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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
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v.
OURTNEY LAMAR SLADE
Appellant
No. 695 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 12, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0002936-2018
EFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:
FILED: MARCH 17, 2023
Appellant, Courtney Lamar Slade, appeals from the order entered on
April 12, 2022, which denied his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
We previously summarized the underlying facts of this case:
A
ppellant and a cohort forcibly entered a home in a
residential neighborhood at night. Inside the home were two
adult men, one adult female, and two six-year-old children.
Appellant and his companion were wearing gloves and
masks, and both were carrying guns. They held a gun to the
head of the adult female, and also pointed their guns at the
two children. Additionally, a scuffle ensued with one of the
adult male victims, and he was badly beaten by Appellant
and/or his companion. Appellant and his cohort left the home
with approximately $900 and gaming equipment. Appellant,
who had been cut during the altercation with the victim, was
subsequently identified by DNA evidence obtained from blood
found inside the home.
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decision) at 1-2.
Commonwealth v. Slade, 240 A.3d 935 (Pa. Super. 2020) (non-precedential
On October 21, 2019, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to robbery,
aggravated assault, and burglary;1 on December 18, 2019, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of 15 and one-half to 40 years
in prison for his convictions. N.T. Guilty Plea, 10/21/19, at 1-7; N.T.
Sentencing, 12/19/21, at 18-19. We affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
sentence on September 16, 2020. Commonwealth v. Slade, 240 A.3d 935
(Pa. Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision) at 1-6.
On April 5, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. The
PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant during the proceedings
and counsel eventually filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf. Within
the amended petition, Appellant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective
“for failing to seek [a mental health] evaluation to see if [Appellant were]
competent to stand trial in this matter” and for “advising [Appellant] to take
an open plea deal instead of taking a plea deal with a negotiated sentence
that was offered by the Commonwealth.” Amended PCRA Petition, 10/7/21,
at 7 and 14.
The PCRA court held a hearing on Appellant’s petition on March 18, 2022
and, during the hearing, both Appellant’s trial counsel (hereinafter “Trial
Counsel”) and Appellant testified. Trial Counsel testified that, when he
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 2702(a)(4), and 3502(a)(1), respectively.
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represented Appellant, he was aware that Appellant had been “diagnosed with
being bipolar and having schizophrenia.” PCRA Hearing, 3/18/22, at 4.
However, Trial Counsel testified that he did not discuss an insanity defense
with Appellant because “throughout all of my interactions with [Appellant, his
mental health] didn’t seem like it was an issue that was going to lead us
anywhere or be something that I felt was going to be productive in terms that
it wasn’t a concern that I had that he was not competent to stand trial.” Id.
at 5. Further, Trial Counsel testified that, when he represented Appellant:
Appellant’s mental health did not impede Appellant’s ability to participate in
his own defense; Appellant’s mental health did not impede Trial Counsel’s
ability to help prepare Appellant’s defense; and, nothing “st[ood] out to [Trial
Counsel] in terms of [Appellant] having comprehension issues or anything like
that.” Id. at 5 and 8-9.
Regarding Appellant’s decision to reject the Commonwealth’s offer of a
negotiated sentence, Trial Counsel testified:
o, if I recall correctly, negotiations had gone on for quite a
while between myself and the District Attorney's Office.
Ultimately, I think where things ended up was, there was an
offer for [eight] and a half to 20. I talked with [Appellant]
about that, and I explained to him that if he plead[ed] open
there was certainly a chance that he would get a lesser
sentence, but there was also a chance that he would get more
than that. If I remember, I think the guidelines started at
[six] and a half years. So he, I think, was hoping that if he
plead[ed] open, he would get something closer to that
bottom range. I don't recall quite frankly whether I advised
him one way or the other as far as what I think the best
option is or what he should do. I explained to him what the
options were, and I let him decide.
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Appellant testified that Trial Counsel advised him to reject the
Commonwealth’s offer and to simply enter an open guilty plea. According to
Appellant, Trial Counsel told him that the trial court “wouldn’t go over the
[eight] and a half that was offered” by the Commonwealth and would probably
sentence Appellant to a standard guideline range sentence of six and a half
years in prison. Id. at 14.
The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on April 12, 2022 and
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant raises two claims on
hether the [PCRA] court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA
petition where he presented a preponderance of the evidence
that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
1. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to seek a
mental health evaluation.
. Ineffective assistance of counsel in advising Appellant
to reject the negotiated plea agreement.
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appeal:
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).
“We review a ruling by the PCRA court to determine whether it is
supported by the record and is free of legal error. Our standard of review of
a PCRA court's legal conclusions is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Cousar,
154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted). However, we afford “great
deference” to the PCRA court’s credibility determinations. Commonwealth
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Id. at 6-7.
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v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 910-911 (Pa. 2021). As our Supreme Court has
e will not disturb the findings of the PCRA court if they are
supported by the record, even where the record could
support a contrary holding. [An appellate court’s] scope of
review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
evidence on the record of the PCRA court's hearing, viewed
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
resulted from “one or more” of the seven, specifically enumerated
circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). One of these statutorily
enumerated circumstances is the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in
the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
Counsel is presumed to be effective and “the burden of demonstrating
ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d
1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). To satisfy this burden, Appellant must plead
and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the
particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have
some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests;
and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged
proceedings would have been different.
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explained:
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explained:
Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). As this Court has
A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if
accurate, could establish cause
See
Commonwealth v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. 2005)
(“if a petitioner raises allegations, which, even if accepted as
true, do not establish the underlying claim . . . , he or she
will have failed to establish the arguable merit prong related
to the claim”). Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable
merit is a legal determination.
relief.
for
The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis
for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel
would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative,
not chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of
success. Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if
they effectuated his client's interests. We do not employ a
hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel's actions with
other efforts he may have taken.
Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the
outcome.
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some
quotations and citations omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong of the test
for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim.” Id.
First, Appellant claims that Trial Counsel was ineffective because counsel
failed to seek a mental health evaluation, which, Appellant claims, would have
enabled counsel to “consider an insanity defense.” Appellant’s Brief at 14.
This claim fails.
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In order to prevail on an insanity defense, [an a]ppellant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the
time he committed the offense, due to a defect of reason or
disease of mind, he either did not know the nature and quality
of the act or did not know that the act was wrong.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 901 (Pa. 2011); see also
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 788 (Pa. 2004) (“[a] defense of
insanity acknowledges commission of the act by the defendant, while
maintaining the absence of legal culpability”).
During the PCRA hearing, Appellant did not produce any evidence
(medical or otherwise) that, at the time he committed the offenses, his alleged
mental illnesses caused him to “not know the nature and quality of the act[s]”
or caused him to “not know that the act[s were] wrong.” See Smith, 17 A.3d
at 901; see also N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/18/22, at 1-18. Therefore, Appellant
did not satisfy his burden of production to show that his underlying claim is of
arguable merit. Appellant’s claim thus fails.
Next, Appellant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective “in advising
Appellant to reject the [Commonwealth’s] negotiated plea” offer. Appellant’s
Brief at 14. As the PCRA court thoroughly explained, Appellant’s claim on
Appellant’s] underlying claim is that [Trial Counsel] advised
him against accepting a plea agreement containing a
negotiated sentence in favor of entering an open plea which
would be "capped" at an eight and one-half year minimum.
[Trial Counsel] testified to the following:
So, if I recall correctly, negotiations had gone on for quite
a while between myself and the District Attorney's Office.
Ultimately, I think where things ended up was, there was
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appeal fails:
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an offer for [eight] and a half to 20. I talked with
[Appellant] about that, and I explained to him that if he
plead[ed] open there was certainly a chance that he
would get a lesser sentence, but there was also a chance
that he would get more than that. If I remember, I think
the guidelines started at [six] and a half years. So he, I
think, was hoping that if he plead[ed] open, he would get
something closer to that bottom range. I don't recall
quite frankly whether I advised him one way or the other
as far as what I think the best option is or what he should
do. I explained to him what the options were, and I let
him decide.
N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/18/22, at 6-7.]
Trial Counsel] further testified that he did not recall ever
informing [Appellant] that the open plea would be "capped"
in any way. [The trial court] ultimately imposed a sentence
of [15 and one-half to 40 years in prison]. Understandably,
[Appellant] regrets his decision to refuse the negotiated plea
agreement. However, [the PCRA court] credit[s Trial
Counsel’s] testimony and discern[s] nothing in his counsel
that fails to adhere to "the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases."
Appellant] claims he went to court on the day of his guilty
plea prepared “to take the 8 and a half.” [N.T. PCRA Hearing,
3/18/22, at 14. The PCRA court does] not find it credible that
[Trial Counsel], an experienced criminal defense attorney
who has represented thousands of defendants, would have
talked a client, who was intending to plead guilty, out of doing
so by fabricating a plea agreement. [The PCRA court]
believe[s] it much more likely that matters transpired exactly
how [Trial Counsel] explained. [Appellant] wanted a
sentence better than the offered eight and one-half [] years.
This inference is supported by [Appellant’s] own testimony,
where he explained his understanding that the original offer
was for either seven [] or seven and one-half [] years.
According to him, the District Attorney later modified that
offer upward to eight and one-half [years]. Under such
circumstances, it seems entirely credible that, as [Trial
Counsel] testified, [Appellant] “was hoping that if he
plead[ed] open, he would get something closer to” the
bottom of the standard range of the Sentencing Guidelines.
[
[
[
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inding that [Trial Counsel] did not promise [Appellant] the
sentence would be "capped", and that [Appellant] expressed
hope of obtaining a lesser sentence than what was being
offered, [the PCRA court] find[s Trial Counsel’s] advice
completely reasonable and legally correct. [Appellant] was
not promised a lesser sentence. He was offered the
opportunity for a lesser sentence through an open plea. He
chose to pursue that opportunity and cannot now claim
ineffective assistance because
it proved unsuccessful.
Therefore, [Appellant’s] underlying claim lacks arguable
merit and his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in this
regard must fail.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/12/22, at 4-6 (some citations omitted).
The PCRA court’s credibility determinations and factual findings are
supported by the record and, thus, are binding on this Court. As such,
Appellant’s claim on appeal necessarily fails.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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udgment Entered.
oseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
ate: 03/17/2023
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