or  she  has  the  same  authority  to  choose  arbitration  as  the 
litigation forum. 

 

Id.6  
 

We  are  unpersuaded  by  Sky  Zone’s  arguments  in  general  and  its 

reliance upon the Hojnowski and Cross decisions in particular.  We reiterate 

that the issue before us is whether there exists in each case an agreement to 

arbitrate  to  which  the  minor  child  was  a  party  or  otherwise  bound.    See 

Humphrey,  supra  at  14  (“[A]  party  cannot  be  required  to  submit  to 

arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” (cleaned up)).  

It  is  only  if  “common  law  principles  of  agency  and  contract”  render  the 

respective parents capable of contracting on behalf of their children that the 

children are bound to arbitrate in these cases.  Id. at 15 (cleaned up).   

____________________________________________ 

6  As the Hojnowski Court relied upon Cross in reaching its conclusion, the 
Cross Court in turn relied upon Leong by Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 
788 P.2d 164, 169 (Hawaii 1990), and Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 
1965).    See  Cross  v.  Carnes,  724  N.E.2d  828,  836  (Ohio  Ct.  App.  1998).  
We observe that both of those cases affirmed a parent’s ability to bind a child 
to  an  arbitration  provision  in  a  contract  of  which  the  child  is  a  third-party 
beneficiary.    As  noted  above,  Sky  Zone  has  never  posited  that  Rocco  and 
Isabella were bound by the Agreement as third-party beneficiaries.   

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The  foundation  of  the  Cross  ruling,  which  informed  the  Hojnowski 

decision, is that, because parents can choose to sue in court on behalf of their 

minor children, they are just as authorized to choose to arbitrate the claims 

instead.  However, as discussed above, a parent’s right to pursue litigation on 

behalf of a minor child “is subject to the trial court’s control and supervision, 

and it has the right in each case to determine whether the litigation is in the 

minor’s best interests.”  Rehrer, supra at 193.  Concomitantly, a parent suing 

on a child’s behalf as natural guardian nonetheless lacks authority to settle or 

discontinue  without  court  approval.    See  Pa.R.C.P.  2039(a).    Moreover,  no 

Pennsylvania court has ruled that a parent has a right to enter a pre-injury 

release of a child’s right to bring substantive claims as did the Ohio Supreme 

Court,  and  the  above-referenced  law  protecting  minors’  substantive  legal 

claims suggests to us that the federal district courts accurately predicted that 

Pennsylvania would reject that proposition as did the Hojnowski Court.  See 

Simmons, supra and Apicella, supra. 

 

In  our  view,  the  court  involvement  in  a  parent’s  litigation  of  a  minor 

child’s claims has the significant effect of transforming the parent’s role from 

that  of  a  natural  guardian  into,  in  essence,  a  court-approved  guardian  who 

has  authority  to  make  decisions  about  the  minor’s  estate,  not  merely  the 

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child’s person.7  An agreement executed by natural guardian purportedly on 

the minor’s behalf without any court involvement, however, has none of the 

legal  safeguards  attendant  to  the  appointment  of  a  guardian  of  the  minor’s 

estate.    Consequently,  the  parents  in  their  pre-litigation  state  of  natural 

guardianship  lacked  any  authority  to  manage  the  estate  of  their  minor 

children.  See, e.g., Rock, supra at 141 (“[N]atural guardianship confers no 

inherent  right  to  intermeddle  with  the  property  of  the  minor  child,  and  the 

natural  guardian  has  no  inherent  authority  to  demand  or  power  to  receive, 

hold or manage the minor’s property unless the natural guardian has also 

been appointed as guardian of the minor’s estate.” (emphasis added)).  

 

Therefore,  we  conclude  that,  in  the  absence  of  any  suggestion  that 

Rocco  and  Isabella  were  third-party  beneficiaries  of  the  Agreement,  or  that 

their  respective  parents  were  authorized  to  sign  the  agreements  on  their 

behalves,  the  statuses  of  Mr.  Shultz  and  Ms.  Santiago  as  natural  guardians 

did not ipso facto grant them the authority to bind their minor children to an 

arbitration agreement.  Consequently, we hold that the trial courts properly 

denied Sky Zone’s petitions to compel arbitration of the claims of Rocco and 

Isabella. 

____________________________________________ 

7    See  20  Pa.C.S.  §§  5111-5116  (concerning  appointment  of  guardians  for 
minors).  See also 20 Pa.C.S. § 5101 (indicating certain circumstances when 
a  guardian  of  minor  with  small  estates  is  unnecessary);  20  Pa.C.S.  §  5102 
(providing that a court may authorize a parent as natural guardian to execute 
certain documents).   

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J-A26009-22  
J-A26010-22  

IV.  Conclusion  

 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the respective trial courts 

properly ruled that no agreements bound the children or non-signing spouses 

to  resolve  the  alleged  negligence  claims  in  arbitration  rather  than  in  the 

courts.    Specifically,  we  agree  with  the  trial  courts  that  Sky  Zone  failed  to 

meet its burden to show that the signatory spouses were the agents of the 

non-signing spouses.  Further, we hold that the parent-child relationship did 

not empower the signatory parents to waive their minor children’s rights to 

have their claims resolved in a court of law.  Therefore, we affirm. 

Orders affirmed.   

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udgment Entered. 

oseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 
Prothonotary 

ate: 3/21/2023 

 

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